


**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**




Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Five

**A Project of the
Jawaharlal Nehru
Memorial Fund**


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FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilization, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretched-

ness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievements, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.



New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the weeks from 1 January to 6 April 1948, covered by this volume, communal tension reached unprecedented levels and resulted in the high tragedy of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. Weighed down by personal sorrow, yet Jawaharlal Nehru did not falter in the task of pulling the people back to sanity. He strove to see that the minorities in India received fair treatment and that the country was not dragged into war with Pakistan, whatever the provocations of the other side and the quibblings of the western powers at the United Nations on Kashmir.

These were basic problems; but other issues as fundamental would not wait. So attention had to be given to the drafting of a democratic constitution suited to India's needs and aspirations, the betterment of standards of living and the promotion of a forward-looking society. As the speeches and writings in this volume reveal, in a short period of time almost every essential of India's future came under scrutiny and was often under attack. It was Nehru's task to resist the forces of reaction on every front and place the country on the right road.

The Nehru Memorial Library has been good enough to provide access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and other relevant collections. Shrimati Indira Gandhi made available to us a large number of documents in her possession, and these papers have been referred to in the footnotes as the J.N. Collection. The India Office Library in London has allowed the printing of some material in its possession. The Broadlands Archives Trust has permitted us to reproduce extracts from the Mountbatten Papers. The Secretariats of the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Ministries of Law, Home and External Affairs and the National Archives of India have authorized the reproduction of some notes and letters in their possession. Much of it is classified material, and some portions have necessarily been deleted. A few items from the volumes of *Sardar Patel's Correspondence* have also been included. Shrimati Bela Devi Nayar and Shrimati Sushila Nayar were kind enough to give us permission to reproduce letters from Shri Pyarelal's papers.

The biographical footnotes in the earlier volumes of the *Selected Works* are not repeated; but references to biographical footnotes in those volumes are given in the index. A note to Dorothy Norman written sometime in 1956, which has a bearing on Mahatma Gandhi's fast, has been printed in the appendix.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.C.C.	All India Congress Committee
A.I.R.	All India Radio
B.B.C.	British Broadcasting Corporation
B.O.A.C.	British Overseas Airways Corporation
B.O.C.	Burma Oil Company
B.P.C.C.	Bombay Provincial Congress Committee
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
C.P.I.	Communist Party of India
C.P.I. (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
D.C.G.S.	Deputy Chief of General Staff
H.E.H.	His Exalted Highness
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government
I.A.A.S.	Indian Audit and Accounts Service
I. & B. Department	Information and Broadcasting Department
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service
I.N.A.	Indian National Army
I.N.T.U.C.	Indian National Trade Union Congress
I.O.L.R.	India Office Library and Records
M.E.A. & C.R.	Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
M.H.A.	Ministry of Home Affairs
M.P.	Member of Parliament
N.A.I.	National Archives of India
N.M.M.L.	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
O.R.	Other Ranks
P.I.O.	Principal Information Officer
P.M.	Prime Minister
P.M.S.	Prime Minister's Secretariat
P.R.O.	Public Relations Officer
R.I.E.	Royal Indian Engineers
R.S.S.	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
T.W.A.	Trans World Airlines
U.N.R.R.A.	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
U.P.	United Provinces
U.P.S.C.	Union Public Service Commission
V.C.O.	Viceroy's Commissioned Officer

THE COMMUNAL DANGER

1. Muslims Should Be Able to Live with Honour¹

I have come to Ajmer several times with happy feelings but during the present visit my heart is full of sorrow. Ajmer is famous throughout the world for its *Durgah*, but it is most regrettable that a number of Muslims have left Ajmer.² We are duty-bound to give full protection to Muslims. Although we fully sympathise with the refugees from Pakistan and shall help them, we must, at the same time, see that every Muslim lives here in safety and with honour. The aims of Pakistan are not worth emulating. We not only want every Muslim to stay here but also desire that those who have left should return to their homes.

We had condemned and opposed the Muslim League for propagating factionalism and the two-nation theory. But we now see these evils finding a place even among the Hindus and the Sikhs. They not only retard the progress of society but also lead to its fall. As Minister in charge of foreign affairs, I can say authoritatively that India's prestige has suffered a great setback in the eyes of the world during the last five months due to our mutual quarrels and display of narrow tendencies. We must unite to gain strength. But that strength must be channelised for constructive purposes and not for killing and looting. That kind of strength will destroy our independence. It is, therefore, up to the people of India to choose their path. As it is, it is the people who make a government or choose their prime minister. Big changes in the history of a country are followed by big revolutions but we should not allow ourselves to be swayed by false notions.

India has sent military aid to Kashmir to help our Muslim brothers in their fight for freedom against the aggressors. Kashmir is strategically very important. Such distressing events as took place in Ajmer last month can naturally give rise to doubts in the minds of the people of Kashmir as to the treatment they might get from other people in India.

The Congress has placed certain ideals before the country; and if the people do not like them, they should change them. The All India Congress Committee, at its last meeting, unambiguously declared its resolve on communalism and on the question of minorities.³ That is the ideal for the present

1. Speech at Ajmer, 3 January 1948. From *National Herald*, 5 January 1948.
2. From November 1947 thousands of Hindu and Muslim refugees had come from neighbouring States to Ajmer. This increase in the local population led to riots in December 1947. But in January 1948, although the *Durgah* was safe, a number of Muslims left Ajmer because of differences between the local Muslims.
3. At the meeting on 16 November 1947, the Congress resolution on relief and rehabilitation and protection of minorities was passed. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 668-670.

Government, and although I admit some failure in its implementation, we shall not flinch from it and shall do everything to carry it out. No state based on religion can exist in the present-day world.

In the fight for freedom the Congress was alone, but now a number of parties have come into the arena solely to destroy that freedom. The Congress is still powerful and is not afraid of the disruptive forces which can only delay our progress but shall never be able to destroy our freedom. Anyone who is communal-minded is the greatest enemy of this country.

I have personally come to the *Durgah* to express my great sorrow at the events of the last few days. This is a problem not of Ajmer alone but of the whole country. It has to be solved if we do not desire our independence to perish. The Government of India wants everyone to enjoy equal freedom in pursuing any religion or faith. Fear is the greatest enemy of man and I ask you to get rid of it.

2. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I visited Ajmer yesterday and have just returned. Your information about Ajmer is very far from the truth.

During the last two months large numbers of Hindu refugees, estimated at about forty thousand, chiefly from Sind, came to Ajmer; also many thousands of Muslim refugees from neighbouring States came to Ajmer. This great increase of local population by outsiders created unprecedented situation. On 5th December there was some rioting which was controlled. Again on 14th and 15th December there was rioting. During these disturbances 56 persons were killed either by rioters or by the police or military firing. These included 14 Hindus. Large numbers of Muslim shops and houses were burnt and looted. Some mosques were also partly destroyed. I greatly regret these occurrences. Since then there has been no disturbance and the situation has been completely under control. The *Durgah* has been completely safe and at no time been in any danger. Large numbers of Muslim residents have however been leaving Ajmer during the past few weeks. Some have gone to Pakistan but most of them have gone to neighbouring States. They have gone of their own accord in spite of being pressed to stay on. I have assured the Muslims in Ajmer that they will be given full protection and we will welcome those who have gone returning to their homes.

1, Now Delhi, 4 January 1948. File No. 28(3)/47-PMS.

As regards the Chief Commissioner, Shankar Prasad, he is one of our ablest officers known for his efficiency and impartiality. It was largely due to him that the situation at Garhmuktesar and elsewhere in Meerut district a year ago was rapidly controlled. I will suggest to you to enquire from Major-General Akbar Khan about Shankar Prasad. Both of them cooperated together in Meerut district in dealing with the disturbances and General Akbar Khan will be able to give you information on the subject.

3. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
5 January 1948

My dear Subbarayan,
Your letter of the 2nd January.

I agree with you that the Muslim National Guards and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh should be carefully watched. Both are in the nature of private armies and have done a great deal of harm. The Muslim National Guards have practically no position left in India except perhaps in Bengal. We have to deal here with the R.S.S. chiefly. We have seen a great deal of evidence which goes to show that many of our recent troubles have been caused by the R.S.S. people. Indeed, in some places they acted as *agents provocateur*.

It is for you to judge whether you should ban the Muslim National Guards and the R.S.S. So far as I am concerned, I would certainly not object; indeed, I think it high time these communal organisations were completely checked.

The question of banning the meeting of the Muslim League as such stands on a different footing. Nobody can say that the meeting of the League would result in rioting. The Muslims in India are down and out today and are thoroughly frightened. There is not the least chance in the world of these Muslims creating any major trouble. Of course, it may be that in particularly small areas like Malabar, they might be troublesome.

Anyway, it seems to me wrong for the Muslim League meeting to be prevented. There are at present many conflicts in the minds of Muslims in India. The Muslim League is rapidly disappearing from large parts of India and even this Madras meeting has been bitterly criticised by Muslims in the U.P. and possibly elsewhere. There appears to be no reason whatever why a Muslim League meeting should be prohibited. Probably such a meeting would lead to a further disruption of the League. Why should we come in the way

1. J.N. Collection.

of this? Such a meeting would also give us useful information of what the Muslims are thinking at present and who they look up to.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
5 January 1948

My dear Premier,

I have your letter of the 2nd January. Thank you for writing to me about certain elements that have existed in Bombay which have led to certain unfortunate occurrences.²

I have no doubt that your Government's first duty is to preserve the peace and in particular to prevent any actual incidents. In the furtherance of this duty you have to judge what should be done and what should not be done. I cannot, sitting here, pass any judgment as it is not possible for me to be acquainted with all the facts of the situation but, as I wrote³ to you from Lucknow, I have been disturbed at these various happenings. Whoever may have been to blame, the fact remains that there is a big gap between the Government and a considerable section of the people, notably the working classes. No popular Government can afford to have this feeling of estrangement between it and considerable sections of the people.

I agree with you that the Socialists have acted in a very irresponsible manner not only in this incident but previously. Immediately after the agreement about a three-year truce this token strike was peculiarly undesirable.⁴

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 29 December 1947 over 60 labour unions in Bombay observed a one-day strike. The dockyard and port trust workers struck work demanding higher wages. On 2 January 1948 the workers in Kanpur also observed a strike and it was followed by an indefinite strike of the workers in the Kanpur textile mills. See also *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, p. 578.

3. Not traceable.

4. The representatives of employers, employees and Government unanimously decided at the Industries Conference on 18 December 1947 to maintain industrial peace and avoid lock-outs, strikes and slowing down of production for the next three years. For Nehru's address to this conference see *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 570-579.

What the Congress attitude should be towards the Socialists it is for the Congress Working Committee to determine and no doubt they will consider it. I am more concerned, as you must be, with the Governmental attitude. Government have to keep the peace but Government also have to carry people with them and any government which has to indulge in repeated conflicts with the people has somehow lost touch with their prevailing sentiment. It may be, of course, that this is largely due to misdirected or malicious agitation. Nevertheless, the fact that such demonstrations succeed against Government and force the hands of Government is itself significant. So far as the Socialists are concerned, as I have said, the Congress must decide. As a matter of fact, the Socialists themselves have practically declared their intention of leaving the Congress and so little pressure can be exercised upon them by taking disciplinary action.⁵

So far as Communists are concerned, they are actually outside the Congress and we cannot, as a Congress organisation, do anything more to them. As Government, we have to treat them as any other group which may offend against the law.

I agree with you that the incidents that have taken place in Bombay will be thoroughly exploited against us. That is to be expected. The point is how we are to meet this. I can hardly advise you about the Bombay situation. Such incidents inevitably raise public sympathy for the sufferers. What is more important is the outside reaction to them. That too is not favourable to us and it is impossible for us to go about explaining everything. Where students and workers are concerned, they function in an international background and can easily have sympathy from abroad. We have to bear all this in mind in any action that we may take. Students in India have lost any sense of discipline and it is not easy to deal with them by methods of force and compulsion though these may have to be resorted to sometimes.

Regarding communal disturbances, I should like to inform you that information has reached us about the R.S.S.'s intensive part in encouraging these disturbances in various parts of the country. There have been instances where R.S.S. men have acted as *agents provocateur* and thus brought about a riot.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The Socialist Party abstained from contesting the elections to the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee. Purushottamdas Tricunddas and Asoka Mehta resigned from the membership of the A.I.C.C. and the B.P.C.C.

5. Lord Mountbatten's Record of Interview with Nehru¹

Nehru told me, for my private information, that he could not conceal his pleasure as well as his admiration at the Mahatma's fast² for he said this was needed to bring our people to their senses. He thanked me for having spoken encouragingly to him about his fast the night before, and revealed to me that Mahatma Gandhi had not told him of his decision to fast even though he was with him for an hour before the prayer meeting, and just before the Mahatma came to see me, he said, "I have known him for 32 years and I still can never guarantee that I can fathom his mind."

1. New Delhi, 13 January 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.
2. Mahatma Gandhi started fasting on 13 January 1948, for an indeterminate period, to bring about a reunion of the hearts of all communities. He was anxious that minorities should be given protection. The fast was also a silent reproach to the Government of India for its decision not to implement the financial agreement with Pakistan. "There is, however, a fast which a votary of nonviolence sometimes feels impelled to undertake by way of protest against some wrong done by the society. . . ."

6. The Question of Rs. 55 Crores¹

The Prime Minister stated that both he and the Deputy Prime Minister had seen Mahatma Gandhi who had started his fast that day. The Government were anxious to do all in their power to improve the communal situation and steps were being taken to that end.

One particular matter was in Gandhiji's mind and he had referred to it. This was the question of payment of Rs. 55 crores,² in terms of the financial

1. Extracts from the minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 14 January 1948. J.N. Collection.
2. The cash balances of undivided India with the Reserve Bank of India on the date of partition were around Rs. 375 crores. In December 1947, the two Governments arrived at a financial agreement under which Pakistan's share was fixed at Rs. 75 crores. Of this, Pakistan had already been paid Rs. 20 crores on 14 August 1947. Fearing that the balance of Rs. 55 crores would be used to sustain the fight in Kashmir, the Government of India decided to withhold payment pending a settlement on Kashmir. However, on 15 January 1948, in deference to Mahatma Gandhi's wishes, the Indian Government decided to make immediate payment of Rs. 55 crores, after deducting Rs. 10 crores which was advanced to Pakistan under the "ways and means" head and making other necessary adjustments caused by the working of the joint accounts.

agreement, to Pakistan. He felt that it would have been better for us to pay this, although legally and on other grounds we might have been justified in refusing to implement the agreement till other settlements had been arrived at. He felt strongly on this question and suggested that even now we should pay this sum. This would remove one cause of ill-will and bitterness between the two states.

7. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

As you know our Government have accepted financial settlement made with Pakistan, but have stated that actual implementation of it and more specially payment of cash balances depend on an overall settlement of other issues. There have been long statements on this issue on the part of our Government and Pakistan Government. We are convinced that both on legal and other grounds our position is very strong.

2. Meanwhile Reserve Bank had agreed to advance ways and means loans of ten crores to Pakistan without any objection being taken by us. This showed that we had no desire to embarrass Pakistan Government in their day-to-day working.

3. This issue of delay in implementing financial agreement has given rise to a great deal of friction and ill-will, both sides adhering strongly to their position. In view of Gandhiji's fast and his advice to us we have reconsidered the matter. On the merits we are unanimously of opinion that our previous decision was right, but having regard to all the circumstances and more specially Gandhiji's advice at this crucial moment we have decided to make payment of fifty-five crores minus sums to be set off against it to Pakistan immediately. We have done this deliberately as a gesture of goodwill and in order to lessen tension.

4. The full text of the Government of India communique on this subject as well as press statement by me are being telegraphed separately to Indiadell. I would like to impress upon you that this does not mean any weakening on our part on the Kashmir issue. Indeed we want it to have the reverse effect. We have gone to the utmost to show our *bona fides* and desire for peace.

1. New Delhi, 15 January 1948. J.N. Collection. Gopalaswami Ayyangar was at Lake Success attending the meeting of the Security Council to present India's case on the Kashmir issue.

We have cleared other outstanding matters. But on the Kashmir issue we have adhered fully to the stand we have already indicated.

5. Press reports from Peshawar state that Liaquat Ali Khan has been told by tribal *mullicks* that they are determined to carry on their war against Sikhs and Hindus of Kashmir and India.² Further they threatened to carry the war to Delhi and objected to the reference to the United Nations. Some of them said that they would not accept a U.N.O. decision or any compromise or listen to any appeal from Pakistan.

2. A press release dated 16 January from Peshawar stated that the tribesmen, while assuring Liaquat Ali Khan of Muslim solidarity and wholehearted allegiance to Pakistan, expressed deep resentment and distress over the atrocities committed on their Muslim brethren in East Punjab and Kashmir.

8. Payment of Cash Balances to Pakistan¹

The Government's decision in regard to the payment of the cash balances to Pakistan has been taken after the most careful thought and after consultation with Gandhiji. I should like to make it clear that this does not mean any change in our unanimous view about the strength and validity of the Government's position as set out in various statements made by distinguished colleagues of mine.³ Nor do we accept the facts or arguments advanced in the latest statement of the Finance Minister of Pakistan.³

We have come to this decision in the hope that this generous gesture, in accord with India's high ideals and Gandhiji's noble standards, will convince the world of our earnest desire for peace and goodwill. We earnestly

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 15 January 1948. *The Hindustan Times*, 16 January 1948.
2. Vallabhbhai Patel and Shanmukham Chetty had reiterated on 12 January 1948 that the Government of India were the only competent authority to operate the cash balances which stood in their name and that Pakistan had been repeatedly told that the financial question could not be settled in isolation from other outstanding problems like Kashmir.
3. At a press conference in Karachi on 8 January 1948, Ghulam Mohammed claimed that the cash balances lying with the Reserve Bank "vest in His Majesty for the purpose of the two Dominions. Therefore one Government or another country cannot direct the bank."

trust also that this will go a long way towards producing a situation which will induce Gandhiji to break his fast. That fast, of course, had nothing to do with this particular matter, and we have thought of it because of our desire to help in every way in easing the present tension.

Six months ago we witnessed a miracle in Calcutta, where ill-will changed overnight into goodwill through the alchemy of a similar fast. The alchemist who worked this change was described by our Governor-General as the one-man boundary force which succeeded when the boundary force of 50,000 men in West Punjab did not succeed in keeping the peace.⁴ This unarmed knight of nonviolence is functioning again. May the same alchemy work again in India and elsewhere!

We have sought to remove one major cause of dispute and argument between India and Pakistan and we hope that other problems will also be resolved. But let it be remembered that the people of Kashmir are suffering from a brutal and unprovoked invasion and we have pledged ourselves to help them to gain their freedom. To that pledge we shall hold and we shall do our utmost to redeem it. We seek their freedom not for any gain to us but to prevent the ravishing of a fair country and a peaceful people.

4. Lord Mountbatten wrote to Mahatma Gandhi on 26 August 1947 : "In the Punjab we have 55,000 soldiers and large-scale rioting on our hands. In Bengal our forces consist of one-man, and there is no rioting. As a serving officer, as well as an administrator, may I be allowed to pay my tribute to the One-Man Boundary Force?"

9. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

You are aware that a financial agreement was arrived at between India and Pakistan under which cash balance of fifty-five crores minus certain set-offs was to be paid to Pakistan. It was however stated clearly on behalf of Government of India that while we accepted the agreement we could not implement it till an overall settlement of all issues was made. This referred specially to Kashmir. There has been a great deal of controversy over this issue. Our Cabinet has been unanimously of opinion that both on legal and other grounds we were justified in delaying implementation of agreement pending settlement of other issues.

1. New Delhi, 15 January 1948. J.N. Collection.

In view of Gandhiji's fast, however, and our earnest desire to remove ill-will and tension and in accordance with his advice, we have decided to make a generous gesture to Pakistan and directed payment of this cash balance to Pakistan. This has been done as Government wanted to make a strong contribution to the cause of communal goodwill for which Gandhiji was fasting and in the hope that this may result in creating conditions which would lead him to end his fast.

It should be clearly understood however that this does not weaken in any way our stand regarding Kashmir. Indeed it is meant to strengthen our position there. We want to make it clear to India, Pakistan and the world that we are generous and earnestly desirous of peace but even so the brutal and unprovoked invasion of Kashmir has to be resisted and ended at all costs.

Gandhiji somewhat weak but cheerful. Health generally good.

10. Do Not Copy Pakistan¹

Soon after taking office the Government of free India was confronted with gigantic problems which demanded immediate attention and energy of the people. The first major task which we had to undertake was the maintenance of law and order and evacuation of our brethren from Pakistan. The next problem was their resettlement and rehabilitation. The first job had to be finished before the Government could take up the second. But this is not the case today. At times we felt that the first problem had been satisfactorily solved and that there was peace in the country but our hopes were proved to be false by periodic outbreaks of lawlessness.

While the Government were still considering the different rehabilitation schemes, other urgent problems as that of Kashmir arose. The Indian Army is fighting in Kashmir. It has gone there because we felt it was our duty to defend the innocent people of Kashmir against the unprovoked aggression. We have a clear conscience over that issue, and the cause that we have taken up in Kashmir demands perfect harmony in our own ranks. If we do not have peace among us, our military operations are bound to suffer in Kashmir.

1. Speech at a public meeting in Delhi, 15 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times* and *The Statesman*, 16 January 1948.

While we were thus engaged in rehabilitating the people who had been evacuated from Pakistan and in defending Kashmir, fresh batches of refugees started coming from Karachi.² These series of human earthquakes were not of our making. We did not start them and the responsibility was not ours, but that of the people who had created Pakistan. They had fired the first shot. The people of both countries have lost their balance. The fact that sanity has not returned in Pakistan should not prevent us from returning to normal life. We must set our own house in order. We will succeed in doing that only if the internal situation is peaceful.

Western Punjab and parts of the Frontier Province are at present full of tribesmen. They were actually called there by the provincial governments, but are now not under their control. Lawlessness is prevailing there and in certain districts administration has collapsed completely. The tribesmen are harassing not only non-Muslims but the Muslims also. Recently they kidnapped a few Muslims and Pakistan officials succeeded in rescuing them only on the payment of ransom of about Rs. 100 per head. This must be a lesson for all. We cannot let such things happen in India. Lawlessness will spell the ruin of the country.

The present atmosphere in the country is a cause of great worry to us. To Mahatma Gandhi it is even more painful. It hurts him to see bloodshed and rioting. We must realise that communal fighting, if not checked immediately, will bring about an end of our freedom. He feels what is in the minds of the people. He has gone on fast so that people may search their hearts and stop doing things which will lower their standards. Gandhiji knew the way events were shaping themselves in Pakistan and India and was worried. He did not want to see India go the way Pakistan had gone. After having led India in her struggle for freedom, he was happy when India became free, though he did not like the shape it took. He still hopes that if we work hard it will be possible to build a strong and powerful nation.

The news of Gandhiji's fast came as a surprise to me and my colleagues. When I saw him on Monday at three o'clock in the afternoon, Gandhiji did not tell me anything. It was his day of silence and he was writing something. Even Sardar Patel was not aware of the proposed fast. We knew Gandhiji was worried about conditions in the country and was thinking what he should do to improve them.

It is not enough to consider the effect of the fast on Gandhiji's health. We have to understand the issues involved. The country is faced with grave

2. On 6 January 1948, a party of 184 Sikhs, who were being evacuated from Upper Sind, were attacked by a Muslim mob while spending a night in a *gurdwara* in Karachi. Sixty-four of them were killed and the rest wounded. The mob then took to looting, particularly of non-Muslim shops in the city.

dangers. There are external dangers. There may be dangers from Pakistan. We are not afraid of them. But if there are internal troubles we cannot face them effectively. We have also to provide food and shelter to thirty lakhs of people. Unfortunately, the two-nation theory and the hate propaganda carried on by the protagonists of Pakistan have affected some of us. But we in India should realise the dangers and not think in terms of religion.

No nation in the world was founded on the basis of religion. After all, there are crores of Hindus in East Bengal and there are crores of Muslims in India. If they start moving from one country to another as destitutes it will be impossible to carry on the work of administration. It is wrong to think that all Muslims are traitors and all Hindus and Sikhs are patriots. The fact is that there are large numbers of Muslims who have been loyal to the country's struggle for freedom. Many Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims opposed our struggle. It is wrong to think that one community is traitor as a whole. It is a question of individuals. Those who are traitors will be punished.

In Delhi alone there are three or four lakhs of refugees from the Frontier Province, West Punjab, Baluchistan and Sind. Within a week all the refugees, who have no accommodation, will be provided with accommodation in barracks or elsewhere. A sufficiently large area near Delhi has been set apart for refugees who will be helped to build houses. The Government will provide them the necessary land and building material. They will also build roads and arrange for water supply. In Delhi, as in other parts of India, small townships will be built for the refugees. They will also be given good land. Middle-class refugees in Delhi will be helped to form corporations for building houses.

All this however requires public cooperation and it cannot be done if there is rioting in Delhi. Out of three and a half lakhs of Muslims, nearly two lakhs have left Delhi. Many of the *mohallas* have become empty and Hindus and Sikhs have occupied the houses vacated by Muslims. But it is the policy of the Government to give every facility to Muslims living in Delhi and who are wanting to stay on here.

If we can create peaceful conditions here, we can change the atmosphere throughout the country. We should create conditions in which nobody should be obsessed by the fear of rioting or be afraid of moving about freely. May be no Hindu or Sikh can live in peace and honour in Lahore. But if we create similar conditions here, what is the difference between them and us? Should we become like them?

Here in India we have comprehensive plans for the improvement of the people's conditions. In Pakistan they have no plans except that for creating mutual hatred. They have unfortunately got us also entangled in their net. The only reply that we should give them is to create peaceful conditions in our country.

I disapprove of all talk of war between India and Pakistan and there

is no immediate possibility of war.³ The Government of India are, however, prepared for every eventuality. We have prepared ourselves militarily and there is no need for the kind of panic which made some people run away from Amritsar and Jullundur. I assure you that if there is a war not one soldier of the enemy will be allowed to step into Indian territory.

In the recent attack in Gujrat on the train carrying Hindu and Sikh refugees by tribesmen and Muslim refugees, sixty-one Indian soldiers fought gallantly until they ran out of ammunition and a large number of Hindus and Sikhs were killed.⁴ It was a ghastly tragedy and was bound to anger us. Measures will be taken to prevent recurrence of such incidents. It does not, however, mean that we should retaliate. There are still a large number of Hindus and Sikhs in Bannu. I assure you that the Government are not less worried about the massacre in Karachi than you are.

You should pledge to bring about complete peace in Delhi. There should be no boycott of Muslims and peaceful relations should be restored. Delhi is not merely the capital of India but a city with a great historical past. Conditions here have their effect on other parts of India. You have to make Delhi the bulwark of peace and harmony.

Gandhiji has shown us a new way of life. He is the sentinel and hope of our freedom. He has taught us that we can rise not by adopting means that mere expediency demands but by following the right path. It is he who brought us freedom by making us follow the right path. His fast is a warning to us not to deviate from it. If we want to influence others, we have to teach ourselves to follow the right path. He is a mere bundle of bones, but he has made an empire shake beneath his feet through his spiritual power. Military power is liable to be shortlived and incapable of achieving great ends. Military might alone is not enough because a nation's progress depends on its spiritual power. The Mahatma is the symbol of our spiritual strength and his loss will mean the loss of India's soul.

3. On 3 January 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan accused India of having never accepted partition whole-heartedly and said that its leaders paid lip-service to it merely to get British troops out of the country and charged that India was out to destroy Pakistan.
4. On 12 January 1948, a train carrying about 3,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees from Bannu in the N.W.F.P. was attacked by Pathans at the Gujrat railway station in West Punjab. Over 1,650 persons, it was estimated officially, had been killed.

11. Mahatma Gandhi's Fast¹

Mahatma Gandhi has undertaken this fast to stop the people of India from treading the path of communalism and to make them alive to the grim dangers which are staring them in the face. He has gone on fast to draw our attention to our own faults, to rouse our conscience, and to make us realise that internal peace and communal harmony are essential if the country is to progress.

Even from the point of view of self-interest, it is necessary that there should be peace in the country. Peace is essential if India is to become a strong country. The strength of a country is measured by its economic resources. The United States is the most powerful country in the world not because it has a big army but because it is economically strong. A poverty-stricken country cannot fight its enemies. The present atmosphere in India, with the constant threat of internal riots, makes it difficult for us to implement plans of development and rehabilitation. It is our primary responsibility to help in the country's progress. If free India lives, we live, but if our country becomes weak, we will fall with her. We have forgotten this fundamental principle and are fighting among ourselves because anger has clouded our vision. The people might hold different opinions on political or economic questions. There might be different communal parties in a country. But there must be only one goal for which all must work, namely, to make India strong. They should not do anything which might weaken the country.

Some communal organisations talk of riots and disturbances. This sort of talk is bad at all times, but it is dangerous at present. These organisations do not seem to realise that they are playing with the interests of India and will bring her utter ruin.

Retaliation in India is no way to avenge the wrongs done to Hindus in Pakistan. It will be a vengeance against ourselves. If a few people forcibly occupy houses of Muslims, they are not solving the refugee problem. There are crores of Muslims in India and if we go on creating internal troubles, it will take decades before we can make any progress. Moreover, no civilised government can tolerate such actions. We have plenty of mineral and technical resources. One-third of our country is under-populated. We only need time to build up our country. Every action we take must advance her progress.

We know Muslims are oppressing non-Muslims in Pakistan but should we lower ourselves to their standards? Such things cannot be permitted to happen in India simply because they go unchecked in Pakistan. We are not

1. Speech at a public meeting in Delhi, 16 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times* and *The Statesman*, 17 January 1948.

framing the destinies of India on the lines adopted by Pakistan. We have our own standards of judging what is right and wrong. We must not follow the example set by Pakistan. They are at present in a shaky position because their actions, right from the beginning, were improper. They created trouble in Kashmir and we are fighting, and shall fight them there with all our might. Their deeds are now recoiling on them. They sowed the wind in Kashmir and they are reaping the whirlwind in the form of lawlessness and anarchy in West Punjab.

Though there is no near possibility of war with Pakistan, it does not mean that we should not strengthen our army, air force and navy. Only weak countries are attacked, and if our country becomes strong, we need not fear any invasion.

The Government will leave nothing undone for the proper rehabilitation of the refugees from Pakistan. They are the wealth of the nation. They have every right to demand full attention from the Government, but they have no right to take the law into their hands. They will achieve nothing by breaking the peace as that will create more complications and delay their resettlement.

12. The Purpose of Mahatma Gandhi's Fast¹

For the last twenty years India has followed the advice and guidance of Mahatma Gandhi. He has impressed on us that we as a nation cannot progress unless we build up our inner strength and that this can be done only by the nation adopting good means to achieve good ends. Good results cannot be achieved by adopting bad methods.

No doubt we adhered to these principles, but of late these principles have not been so prominent inside the Congress itself. There is a tendency to split. Sometimes during the last few months I have doubted whether the vision of a free India, based upon progress and good philosophy, so that she can take a prominent place in Asia and in the rest of the world, can be realised. Mahatma Gandhi's fast is intended to build up our inner strength so that we can tread along the right and proper path.

1. Speech to a gathering on the lawns of Birla House, New Delhi, 17 January 1948. *The Hindustan Times*, 18 January 1948.

Ever since I learnt of Mahatma Gandhi's decision to fast, I neither asked him not to resort to fast nor to give it up, because I knew what the Mahatma wanted. It is up to the people to do their duty correctly and follow the advice of Mahatma Gandhi. Only then can he be induced to break the fast.

Gandhiji has taken the decision to fast not out of anger or petulance. He has gone on fast because he wants to save the country which he has served for so many years. He is one of the bravest men in the world. He has never countenanced any wrong action. For the past four days he is on fast. It is shameful that we should be eating thrice a day and that he should bear the burden of our sins all alone.² But you should return to sanity and end communalism for your own sake and not merely for saving the life of Mahatma Gandhi. You should act in such a way that I may be able to go to Gandhiji and tell him that the great purpose for which he raised his silent voice has been realised.

2. Nehru also did not take any food during the period of Mahatma Gandhi's fast. See Appendix, one.

13. Pledge to Restore Harmony¹

For the past few days the eyes of the whole world were focused on Delhi. The people of Delhi were on trial. I am glad that your solemn pledge² has made it possible for Gandhiji to break his fast.

There is some relief over Gandhiji's ending his fast, and there is no danger to his life now. Another grave responsibility has, however, been placed on our shoulders. We have given a pledge that there will be peace not merely in Delhi but in the whole of India. It is our duty to implement that pledge.

There is only one frail old man in our country who has all along stuck to the right path. We had all, some time or other, strayed away from his

1. Speech at a public meeting, Delhi, 18 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 19 January 1948.
2. A peace committee of 130 members, representing Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and other communities and organisations, set up on 18 January, with Rajendra Prasad as convener, gave a pledge promising Mahatma Gandhi to end discrimination against Muslims, including economic boycott, ensure conditions for the return to them of 17 mosques in Delhi and provide facilities for them to travel freely and hold their annual fair. As a result of this Mahatma Gandhi ended his fast the same day.

path. In order to make us realise our mistakes, he undertook this great ordeal.

During these five days I have pondered a great deal over the problems facing us. The question of increasing our production, providing food, shelter and clothing to the large number of refugees, the problem of rehabilitation and the like demand our immediate attention, but no government can tackle them if there is no peace in the country.

If there are disturbances in the country, it cannot defend itself against external dangers. The country itself will suffer greatly the consequences of such disturbances. Unfortunately, our country is on the wrong path. It is possible that by following that path some people have benefited but the majority of people have suffered. Gandhiji has all along been warning us that we have strayed away, but we did not listen to him. Then he raised his silent yet powerful voice.

Your complaints of hardships faced by refugees are true. We have failed to tackle this problem so far but not because of our reluctance or due to lack of a realisation of our responsibilities. You must understand that provision of shelter, food and occupation to 50 or 60 lakhs of displaced persons is no small problem. Nevertheless, I assure you that we will soon tackle it in all its aspects.

Gold and silver do not constitute a nation's riches. Its riches are her people. Those who have come from the Punjab have added to our wealth. I know there are many refugees willing to work but cannot, because we have not been able to give them any work.

I reiterate the assurance that I gave on Friday last that all the refugees in Delhi will be given shelter within a week's time. But that assurance does not mean that each refugee will have separate accommodation. Such a thing is impossible. What I mean is, after a week, no refugee will be found on the road without proper shelter. Purana Qila, a few palaces in New Delhi, the military barracks and similar housing accommodation will be made available to the refugees. All arrangements in regard to their housing will be made without any more delay.

We have before us a number of development projects such as irrigation works, new factories and mills, hydro-electric projects and reclamation of wastelands, which will increase our production. So far we have not been able to coordinate these projects with our rehabilitation plans. Efforts will now be made in this direction.

Our country has been partitioned. Some parts have gone to Pakistan and some to the Indian Union. I have all along felt that this was a wrong step, and, God willing, the two parts will be united again. The oft-repeated charge of Muslim League spokesmen is that the Indian leaders are out to destroy Pakistan and want to reunite Pakistan and India. Let me tell them

plainly now that we have no desire to reunite Pakistan with India for the present. We want to build our nation as we desire.

If you want your country to progress, there is no way out but to fraternise with each and every community. I have every hope that the people of Delhi will abide by the solemn pledge they made today to work for peace and because of which Gandhiji agreed to break his fast.

14. The Effect of Mahatma Gandhi's Fast¹

Gandhiji broke his fast just now today. During last five days as a result of his fast great change in Delhi. Numerous mass meetings, processions and demonstrations in favour of communal harmony. As Gandhiji deteriorated this movement became more urgent and widespread. Gandhiji yesterday laid down certain conditions which related principally to Delhi and neighbourhood. This morning representatives of all groups and communities including communal organisations accepted fully those conditions and pledged themselves to work for peace and harmony. Thereupon Gandhiji agreed to end his fast.

1. Cable to Indian envoys in Moscow, New York, Washington, London, Nanking, Tehran, Batavia, Rangoon and Colombo, 18 January 1948, File No. 2(69)-48-PMS.

15. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
19 January 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I have received information from Mridula Sarabhai and other sources in Amritsar that the position in Amritsar has deteriorated very much. The news of the Gujrat train incident especially has led to this deterioration. Some of the Sikh gangs are moving about and threatening reprisals. There is considerable apprehension of these reprisals taking the shape not only of attacks on trains carrying Muslim refugees or stores to Pakistan but also raids on Pakistan villages. You will appreciate that any such raid will have an exceedingly bad effect not only on the general situation but also more particularly on the proceedings of the Security Council and the Kashmir situation.

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

Sardar Udham Singh Nagoke² is one of the prominent leaders of the guerilla bands. He is reported to have said : "I took no permission when I started the August campaign and I will take none this time." The whole object of these people is to create incidents which will lead to war between India and Pakistan.

This is a dangerous business and must be stopped. It has been suggested that you might visit Amritsar for a day preferably with the Maharaja of Patiala or even without him. Your going is more important than Patiala's as Patiala's stock is lower than it was with the Akali Sikhs. If it is at all possible for you to go I shall be very grateful. We would of course make all necessary arrangements. The sooner this is done the better.³

For the present we have stopped trains to Pakistan but we want to start them again.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. (1894-1966); member, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1926-54, and its President, 1948-50 and 1950-52; imprisoned for three years in 1942 for helping Subhas Chandra Bose to escape to Afghanistan; elected to Rajya Sabha, 1952; joined Swatantra Party and became President of its Punjab unit in 1960 and Vice-President of its national executive in 1965.
3. Rajendra Prasad replied that Giani Kartar Singh and other Sikh leaders had assured him that there "was no apprehension... of any trouble... nor was there any organisation behind the demonstrations at the Amritsar railway station which was only a reaction to the tragedy at Gujrat."

16. To Mahatma Gandhi¹

New Delhi
20 January 1948

Dear Bapu,

The Chinese Ambassador² has sent me a message he has received from Dr. Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination Yuan of the Republic of China. This message came by telegram. I enclose copy of this message.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Dr. Lo Chia-lun.

3. Tai Chi-tao, in his letter of 18 January 1948 written from Nanking, stated "...The Chinese people, who are heartily in accord with all which Gandhiji stands for, are feeling anxious in this hour when he is again in the courageous act of mercy and sacrifice. I, for one, pray that his noble mission be fulfilled so that he may end his fast...."

17. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
20 January 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I have your letter of the 19th January about the Peace Committee.² I entirely agree with you that this Committee should have the fullest help and cooperation from the Government. As regards your particular suggestions I am taking such action as I can.

(1) There is no question of formal recognition by Government but the Departments concerned and more specially the Delhi local administration are being requested to cooperate in every way with your Committee.

(2) You have not mentioned any particular sum that you require. Deshbandhu Gupta, a member of your Committee, has told me that Rs. 10,000 will be enough for the present at least. I am asking the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation to place this sum at your disposal.

(3) I understand that the local administration is doing its utmost to evacuate the mosques at present occupied by Hindus and Sikhs. Alternative accommodation is being arranged.

(4) I am asking the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi to make arrangements for you to have two or three jeeps.

2. I need not add that we shall be happy to help you in every possible way. Please let me know what else I can do for you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

2. Rajendra Prasad was for official recognition of the committee and cooperation of local authorities with it in the evacuation of Hindus and Sikhs from the mosques.

18. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 21st² about conditions in Amritsar. The

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

2. Rajendra Prasad wrote that the demonstrators at the Amritsar station dispersed after two days when no train carrying refugees went from the Indian side.

report made by Giani Kartar Singh does not quite tally with the report that I have received and conditions are still bad there. You will have seen the account of *The Daily Telegraph* in the papers today. There is some truth in it. I do hope that you will be able to go to Amritsar as soon as you are well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

19. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Most of the Urdu and Hindi newspapers of Delhi have been writing poisonous stuff during the last few weeks. This was noticeable specially during Gandhiji's fast. These newspapers or some of them are official organs of the Hindu Mahasabha or are aligned with it.² I do not know what steps can be taken about this matter but I think much of our trouble at this end is due to this totally unbalanced writing in the press, just as the Pakistan newspapers write poisonous stuff.

In view of the attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S. it is becoming increasingly difficult to be neutral towards them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A leading article in the *Hindu Outlook* stated that Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru should be murdered. An anonymous poster in Hindi incited the public "to murder Mahatma Gandhi, to cut him to pieces and throw his flesh to dogs and crows". The Hindu Mahasabha held meetings in defiance of the ban order and criticised the Congress and the Government for helping the Muslims.

20. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Subbarayan,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th January.

About the Home Guards Bill² I am quite clear in my mind that some Muslims should be recruited. Of course, a proper selection should be made. If you recruit them in proportion to the population they will be very few. Even if so inclined they cannot do any mischief. I do not think that they will be so inclined and their presence will have a good effect. Not to take them will, I think, definitely have a bad effect.

In the U.P. there are plenty of Muslim policemen still and on the whole they have done well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Madras Government promulgated an ordinance on 12 January 1948, providing for the formation of home guards, numbering 1000 in each district. Local authorities were empowered to call them to service when the need arose. A bill on these lines was under preparation.

21. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Radhakrishnan,

I have just received your letter of the 17th.

I am glad you think that India's heart is sound. I confess that some doubts have arisen in my own mind about this. I suppose fundamentally it is sound but it has got hidden in so many layers of the wrong stuff that it is often difficult to feel the heartbeats. There is no doubt that Pakistan and the people behind Pakistan started this terrible business of hatred and killing. But there is also little doubt that both sides indulged in it in equal measure. There is nothing to choose between the inequity of either.

Our own present problem here is not so much of what Pakistan does or does not do, but what many of our own people do. In this connection I might

1. J.N. Collection.

say that I was rather sorry to read some time back that you had encouraged the R.S.S.² This organisation is one of the most mischievous in India at present.

Gandhiji's fast is over and he is keeping fairly well. The fast produced good results and even Pakistan was affected.³ But the evil is too deep to be cured easily.

I think you should continue your membership of the Constituent Assembly. The constitution-making body will not be meeting till April.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Radhakrishnan, addressing the volunteers of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in Rewa on 29 December 1947, appreciated the Sangh's discipline, self-sacrifice, endurance and courage and asked them to fit into the national mainstream.
3. Warm tributes were paid to Mahatma Gandhi in the West Punjab Assembly by the members of the Muslim League.

22. Subhas Chandra Bose¹

On this day of Netaji's birth anniversary many things come to my mind but most of all I think of the way he faced and solved the communal problem not only in the I.N.A. but also in his other activities in Southeast Asia. How soon we have forgotten that lesson!

If we have to honour his memory and his work, the first thing we have to remember is that there must be unity in India and that we must not think on religious but on national lines.

Let us pay tribute to Netaji's memory, but in doing so let us realise that we have a big task ahead and that the fight for freedom which may have ended politically has yet to be won in other fields. We have enemies abroad and we must be on our guard against them, but we must be even more on guard against the enemies within who disrupt and endeavour to destroy the edifice of India's freedom.

1. Message to I.N.A. officers on the occasion of the fifty-second birth anniversary of Subhas Chandra Bose, 23 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 24 January 1948.

23. A Common Cultural Inheritance¹

I have come back to Aligarh and to this university after a long interval. We have been separated not only by this distance of time but also by a distance of spirit and outlook. I do not quite know where you, or for the matter of that most of us, stand today, for we have gone through convulsions and heartbreaks which have no doubt created in many of us doubts and disillusionment. While the present is full of uncertainty, the future is even more shrouded and difficult to pierce. Nevertheless, we have to face the present and try to mould the future. We have to see, each one of us, where we stand and what we stand for. Without a stout anchor of faith in the future we will drift in the present and life itself will have no objective worth striving for.

I accepted the invitation of your Vice-Chancellor² with pleasure, for I wanted to meet all of you and to probe somewhat into your minds and to let you have a glimpse of my own mind. We have to understand each other, and if we cannot agree about everything, we must at least agree to differ, and know where we agree and where we differ.

For every sensitive human being in India the last six months have brought pain and sorrow and, what is worst of all, a humiliation of the spirit. It has been bad enough for those who are old in years and experience, but I often wonder how the young feel who, at the threshold of their lives, have seen and experienced catastrophes and disasters. They will, no doubt, survive it, for youth is resilient; but it may well be that they will carry the mark of it for the rest of their lives. Perhaps, if we are wise and strong enough to think and act rightly even now, we may succeed in erasing that mark.

For my part I wish to say that, in spite of everything, I have a firm faith in India's future. Indeed, if I did not have it, it would not be possible for me to function effectively. Although many of my old dreams have been shattered by recent events, yet the basic objective still holds and I have seen no reason to change it. That objective is to build up a free India of high ideals and noble endeavours, where there is equality of opportunity for all and where many variegated streams of thought and culture meet together to form a mighty river of progress and advancement for her people.

I am proud of India not only because of her ancient, magnificent heritage, but also because of her remarkable capacity to add to it by keeping the doors and windows of her mind and spirit open to fresh and invigorating

1. Convocation address at the Aligarh Muslim University, 24 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 25 January 1948.
2. Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1947-48.

winds from distant lands. India's strength has been twofold; her own innate culture which flowered through the ages, and her capacity to draw from other sources and thus add this to her own. She was far too strong to be submerged by outside streams, and she was too wise to isolate herself from them, and so there is a continuing synthesis in India's real history, and the many political changes which have taken place have had little effect on the growth of this variegated and yet essentially unified culture.

I have said that I am proud of our inheritance and our ancestors who gave an intellectual and cultural pre-eminence to India. How do you feel about this past? Do you feel that you are also sharers in it and inheritors of it and, therefore, proud of something that belongs to you as much as to me? Or do you feel alien to it and pass it by without understanding it or feeling that strange thrill which comes from the realisation that we are the trustees and inheritors of this vast treasure? I ask you these questions, because in recent years many forces have been at play diverting people's minds into wrong channels and trying to pervert the course of history. You are Muslims and I am a Hindu. We may adhere to any religious faith or even to none; but that does not take away from that cultural inheritance that is yours as well as mine. The past holds us together; why should the present or the future divide us in spirit?

Political changes produce certain results, but the essential changes are in the spirit and outlook of a nation. What has troubled me very greatly during these past months and years is not the political changes, but rather the creeping sense of a change of spirit which created enormous barriers between us. The attempt to change the spirit of India was a reversal of the historic process through which we had been passing for long ages past and it is because we tried to reverse the current of history that disaster overwhelmed us. We cannot easily play about with geography or with the powerful trends which make history, and it is infinitely worse if we make hatred and violence the springs of action.

Pakistan has come into being, rather unnaturally, I think. Nevertheless, it represents the urges of a large number of persons. I believe that this development has been a throwback, but we accepted it in good faith. I want you to understand clearly what our present view is. We have been charged with desiring to strangle and crush Pakistan and to force it into a reunion with India. That charge, as many others, is based on fear and a complete misunderstanding of our attitude. I believe that, for a variety of reasons, it is inevitable that India and Pakistan should draw closer to each other or else they will come into conflict. There is no middle way, for we have known each other too long to be indifferent neighbours. I believe, indeed, that in the present context of the world India must develop a closer union with many other neighbouring countries. But all this does not mean any desire to strangle or coerce Pakistan. Compulsion there can never be and an attempt to disrupt

Pakistan will recoil to India's disadvantage. If we wanted to break Pakistan, why did we agree to the partition? It was easier to prevent it then than to do so now after all that has happened. There is no going back in history. As a matter of fact, it is to India's advantage that Pakistan should be a secure and prosperous state with which we can develop close and friendly relations. If today, by any chance, I was offered a reunion of India and Pakistan, I would decline it for obvious reasons. I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great problems. I have enough of my own. Any closer association must come out of a normal process and in a friendly way which does not end Pakistan as a state, but makes it an equal part of a larger union in which several countries might be associated.

I have spoken of Pakistan because this subject must be in your minds and you would like to know what our attitude towards it is. Your minds are probably in a fluid state at present, not knowing which way to look and what to do. All of us have to be clear about our basic allegiance to certain ideas. Do we believe in a national state which includes people of all religions and shades of opinion and is essentially secular as a state, or do we believe in the religious, theocratic conception of a state which considers people of other faiths as something beyond the pale? That is an odd question to ask, for the idea of a religious or theocratic state was given up by the world some centuries ago and it has no place in the mind of a modern man. And yet the question has to be put in India today, for many of us have tried to jump back to a past age. I have no doubt that, whatever our individual answers might be, it is not possible for us to go back to a conception that the world has outlived and that is completely out of tune with modern conceptions. So far as India is concerned, I can speak with some certainty that we shall proceed on secular and national lines in keeping with the powerful trends towards internationalism. Whatever confusion the present may contain, in the future India will be a land, as in the past, of many faiths equally honoured and respected, but of one national outlook, not, I hope, a narrow nationalism living in its own shell, but rather the tolerant, creative nationalism which, believing in itself and the genius of its people, takes full part in the establishment of an international order. The only ultimate aim we can have is that of one world. That seems a far cry today with warring groups and preparations for and shouting of World War III. Yet, despite all this shouting, that is the only aim that we can keep in view, for the alternative to world cooperation is world disaster.

We must cultivate this broad outlook and not be led away by the narrowness of others into becoming narrow in spirit and outlook ourselves. We have had enough of what has been called communalism in this country and we have tasted of its bitter and poisonous fruit. It is time that we put an end to it. For my part, I do not like the intrusion of this communal spirit anywhere, and least of all in educational institutions.

Education is meant to free the spirit of a man and not to imprison it in set frames. I do not like this university being called the Muslim University just as I do not like the Banaras University to be called the Hindu University. That does not mean that a university should not specialise in particular cultural subjects and studies. I think it is right that this university should lay special stress on certain aspects of Islamic thought and culture.

I want you to think about these problems and come to your own conclusions. These conclusions cannot be forced upon you except to some extent, of course, by the compulsion of events which none of us can ignore. Do not think that you are outsiders here, for you are as much the flesh and blood of India as anyone else, and you have every right to share in what India has to offer. But those who seek rights must share in the obligations also. Indeed, if the duties and obligations are accepted, then rights automatically flow from them.

I invite you as free citizens of free India to play your role in the building up of this great country and to be sharers, in common with others, in the triumphs and setbacks alike that may come our way. The present with all its unhappiness and misery will pass. It is the future that counts, more specially for the young, and it is that future that beckons to you. How will you answer that call?

24. No Progress Without Communal Peace¹

Poverty and unemployment will become permanent features of our life if communal peace is not maintained. Our freedom is not only to be guarded but also given a practical shape.

We fought the battle for independence nobly and well. We always had high principles and inspiring ideals, but so soon after our achievement of freedom we stood lowered in the estimation of the world with bruised souls. To translate freedom into reality the people of India are now called upon to stand undivided and make concerted efforts to solve the many problems facing them.

Free India has the primary duty to defend itself and not look towards other countries or even to the U.N.O. for protection and defence. But defence cannot be effective if peace is broken or is in constant danger of being broken.

1. Speech at Aligarh, 24 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 26 January 1948.

The world is passing through a critical phase and India's state is even more critical because, besides the Second World War, it has just experienced a big revolution. Under these circumstances, no patriotic person can allow his attention to be diverted from the real issues.

The new Constitution of the country will be ready and become operative in a few months but before that the people must show that they are capable of shouldering new responsibilities.² The Hindus being in a large majority in India will naturally influence all phases of life in the country but they cannot be given special rights nor others denied some because they happen to belong to a particular community.

2. The Draft Constitution was released on 25 February 1948.

25. Priority to Constructive Work¹

Much has happened in India during the past few months which was prompted by hate and falsehood. That alone has caused so much misery which one sees in the country today.

I would therefore urge you not to allow hatred to warp your judgment and condition your actions. No good ever comes out of an action based upon distrust and hate. Anything which is basically wrong is sure to recoil on those who indulge in it. Such a thing may bring some short-term gain but ultimately it will cause great harm.

Our energies should, therefore, be channellised for doing constructive work. India is a rich country but is inhabited by the poor. By saying that Indians are poor, it should not be construed that we do not possess the necessary resources to become rich if we would care to.

Manpower is necessary to tap the vast resources of the country which add to our wealth and raise the standard of living of the people. Except for the profession of law, we need people in all other major fields. Lawyers do not add to the country's wealth. They only transfer it from one pocket to another.

1. Address to the Aligarh Muslim University Students Union, 25 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 26 January 1948.

26. To T. G. Sanjeevi¹

New Delhi
27 January 1948

Dear Sanjeevi,

Reports have reached me from various sources in Delhi and in other provinces about the increasingly aggressive and offensive activities of the Hindu Mahasabha. Some of the reports of the speeches are really extraordinary in their virulence.² I understand that this evening a meeting was held in Connaught Circus where very offensive speeches were made and slogans shouted.³ I should like to know what your information is about all these activities and what steps, if any, are being taken in regard to them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.
2. When Rs. 55 crores were given to Pakistan on the insistence of Mahatma Gandhi speeches inciting people to violence were made by R.S.S. leaders in Delhi and Pune. Some East Punjab papers were writing in the same hostile strain. A pamphlet described Mahatma Gandhi "as an enemy of the Hindus" and said, if he did "not change his ways, steps should be taken to neutralise him"
3. At a meeting in Delhi on 27 January 1948, V. G. Deshpande and Ram Singh said that there could be no peace in the country so long as Muslims remained. The only way to make India strong and powerful was to establish a Hindu Rashtra.

27. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
27 January 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

I enclose an extract from the *Jana Sakthi* of Patna. This gives a report of a Hindu Sabha meeting held at Khagariah on 11th of January or thereabouts. You will notice that the speakers at this meeting, who include Prof. Deshpande,² the General Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, have said something very extraordinary. It seems to me that Hindu Sabha speeches are

1. J.N. Collection.
2. V.G. Deshpande (1911-1975); jailed during Hyderabad Satyagraha, 1939, Bhagalpur Satyagraha, 1940, and Quit India Movement, 1942; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57; President, Hindu Mahasabha, 1960-62; editor of *Adesh*, *Daily Bharat Times* and *Hindu Outlook*.

getting more and more intolerable and objectionable and something has to be done to meet this menace.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Deshpande was arrested on 2 February 1948 for having incited communal violence.

28. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
28 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister, U.P. Government, tells me that they have received information to the effect that R.S.S. men are being trained in Bharatpur with arms. Many of these people go from the U.P. for training in camps or otherwise and then return with arms. We had heard previously of such training camps being run in Bharatpur State.² Apparently this kind of thing is still going on to some extent and the U.P. Government are rather worried about it.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. R.S.S. camps and rallies had been arranged in May-June 1947 in the States of Bharatpur and Alwar and military training was also given to R.S.S. volunteers in these States.

29. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
28 January 1948

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

For some time past I have been greatly distressed by the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha.² At the present moment it is functioning not only as

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Hindu Mahasabha had held meetings in defiance of the ban order in Pune, Ahmednagar and Delhi. Speeches were delivered that Mahatma Gandhi was an impediment and the sooner he died the better it would be for the country. There were nearly 700 cases against the R.S.S. men in the two months after 15 August 1947, the charges against them being of collecting arms, attacking villages and assaulting individuals.

the main opposition to the Government and to the Congress in India but as an organisation continually inciting to violence. The R.S.S. has behaved in an even worse way and we have collected a mass of information about its very objectionable activities and its close association with riots and disorder.

2. Apart from what I have written above, what pains me most is the extreme vulgarity and indecency of speeches being made from Hindu Mahasabha platforms. *Gandhi Murdabad*³ is one of their special slogans. Recently a prominent leader of the Hindu Mahasabha stated that an objective to be aimed at was the hanging of Nehru, Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad.

3. Normally one does not like to interfere with any political activities however much one may dislike them. But there is a limit to this kind of thing, and I fear that the limit is being reached if it has not already been crossed. I write to you specially because of your own close association with the Hindu Mahasabha. We are continually being asked in our party, in the Constituent Assembly as well as elsewhere as to your position in this matter. I should be grateful to you if you will let me know how you propose to deal with this situation which must be as embarrassing to you as it is to me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 24 January 1948 some people had gathered outside the gate of Birla House and said "Let Gandhi die". Nehru was coming out after a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi and hearing this he got out of his car and shouted: "How dare you say those words? Come and kill me first." The demonstrators then dispersed.

30. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
28 January 1948

My dear Subbarayan,

Your letter of the 26th January. I think it should be made perfectly clear that we are not keeping out any community from our police force or any other service. Those selected are of course chosen with care and the proportion is going to be normally the proportion in the population. It need not be mathematically so. Where the police force has a considerable proportion of Muslims now, the Government would be justified in recruiting non-Muslims for some time. It should be made clear however that this is not

1. J.N. Collection.

meant to exclude Muslims but rather to balance the proportion. I think this should apply to the new armed police also. A few Muslims in it cannot do any harm even if so inclined. Their rigid exclusion would set a bad example.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

31. Challenge to Communal Organisations¹

I challenge communal organisations to come out in the open if they dare test their strength to fight with the Congress Government. Whoever insults the National Flag,² be he a Pakistani, an Englishman, a Hindu Sabhaite or an R.S.S. man, will be considered a traitor and treated as such.

I say to you that I see no prospect of war between the two Dominions, but it is our duty to keep ourselves prepared for all eventualities. I hate war because it causes harm and impedes progress.

We cannot manage to do both things at the same time—fight a war and build the country. I do not want war. But if it becomes unavoidable and is forced upon us, then every man, woman and child will rise up to the defence of India.

I am quite confident that the Indian Army will deal a fitting blow to anybody who casts covetous eyes upon the land which they defend. But the Indian Army cannot meet external dangers and at the same time be saddled with the responsibility of maintaining internal peace.

I appeal to people living on the border of India to keep peace in East Punjab at all costs. Nobody has any reason to flee from the border districts, as that would be cowardice. There is no cause for panic. In the matter of defence the morale of the people is as important as the discipline and efficiency of troops.

The Gujrat incident in which a refugee train had been attacked and hundreds of innocent people put to death has exposed the reality of Pakistan to the world at large. But I warn you against any retaliation. I understand that over 7,000 Muslims are waiting in Delhi to proceed to Pakistan but are not able to do so because the authorities fear retaliatory action on the train carrying these Muslim refugees to Pakistan.

1. Speech at Attari, a village on the Indo-Pakistan border in Amritsar district, 29 January 1948. Based on reports in *The Hindustan Times* and *The Statesman*, 30 January 1948.
2. Some people had trampled on the National Flag on 26 January in Amritsar.

THE ASSASSINATION OF
MAHATMA GANDHI

1. The Light Has Gone Out¹

The light has gone out from our lives and there is darkness everywhere. And I do not know what to tell you and how to say it. Our beloved leader, Bapu, as we called him, the Father of the Nation, is no more.² Perhaps I am wrong to say that. Nevertheless, we will not see him again as we have seen him for these many years. We will not run to him for advice and seek solace from him; and that is a terrible blow, not to me only, but to millions and millions in this country. And it is a little difficult to soften the blow by any advice that I or anyone else can give you.

The light has gone out, I said, and yet I was wrong. For the light that shone in this country was no ordinary light. The light that has illumined this country for these many, many years will illumine this country for many more years, and a thousand years later that light will still be seen in this country, and the world will see it, and it will give solace to innumerable hearts. For that light represented something more than the immediate present; it represented the living, eternal truths reminding us of the right path, drawing us from error, taking this ancient country to freedom.

All this has happened when there was so much more for him to do. We could never, of course, do away with him, we could never think that he was unnecessary, or that he had done his task. But now, particularly, when we are faced with so many difficulties, his not being with us is a blow most terrible to bear.

A madman has put an end to his life, for I can only call him mad who did it. And yet there has been enough of poison spread in this country during the past years and months, and this poison has had effect on people's minds. We must face this poison, we must root out this poison, and we must face all the perils that encompass us, and face them, not madly or badly, but rather in the way that our beloved teacher taught us to face them. The first thing to remember now is that none of us dare misbehave because we

1. Broadcast to the nation announcing the death of Mahatma Gandhi, 30 January 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.
2. On 30 January 1948, at about 5 p.m., Mahatma Gandhi was late by a few minutes for the prayer meeting on the grounds of Birla House, New Delhi, because he had been held up a little beyond the schedule by a meeting with Vallabhbhai Patel. With his forearms on the shoulders of his grandnieces, Abha and Manubehn, he walked briskly to the prayer ground where about 500 persons had gathered. He raised his hands and joined them to greet the congregation who returned the greeting in a similar manner. Just at that moment Nathuram Vinayak Godse pushed his way past Manubehn, whipped out a pistol and fired three shots. Mahatma Gandhi fell instantly with the words *He Ram* (O God I) on his lips.

are angry. We have to behave like strong, determined people, determined to face all the perils that surround us, determined to carry out the mandate that our great teacher and our great leader has given us, remembering always that if, as I believe, his spirit looks upon us and sees us, nothing would displease his soul so much as to see that we have indulged in unseemly behaviour or in violence. So we must not do that. But that does not mean that we should be weak, but rather that we should, in strength and in unity, face all the troubles that are in front of us. We must hold together, and all our petty troubles and difficulties and conflicts must be ended in the face of this great disaster. A great disaster is a symbol to us to remember all the big things of life and forget the small things of which we have thought too much. Now the time has come again. As in his life, so in his death he has reminded us of the big things of life, the living truth, and if we remember that, then it will be well with us and well with India.

May I now tell you the programme for tomorrow? It was proposed by some friends that Mahatmaji's body should be embalmed for a few days to enable millions of people to pay their last homage to him. But it was his wish, repeatedly expressed, that no such thing should happen, that this should not be done, that he was entirely opposed to any embalming of his body, and so we decided that we must follow his wishes in this matter, however much others might have wished otherwise.

And so the cremation will take place tomorrow in Delhi city by the side of the Jumna river. Tomorrow morning, or rather forenoon, about 11.30, the bier will be taken out from Birla House and it will follow the prescribed route and go to the Jumna river. The cremation will take place there at about 4.00 p.m. The exact place and route will be announced by radio and the press.

People in Delhi who wish to pay their last homage should gather along this route. I would not advise too many of them to come to Birla House, but rather to gather on both sides of this long route, from Birla House to the Jumna river. And I trust that they will remain there in silence without any demonstrations. That is the best way and the most fitting way to pay homage to this great soul. Also, tomorrow should be a day of fasting and prayer for all of us.

Those who live elsewhere, out of Delhi and in other parts of India, will no doubt also take such part as they can in this last homage. For them also let this be a day of fasting and prayer. And at the appointed time for cremation, that is 4.00 p.m. tomorrow afternoon, people should go to the river or to the sea and offer prayers there. And while we pray, the greatest prayer that we can offer is to take a pledge to dedicate ourselves to the truth and to the cause for which this great countryman of ours lived and for which he has died. That is the best prayer that we can offer him and his memory. That is the best prayer that we can offer to India and ourselves. *Jal Hind.*

2. Official Tribute to the Mahatma¹

The Prime Minister stated that a statement by the Government of India on the death of Gandhiji was called for, and it was also necessary to consider steps to meet the situation that had arisen. The Prime Minister asked the Cabinet to express its views as to the contents of the proposed statement which, in his opinion, besides containing references to Gandhiji, ought to touch upon the larger things he had stood for, and more specifically the peace pledge given to him at the termination of his last fast. After a short discussion it was decided that the Government would meet the following day, after the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, to finalise a draft which the Prime Minister undertook to prepare.²

1. Minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 1 February 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers. Extracts.
2. In fact, two resolutions were published by the Government. See the next item.

3. Resolutions on the Death of Mahatma Gandhi¹

I

Sudden and overwhelming tragedy has befallen India and the world. On January 30, shortly after 5 p.m., the foul hand of an assassin ended a life of supreme value to humanity, a life round which had revolved India's destiny for half a century. Mahatma Gandhi, Father of the Nation and beloved of his people, apostle of nonviolence, saint and prophet of peace, great soldier for freedom and lover, above all, of the lowly, the humble and the oppressed, perished while on his way to prayer to which his fellow-countrymen flocked every evening to listen to his message. The evening sun set in mourning over a nation's tragedy.

The last great act of Gandhiji was his decision to sacrifice his life to bring about peace and harmony among the people of India. On Sunday, January 18, he terminated his fast on a solemn pledge being taken on behalf of the people, and India heaved a sigh of relief.

1. Drafted by Nehru, 2 February 1948. The Government of India brought out a black-bordered *Gazette Extraordinary* in which the two resolutions were published.

The greatest and noblest of India's sons has passed and the world mourns him and pays homage to his mighty achievements and the splendour of his spirit. Overwhelmed by sorrow, the Government of India still think with pride and thankfulness of their great leader, who has been an inspiration to hundreds of millions of people and has taught them the path of high endeavour and right action. In death as in life he was smiling, serene and full of love for all, the very embodiment of his message of truth and ahimsa. His life was one long struggle for justice and tolerance between man and man.

The Government of India, in paying reverent homage to the glorious memory of Mahatma Gandhi, declare their determination to strive to the utmost to fulfil his great message. To him the call of duty was paramount and duty demands of the Indian people today courage, vision and faith and the pursuit of truth and the practice of tolerance. They urge upon their countrymen to remember, even in this hour of national bereavement, this duty and to face the future with stout hearts and steady gaze. They must assist the Government to fight the dark forces of evil and violence that are at work in our midst and that have succeeded in putting an end to the most precious treasure that India possessed. But even this act has only heightened the splendour of his spirit which shines today and will always shine upon the Indian people and humanity. As in life, so now that great spirit will guard and guide India which he loved so passionately and served so unceasingly and with such devotion. India and India's message were embodied in his own magnificent self. Let us, therefore, be true to Gandhiji and to India and strive our utmost to realise the India of his dreams.

II

The manner of Mahatma Gandhi's death is a grim and urgent reminder of the forces of hate and violence that are at work in our country and which imperil the freedom of the nation and darken her fair name. These forces must be swiftly controlled and rooted out. Only thus can India proceed along her appointed path and fulfil her destiny. Success in this endeavour demands the willing help of her people. Government have no doubt that the great majority of the Indian people demand that this action be taken and this duty performed. Government will, therefore, act with determination and justice and they trust that the people while offering their cooperation will not take the law into their own hands.

There is no place today in India for any organisation preaching violence or communal hatred. No such organisation will, therefore, be tolerated. No private armies will be permitted. Government call upon all citizens, and particularly those serving Government in any capacity, to abide by these standards of behaviour and to act strictly in accordance with the declared policy of Government in this respect.

4. Ban on Communal Organisations¹

I thank the Governors for their views.² The Cabinet is also considering the matter. Indeed, a resolution, containing a general formula, has been passed this very day.³ I feel that a situation has now arisen when, if the Government does not take action, the people will think that they themselves should do so. I consider that there is a definite plot to capture power by putting an end to prominent individuals.

1. Remarks at a discussion on communal organisations at a conference of Governors, 2 February 1948. File No. 9-GG/47, pp. 69-70, President's Secretariat.
2. The Governor of West Bengal suggested firm action against communal organisations. The Governor of Bihar said that a total ban on communal organisations might open the Congress to the charge of taking political advantage. He suggested that provincial governments could take local action where necessary. The Governor General advocated emergency measures and the Governors of West Bengal and East Punjab felt that the Centre had to take the lead. The issue of membership of civil servants in communal organisations was also considered.
3. See the preceding item.

5. A Glory That Is No More¹

Sir, may I associate myself with what you have said?² It is customary in this House to pay some tribute to the eminent departed, to say some words of praise and condolence. I am not quite sure in my own mind if it is exactly fitting for me or for any others of this House to say much on this occasion, for I have a sense of utter shame both as an individual and as the head of the Government of India that we should have failed to protect the greatest treasure that we possessed. It is our failure, as it has been our failure in the many months past, to give protection to many an innocent man, woman and child; it may be that the burden and the task was too great for us or for any Government. Nevertheless, it is a failure. And today the fact that this

1. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 2 February 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. I, 1948, pp. 102-104.
2. The Speaker, G.V. Mavalankar, had said that Mahatma Gandhi had been a parent to all and they mourned the loss of his guidance.

mighty person whom we honoured and loved beyond measure has gone because we could not give him adequate protection is a shame for all of us. It is a shame to me as an Indian that an Indian should have raised his hand against him, it is a shame to me as a Hindu that a Hindu should have done this deed and done it to the greatest Indian of the day and the greatest Hindu of the age.

We praise people in well-chosen words and we have some kind of a measure for greatness. How shall we praise him and how shall we measure him, because he was not of the common clay that all of us are made of? He came, lived a fairly long span of life, and has passed away. No words of praise of ours in this House are needed, for he has had greater praise in his life than any living man in history. And during these two or three days since his death he has had the homage of the world; what can we add to that? How can we praise him, how can we who have been children of his, and perhaps more intimately his children than the children of his body, for we have all been in some greater or smaller measure the children of his spirit, unworthy as we were?

A glory has departed and the sun that warmed and brightened our lives has set and we shiver in the cold and dark. Yet, he would not have us feel this way. After all, that glory that we saw for all these years, that man with the divine fire, changed us also—and such as we are, we have been moulded by him during these years; and out of that divine fire many of us also took a small spark which strengthened and made us work to some extent on the lines that he fashioned. And so if we praise him, our words seem rather small, and if we praise him, to some extent we also praise ourselves. Great men and eminent men have monuments in bronze and marble set up for them, but this man of divine fire managed in his life-time to become enshrined in millions and millions of hearts so that all of us became somewhat of the stuff that he was made of, though to an infinitely lesser degree. He spread out in this way all over India, not in palaces only, or in select places or in assemblies, but in every hamlet and hut of the lowly and those who suffer. He lives in the hearts of millions and he will live for immemorial ages.

What then can we say about him except to feel humble on this occasion? To praise him we are not worthy—to praise him whom we could not follow adequately and sufficiently. It is almost doing him an injustice just to pass him by with words when he demanded work and labour and sacrifice from us; in a large measure he made this country, during the last thirty years or more, attain to heights of sacrifice which in that particular domain have never been equalled elsewhere. He succeeded in that. Yet ultimately things happened which no doubt made him suffer tremendously though his tender face never lost its smile and he never spoke a harsh word to anyone. Yet, he must have suffered—suffered for the failing of this generation whom he had trained, suffered because we went away from the path that he had

shown us. And ultimately the hand of a child of his—for he, after all, is as much a child of his as any other Indian—a hand of that child of his struck him down.

Long ages afterwards history will judge of this period that we have passed through. It will judge of the successes and the failures. We are too near it to be proper judges and to understand what has happened and what has not happened. All we know is that there was a glory and that it is no more ; all we know is that for the moment there is darkness, not so dark certainly, because when we look into our hearts we still find the living flame which he lighted there. And if those living flames exist, there will not be darkness in this land and we shall be able, with our effort, remembering him and following his path, to illumine this land again, small as we are, but still with the fire that he instilled into us.

He was perhaps the greatest symbol of the India of the past, and, may I say, of the India of the future, that we could have had. We stand on this perilous edge of the present between that past and the future to be, and we face all manner of perils and the greatest peril is sometimes the lack of faith which comes to us, the sense of frustration that comes to us, the sinking of the heart and of the spirit that comes to us when we see ideals go overboard, when we see the great things that we talked about somehow pass into empty words and life takes a different course. Yet, I do believe that perhaps this period will pass soon enough.

Great as this man of God was in his life, he has been great in his death and I have not the shadow of a doubt that by his death he has served the great cause as he served it throughout his life. We mourn him; we shall always mourn him, because we are human and cannot forget our beloved Master. But I know that he would not like us to mourn him. No tears came to his eyes when his dearest and closest passed away—only a firm resolve to persevere, to serve the great cause that he had chosen. So he would chide us if we merely mourn. That is a poor way of doing homage to him. The only way is to express our determination, to pledge ourselves anew, to conduct ourselves in a befitting manner and to dedicate ourselves to the great task which he undertook and which he accomplished to such a large extent. So we have to work, we have to labour, we have to sacrifice and thus prove, to some extent at least, worthy followers of his.

It is clear, as you said, Sir, that this happening, this tragedy, is not merely an isolated act of a madman.³ This comes out of a certain atmosphere of violence and hatred that has prevailed in this country for many months and years and more especially in the past few months. That atmosphere

3. The Speaker had said that mere condemnation of the terrorist act of a mad and misguided person was not enough. What every citizen had to ensure was that terrorism did not grow into a cult in the country.

envelops us and surrounds us and if we are to serve the cause he put before us, we have to face this atmosphere, to combat it, to struggle against it and root out the evil of hatred and violence.

So far as this Government is concerned, I trust they will spare no means, spare no effort to tackle it, because if we do not do that, if we, in our weakness or for any other reason that we may consider adequate, do not adopt effective means to stop this violence, to stop this spreading of hatred by word of mouth or writing or act, then indeed we are not worthy of being in this Government; we are certainly not worthy of being his followers and we are not worthy of even saying words of praise for this great soul who has departed. So on this occasion or any other when we think of this great Master who has gone, let us always think of him in terms of work and labour and sacrifice, in terms of fighting evil wherever we see it, in terms of holding to the truth as he put it before us, and if we do so, however unworthy we may be, we shall at least have done our duty and paid proper homage to his spirit.

He has gone, and all over India there is a feeling of having been left desolate and forlorn. All of us sense that feeling, and I do not know when we shall be able to get rid of it, and yet together with that feeling there is also a feeling of proud thankfulness that it has been given to us of this generation to be associated with this mighty person. In ages to come, centuries and may be millennia after us, people will think of this generation when this man of God trod on earth and will think of us who, however small, could also follow his path and tread the holy ground where his feet had been. Let us be worthy of him.

6. The Responsibility of the People¹

I want the communalists to come out into the open and face the public. The choice before the people is either to come to their senses or to perish.

For letting communal poison spread and a dangerous atmosphere prevail in the country, you and I are as much to blame as anyone else.

We had met at the same place some days ago to rejoice when Gandhiji broke his fast on the pledge to maintain communal peace being given by responsible people belonging to all communities and parties. We had then

1. Speech at a public meeting in New Delhi organised to mourn Mahatma Gandhi's death, 2 February 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 3 February 1948.

undertaken to fulfil the pledge. Who knew then that we would again meet here under such different circumstances?

The past three days have changed the entire face of the country. A mad man has shot Gandhiji. But what is the use of being angry with an individual? He will be tried under the law and punished. What we have to see is that how and why even one man among 40 crores of Indians dared to inflict this terrible wound on our country. How was an atmosphere created in which people like him dared call themselves Indians?

There are people who rejoiced over Gandhiji's death and distributed sweets.² It is a matter of shame to us that we allowed such tendencies to develop. If we do not act even now, they will destroy our country. Expression of grief alone will not achieve our object. If grief makes us prostrate and weakens our power then we will not be able to progress. We have to clear the present polluted atmosphere.

I have seen that during the past few months the minds of some of our young men have been poisoned by communalists. We have to crush all such elements. But if people want that we should not do this, they should say so and not deceive us by shouting false slogans of *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*. Many of us have been shouting *jai* to the Mahatma, but how many actually obey him and follow the path he showed us?

It is clear that we did not fully understand him. Whatever little we understood him and whatever of his teachings we put into practice enabled us to gain our freedom. We were merely petty instruments of the powerful forces which Gandhiji created in this country.

We, however, strayed from the right path after freedom was achieved and did many improper things. In Delhi too we did many shameful things.

Gandhiji came here because Delhi was to be the model for the whole of India. Apart from being the capital of India, Delhi represented the heart of India. He realised that what has happened here was bound to affect the whole of India. So he came to our city. He did not leave this place, though people of other parts of the country were anxious to have him amongst them.

He has sacrificed his life for Delhi. It is true that the man who is alleged to have murdered him came from Poona and that there are outsiders involved in the conspiracy. But it is also clear that there are local elements who helped in creating the existing communal atmosphere.

You have seen how during the past few months communalism was preached openly in newspapers, some newly started and others of long standing. Day after day communal virus was injected into the people. What punishment are you going to give to these people who have created the present poisonous atmosphere?

2. There were reports of distribution of sweets in Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi and in Assam.

We have to consider and decide what attitude we should adopt towards communal organisations. Are we going to turn our India into a country where people of different faiths have no place? This question has been before us for some time now. Recently a cry for Hindu Rashtra was raised by some organisations.³ It was one of the votaries of this demand for Hindu Rashtra who killed the greatest living Hindu. Was Hindu dharma protected by this foul deed?

To think of wreaking vengeance in the name of Gandhiji is not proper, but those who created the present atmosphere must be destroyed and crushed. Neither by shouting nor by taking the law into your hands³ can this be achieved. That way you will be hindering us and the wheels of justice from taking their course.

We pledged to maintain peace in the city. It is our first duty, particularly of those who live in Delhi, to stick to that pledge. If we do not fulfil that pledge, the martyrdom of Gandhiji will be in vain. It was he who, in recent months, brought order when the whole of the country was enveloped by the forces of darkness.

I do not know how we could have carried on if he had not been here during the past four or five months. Whenever I felt worried I went to him and drew inspiration from what he taught us. But for him I would not have been able to bear the heavy burden that has been placed on me.

The presence of a great man is a source of both strength and weakness among his followers, strength from what we learn from him and weakness because we lose self-confidence. We had been depending on him for everything. Though it is a difficult task, we have to be self-reliant. We have to follow his ideals. We have to clear our minds and act in a disciplined manner.

On behalf of the Government I assure you that those who preach communalism or maintain private armies will be destroyed. We have already paid a heavy price to the forces of communalism that have risen in our country. We cannot and will not tolerate it in the future.

The communalism of the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha has done much mischief and created much distress in India and we cannot tolerate any more the anti-national activities of any group. We are planning to create a secular state, where one community or group or party will not be permitted to usurp the rights of another.

In this task, we need the help of the people of India. We have faith in the basic goodness of the millions of our people. It may be clouded by something for some time but it is inherent in everybody. It was this faith that made Mahatma Gandhi undertake his last fast; and now will his death not bring it to the surface again?

3. Infuriated mobs had, in various parts of the country, attacked the offices and individuals belonging to the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S.

THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHATMA GANDHI

A great responsibility has fallen on the people of India. The eyes of the world are on us. We should not forget Gandhiji's teachings. His death has shaken the world. And the worst part of it is that one of his own children, an Indian, should have killed him.

7. To F.R.R. Bucher¹

New Delhi
3 February 1948

My dear General Bucher,

The ashes of Mahatma Gandhi are being sent to Allahabad for immersion at the junction of the Ganga and Jumna rivers. They will be sent from here by special train on the night of the 11th February and will reach Allahabad early on the morning of the 12th. It is proposed to take them in procession from the railway station direct to the river bank. There are likely to be large crowds. This is *mela* time in Allahabad² and this will add to the crowds. I think it will be desirable to make arrangements in Allahabad for the procession more or less similar to those we made in Delhi. This means that the military should play a large part in making these arrangements and in the procession. I suggest that you might inform the military authorities in that area and ask them to confer with the civil authorities as well as the non-officials who are helping in organising this procession, etc.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. *Kumbha mela* is celebrated once in twelve years at Allahabad, Hardwar, Ujjain and Nasik by turns.

8. The Site of Cremation¹

The surface of the platform on which Mahatma Gandhi's body was cremated

1. Nehru's proposal contained in this undated note was accepted by the Cabinet at its meeting on 3 February 1948. File No. 2 (525)/50-PMS.

may be cemented in order that people in search of sacred earth from the spot will not be able to tamper with it. I also suggest the construction of a two-foot-high wall with a railing on top, around the platform at a distance of 15 feet away from it.² In view of the fact that the place is liable to be flooded about once in 17-18 years, as also for other reasons, it is not desirable to construct any building on the cremation site. It will, however, be in the fitness of things to immediately lay out a park and erect a column, the design of which may be prepared by an artist such as Mr. Nandalal Bose. The area of the park might be about 100 acres.

2. A quadrangular platform was raised on the cremation site at Rajghat in Delhi.

9. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
4 February 1948

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

You will remember my writing to you some days ago about the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha or their leaders which were embarrassing alike to you and me.² You were going to Calcutta about that time and you told me that you yourself were worried over this matter and that you would discuss it on your return.

2. Since then a great tragedy has taken place and the situation has infinitely worsened. The Hindu Mahasabha is associated in people's minds in some ways with this tragedy and, as you know, there is a great deal of excitement in the country.

3. Whatever our attitude to the Hindu Mahasabha might be, the question I raised in my last letter to you faces us still and with greater intensity. Already members of our party in the Assembly are asking me this question and insist on an answer. It is very probable that they might raise it at the party meeting this afternoon.

4. I myself am convinced that the day for communal organisations in politics is past and we should not encourage them in any way. In particular it is difficult and embarrassing for all concerned for a Minister of the Central

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, section 1, item 29.

Government to be personally associated with a communal organisation like the Hindu Mahasabha which, even on the political plane, is opposed to our general policy and indeed to the Government as a whole.

5. You must have given thought to these matters. It is a little difficult for me to advise you, but, if I may do so, I think that the time has come for you to raise your voice against communal organisations including the Mahasabha and, in any event, to sever your connection with the Hindu Mahasabha. Any such action from you would be greatly appreciated by the party and, I think, the country.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
5 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

It appears that considerable numbers of prominent R.S.S. people have gone to some of the States, notably Bharatpur and Alwar. They have also taken a good deal of material with them of various kinds. It is possible that they might organise bases there for the purpose of carrying on secret activities elsewhere. Would it not be possible to get the State Governments to ban the organisation?² In any event, it seems desirable to ask them to do so.

I understand that the R.S.S. in Delhi have started open-air *Gita* classes which really are meant for them to meet and confer together.

I think it would be worthwhile for us to consider the banning of the Muslim National Guards and the Khaksars.³ Khaksars more or less went underground some time ago and have not functioned in public since then. But they have been a mischievous lot and may give trouble in future. So also the Muslim National Guards. Neither is aggressive at present. But the potentialities of mischief are there. In view of our decision against private armies we might take action against their organisation. If you agree,

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 31-32.

2. In reply Patel said that telegrams had already been sent to all the bigger States, including Bharatpur and Alwar, asking them to ban the organisation.

3. Patel agreed with this and both these organisations were declared unlawful by the Government of India on 8 February 1948.

we might consider this matter at the next Cabinet meeting, day after tomorrow.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

11. The Perfect Artist¹

Nineteen-sixteen. Over thirty-two years ago. That was when I first saw Bapu, and an age has gone by since then. Inevitably one looks back and memories crowd in. What a strange period this has been in India's history and the story, with all its ups and downs and triumphs and defeats, has the quality of a ballad and a romance. Even our trivial lives were touched by a halo of romance, because we lived through this period and were actors, in greater or lesser degree, in the great drama of India.

This period has been full of wars and upheavals and stirring events all over the world. Yet events in India stand out in a distinctive outline because they were on an entirely different plane. If a person studied this period without knowing much of Bapu he would wonder how and why all this happened in India. It is difficult to explain it; it is even difficult to understand by the cold light of reason why each one of us behaved as he or she did. It sometimes happens that an individual or even a nation is swept away by some gust of emotion or feeling into a particular type of action, sometimes noble action, more often ignoble action. But that passion and feeling pass and the individual soon returns to his normal levels of action and inaction.

The surprising thing about India during this period was not only that the country as a whole functioned on a high plane, but also that it functioned more or less continuously for a lengthy period on that plane. That indeed was a remarkable achievement. It cannot easily be explained or understood unless one looks upon the astonishing personality that moulded this period. Like a colossus he stands astride half a century of India's history, a colossus not of the body but of the mind and spirit.

We mourn for Bapu and feel orphaned. Looking back at his magnificent life, what is there to mourn for? Surely to very, very few human beings in history could it have been given to find so much fulfilment in their own lives. He was sad for our failures and unhappy at not having raised India to greater heights. That sadness and unhappiness are easy to understand. Yet who dare say that his life was a failure? Whatever he touched he turned

1. Written on 5 February 1948 and published in *Harjan*, 15 February 1948.



ANNOUNCING THE DEATH OF MAHATMA GANDHI FROM BIRLA
HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 30 JANUARY 1948



MAHATMA GANDHI'S FUNERAL PROCESSION, NEW DELHI,
31 JANUARY 1948

into something worthwhile and precious. Whatever he did yielded substantial results, though perhaps not as great as he hoped for. One carried away the impression that he could not really fail in anything that he attempted. According to the teachings of the *Gita*, he laboured dispassionately without caring too much for results, and so results came to him.

During his long life, full of hard work and activity and novel adventures out of the common rut, there is hardly any jarring note anywhere. All his manifold activities became progressively a symphony and every word he spoke and every gesture that he made fitted into this and so unconsciously he became the perfect artist for he had learnt the art of living, though the way of life he had adopted was very different from the world's way. It became apparent that the pursuit of truth and goodness leads among other things to this artistry in life.

As he grew older his body seemed to be just a vehicle for the mighty spirit within him. Almost one forgot the body as one listened to him or looked at him, and so where he sat became a temple and where he trod was hallowed ground.

Even in his death there was a magnificence and complete artistry. It was from every point of view a fitting climax to the man and to the life he had lived. Indeed, it heightened the lesson of his life. He died in the fullness of his powers and, as he would no doubt have liked to die, at the moment of prayer. He died a martyr to the cause of unity to which he had always been devoted and for which he had worked unceasingly, more specially during the past year or more. He died suddenly as all men should wish to die. There was no fading away of the body or a long illness or the forgetfulness of the mind that comes with age. Why then should we grieve for him? Our memories of him will be of the Master, whose step was light to the end, whose smile was infectious and whose eyes were full of laughter. We shall associate no tailing powers with him of body or mind. He lived and he died at the top of his strength and powers, leaving a picture in our minds and in the mind of the age that we live in that can never fade away.

That picture will not fade. But he did something much more than that, for he entered into the very stuff of our minds and spirits and changed them and moulded them. The Gandhi generation will pass away, but that stuff will remain and will affect each succeeding generation, for it has become a part of India's spirit. Just when we were growing poor in spirit in this country, Bapu came to enrich us and make us strong, and the strength he gave us was not for a moment or a day or a year but it was something added on to our national inheritance.

Bapu has done a giant's work for India and the world and even for our poor selves, and he has done it astonishingly well. And now it is our turn not to fail him or his memory but to carry on the work to the best of our ability and to fulfil the pledges we have so often taken.

12. The Constructive Role of the Mahatma¹

All human activities can be divided into two broad categories, that is, destructive and constructive. The energies of a vast majority of people are directed in destroying things rather than building them. Mahatma Gandhi was one of those very few who invariably aimed at construction.

He fought against evil and falsehood all his life, but though he was a fighter, he was a constructive soldier and not a destructive one. The aim before him was never to destroy or annihilate the enemy but to bring about a change in him and to win him over to his side.

The best proof of our love for Mahatma Gandhi and a befitting monument to his greatness is for the people to imbibe the same spirit and to develop an attribute of friendliness and understanding towards one another.

India is fortunate in having one of the greatest figures in world history, someone whose greatness will be acknowledged by all countries and in all ages, and yet it is unfortunate that she cannot take full advantage of what he preached. Gandhiji was loved and revered not only in his own country but throughout the world and it was no mean achievement to find a place in the heart of humanity. Gandhiji wielded a power which was essentially spiritual and proved to the world that ultimately spiritual power was more potent than the physical one.

1. Speech at a Sikh gathering to mourn the death of Mahatma Gandhi, New Delhi, 8 February 1948. From *The Statesman*, 9 February 1948.

13. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
9 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your 4 letters of 9 February dealing with the Warrant of Precedence, the question of honours and awards for India,² Gopaldaswami's

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 380-381.
2. Patel had suggested that gallantry awards and honours be instituted for the military and a very restricted order instituted in the civil sphere for literature, art and science, police gallantry and civilian bravery.

telegram about the Security Council proceedings, and Dr. Gopichand Bhargava's reference about Desh Sewak Sena.³

I have nothing to suggest about the action you are taking in these various matters. I might mention however that I had a talk with the Governor-General about the Security Council and I believe he has taken some action in the matter also.

I might mention that I have received some reports from Amritsar to the effect that the R.S.S. people are openly defying orders by bringing out processions etc. and challenging arrest. Their chief men have already gone underground, but others have decided to carry out a programme of defence. I have been further informed that the Akali Party in Amritsar is of opinion that no strong action should be taken against the R.S.S. there. One other fact that I should like to bring to your notice is that one of the chief organisers of the R.S.S. in Amritsar and indeed in East Punjab—he is, I believe, the Chief Provincial *Sanchalak*—is said to be Rai Bahadur Badri Das.⁴ This gentleman has recently been appointed, or is going to be appointed, the Vice-Chancellor of the East Punjab University.⁵ If these facts are correct then his appointment appears to be undesirable. Indeed, some step might have been taken against him. Perhaps you will kindly inquire into this.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Bhargava had written to Patel informing him that, though the Government had banned private armies, General Mohan Singh, formerly of the I.N.A., had not disbanded a private army called the Desh Sewak Sena started by him.
4. (1874-1972); lawyer; President, Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab, for 30 years.
5. Bhargava informed Nehru on 14 February that Justice Teja Singh had been appointed Vice-Chancellor of the East Punjab University.

14. To M.C. Mahajan¹

New Delhi
10 February 1948

My dear Dr. Mahajan,
Thank you for your letter of January 31st which has only just reached me.

1. J.N. Collection.

I have learnt that in Jammu there was a hartal because of Savarkar's arrest.² I am sorry to learn this as it denotes a certain sympathy with those who are supposed to be associated with Gandhiji's assassination.

After a long while some good news has come from the military front at Naushahra. This should make some difference to people's morale.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. V.D. Savarkar was arrested on 5 February 1948 on the charge of involvement in the conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi.

15. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
11 February 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I am concerned to learn that the R.S.S. people in Amritsar have been taking out processions, shouting slogans, and generally defying the orders of Government. So far as I know, nowhere else in India has this kind of thing happened since the ban was imposed. All over India the reaction to the Governmental ban of the R.S.S. has been one of very great approval.² Indeed, public opinion had gone ahead of the Government in this matter. It is surprising, therefore, that in Amritsar anyone should dare to behave in the manner reported.

2. I trust that the local authorities and the police in Amritsar are not showing any weakness in dealing with the situation. That would be fatal and cannot be tolerated. The only way to deal with such a situation is swift and stern measures. Possibly some innocent people might suffer. That will be unfortunate. But it cannot be helped. We have had suffering enough already in India because of the activities of the R.S.S. and like groups. I trust, therefore, that your Government will make it perfectly

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 4 February 1948 the R.S.S. was declared unlawful throughout India. A press communique stated that the cult of violence sponsored and inspired by the R.S.S. had claimed many lives, the latest and the most precious of all being that of Mahatma Gandhi. About 25,000 men sympathetic to the Hindu Mahasabha were arrested all over the country.

clear by the action it takes that any person sympathising with the R.S.S. at this juncture will have to face the stern displeasure of Government. These people have the blood of Mahatma Gandhi on their hands, and pious disclaimers and dissociation now have no meaning.

3. You will have seen that the Government of India has not hesitated to take action in regard to two States³ connected with the R.S.S.

4. I understand that the East Punjab provincial head of the R.S.S., Rai Bahadur Badri Nath,⁴ has been appointed Vice-Chancellor of the University. I am told that he has resigned from the R.S.S. Whether he has resigned or not does not make much difference. A person who has been so identified with the R.S.S. cannot be placed in any responsible position. This will have the worst possible reaction in the rest of India.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 7 February 1948, the Maharaja and the Prime Minister of Alwar had been asked to remain outside the State and a new State Administrator was appointed in Bharatpur by the Government of India.

4. In fact, Nehru had in mind Rai Bahadur Badri Das.

16. The Last Journey¹

The last journey has ended. The final pilgrimage has been made. For over fifty years Mahatma Gandhi wandered all over our great country from the Himalayas and the North West Frontier and the Brahmaputra in the north-east to Kanyakumari in the far south. He visited every part of the country, not for pleasure but to understand and serve the people. Perhaps no other Indian has travelled so extensively in the country or got to know and served her people so well. And now his journey in this world is over, though we have still to go a long way. Some grieve over his passing away, and this is natural and proper. But why should we grieve? Do we grieve for him

1. Speech on the occasion of the immersion of Mahatma Gandhi's ashes at *Triveni*, the confluence of three rivers—Ganga, Jumna and Saraswati—at Allahabad, 12 February 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi.)

or for something else? In his life, as in his death, he lent a radiance to our country which will keep it always illumined. Why then should we grieve for him? Yes, we rather grieve for ourselves, for our own weaknesses, for the ill-will in our hearts, for our conflicts with others. We have to remember that it was to remove all these that Mahatma Gandhi sacrificed his life. It was this problem which had gripped him during these last few months. We honour him not for his name alone, but for what he stood for, what he taught us, and especially what he died for.

Let us, standing here on the banks of the Ganga, at the *Triveni*, search our own hearts and ask ourselves the question: how far have we done our duty, how far have we followed his path, how far have we tried to live in peace and cooperation with others? If we think about this and even now we follow the right path, it will be well with us and well with our country.

Our country gave birth to a great man. He shone like a beacon not only for our country but for the whole world. And yet he was done to death by one of our own brothers. How did this happen? You might think that it was an act of madness. But that does not explain this tragedy. It could only occur because a seed of poison had been sown in our hearts against one another—a poison of enmity and hatred—and such acts affected the country and affected so many of our people. Now it is our duty to put an end to this poison of hatred and ill-will. If we have learnt anything from the Mahatma, we must bear no enmity towards any person. An individual is not our enemy. It is the poison within him that we must fight and root out. We are weak but Gandhiji's strength passed into us and we have acquired some stature, living in his shadow. In his reflected glory we seemed to have acquired some strength. But the real strength and glory were his and the path he showed was also his. We stumbled often enough and fell down in our attempts to tread that path and so could to some service to the country.

Now our pillar of strength and support is no more. But how can I say this? There are lakhs here and millions in the country in whose hearts the Mahatma's image is enshrined. Future generations of our people, who have not seen him or heard him, will also have that image in their hearts because that image is now a part of India's inheritance and history.

The Gandhian era, which began thirty or forty years ago in India, has, in a sense, come to an end today. And yet I am wrong, for it has not ended. Perhaps it is, in a way, just beginning. Thus far we have been leaning on him for advice and support; from now onwards we have to stand on our own feet, taking, of course, the support of his teachings, and rely on ourselves. May his memory and his teachings light our path! Remember his last lesson, his message, which was that we should be free from fear. He taught us constantly to root out all fear and enmity from our hearts, live in peace with one another and keep our country free.

He led our country to freedom and the world marvelled at the way he

did it. But at the very moment of gaining our freedom we forgot his lesson. We were misled. We fought with one another and disgraced our country. Many of our youths shouted all kinds of slogans and took to the wrong path. Are we to drive them away and crush them? But they are still our own people and we have to win them over.

I want to tell you that this communal poison which keeps Hindus against Muslims and Muslims against Hindus or Sikhs, whether it springs from religious fervour or in the name of religion, it will end our freedom if we are not vigilant. It was to awaken us to this impending danger that Gandhiji undertook his last fast two or three weeks ago. This aroused the nation's conscience and we and other representatives of the people pledged to behave better. It was only then that he gave up his fast. Gandhiji used to observe silence for one day in every week. Who knew that an unending silence and fasting were to begin now that his voice is silenced for ever.

His last lesson was that of putting an end to all this fighting and killing and we must keep this lesson in mind. For his assassination is a grim warning of what can happen. Why was such a great man murdered? It was because some people did not agree with him politically. This is a most dangerous path. For Swaraj means that we should try to understand one another and work by persuasion. People should choose their representatives and their decisions should be implemented. If we do not work by persuasion but use violence against one another, then the very nation gets destroyed.

I see many soldiers of the Indian Army in the audience. It is their duty to defend their country. If they were to quarrel among themselves, what would their strength be worth and how could they serve their country? True Swaraj demands mutual consultation and harmonious living.

Democracy demands discipline, tolerance and mutual regard. Freedom demands respect for the freedom of others. In a democracy changes are made by mutual discussion and persuasion and not by violent means. If a government has no popular support, another government which commands that popular support takes its place. It is only small groups who know that they cannot get sufficient popular support that resort to methods of violence, imagining in their folly that they can gain their ends in this way. This is not only utterly wrong but it is also quite foolish. For the reaction to the violence of the minority, which seeks to coerce the majority, is to provoke the majority into violence against it.

This great tragedy has happened because many persons, including some in high places, have poisoned the atmosphere of this country of ours. It is the duty of the Government as well as the people to root out this poison. We have had our lesson at a terrible cost. Is there anyone amongst us now who will not pledge himself after Gandhiji's death to fulfil his mission—a mission for which the greatest man of our country, the greatest man in the world, has laid down his life?

And now you and I and all of us will go back from the banks of the Ganga. We shall feel sad and lonely. We shall never see Gandhiji again. We used to run to him for advice and guidance whenever we faced any great problems or were in doubt or disturbed. There is no one to give us advice now or to share our burdens. It is not I alone or a few of us who looked up to him for help. Millions of our countrymen considered him a friend. We went to him as though we were his children. Rightly did he come to be known as the Father of the Nation. In millions of homes in the country today there is mourning as on the passing away of a beloved father.

We shall go away from here, sad and lonely, but with a sense of pride because of the realisation that our country produced such a noble personality. He led our country to great heights, along a unique path to freedom and truth. The path he showed us was one of fighting for the good. It is not the way of sitting quietly on a Himalayan peak. He was always ready to fight for right causes. But his battle was one of truth, nonviolence and peace—and yet it was a battle by which he set forty crores of people free. We cannot, therefore, remain passive. We have our obligations to fulfil and the duty to perform to which we have pledged ourselves. That duty is to eradicate this poison, follow the path of truth, and build such a free country, where all individuals of every faith, can live in harmony. It should be a country which will set an example to the rest of the world. If we take this pledge we shall have learnt a great lesson. If we fail, it will be said that a great man came among us but the people were not worthy of him, they could not understand his greatness.

How often, in the last thirty or forty years, we have shouted *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai* ! Yet it hurt Gandhiji to hear that slogan. What victory could we wish him? He was already the victorious one. It is you and I, and this unfortunate country, who have still to struggle for victory. Even a thousand years hence people will remember him because he was the victorious one. He desired my and your victory. To raise the people of this country, especially the poor, the downtrodden, the kisans and our Harijan brothers, was the mission of his life. In working for them he adopted their ways of life and dress which were in accord with the lifestyle of the weak and the poor people. He often spoke of the *Daridranarayan*.² It was in this way that he worked for the victory of the people. No one can give us this victory. We have to work for it through our own efforts. He taught us the way to triumph. He taught us the kind of triumph that he wished for us—not the superficial triumph for which most people and countries strive through violence, treachery and evil means. That kind of victory is always short-lived. Gandhiji wanted a victory that would rest on the foundation of truth which, no matter how high we built the structure upon it, would

not collapse. Today the world is in a state of political flux—some countries are rising, others are going down. Untruth, turmoil and deceit characterise the politics of the world today. Gandhiji taught us a different kind of method—a new method of struggle and warfare. He demonstrated the efficacy of truth, of nonviolence and of living for one another. He taught us to respect the many religions which have been in this country for a long time and are not foreign. We all belong to India, and we are all brothers and sisters and must live in harmony. We are all equal partners in the freedom that we have won. We have no right to encroach on the rights of others or to deprive others of their share. All Indians—30 or 40 crores—should have an equal right to opportunities and blessings that free India has to offer. We do not want a handful of rich men to take the major share and leave the rest of the people poor. This was not the Swaraj that the Mahatma envisaged. It is not easy to achieve that Swaraj for the people but we are slowly striving in that direction, drawing sometimes upon Gandhiji's teachings and supported by his strength and ideal.

Now, with his last lesson in mind, we must strive for the same ideal more vigorously, destroying all evils in the path. Only then can we, in truth and honesty, be worthy to say *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*.

17. Telegram to G.B. Pant¹

May I express my deep appreciation to you and your Government for the excellent arrangements made in Allahabad today for the ceremonies connected with the immersion of Mahatmaji's *asthi*? The journey of the ashes from Delhi to Allahabad by special train attracted, as it was bound to do, vast number of people who wished to pay their homage to Gandhiji. The Railway Board and the U.P. Government have to be congratulated on a fine piece of organisation.

In Allahabad again vast crowds collected on the route and on the river-side. The procession and other ceremonies took place in an orderly and solemn manner befitting the occasion. The burden of these arrangements fell on you and your Government and I am grateful to all those concerned for the help they rendered on this historic occasion.

I shall be glad if you will convey my thanks to the district authorities, to the military and the police as well as others, officials and non-officials,

1. New Delhi, 12 February 1948. From *The Hindu*, 14 February 1948.

who cooperated in this great task. To you personally I am most grateful. I should like to add my tribute to the vast numbers of people who came to pay their homage in an orderly and disciplined manner. May this magnificent tribute to the Father of the Nation be followed by a single-minded endeavour to work in a united way to fulfil the great tasks he has set us!

18. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
13 February 1948

My dear Amrit,

I have your letter enclosing the letter from Lady Parmoor. I have shown both these letters to Sardar Patel. He is strongly of opinion that it would be inadvisable for you to see Godse² in prison. This might lead to all manner of insinuations and unfortunate consequences. I think he is right. If you feel like it you can discuss this matter further with him. I am returning Lady Parmoor's letter.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Nathuram Vinayak Godse (1912-1949); an active member of the R.S.S. and Hindu Mahasabha; editor, *Hindu Rashtra*, a Marathi daily published from Pune; hanged on 15 November 1949 for the murder of Mahatma Gandhi.

19. The Immortal Message¹

Friends and Comrades,

Two weeks have passed since India and the world learnt of that tragedy which will shame India for ages to come. Two weeks of sorrow and searching of heart, and strong and dormant emotions rising in a flood of tears from millions of eyes. Would that those tears had washed away our weakness and littleness and made us a little worthy of the Master for whom we sorrow?

1. Broadcast from New Delhi, 14 February 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

Two weeks of homage and tribute from every corner of the globe, from kings and potentates and those in high authority to the common man everywhere, who instinctively looked to him as a friend, a comrade and a champion. The flood of emotion will tone down gradually as all such emotions do, though none of us can ever be the same as we were before, for he has entered in the very texture of our lives and minds. People talk of memorials to him, in statues of bronze or marble or pillars of stone, and thus they mock him and belie his message. What tribute shall we pay to him that he would have appreciated? He has shown us the way to live and the way to die and if we have not understood that lesson, it would be better that we raised no memorial to him, for the only fitting memorial is to follow reverently the path he showed us, and to do our duty in life and in death.

He was a Hindu and an Indian, the greatest in many generations, and he was proud of being a Hindu and an Indian. To him India was dear, because she had represented throughout the ages certain immutable truths. But though he was intensely religious and came to be called the Father of the Nation which he had liberated, yet no narrow religious or national bonds confined his spirit. And so he became the great internationalist, believing in the essential unity of men, the underlying unity of all religions, and the needs of humanity, and more specially devoting himself to the service of the poor, the distressed and the oppressed millions everywhere. His death brought more tributes than have been paid at the passing away of any other human being in history. Perhaps what would have pleased him best were the spontaneous tributes that came from the people of Pakistan.² On the morrow of the tragedy, all of us forgot for a while the bitterness that had crept in, the estrangement and conflict of these past months, and Gandhiji stood out as the beloved champion and leader of the people of India, of India as it was before partition cut up this living nation. What was his great power over the mind and heart of man due to? Ages to come will judge and we are too near him to assess the many facets of his extraordinarily rich personality. But even we realise that his dominating passion was truth. That truth led him to proclaim, without ceasing, that good ends can never be attained by evil methods, that the end itself is distorted if the method pursued is bad. That truth led him to confess publicly whenever he thought he had made a mistake—Himalayan errors he called some of his own mistakes. That truth led him to fight evil and untruth wherever he found them regardless of the consequences. That truth made the service of the poor and the dispossessed the passion of his life, for where there is inequality and discrimination

2. At a meeting on 31 January in Karachi, about 25,000 Muslims mourned the death of Mahatma Gandhi. Major Yusuf Ismail, President of the Pakistan Islamic Council Conference, and other prominent leaders paid tributes. The Government of Pakistan brought out a special gazette with black borders.

and suppression, there is injustice and evil and untruth. And thus he became the beloved of all those who have suffered from social and political evils, and the great representative of humanity as it should be. Because of that truth in him, wherever he sat that place became a temple and where he trod it became a hallowed ground.

His physical body has left us and we shall never see him again or hear his gentle voice or run to him for counsel. But this imperishable memory and immortal message remain with us. How can we honour them and live up to them ? He was the great unifier in India, who taught us not only a bare tolerance of others but a willing acceptance of them as our friends and comrades in common undertakings. He taught us to rise above our little selves and prejudices and see the good in others. His last few months and his very death symbolise to us this message of large-hearted tolerance and unity. A little before he died we pledged ourselves to this before him, We must keep that pledge and remember that India is a common home to all those who live here, to whatever religion they may belong. They are equal sharers in our great inheritance and they have equal rights and obligations. Ours is a composite nation, as all great nations must necessarily be. Any narrowness in outlook, any attempt to confine the bounds of this great nation, will be a betrayal of his final lesson to us and will surely lead to disaster and to the loss of that freedom, for which he laboured and which he gained for us in large measure.

Equally important is the service of the common man in India who has suffered so much in the past. His claims must be paramount and everything that comes in the way of his betterment must have a second place. Not merely on moral and humanitarian grounds but also from the point of view of political commonsense, has it become essential to raise the standard of the common man and to give him full opportunity of progress. A social structure which denies him this opportunity stands self-condemned and must be changed.

Gandhiji has gone, though his flaming spirit envelops us. The burden is upon us now and the immediate need is that we should endeavour to the utmost of our ability to discharge that burden. We have to hold together and fight that terrible poison of communalism that has killed the greatest man of our age. We must root this out not in any spirit of ill-will to misguided individuals, but in militant opposition to the evil itself, wherever it may be. That evil has not ended with the killing of Gandhiji. It was an even more shameful thing for some people to celebrate this killing in various ways. Those who did so or feel that way have forfeited their right to be called Indians.

I have said that we must all hold together in this hour of crisis for our nation and must avoid public controversy as far as possible and lay stress on the points of agreement on essential matters. I would make a special

appeal to the press to help in this urgent task and to avoid personal or other criticisms, which encourage fissiparous tendencies in the country. I would appeal, more specially, to the millions of my colleagues and comrades in the Congress, who have followed, often haltingly enough, the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. It has distressed me beyond measure to read in newspapers and otherwise learn of whisperings about vital differences between Sardar Patel and myself. Of course, there have been, for many years past, differences between us, temperamental or other, in regard to many problems. But India, at least, should know that these differences have been overshadowed by fundamental agreements about the most important aspects of our public life, and that we have cooperated together, for a quarter of a century or more, in great undertakings. We have been sharers in joy and sorrow alike. Is it likely that at this crisis in our national destiny either of us would be petty-minded and think of anything but the national good? May I pay my tribute of respect and admiration to Sardar Patel, not only for his life-long service to the nation, but also for the great work he has done since he and I have served together in the Government of India? He has been a brave captain of our people in war and peace, stout-hearted when others might have wavered, and a great organiser. It has been my privilege to have been associated with him for these many years and my affection for him and appreciation of his great qualities have grown with the passing of time.

Recently certain reports appeared in the public press which were unauthorised and which led people to believe that I had used strong language to criticise my old friend and colleague, Jayaprakash Narayan. These reports were incorrect. I should like to say that I have deeply regretted some of the policies pursued by the Socialist Party in India, and I think that they have been led by the stress of events or emotion into wrong actions and wrong statements. But I have never had any doubt about the ability and integrity of Jayaprakash Narayan whom I value as a friend and I am sure that a time will come when he will play a very important part in shaping India's destiny. Unfortunately, the Socialist Party has adopted rather negative policies for a long time and has often ignored wider considerations which must be given priority.

I plead, therefore, for tolerance and cooperation in our public life and the joining together of all the forces, which want to make India a great and progressive nation. I plead for an all-out effort against the poison of communalism and narrow provincialism. I plead for a cessation of industrial conflict and joint endeavour of all concerned to build up India. In these great tasks, I pledge myself and I earnestly trust that it may be given to us of this generation to realise somewhat the dreams that Gandhiji had. Thus, will we honour his memory and erect a worthy memorial to him. *Jai Hind.*

20. To the Maharaja of Dholpur¹

21 February 1948

My dear Maharaja Sahab,²

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd February. It is now three weeks since Gandhiji died and as time passes the realisation of what we have lost becomes keener. Yet I feel sure that great men live in other ways than in the physical body, and Gandhiji will in a sense be intensely alive in India for a long time to come.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Udai Bhan Singh (1893-1954); succeeded as Maharaja in 1911; Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes for some years.

21. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No. 3943. Devadas Gandhi informs me that he gave a small quantity of Gandhiji's ashes to Katial² for him to keep personally making it clear that there must be no ceremony or publicity and further adding that any future ceremony would necessarily have to be sponsored by High Commissioner. Devadas is telegraphing to Katial accordingly reminding him of this. We are strongly opposed to ashes being scattered in Thames or any other place in England. Please inform Katial and Bhandari³ that this must not take place and there should be no other ceremony either.

1. 21 February 1948. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. C.L. Katial (b. 1898); practising physician in London, 1927-48; Director-General, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, July 1948-July 1953.

3. P.C. Bhandari.

22. The Purge of Communalism¹

The people in East Punjab have been talking in excitement of attacking Pakistan. Such talk is childish. If such speeches are reported it would be the duty of the administration to prevent such wild talks. We are not afraid of anyone however big he may be. It is childish to say that we have to conquer Lahore and attack Pakistan. At the same time I may say that we are not afraid of any aggression. We are not afraid of war. You have seen this morning what an excellent army we have got. It is not there to attack any country but to defend our country.

Let us realise our responsibilities and do our duty towards our people and country. Every soldier, or every one of us, does not belong to one province, but we are sons of the same soil born to serve India. We should rightly understand the real meaning of freedom. We have gained freedom and we must do such things as may win us the respect of the whole world and give us an honourable and rightful place in the comity of nations.

We cannot tolerate those who spread poison. Communalists must go. External and internal enemies must be faced with determination and courage. Let there be no blot on our fair name. We must realise our responsibilities at this critical juncture.

You must search your hearts and find out what led to the abominable act of assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. If we could not save the life of the most precious person, how can we save the life of a humble citizen? It is, therefore, our duty to purge the country of the poison of communalism that has led to the assassination of Gandhiji.

We are all responsible for this unprecedented tragedy. We have lost the world's greatest man. Our heads hang in shame that we could not protect him and save his life, though we always cried *Gandhiji ki jai*. Let us remove our weaknesses and be guilty of no more lapses which weaken our strength. Let us follow Gandhiji's footsteps. He showed us the right path. He was our guiding light.

Maintain peace at all costs as that is our duty. Gandhiji's death shook the whole world as well as India. Our mourning should goad us to constructive efforts. We must build up our country on firmer foundations. No more bloodshed, no more intolerance towards any caste or community, no more sectarianism. Mad men are born in a bad atmosphere. We must purify that atmosphere if we have to save India. The army has to play a significant

1. Speech at ceremonial army parade attended by about two lakh people at Jullundur, 24 February 1948. Based on reports in *The Tribune*, 25 February and *The Hindustan Times*, 26 February 1948.

role in accomplishing this gigantic task. The testing time has come. Yours is a great army. You and the people of India have to march together to serve each other. With courage you have to save India's honour.

It is the demand for separate electorates which brought this calamity. Under the new constitution separate electorates will have no place.² The most we can agree to is to keep this system for some community for two or three years on the understanding that it will be completely removed afterwards. The Akalis are demanding weightage.³ Those who want weightage are demanding it at the expense of others. This question is now engaging our attention. But I am personally against any kind of weightage for any community. The time for such demands is now over. They have now to make demands as Indians for the whole people. I never expected such demands at least from such a powerful community as the Sikhs. A powerful and advanced community should only demand freedom to progress.

I have come here after five and a half months. In comparison to conditions prevailing now this period appears to be most dreadful. Many of you have suffered during these five and a half months. We have now to consider dispassionately what led to those dreadful days and how we can prevent in future a repetition of these ghastly events. We know how they happened. But such things as happened then are so savage that doubts have arisen in my mind whether we are fit for freedom, for free nations do not indulge in such violence as took place in the Punjab. Now we have realised our folly but have paid a very heavy price in men and material.

The question then arises, why did people go mad? I do not challenge the allegation that it was the fault of Pakistan or the Muslim League, but we should not fall from the high standards set by us by repeating the same mistakes of the Muslim League. I want all of you to think coolly what weaknesses have crept into us that such events should have taken place.

The assassination of Gandhiji took place as a result of a certain type of trend. Why was that trend allowed to take roots? It is alleged that when Gandhiji was assassinated some people in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Assam distributed sweets. I cannot understand this kind of mentality in our people. Even at the death of an enemy such a behaviour cannot be seen.

2. On 23 July 1947, the Minorities Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly had decided to abandon separate electorates and adopt the system of joint electorates.
3. The Akali memorandum to the Minority Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly demanded that the Sikhs be granted separate electorates and have half the number of seats in the East Punjab Legislature and 5 per cent in the Central Legislature reserved for them. It also demanded reservation of seats in the U.P. and Delhi, grant to their Scheduled Castes of same concessions as to other Scheduled Castes and "statutory reservation of certain proportions" in the Army.

Why did it happen in the case of a very big personality of the world? It is because communalism has taken deep roots in our land.

It is true that the seed of communalism was sown by the Muslim League. During the past year and a half the Muslim League spread hatred and violence. The events that took place were the result of the policy of the Muslim League. Certain organisations in India not only copied that policy but even went a few steps ahead. I do not think I can advise the people on the other side, but I would ask the people on this side not to take to violence. They should adopt a democratic method to convert their opponents.

I have been told that at some places members of the R.S.S. dishonoured the National Flag. They know well that by disgracing the National Flag they are proving themselves as traitors. I warn that anybody who behaves in such a manner will have to meet the full force of the Government. It is the duty of the Government to suppress such activities.

The Government have arrested some persons and put them in jails and have declared two or three organisations unlawful. If by these actions of the Government it is thought that the whole thing is over then people are mistaken. We have to uproot this despicable communalism. It must be obliterated from this land so that it may not take roots again. This poison has so much permeated the land that more arrests and declaration of certain organisations as unlawful are not enough. Communalism should disappear from this land entirely and for this the Government want your cooperation.

If a Hindu thinks that he can save his community at the expense of other communities then he is thoroughly mistaken. The same holds good in the case of persons belonging to other communities also. It was this feeling of getting something at the expense of other communities that kept us slaves so long.

I appeal for the cooperation of all with the Government programme of eradicating poverty from the land and raising the standard of living by increased production. The Punjab has become poor as a result of turmoil in the past five or six months. Punjabis must now settle down to increase production in agriculture and industry.

It is a disgrace that people of India could not save Mahatma Gandhi. If they had marched along the path shown by that great leader even during the past six months they could have progressed so much that India would have stood among the five or six greatest countries of the world. The assassination of Gandhiji has left us heart-broken. If only we follow his footsteps India can soon rank among the greatest countries of the world.

23. The Most Worthy Memorial¹

Every part of India is naturally desirous of erecting some memorial to Mahatma Gandhi. Provincial Governments, State Governments, municipalities and local boards, other public bodies and private individuals are all eager to erect their own memorials. Proposals have been made for all kinds of structures, from temples to statues. In a recent statement Sardar Patel said that he deplored with all the emphasis at his command the many attempts that were being made to raise temples or erect memorials which would savour of idolatry. This would surely have displeased Gandhiji and indeed he had often expressed his views on such matters in forcible language.

It seems obvious that the most suitable memorial is to follow his great teachings and to organise work in order to further his constructive ideas in the development of the nation.

Nevertheless, it is perhaps inevitable that some statues might be put up. If so, the greatest care should be taken that only real works of art are permitted. Unfortunately the standard in India of such statuary has been low and most people are satisfied with anything that bears a remote resemblance to the person concerned. Our cities and public places are full of structures which cannot by any stretch of imagination be called artistic or pleasing to the sight. I have been shocked on many occasions at seeing these totally inadequate efforts. I should like to warn most earnestly those who are thinking in terms of having statues not to take any hasty decisions and to await a full consideration of this question by the National Memorial Committee under the chairmanship of the Congress President.

There is another matter to which I should like to draw public attention. All over India there is a tendency to name roads, squares and public buildings after Gandhiji. This is a very cheap form of memorial, and a certain satisfaction is gained without expense or exertion. Almost, it seems to me that this is exploiting his name, and a showing off that we honour him without any effort on our part. Even more undesirable is to change famous and historical names which have had a distinction of their own. If these tendencies are not checked we shall have thousands of roads and parks and squares named after Gandhiji. That will not contribute either to convenience or to the glory of the Father of the Nation. Only confusion will result as well as a certain drab uniformity. Most of us will then live in Gandhi roads, Gandhinagars or Gandhigram.

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 25 February 1948. *The Hindu*, 26 February 1948.

24. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
26 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You are so terribly busy, and I am pretty well occupied, that I hesitate to add to your work. I feel however that I must tell you what I have had in my mind for some days.

While the investigation about Bapu's assassination by Godse is proceeding here and in Bombay and elsewhere, there appears to be a certain lack of real effort in tracing the larger conspiracy. More and more I have come to the conclusion that Bapu's murder was not an isolated business but a part of a much wider campaign organised chiefly by the R.S.S. A large number of R.S.S. men have been arrested, probably many of them more or less innocent. But a considerable number of their key men are still abroad or underground or even sometimes flourishing in the open. Many of these people are in our offices and in the police. It is hardly possible to keep anything secret from their group. I was told the other day by a responsible police officer that no search could be conducted in secret because previous intimation always reached the parties concerned.

The Delhi police has apparently a goodly number of sympathisers with the R.S.S. It may not be easy to deal with all of them. But I think something more than has been done can be undertaken. I have little doubt that the R.S.S. organisation is still fairly active in many ways and will hit back when it can. To be complacent about it might lead to fresh disaster. I am told that they have taken to a number of apparently innocent activities and are utilising them to keep their organisation in proper trim.

I do not know what exactly to suggest to you. But I have a feeling of uneasiness about the situation in Delhi specially. I think the police and the local authorities have to be kept up to the mark. They have a habit of slackening off after the spurt. What is more dangerous is that a number of them appear to sympathise with the R.S.S. Hence an impression is created that nothing very effective is being done. Effectiveness does not mean mass

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 55-56.

arrests but the singling out of people who count and whose potentiality for mischief is great.²

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. In his reply Patel said it was a fanatical wing of the Hindu Mahasabha, directly under Savarkar and not the R.S.S., which was involved. The conspiracy, not so wide as was generally assumed, involved about ten men, and the main centres of activity were Pune, Bombay, Ahmadnagar and Gwalior, and not Delhi. In Delhi, all important workers of the R.S.S. had been rounded up. Patel doubted if the Delhi police were inactive because of sympathies for the R.S.S., though he realised that the police and local authorities in Delhi and elsewhere had an appreciable number of R.S.S. sympathisers, and that it was difficult to locate them.

25. To Louis Arthur Johnson¹

New Delhi
26 February 1948

My dear Louis,

I am grateful to you for your letter of February 6. The tragedy that has occurred in India has overwhelmed us, both nationally and personally, and yet the more I think of it the more it becomes an inevitable and fitting end to the life that Gandhi led. The tributes that have come from all over the world indicate that even in this world of conflict and pettiness, true greatness is recognised.

Our burden is heavy indeed, but it is lightened by the friendship and sympathy of innumerable friends and so I have welcomed your letter.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

26. To Emmanuel Cellar¹

New Delhi
26 February 1948

Dear Mr. Cellar,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th February. I value your sympathy

1. J.N. Collection.

with us at this moment when we have suffered a great blow. Yet, though Gandhi is gone he has left his indelible impress on India and we see his mark everywhere.

With all good wishes to you,

Sincerely yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

27. To Ravi Shankar Shukla¹

New Delhi
27th February 1948

My dear Shuklaji,

Thank you for your letter of February 20th.

I well realise the difficulties you must have had with the R.S.S. as your province was in many ways their centre of activities. I feel that we must be very vigilant and not allow any complacency in the minds of our officers. The R.S.S. was an organisation which almost deliberately believed in saying one thing and doing another. Their apologies, therefore, are of no value. We have to be sure that active members are kept in check. This is not merely a question of investigation in connection with the assassination but of dealing with a very widespread conspiracy.

News have reached me that some of your police officers and notably a very high one have been connected with the R.S.S. No doubt you must be enquiring into this matter and will take necessary action.

Hyderabad continues to give us a bit of a headache. We have to be vigilant on the borders and keep our own people in check as well as the Hyderabadis.

Regarding the press, we must take swift action whenever any flagrant error is committed. Homilies do little good. I think that the Home Ministry has already addressed you on this subject. If any newspaper misbehaves it should be suppressed for a while.

I am glad to learn that your Home Guards movement is progressing rapidly and that they are giving an excellent account of themselves. I am specially glad to notice that you are using ex-officers of the I.N.A.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

28. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
1 March 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Governor of East Punjab together with a police report of a speech² delivered by Sardar Udham Singh Nagoke on 15 November 1947 at Simla. You will observe that the speech as reported is of the worst possible kind. I think Udham Singh should be confronted with the report and asked to confirm it, deny it or correct it. A speech of this type can hardly be overlooked. I have suggested to Dr. Gopichand to do this.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, p. 215.
2. In his letter C.M. Trivedi had suggested that Gopichand Bhargava and Swaran Singh should confront Nagoke with a police report of his speech according to which he had incited the non-Muslims near his village to kill the Muslims of nearby villages and take possession of their lands and property.

29. To M.A. Rauf¹

New Delhi
6th March 1948

My dear Rauf,

Your letter of the 13th February in which you have asked as to what form the memorial to Mahatma Gandhi should take in Rangoon. I have consulted Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Congress President as also the Chairman of the National Memorial Committee. He is of opinion that in Rangoon a visible memorial would be more appreciated than any kind of social service only. He therefore generally approves of the idea of a library but adds that this library should pay particular attention to literature about Gandhiji and his writings. It might become a sort of study centre and develop into a social service centre also. I am in general agreement with his views in this matter. If you have enough funds at your disposal it would be desirable to have a hall and a library combined; the building could have a number of other rooms for study purposes as well as later for social centre activities. The trust controlling

1. File No. 2(403)/49, PMS.

it should be a joint Burmese Indian Trust or Committee. It would be as well to include Chinese and others. In fact your present Committee with Thakin Nu as Chairman and you and other persons as Vice-Presidents is a good Committee. Details of the memorial can be settled by your Committee.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

30. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
8 March 1948

My dear Bidhan,

Shahid Suhrawardy saw me today and complained that some of his best unity workers in Calcutta had been rounded up and put in prison recently. Apparently this was in connection with the Muslim National Guards. I told him that this was a matter he should refer to you and if there were any mistakes made in arrests they would be rectified. We have no desire to harass any person needlessly, more specially those who may be working for unity.

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

31. To Ali Yavar Jung¹

New Delhi
9 March 1948

My dear Ali Yavar Jung,

Thank you for your letter of the 12th February. I do not know what to write about Gandhiji's death. It is difficult to get used to the idea of his death. Unconsciously I think of running to him to consult him about some urgent and important matter and then I realise that this cannot be done. His mantle can be worn by no one else. We are all petty men and women who, because of him, achieved some temporary prominence.

1. J. N. Collection.

The world is all awry and all one can do is to perform one's duty to the best of one's understanding.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

32. A Pilgrimage to Wardha¹

I have come to Nagpur after about a year and a half. I wish I could express all the thoughts that arise in me. They are so diverse and many that I do not know what to say, except to thank you all for the reception you have given me.

In the last eighteen or nineteen months many things have happened. *Inquillab zindabad* had been our slogan. The revolution which has come has its benefits as well as its ills. It is for us to adopt the good and discard the evil. A revolution is capable both of making or marring a nation.

I had been planning to come to Nagpur for many months but the happenings in the Punjab and nearabout Delhi kept me tied to the capital. Some of the problems which confronted us have been solved but new ones are raising their heads. That is why I could not come. I came to Wardha for a particular purpose. It is a place of pilgrimage. It is the centre where the greatest man of the present age lived. The place is now without its attraction and yet it is that which drew me to it.

I always ran to Mahatmaji with a load of difficulties and felt relieved when I saw him. The bearer of the burden of forty crores of Indians is no more and the forty crores have been left to carry their own load. In our unity now lies our strength. United we will progress. In order to keep step with the modern world we will have to strengthen our own country.

There is trouble in Kashmir and the Indian troops are in operation. Here on the borders of the Central Provinces is Hyderabad and there is trouble there inside the State and on the borders. These are the problems which cannot be tackled by slogans. These can be solved by unity, sincerity and probity.

All kinds of people sought the advice of Mahatma Gandhi. He had a big heart and a large understanding. Even those who did not agree with him came back satisfied. What he insisted on was truth. It is for the country now to decide whether it will follow the path laid down by Mahatma Gandhi or

1. Speech at Nagpur airport, 12 March 1948. From *The Hitavada*, 13 March 1948.

carve a new way. In the last six months we have been faced with many difficulties and problems and the mere sight of Mahatma Gandhi had inspired us into action. Weakness brings ruin to a nation. I have come to the conclusion that if we want to make our country strong we must follow the path laid down by Mahatma Gandhi—the path of truth. Some people believe in beating the enemy by deceit and treachery. That was not Gandhiji's way. If we desire to make our nation great we will have to go the way shown by Mahatma Gandhi. *Jai Hind*.

33. Constructive Work in a Larger Context¹

My mind these days is, for obvious reasons, much worried and disturbed. I get very little time to devote serious thought to a variety of problems. During the year and a half that we have been in office, we have achieved something, but much remains to be done. Our hearts are full of grief and anguish. Having lost the Father of the Nation, we are faced with enormous problems, including that of a large number of refugees. I am, therefore, hardly in a position to guide the deliberations of this conference.

Khadi is always important. But the basic problem is to arrest the wave of violence and prevent further disintegration of the country. We have to protect and safeguard the very freedom and integrity of India. In this larger context, talk of mere constructive work becomes rather artificial and unreal.

Mahatmajī had the unique quality and capacity of linking up constructive work with the struggle for political liberation. He used to lay his finger on the crucial problem and the whole nation spontaneously followed him. Under the present circumstances, we shall not be able to preserve our independence without effectively counteracting the forces of communalism.

Being in the Government I have my own limitations. I have to be mostly in Delhi, under a heavy guard, day and night. I am almost in a prison house. If this state of affairs continues, I may well go mad. I do not know how long I can tolerate all these restrictions.

While pursuing constructive work with renewed zeal, we have first to safeguard the roots which are being assailed day in and day out by anti-social and anti-national forces. After the partition of the country, we now

1. Remarks at a conference of constructive workers in Sevagram, Wardha, 13 March 1948. Based on the report by Shriman Narayan printed in his book *Vinoba : His Life and Work* (Bombay, 1970), pp. 168-172.

hear angry words about the linguistic redistribution of provinces. These are danger signals and we have to be vigilant all the time.

Bapu had placed before the nation the concept of Lok Sevak Sangh² which was essentially meant to be a non-political organisation. If we dissolve the Congress, we shall have to organise a new party for shouldering political responsibilities. The same Congressmen will have to function more or less in the same manner but under a new name. The Congress is an old organisation and has a tradition of discipline behind it. It has fulfilled its objective of attaining Swaraj. It has yet to work ceaselessly for the social and economic freedom of India. In this task, the Congress must maintain its close links with various constructive organisations.

I entirely agree with Vinobaji³ that we should ponder over the basic questions.⁴ Our main concern should be to preserve the hard-won freedom. Real danger to our independence is not from outside but from within. If the present violent trends continue, the nation will be torn to tatters. I am at one with Vinobaji that our means should be as pure as the end. I am convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that wrong methods always lead to wrong results. If we are clear about this fundamental idea, all our questions can be resolved satisfactorily.

2. On 29 January 1948 Mahatma Gandhi had prepared a draft constitution of the Congress recommending dissolution of the Congress and converting it into a Lok Sevak Sangh, an organization for the service of the people. It was published after his death.
3. Acharya Vinoba Bhave (1895-1982); joined Sabarmati Ashram, 1916; was named by Mahatma Gandhi as his first satyagrahi to offer Individual Civil Disobedience in 1940; originator of Bhoodan movement and covered on foot more than 40,000 miles; undertook peace mission in dacoit-infested areas of Bhind and Morena districts of Madhya Pradesh, 1960; toured Rangpur and Dinajpur districts of East Pakistan in connection with Bhoodan movement, 1962.
4. Vinoba Bhave, at the same conference, had said that he was trying to find out "the reasons for our current predicament" and emphasised the need "to forge a united front" on the principle of the purity of the means.

34. Eradication of Communalism¹

I am visiting Wardha after eighteen months. Many sensational events have happened in the meanwhile. The most tragic of them is the passing away of

1. Speech at a public meeting at Wardha, 13 March 1948. From *The Hindu*, 15 March 1948.

Gandhiji. Not only Sevagram, but the whole of India today has a sense of this tragic loss writ on its face.

The total eradication of communalism from our politics is the one way of paying homage to Mahatmaji. This communalism, which is making many young men mad, must be rooted out at all costs.

India was saved from a great catastrophe by Mahatma Gandhi who succeeded in restoring communal harmony in Delhi. Mahatma Gandhi's assassination was the first show of a challenge thrown out by the Hindu Mahasabha to seize power and bring about a change in the Government and to resort to violence. I think it foolish to imagine that a new order can be established by such methods. It pains me deeply to find that there are misguided youths who can sink to such depths.

At times I feel like divesting myself of office and meeting this challenge in the open. Communalism is diametrically opposed to democracy and usually relies on Nazi and fascist methods. I do not believe that Pakistan can ever succeed in establishing an Islamic state even as India can never be a Hindu state. World conditions are such today that religious or communal states are out of place.

We must in any case and under all circumstances eradicate the poison of communalism that has crept into our body politic. It is not by sitting in chairs in Delhi that this can be done, but only by coming down to the plains and working in the midst of the people.

35. The Crisis in India and the World¹

Mr. Vice-Chancellor² and members of the University,
I must begin with an apology. Coming at the tail end of the university dignitaries, gowns and various colours, I felt somewhat naked. I ought, I suppose, to have garbed myself in some similar fashion. I can assure you I do possess some such gowns but unfortunately I did not bring them with me and so I did not bring the procession to an end appropriately. I came here, as the Vice-Chancellor has reminded you, about a dozen years ago,³

1. Speech at a special convocation of Andhra University, Waltair, 14 March 1948. A.J.R. tapes, N.M.M.L., and *The Hindu*, 16 March 1948.
2. C. Ramalinga Reddy (1880-1951); Vice-President, Cambridge Union Society, 1906; Inspector-General of Education, Mysore State, 1918-21; Vice-Chancellor, Andhra University, 1926-31 and 1936-49; Pro-Chancellor, Mysore University, 1949-51.
3. Nehru had addressed the students of Andhra University in October 1936.

and I spoke at this university, though what I said then, I have not the faintest conception. But I have a vivid recollection of my visit to this city and to this university, and the fact that I have not been able to come this way during this long period has always been a grievance with me. Partly because I enjoyed that visit of mine and partly because I am, as anyone could be, prone to developing a rather lop-sided view of India. We do not see India as a whole. I want to see India as a whole to understand its many problems separately and as an integrated whole. I want to have a physical picture of India as a whole in my mind. This is difficult if one remains in one part of the country and does not frequently or occasionally visit other parts, meet other people, get their viewpoints and discuss their problems. Therefore I have admitted that during the last many years I have not visited, not only Vizagapatnam, but really the whole of the Madras Presidency. I have been to Madras for a day or two but that too was long ago.

I come back after a dozen of years, and what a period it has been! These have been very troubled years, hard and difficult, and they have wrought a terrible trail of disaster for the human race as we looked on. We were affected by all this of course, yet we looked on, and when our turn came, we were affected even more than we suffered. We gathered layer upon layer of that experience but somehow the experiences that many of us had during the last year or so and, more particularly, during the last seven months have for the time being rather overshadowed all our previous experiences. Now, I have no doubt that you have shared in those experiences, even from Vizagapatnam, but perhaps not quite so intensely, not quite so vividly. We were a little further away and busy with our own affairs, but we not only had, to a large extent, the direction of events, but we were also sitting more or less in the centre of those troubled areas. Our experiences were not only vivid and striking but terrible. Terrible in the sense that a sudden thought came into our minds and it rather shook us up. A sudden doubt came to our minds when we saw the horrible deeds that were done in Pakistan, or in parts of India, on the Pakistan border, in western Punjab, or the Frontier Province, or in eastern Punjab, or to some extent in Delhi, or at other places. When we saw the mentality of the people, of those so-called educated people, and the lesser educated or uneducated people, how they were swept away by the gust of passion into doing deeds which were unimaginable to me, for the first time in my life, I tell you my faith in India weakened. Nothing that had happened previously had made me doubt India's mission in the future or her strength even in the present, but for the first time this doubt crept in. Were we worthy of bearing the burden of freedom or had we shouted too loudly and shown ourselves unworthy of it?

Well, we are after all—barring individuals here and there—little men and women in this country, incapable of rising to the height of an occasion. The past quarter of a century or more had shown that there was some stuff

in us. We may have erred, taken a wrong step here or there, that is a small matter, but we had shown vitality and strength and endurance and a certain character as a race, and it is bad that this should have come to an end. Our faith in India had grown, and in spite of stumbling often and falling, in spite of many disillusionments, that faith still remained, but on seeing what happened a year ago or chiefly in the last seven months, partly even earlier, this terrible doubt increased in our minds. We have got over that immediate difficulty but I want to be frank with you here that I have not shaken off the doubt in my mind. It is no good my trying to deceive you or your trying to deceive me. We are in the same boat and we sink or swim together. We shout enough and sometimes this shouting is justified. But we have misbehaved terribly, and this is the first thing for us to realise. Not all of us of course. I am not talking of you or any individual among you. I am not talking of what many in India have done. And I am not prepared to say that I am blameless, that somebody else in India sins. The responsibility to a certain extent is mine. To a slight extent, perhaps, it is yours also.

All these things culminated ultimately in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. That is bad enough, terrible enough, but what one tries to understand is this. Why did this happen? It was as foolish as it was wrong to say that some odd mad man had done the deed. Mad he may have been but out of a certain atmosphere, as a result of a certain kind of media, something had emerged in the country which was the very opposite of what we had struggled for. Many people in India, young men and possibly young women too, had been swept away by this madness. It is easy enough to deal with this matter in a military way or in a police way, but the malady lay deeper. It was one which had affected the minds, if those people possessed any thinking minds. Or it lay in the unconscious, subconscious mind and was born of certain passions and prejudices. You know that there were people who, after this assassination, celebrated it in various ways. Now what was this? Why should this happen? It is almost too big a thing for mere expression of anger. For the last twentyfive to twentyeight years Gandhiji had impressed upon the nation many things and, on the whole, the country had acclaimed him more than any individual had been acclaimed by any country or at any time and, on the whole, the country had followed him to a certain degree. He had put many things before the country. To Gandhiji the means became more important than the ends. He said if the means were not right, inevitably the ends got distorted and one never reached them. But within the last year or two a change had come about in an increasing tempo which was a complete and absolute denial of what Gandhiji had placed before the nation and the world. It was the affirmation of a creed which praised horrible deeds done just to retaliate and injure even without any other particular objective. This was an astounding folly. How did large numbers suddenly seem to sink to a sub-human level? All this created doubt in my mind and made me wonder who

could save the people against their folly! But we could not even save Mahatma Gandhi. I want young men and women to ponder over what has happened and what is happening in India. India is passing through a crisis of the spirit, you have to understand this and be clear in your minds as to what you are going to do about it.

I have come here to launch a new ship⁴ and I am sure many other ships will be launched in the Vizagapatnam port. I hope the city will grow into a great and flourishing one. You should think of the happenings outside India and view your own problems in that context. The world today is in great travail and has not recovered from the shocks of the last war. Only the other day a great statesman of Central Europe, Masaryk, met with death by suicide.⁵ He was a great man whose acquaintance I had the privilege of having. Masaryk's death came to me as the death of a friend. But there was something more than personal about it. It seemed to presage all manner of awful happenings in the future. The world, therefore, is hanging again at the brink of a precipice and no man knows when it might topple over and what the result will be. As Foreign Minister of India I have repeatedly stated that India does not want to quarrel with other people. We do not want to quarrel with any nation. We want to be at peace with everybody and concentrate on our own development. Yet I know that it is not possible to get away from the world, to isolate myself or my country. So when I look on the events happening outside the borders of India, the lining up of armies, and the beat of battle drums, I do not know when war will come. I do not feel it will come soon. Nevertheless, the preparation is there.

By all means you can have military training in colleges because it teaches discipline and other good things too. But remember that the training you get will not be of practical use in modern warfare. Even weapons used in the last war have become out of date now. Nonetheless, nations and humanity have not the sense to come to some understanding. Possibly, if India was strong and prepared in every way, she might have pulled her weight and done something, but it is no good shouting about changing the world when we are immersed in quarrels and squabbles. If we are to influence the future, we must set our own house in order.

If India is to survive, it must be as a unified whole. You have seen the disruption of a part of India and what it has brought about. Reactionary forces in India have joined hands with and supported communalism in many ways and exploited the name of a precious thing like religion and used it to debase man. If provincialism means disruption, it should also be discarded.

4. See *post*, section 9, item 18.

5. Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, committed suicide on 10 March 1948, two weeks after the formation of a government by Klement Gottwald.

I know you feel strongly about the demand for an Andhra province. At least ten years back the Congress approved of the principle and accepted the demand.⁶ There is no questioning this that the Andhras must have their province and will have it. But what I do not understand is the kind of hysteria accompanying this demand. Let the province be formed, but let this be done without injury to anyone, with as much cooperation and goodwill as possible. But if you start demanding "Do this tomorrow or tonight", it might mean a great deal of harm being done in attempting a beginning. Such a course might delay instead of hasten the advent of the province. It is therefore no use sending me telegrams or letters demanding this or that. Produce a scheme, a united scheme, formulated by those who are concerned with this matter. It must be a united scheme. I do not say that till a united scheme is produced nothing should be done. But a large measure of agreement would help. Frankly, I attach the greatest importance to not encouraging any disruptive tendency.

The Hyderabad problem has become tangled and it is a bit of a nuisance.⁷ It is however no major problem and we can deal with Hyderabad when we want to. We want to deal with it in the best way possible in order to have the best results. There are so many problems confronting us that I would urge you to be vigilant about everything. I do not want you to become complacent or excited but to be wary and alert.

The Government of India are on the verge of deciding to give a grant to this university as they want to encourage universities, and particularly research and technical training. If the grant is given, I think it is likely to be earmarked for one of these objects. I hope this university will grow more and more in importance in India because of this great ship-building industry here and other industries. This university will have to think more in terms of technology and science and I hope it will do so.

A country is great or small according to the number of men of stature she has. The time has come when we should build men of stature and where can these be got except through universities? I wonder how many of you have qualities of leadership, the quality of rising to the occasion, facing crises and overcoming them! How many of you are trying to be taller in stature? If you try, you will succeed. But if right at the beginning of your career, you set yourself small objectives and think in small terms,

6. In July 1938, the Congress Working Committee assured deputations from Andhra, Kerala and Karnataka that the demand for linguistic reorganisation of their territories would be considered as soon as the Congress had the power to do so.

7. The Razakars from the Hyderabad State raided the border villages of Ahmadnagar and Sholapur. On 12 December 1947 their attacks resulted in murder, arson, destruction of crops, lifting of cattle and molestation of women. On 8 January 1948, there was firing in Jainpur village. Swami Ramananda Teertha, President of the State Congress, had been taken into custody.

there is not much chance of your growing. Today, in India, the field of opportunity is unlimited. There is a need for men of ability and I want you too to aim high. If one has to be ambitious then let young men be ambitious about something big and not about something narrowly personal. Ambition should be made of sterner stuff than to go after petty jobs here and there. I want you to aim high, think India is going to be big, and do your bit, big or small, in making her big.

36. To Ghulam Mohammed¹

New Delhi
18 March 1948

My dear Ghulam Mohammed²

Please forgive me for the delay in thanking for your letter of the 31st January.

I need hardly tell you what a terrible shock Gandhiji's death has been to all of us and to me specially.³ We get used to everything, both littleness and greatness, and rather take them for granted after a while, and so we began to take Gandhiji for granted and now that he is no more we realise even better than ever before what a tremendous personality he was and we feel helpless without him. Still we have to carry on our work to the best of our ability and I hope that the work will always be governed by what he taught us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. (1895-1956); Finance Minister of Hyderabad State, 1942-45; Finance Minister of Pakistan, 1947-51; Governor-General of Pakistan, 1951-55.
3. Ghulam Mohammed had said that the death of Mahatma Gandhi constituted a grievous loss to Pakistan as to India and an irreparable loss to the cause of peace throughout the world.

37. Elimination of Communal Organisations¹

Sir, before this debate proceeds any further I should like to indicate the

1. Speech in the Constituent Assembly on a resolution on elimination of communal organisations, 3 April 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, (Official Report)*, Vol. IV, 1948, pp. 3116-3123.



ON THE BOAT CARRYING THE ASHES OF MAHATMA GANDHI,
ALLAHABAD, 12 FEBRUARY 1948



AT THE SANGAM, ALLAHABAD, AFTER THE IMMERSION OF THE
ASHES OF MAHATMA GANDHI, 12 FEBRUARY 1948

attitude of Government in regard to this resolution.² Government welcome this resolution and desire to say that they wish to do everything in their power to achieve the objective which lies behind this resolution. After the eloquent speech of the Honourable Mover³ I need not say much about the desirability of this resolution; as a matter of fact it is an inevitable policy which an independent country must adopt. There might have been in the past various reasons which came in the way of such policy being given effect to, although I think that even in the past those of us who accepted any measure of communalism erred and acted unwisely, and we have suffered greatly for our unwisdom. However, in the past conditions were different; but when a country is functioning independently there is no alternative except to follow this. The only alternative is civil conflict. We have seen as a matter of fact how far communalism in politics has led us; all of us remember the grave dangers through which we have passed and the terrible consequences we have seen. In any event, now there is no other alternative; and we must have it clearly in our minds and in the mind of the country that the alliance of religion and politics in the shape of communalism is a most dangerous alliance, and it yields the most abnormal kind of illegitimate brood. We have talked a great deal about politics being allied to ethics; that is something which I hope we shall always stand for. During the last quarter of a century or more Mahatma Gandhi taught us to place politics on an ethical level. How far we succeeded is for the world to judge and for future generations to decide. But it was something at least that we placed that great ideal before us and tried in our own weak and halting way to give effect to it. But the combination of politics and religion in the narrowest sense of the word, resulting in communal politics, is—there can be no doubt—a most dangerous combination and must be put an end to. It is clear, as has been pointed out by the Honourable Mover, that this combination is harmful to the country as a whole; it is harmful to the majority, but probably it is most harmful to any minority that seeks to have some advantage from it. I think even the past history of India will show that. But in any event a minority in an independent state which seeks to isolate and separate itself does some injury to the cause of the country, and most of all it injures its own interest, because inevitably it puts a barrier between itself and the others, a barrier not on the religious plane but on the political plane, sometimes

2. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar's resolution pleaded for separation of religion from politics and for India becoming a secular state and demanded administrative and legislative measures to be taken to give effect to it.
3. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar (1891-1978); took part in noncooperation movement, 1921-22; elected to Central Legislative Assembly, 1934; elected secretary, Congress Parliamentary Party, 1947; Deputy Speaker, Lower House, and first Lok Sabha, 1949 and 1952 respectively and Speaker, 1953-62; Governor of Bihar, 1962-67.

even to some extent on the economic plane; and it can never really exercise the influence which it legitimately ought to aspire to exercise if it functions in that way.

Now the future constitution of India is being hammered out in the Constituent Assembly and no doubt it will give shape to it in the course of the next two or three months and finalise it, and any resolution that we may pass is not going to alter that constitution as it is finally adopted. But, after all, the constitution-making body is more or less this body; there is not much difference. And if this House thinks in terms of this resolution I have no doubt that the constitution-making body will also think in terms of this resolution. Further, from such evidence as we have got of the working of that constitution-making body, it has already gone a long way in terms of this resolution. It has put aside many of the dangerous features of our old constitution which led to communalism. Whether other features will remain or not I cannot obviously guarantee. But as far as I am concerned, I think the less we have of any form of communalism the better it is for our constitution and for the practical working of our Government.

Now, Sir, so far as this resolution is concerned, as I said, we warmly welcome the objective underlying it and the spirit behind it. But this resolution mentioned administrative and legislative measures to be taken to give effect to it. Exactly what those administrative and legislative measures might be, it is impossible to say straight off; it will require the closest scrutiny, certainly the legislative part of it. And presumably the right course for Government will be—if this resolution is passed, as I feel sure it will be—to consider this matter and see what administrative and—more specially—what legislative measures are necessary to gain this end; and then later, when this House meets again for another session, to consider any recommendations in that respect so far as legislative measures are concerned. Meanwhile, no doubt our new constitution will have taken shape also and it will help us then to consider those legislative measures in terms of that new constitution. But we need not wait till then. The point is so far as the Government is concerned that we should function as closely as possible in accordance with the spirit of this resolution. Further, the purpose of this resolution, I take it, is also to give a lead to the country in this matter, so that the country may realise as clearly as possible that the only right way for us to function is to do away with communalism in its political aspect in every shape and form. That we accept. Now there are at the present moment, as some members may later point out, in the Draft Constitution that has been proposed, certain definite communal elements. For instance, I believe that there is a proposal that although there should be joint and common electorate, still there might be some reservation of seats for minorities or for the scheduled castes on more or less, I take it, the population basis. Now what the final decision will be about that I cannot say. I hope personally that the less reserva-

tion there is the better, and I think that is so mostly even more from the point of view of the group or the minority that might have that reservation than from the point of view of any other group or majority.

There is another aspect of this matter which must be remembered. We talk about democracy and unity and all that and I hope we shall rapidly have more and more democracy and more and more unity in this country. Democracy is not purely a political affair. The nineteenth-century conception of democracy, that is, each person having a vote was a good enough conception in those days but it was incomplete and people think in terms of a larger and deeper democracy today. After all, there is no equality between the pauper who has a vote and the millionaire who has a vote. There are a hundred ways of exercising influence for the millionaire which the pauper has not got. After all, there is no equality between the person who has got tremendous educational advantages and the person who has had none. So educationally, economically and otherwise people differ greatly. People will, I suppose, differ to some extent. All human beings are not equal in the sense of ability or capacity. But the whole point is that people should have equality of opportunity and that they should be able to go as far as they can go.

Now it is patent in India today that there are huge differences between certain groups, classes and individuals. There is a big hiatus between those at the top and those at the bottom. If we are to have democracy it becomes necessary and essential for us to not merely bridge that gap but to lessen it very greatly; in fact to bring them closer together so far as opportunities are concerned, as far as ultimately general living conditions are concerned, and in so far as the necessities of life are concerned, leaving out for the moment luxuries and the rest, though ultimately there seems to me to be no particular reason why any particular group or class should be favoured even in regard to the luxuries of life. But that is perhaps a rather distant picture. Now, because there are such great differences in India, it becomes incumbent upon us, not only from humanitarian reasons but from the standpoint of the fulfilment of democracy, to raise up those people who are low down in the social, economic and other levels and to bring to them every opportunity of growth and progress, national and otherwise. That has been the general accepted policy of this country and it is the accepted policy of this Government. Now in pursuance of that policy, certain reservation of seats was granted, for instance to the scheduled castes, and various scholarships and educational amenities, etc., have been granted and no doubt will be granted still more, not only to the scheduled castes but there may also be other backward groups in the country. There are tribal people and others who require every help. It is no good for us to say that we have given a vote to the member of a tribal folk and we have done our duty to him; having for hundreds and thousands of years not done our duty to him,

by giving him a vote we consider ourselves absolved of all further duty. Therefore, we have to think always in terms of raising the level of all those who have been denied opportunities in the past. I do not personally think myself that the best way to do that on the political plane is reservation of seats and the rest. I think the best way, and the more basic and fundamental way, is to advance them rapidly in the economic and educational spheres and then they will stand on their own feet.

There is a great danger, whether you deal with an individual, group or community, of giving a certain prop to that community which gives it a false sense of strength which does not belong to it, which does not come out of its own strength, but which is external to it and which when removed suddenly makes it weak. A nation ultimately ought to stand on its own feet. So long as it relies on some external prop it is not strong. It is weak. So these external props, as I might call them—that is reservation of seats and the rest—may occasionally be helpful possibly in the case of the backward groups, but they produce a false sense of political relations, a false sense of strength, and ultimately therefore they are not so nearly as important as real educational, cultural and economic advance, which gives them inner strength to face any difficulty or any opponent. However, I can conceive that in the present context of affairs in regard to these unfortunate countrymen of ours, who have not had these opportunities in the past, special attempts should be made of course in the educational and economic field and even in the political field to see that they have a proper place till they find their own legs to stand upon without any external aid.

So I accept this resolution on behalf of Government, but in accepting it I should like to make it perfectly clear again that so far as the implementation of it is concerned, more especially in regard to the legislative aspect of it, it will have to be very carefully considered and will ultimately have to come before this House.

I have no objection on behalf of Government to accept the addition of the words "social and educational" which are mentioned in one of the amendments to this resolution. It would read: "...should be permitted to engage in any activities other than those essential for the *bona fide* religious, cultural, social and educational needs of the community..."

38. To John H. Holmes¹

New Delhi
6 April 1948

My dear Mr. Holmes,²

Thank you very much for your letter of March 3.³

I read about the moving memorial service that you had.⁴ I shall be grateful if the phonographic record of it is sent to us.

You need not worry yourself about my physical condition. I am well enough. But it is true that the burden has been heavy and we have not adjusted ourselves yet to Gandhiji's passing away. Both India and the world struggle desperately for peace and stability.

With regards,

Very sincerely yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. John Haynes Holmes (1879-1964); Minister, the Community Church, New York City, 1907-49; author of *My Gandhi* (1953).
3. Holmes had said that Gandhi's assassination had made Americans realise the hold he had upon their hearts. He was also concerned about Nehru's "haggard" countenance in the photographs and films he saw.
4. Holmes had said at the memorial service at the Community Church, New York City, on 1 February 1948 : "When all the kings and princes and great captains of our time, who make so much noise and occupy so central a place upon the stage, when these have long since been forgotten, every one of them, the Mahatma will still be known and revered as the greatest Indian since Gautama, the Buddha, and as the greatest man since Jesus Christ."

39. The Advent of a New Era¹

Sixth of April is a day of great significance. It was on this day twenty nine years ago that Mahatma Gandhi finally plunged into Indian politics and thus

1. Speech at a public meeting, New Delhi, 6 April 1948. Based on reports in *The Hindustan Times* and *National Herald*, 7 April 1948

laid the foundation of the Gandhian era in the life of the nation. Sixth of April is the most important day in our recent history, because on this day Gandhiji gave a new meaning to India's struggle for freedom.

Mahatma Gandhi has raised millions to a new moral height by setting an example through his way of life before the Indian people. The doctrines which Gandhiji preached have worldwide significance and though other nations do not always follow his teachings they recognize the supreme excellence of his ideals. This explains the unique homage paid by humanity everywhere to Gandhiji. No man's death in human history has been mourned as deeply and with as great sincerity as Gandhiji's.

On a day like this every Indian must search his heart and pledge himself anew to the lofty ideals which Gandhiji placed before the nation. These ideals have given India an unfailing yardstick by which her Government and people can measure their actions. If correctly interpreted, Gandhiji's principles will never be found wanting in giving the nation sound guidance.

Minorities in East Bengal must not complicate the problems of India by running away from the province out of a sense of fear. Fear is at the root of many misunderstandings and much apparent tension. The biggest crime on earth is fear. Out of fear arose the present strained relations between India and Pakistan. We must remove fear from our hearts, tread the path of peace and then hope for a reciprocal attitude from the other side. Distrust, suspicion and barriers between India and Pakistan have resulted in untold misery to the people of both the Dominions. Wherever one is, one must stay and drive out fear from the heart. I am sure the Government of Pakistan does not like the Hindus to leave the Dominion because it is to their advantage to have the Hindus among them. If all the Hindus of East Bengal, who are much poorer than the Punjabis, migrate, where will they go to? Such a migration will involve very nearly one hundred and twenty five lakhs of people. It will create a problem fifty times more difficult than what the country had to face before. However, if the Hindus want to leave Pakistan, India will not refuse to let them come over and will try her best to resettle them.

The people of India have a right to ask the Government why action had been taken by the Government of West Bengal against the Communist Party and its members denied the civil liberties for which the present regime stood. The provinces of the Indian Union enjoy a great deal of autonomy and can act in the way they think best for themselves. The Central Government can advise them but are not in a position to impose their will upon them. The Central Government do not wish to force the provinces on any particular point either, because that shifts the responsibility for that matter on their own shoulders. The decision of the Government of West Bengal to

ban the Communist Party of India was an independent one and no particular advice was taken from the Centre on this issue.

The Government, either Central or provincial, have no intention of preventing the Communists, or any other political party, from propagating their views and trying to win over the people to their own way of thinking. But no government worth its name can watch a section of people conspiring to overthrow it by violent means and then do nothing about it.

The policy of the Communist Party of India has recently undergone a revolutionary change. A party has every right to change its policy whenever it likes, and there have been drastic and sudden changes in the policy of the Communist Party in the past, too. They have occasionally reversed their policy overnight. But this time the practical effects of the change have been dangerous for India's security services.

The unrest among the labour classes has grown considerably and there have been strikes in factories. A large quantity of arms are being collected, preparations are being made to overthrow the Government by violent means and the security services are faced with a grave danger of sabotage. The Government of West Bengal have evidence to prove all this and they had, therefore, to resort to the extreme course of banning the Communist Party. Steps had to be taken to protect the security services or else the entire life in the country would have been imperilled. The Government had to order the arrest of the people who were planning violence against it.

The Central Government have no desire to declare any party unlawful, but they cannot tolerate any violent activities directed, against them. I have sympathy for their principles, but we have to put them down because the Communists of India are aiming to create unrest among the people and seize power by creating chaos in the country.

The Government's action against the Communists, however, should not be misunderstood. It has nothing to do with India's stand in international politics and it should not be taken to mean an expression of her sympathy for one bloc or opposition to another. This is India's domestic affair. If there is a war in the world, India will not necessarily join it in the aid of any one group. We are not to be tied to any power bloc and shall not be dragged into a world conflict against our wishes. There has been no change in our foreign policy and we shall continue to follow an independent line of action.

The nation must raise a fitting memorial to Gandhiji and contribute liberally to the National Memorial Fund. The best memorial to the Father of the Nation will be to propagate his ideals of life. Gandhiji will be remembered best if every Indian made it his duty to raise humanity to a higher level. Special attention has to be paid to the backward people living in rural areas. No memorial of stone or plaster can perpetuate the memory of Gandhiji as much as actions on the lines laid down by him.

3
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

II. Restoration of Abducted Women

1. Cable to V. Viswanathan¹

Your telegram No. 17 dated 9th January.² While responsibility for refugee camps and protection of non-Muslim refugees and their transport is that of Pakistan Government we cannot divest ourselves of our responsibility to give every kind of help and protection to them. Please therefore do everything in your power to help non-Muslim refugees and send them by ship or otherwise away from Sind. Wherever necessary free passages must be given.

You must protest in strongest terms to Sind and Pakistan Governments at any obstruction being placed in the way of ships coming to Karachi and taking refugees away. We are also telegraphing to Pakistan and tomorrow we shall raise this matter in Lahore with Pakistan Minister.

We are deeply anxious about situation in Sind and plight of refugees. Please keep us fully informed and render all possible assistance.

1. New Delhi, 10 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48-Pak.I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. In his telegram Viswanathan, Deputy High Commissioner in Karachi, said that 70 per cent of the houses of Hindus in Karachi had been looted and curfew imposed in the city; since most refugees would have to be given free passages, he enquired which government would pay for shipping fifty thousand people awaiting evacuation to India. M. A. Khuhro, the Premier of Sind, having failed to make adequate arrangements for refugees from Bombay, refused to allow ships to come to Karachi for the whole of the coming week. Viswanathan asked for a high-level representation to Pakistan for full shipping facilities to evacuate Hindus in distress.

2. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Recent occurrences in Karachi involving very large-scale looting, destruction of property and killing of non-Muslims have disturbed us greatly. We trust that you are taking adequate steps to evacuate non-Muslims and organise refugee camps and otherwise give protection to non-Muslims. In view of these grave developments it is urgently necessary that non-Muslims desirous of leaving Sind should be given immediate opportunities of doing so. This can be done principally by sea. We are astonished to learn that

1. New Delhi, 10 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

Prime Minister, Sind, has instructed District Magistrate, Karachi, not to permit ships to come to Karachi next week. This lack of shipping for removal of evacuees will make position desperate. Request you to issue directions urgently to give full facilities for evacuation and shipping non-Muslims.

3. Mountbatten's Record of Meeting with Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Pandit Nehru asked whether it was true that the Government of Sind had issued orders which precluded the departure of Hindu refugees by boat to Bombay.² Mr. Liaquat Ali said that their only anxiety was to prevent a large influx of Muslim refugees who could not be accommodated in Karachi and that so far as he knew the order merely forbade more steamers than normally plied being put on the run.

Pandit Nehru pointed out that so long as all the passengers paid for their tickets both ways, they did not come under the general classification of refugees since they must have enough money to be able to buy such tickets. So long as the steamers plying were doing so on an economic basis and were not government-sponsored, he did not see why even an additional steamer should not be requisitioned.

1. Lahore, 11 January 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.
2. Earlier in the meeting Liaquat Ali Khan had given an account of what had occurred in Karachi on 3 January.

4. Cable to Sri Prakasa¹

We are all very anxious to help in every possible way in the evacuation and relief of the sufferers in the riots going on in Karachi. It is clear now that very large number of non-Muslims have to be sent from Sind to India, chiefly

1. New Delhi, 11 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

by sea to Bombay. We must plan accordingly and make every effort to expedite their transfer. The Government of India will meet all costs incurred. We cannot allow people who look to us for help to suffer for lack of funds. Nor can we tolerate obstructions from Pakistan authorities who have failed to protect them and yet do not give facilities.

2. Gandhiji has received complaints of High Commissioner's office. I do not know nature of these complaints but I hope that your office will deal with this emergency with speed and thoroughness. I fully realise the difficulties you must be facing and that people are apt to complain without the slightest justification. Jehangir Patel² and Dinshah Mehta³ went 8th January at Gandhiji's instance.⁴ Please contact them through Jamshed Mehta.⁵

2. Jehangir Pestonji Patel (b. 1905); Parsi businessman of Bombay.
3. Dinshah K. Mehta (b. 1903); started Nature Cure Clinic and Sanatorium, Pune, 1929; Mahatma Gandhi's personal physician from 1932.
4. Both of them visited Pakistan, under Mahatma Gandhi's instructions, to confer with Jinnah and arrange for Nehru's proposed visit to Pakistan in February 1948 which could not materialise because of Mahatma Gandhi's death on 30 January.
5. Jamshed Nusserwanji Mehta (1886-1952); businessman who helped in the development of Karachi as a Municipal Councillor for six years and then as President of the Municipal Council for fourteen years; President, Home Rule League, Karachi, 1917; elected to first Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937.

5. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Owing to unfortunate occurrences at Karachi, evacuation from Sind has become matter of compelling urgency. We have to organise evacuation, make arrangements for reception and transit camps and then for dispersal. Neogy desires to set up immediately Directorate General of Evacuation with Y. K. Puri² as Director General. I should like to know if you agree.

1. New Delhi, 12 January 1948, File No. 28(35)/48, PMS.
2. (b. 1916); joined I.C.S. 1938; served in Avam and in Indian High Commission in Lahore and Singapore; Ambassador to Morocco and Tunisia, 1964-67, and Sweden 1968-69, High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, 1969-72, and Ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany, 1972-75.

Puri will continue to participate in negotiations with Pakistan on outstanding economic matters. In fact he will continue to do the work that he has been doing. Whether Directorate General should continue to be part of Neogy's Ministry or transferred to you is a matter which may be considered on your return. Grateful for your reply immediately.

6. Cable to Sri Prakasa¹

Your telegram dated 10th. Have already informed you that we must help in every way evacuation non-Muslims. I spoke to Liaquat Ali Khan yesterday on this subject and I am telegraphing to him today about lifting embargo and giving other facilities.

I am also communicating with Bombay Premier and through him with Bombay Steam Navigation Company about Navin Khandwalla.² Prime Minister Pakistan has promised to help in every way.

1. New Delhi, 12 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. (1909-1977); imprisoned for two years for his activities as Captain of National Militia of the Congress Party; founder-member of Congress Socialist Party; manager of Bombay Steam Navigation Company at Karachi, 1940-49; as Chief Adviser to the High Commissioner in Pakistan in 1947-49, he helped to evacuate over half a million non-Muslim refugees to India.

7. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I pointed out to you yesterday immediate necessity of arranging facilities for evacuation non-Muslims who desire to leave Sind. In existing circumstances the embargo that has been placed by Sind Government on movement of ships is very unfair and may lead to far-reaching consequences. We do not wish to encourage in any way Muslim refugees from India going to Karachi by sea. Our anxiety is to give every facility to those non-Muslims who wish to leave Karachi. Would request you therefore to have embargo

1. New Delhi, 12 January 1948. File No. 26-146/48-Pak. I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

removed immediately. Also for adequate arrangement to be made for non-Muslims from interior of Sind to be brought safely to places of departure. Recent ordinances banning departure of *bhangies*, *dhobies* and Harijans generally unfair and causing great disquiet. Would request that these ordinances be rescinded. If immediate steps are taken in these directions situation will improve rapidly.

8. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have in several previous telegrams drawn your attention to the serious situation created by the influx of vast numbers of tribesmen in West Punjab. Apart from the main charge that these were being assisted to attack Kashmir, I had pointed out that they were creating a local law and order situation which was dangerous to non-Muslims. The most recent incident to which I would draw your attention is the attack on the train at Gujrat station last Monday.² The reports that I have received show that there was a fearful massacre which even the large military escort provided by us could not prevent. Of 2400 people in the train only 700 have arrived in Gujranwala of whom a high proportion have been seriously injured. It is significant that these do not include any women who are reported to have been abducted *en masse*. I am informed that of the 1700, of whom there is no trace yet, the bulk have been killed, wounded or kidnapped.

1. New Delhi, 15 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. In his reply of 17 January, Liaquat Ali Khan condemned the attack on non-Muslims but thought the number of casualties given by Nehru was greatly exaggerated. He said that the wounded would be looked after and the guilty punished and added "that such incidents in either Dominion create great difficulties for the Government."

9. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to my telegram Primin 581 dated 15th January regarding tragedy

1. New Delhi, 17 January 1948. File No. 26-146/48, -Pak. I, M.E.A., N.A.I.

at Gujrat. I understand that there were at least 288 families in the train with all their belongings and these have been completely looted and the refugees have arrived with nothing more than the clothes they were wearing. I hope you will see that steps are taken to recover the looted property the bulk of which must still be in Gujrat.

2. The refugees who have been brought into Gujranwala and Lahore do not include young women bulk of whom are reported to have been abducted. These girls must still be in Gujrat and I hope vigorous action will be taken to recover them and send them to India.

3. I have now been informed that the train was routed without proper authority from Khushab to Gujrat *via* Lalamusa and that when the train stopped at Gujrat railway station at 19.30 hours the engine was detached for an indefinite period thus deliberately detaining the train at the platform. I suggest that this matter requires urgent investigation.

10. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

You are doubtless aware that question of exchange of prisoners between East and West Punjab has been under consideration of those two Governments for some time.² Ordinances to legalise exchange have been enacted by both Governments. West Punjab Government agreed to exchange and as a result some important prisoners of theirs were released by East Punjab Government. Two meetings took place between representatives of the two Governments to settle details. At first meeting on 3rd January West Punjab representatives demanded transfer of prisoners belonging to Alwar, Bharatpur and East Punjab States. East Punjab representatives informed them that they could not negotiate on behalf of States. Further negotiations proceeded on this basis. A further meeting took place between representatives on 4th to settle final details. Question of States prisoners was not raised

1. New Delhi, 18 January 1948. File No. 16-4/48,—Pak. I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. The Governments of East and West Punjab had, on 24 December 1947, agreed "to exchange on a communal basis" all prisoners in their custody. This decision involved the repatriation of 2000 Muslim prisoners from East Punjab and 4000 non-Muslim prisoners from West Punjab.

at it and exchange was scheduled to begin on 18th. East Punjab Government have now received a telegram from West Punjab Premier that exchange cannot commence unless States prisoners are also included and are concentrated for their transfer in East Punjab jails or Delhi.

I consider it most unfair that West Punjab Government should back out of agreements at this stage. The question of prisoners in Alwar, Bharatpur and East Punjab States is an issue that I am prepared to have examined through my Ministry of States. To raise it at this stage and stop the transfers that had already been agreed upon is a course which I am sure you would not be prepared to countenance. I hope you will use your influence with West Punjab Government to see that they carry out their agreements.

11. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have been informed that non-Muslim evacuees from Sind are being subjected to the most rigorous and harassing searches and are being deprived of their possessions including articles such as blankets. This is wholly contrary to agreement. After considerable protests from India, the Sind Government had relaxed the severity of searches but these seem to have been reimposed either by them or by customs authorities of the Pakistan Government.² Apart from causing a great deal of hardship to people who are fleeing in panic, these searches embitter relations between the two Dominions and I hope you will take steps to see that they are abandoned.

1. New Delhi, 21 January 1948. File No. 7-43/47-OS-V (Pak.), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. In a cable of 17 February 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan denied that searches of non-Muslim evacuees had been increased recently and suggested that specific instances of unnecessary vigorous measures be brought to his notice.

12. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to agreed press communique issued simultaneously by Pakistan

1. New Delhi, 21 January 1948. File No. 14/48-Pak. M.E.A., N.A.I.

and India on 30th December regarding arms and ammunition confiscated contrary to Inter-Dominion Agreement.* I understand that you have informed Kapur, our officer in Peshawar, that intention was not to restore these arms confiscated in Pakistan, but to keep them as set-off against arms withheld from Muslim evacuees in eastern Punjab and United Provinces. I must point out that this was not the intention when press communique was agreed upon and the statement itself does not bear such interpretation. On the contrary, it makes it clear that arms and ammunition confiscated contrary to agreement should be restored. I hope you will issue instructions accordingly. We ourselves are proceeding on that basis.

2. The communique stated that the two Governments had directed their officials to ensure that the refugees were allowed to retain their arms while crossing the border as agreed upon at the Inter-Dominion Conference of 14 September 1947. The confiscated arms were to be restored to the rightful owners.

13. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I am receiving information that the position of non-Muslims in Sind has become increasingly difficult and at many places grave immediate danger is apprehended. The position has been aggravated by steps taken to prevent the movement of non-Muslims into Karachi from where they have to be evacuated by sea. I understand that over 1000 Hindus travelling by train from Sukkur to Karachi were forcibly detained at Nawabshah and that Sukkur Magistrate has promulgated order that no Hindu can leave for a fortnight. I have no desire to add to the difficulties of the Sind Government but position must be frankly faced that non-Muslims in Sind have lost confidence in the ability of Pakistan authorities to give them adequate protection and are anxious to leave. I hope you will agree that it is the duty of the Sind Government to give facilities for those who want to leave and I trust they will do so.

2. The position of Sikhs in interior of Sind is, I am informed, particularly precarious. They have as a community done no harm to anybody in Sind and are in special need of protection. I hope you will take every possible step to see that they are brought from the interior to evacuation points and treated well.

1. New Delhi, 22 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48-Pak. I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

3. I have already telegraphed to you about searches which are being conducted and I hope you will see that they are stopped.

14. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Prakasa,

You are having a very heavy time and I entirely sympathise with you. We have already informed you that you are at perfect liberty to add to your staff in order to meet the heavy demands upon you. We cannot permit any minor considerations to come in the way of our duty now. That duty is to give every facility for the evacuation of the Sikhs and Hindus. We are trying our utmost to impress the Pakistan authorities with this.

Information has reached me that during the recent disturbances in Karachi our National Flag was removed from your office for about a week. Is this correct? If so I am sorry. No disturbance or disaster should bring down our Flag.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

15. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to your telegram 30-G dated 26th January regarding exchange of prisoners.² As pointed out in my earlier telegram Primin 599 the question of exchange of prisoners between West and East Punjab was the subject of final agreement and what remained to be done was actual transfer. If, as you

1. New Delhi, 1 February 1948, File No. 16-4/48-Pak-I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Liaquat Ali assured Nehru that Pakistan had no intention of repudiating the Inter-Dominion Agreement on the exchange of prisoners. It would be extended to the Frontier Province, Sind, Bahawalpur and Baluchistan. However, the West Punjab ordinance contained legal flaws and his Government was contemplating the issue of a central ordinance.

say, you have come up against legal flaws in West Punjab ordinance, I suggest you immediately enact a central ordinance to enable the agreed transfer to take place.

2. As regards extension of scheme to other provinces and States,³ I desire the exchange to be on widest possible scale including Delhi and Indian States. Agreement hitherto reached at a secretarial level and ratified by both Governments however specifically provided that this aspect of question would be considered subsequently at the next Ministers' conference and that exchange of prisoners between West and East Punjab not be held up on this account. I have not yet completed consultation with other provinces and States on the question of extension of scheme to their areas, but expect to obtain their final views shortly. *Prima facie* there would be no objection to this scheme being accepted in the widest sense but there may be difficulty in regard to cases already tried and pending in appeal.

3. Liaquat Ali hoped that Nehru had consulted his provinces and States about the extension of exchange of prisoners to the East Punjab States and also Delhi.

16. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to my telegram No. Primin 650 dated 1st February regarding exchange of prisoners.² We are anxious to proceed on widest possible basis and as speedily as possible. We have consulted East Punjab States and they can be included in the scheme. We are enquiring about Bharatpur and Alwar. I doubt if many people are involved there.

Delhi stands on a different basis and there are many ordinary prisoners totally unconnected with recent happenings. There will thus be all manner of practical and legal difficulties more especially in regard to cases under appeal. But we are prepared to go as far as we can even in regard to Delhi. If you can let us have any information about particular cases in Delhi, we shall consider it.

I trust that you will now agree to the immediate implementation of our agreement to transfer prisoners.

1. New Delhi, 4 February 1948. File No. 16-4/48-Pak. I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. See the preceding item.

17. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to my telegram No. Primin 737 regarding exchange of prisoners. We are prepared to extend the scheme also to Bharatpur and Alwar. This means that we are agreeable to the extension of the scheme, as desired by you, to the East Punjab States as well as Bharatpur and Alwar. As regards Delhi, the position as explained in my previous telegram is that there are many ordinary prisoners totally unconnected with recent happenings and there will, therefore, be many practical and legal difficulties. We are prepared, however, to go as far as we can even in regard to Delhi and will gladly consider particular cases about which you send us information.

I trust you will let me have urgent reply to my request that we should begin the exchange of prisoners immediately.

1. New Delhi, 22 February 1948. File No. 16-4/48-Pak.I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

18. Cable to Editors in Pakistan¹

Your telegram about exchange of prisoners.² Government of India perfectly willing to carry out exchange of prisoners of disturbances, such Muslim prisoners in East Punjab and Punjab States and Alwar and Bharatpur being sent to Pakistan and at same time similar non-Muslim prisoners in West Punjab, Frontier Province and Bahawalpur being sent to India. We informed Pakistan Government of this some time ago but have received no final answer yet. We are anxious that this exchange takes place as early as possible as we realise that many unfortunate people as well as their relatives are suffering. As soon as we have the consent of Pakistan Government we shall immediately begin the exchange.

1. New Delhi, 2 March 1948. File No. 16-4/48-Pak.I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I. This cable was sent to the editors of *Zamindar*, *Ehsan*, *Inquilab*, *Nawa-i-Waqt* and *Pakistan Times*.
2. The editors had requested Nehru to order an early repatriation of all Muslim prisoners from East Punjab and the adjoining areas of Ambala, Faridkot, Kapurthala, Nabha, Patiala, Alwar and Bharatpur.

19. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
6 March 1948

My dear Nawabzada,

Thank you for your letter of February 28th, enclosing copy of a letter from Khwaja Nazimuddin, Premier, East Bengal, dated the 27th February.

I have no doubt that Khwaja Nazimuddin and his Government are trying to look after the interests of non-Muslims in East Bengal but I can assure you that the number of complaints from East Bengal about the kind of protection they receive is very great. It is hardly possible for the non-Muslims there to carry on their normal vocations. They are being squeezed out. The fact that about a million of them have gradually migrated to West Bengal during the past few months is evidence of the fear and apprehension that surround them. We have tried our utmost to prevent them from migrating and in fact we have even avoided giving any publicity to this. Yet in spite of this the migration continues.

You will remember that our respective Governments had agreed about the appointment of a Deputy High Commissioner for India in Dacca. Nevertheless, I have postponed this appointment because I did not wish to give any impression in East Bengal that conditions were very abnormal. Nor did I want our Deputy High Commissioner to become a focus of complaints. The pressure on me, however, is very great for such an appointment and I may have to request you later to agree to our giving effect to the previous arrangement. I am not for the present doing so. Even in the event of our sending a Deputy High Commissioner there, our instructions to him would be to advise people not to migrate and not encourage complaints as far as possible.

We have to face one other difficulty. Many people living in West Bengal have considerable property in East Bengal. They have certainly lost touch with them and cannot look after them or get rent etc. from them. They come to us and want our help. I understand from the West Bengal Government that references made to the East Bengal Government on such matters do not yield results and often do not elicit a reply. Perhaps the appointment of a Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca would facilitate consideration of matters of mutual interest between East and West Bengal. I am considering this matter and balancing the pros and cons. I have not yet come to any decision but I thought I might as well inform you of the urgent demands being made upon me in this respect.

Khwaja Nazimuddin says in his letter to you that Hindus in East Bengal are much better off than the Muslims anywhere in India. I am afraid I cannot

agree to this statement at all. Muslims all over India, and as you know there are large numbers of them, continue to live a normal life and pursue their normal vocation. In fact, during all these troubled times they have not been disturbed except in certain localities in northern India. The fact that there is no marked desire for them to leave India is evidence of the fact that conditions are more or less normal. We have passed through difficult times and it is possible that there is a feeling of uncertainty in the minds of some people. That is gradually disappearing.

About the arrests of members of the Muslim National Guards, it is possible that the original arrests might have been somewhat indiscriminate in some places but I understand that soon after cases were examined and releases were made. Exactly the same process was adopted on a much larger scale in regard to the R.S.S. We have impressed on our provincial authorities to take special care in such matters and not to arrest or keep in prison or detention any person against whom there is not sufficient cause. In the event of any mistake being made, we shall welcome our attention being drawn to particular cases which can be considered separately.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Khwaja Nazimuddin.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

20. The Scope of the Inter-Dominion Conference¹

I met the Pakistan Prime Minister this evening and discussed various matters with him. We did not discuss the question of the recovery of the abducted women as we propose to consider this matter tomorrow morning in your presence.

2. I mentioned the delay in the exchange of prisoners and he promised to expedite the matter. We should be quite ready to start operations. These will include on our side East Punjab, the Punjab States, Alwar and Bharatpur. As for Delhi the case is somewhat different. But I have assured him that we shall deal with it more or less on the same level, exceptional cases apart. For instance, there are some appeals before the East Punjab High Court and it would not be proper to withdraw them. I hope that these appeals

1. Note to K. C. Neogy, 18 March 1948. File No. 29-PS/47-PMS.

would be disposed of by the end of this month. Meanwhile, we can go ahead with the others.

3. Yesterday I received a telegram from the Premier of West Bengal about the Muslim boys at the Delhi Reformatory School being sent to Pakistan. He referred to some agreement at the Partition Council. I do not know much about this. But, in any event, I think these boys should be sent immediately to Pakistan, unless they or their parents (some of whom might be in Delhi) want any to remain here. This matter need not be connected with the general exchange of prisoners, but can be dealt with immediately.

4. I discussed with him the holding of an Inter-Dominion Conference in Calcutta to consider East Bengal and West Bengal problems.² He agreed to such a conference at which the Premiers of East and West Bengal and Assam should also be present. He wanted the scope of it however to be enlarged so that it might consider the question of customs barriers etc. between the two Dominions, wherever these might exist. I agreed to this. The only thing to be done is to convene such a conference at an early date. You might fix up the date with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan tomorrow. I am afraid I shall not be able to go to Calcutta for some time. You could attend it on behalf of the Government of India and possibly another Minister.

2. The Inter-Dominion Conference met in Calcutta from 15 to 19 April 1948 to discuss the problems of the minorities and other questions concerning the two countries.

21. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Reference our conversation on 18th March regarding exchange of prisoners. I have met East Punjab Governor and Ministers and suggested to them to take immediate steps for such exchange. This involves mechanical details being settled at secretariat level. Trust this will be arranged very soon, so that exchange of prisoners may start. East Punjab ready to begin doing so.

1. New Delhi, 22 March 1948. File No. 16-4/48-Pak. I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

22. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 1067 dated 27th March² regarding rioting in Godhra. It is reported that trouble in the town started on 25th March owing to a Hindu refugee having been stabbed in a Muslim locality. Soon after another refugee having a shop in a Muslim locality was killed in the shop and this was followed by stabbing of two more people. The police who tried to intervene were also attacked resulting in severe injuries to two policemen. The police immediately took energetic measures and firing had to be resorted to resulting in two civilians being killed. Troops were also rushed to the town that very day. On the 26th, the refugees whose feelings had been greatly inflamed by the killing of their comrades attacked some Muslims. The situation however was brought under control that very day. Casualties reported are 16 killed and 25 injured including civilians killed and injured by police firing. Several persons have been arrested. There have been a number of cases of arson and a platoon of field company R.I.E.³ is assisting in fighting fire and demolishing burning houses. Fire fighting to start with was difficult as the fire engine of Godhra Municipality could not be worked as the person in charge who was a Muslim had run away. Two engines were however rushed from Lonavla and Baroda. Wells in Godhra are very deep and water tank is situated far away. Water supply therefore was also difficult. Loss of property through burning therefore has been fairly heavy and both Hindu and Muslim buildings have suffered. Home Minister⁴, Bombay, visited Godhra immediately on receipt of information about rioting and everything possible is being done to restore order and protect lives and property. It is hoped that by 1st April normal conditions would be restored.

1. New Delhi, 31 March 1948. File No. 7/46/48-PMS.
2. Liaquat Ali Khan had asked for the facts concerning rioting in Godhra and said that, in view of the danger of repercussions, the Bombay Government should be asked to protect the Muslims.
3. Royal Indian Engineers.
4. Morarji Desai.

23. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
31st March 1948

My dear Prakasa,

I have just received your letter of March 29th and yesterday I saw your other communication which came by bag.

I quite appreciate your difficulty or rather the difficulty of the situation. But I think you have misapprehended certain instructions that were sent from here and more especially Gopalaswami's note. There was absolutely no discourtesy meant for you. Gopalaswami drafted that note on instructions after full discussions in the party and partly even in the Cabinet. That had nothing to do with you but rather with the general situation as it had arisen. Gopalaswami's note was not meant for you; it was a departmental note referring to your office. So please do not think that anyone has for an instant thought in terms of bypassing you.

The fact is that there has been an uproar here ever since the news was published in the press that thousands of Muslim employees of Government now wanted to come back to India from Pakistan. Almost unanimously our newspapers from Madras upwards have expressed their apprehension.¹ The Congress Party in the Assembly grew very excited about it and even today there was a barrage of questions in the Assembly. Now this excitement is partly understandable. All that we did in the instructions sent to your office was that nothing should be done before the matter had been finally examined here. In fact, the party suspects Government of some underhand designs and a suggestion was made that a non-official committee should examine the whole business.

I shall write to you more fully later but generally speaking our position is that we shall honour our word where it has been given. But honouring the word does not get over the inherent difficulty of a lack of jobs and far too many persons asking for them. Many of the old posts have been filled and there are large numbers of Government employees from Pakistan who are on our waiting list. Our rule is to give first preference to those who had first opted for India, secondly to those who have been transferred from Pakistan to India and thirdly to those who have first opted for Pakistan and then for India.

1. File No. 29(1)/PS/47-PMS.

2. For instance, *The Hindu* published a report on 17 March 1948 that the Government of Pakistan was making strenuous efforts to send back to India over twelve thousand surplus employees. Many Congressmen vigorously opposed acceptance of these Muslim employees who had opted for Pakistan but sought re-transfer of services to India.

Retrenchment is taking place in many of our services and it is physically impossible to take in many persons. In fact, quite a number of railway employees who came back from Pakistan here have found no place thus far and are being treated as if they were on leave. There has also been some trouble with the Hindu employees in the railway workshops who objected to this fresh incursion of Muslim employees. Then there is the general public apprehension.

All the facts were not known to us and now your letter has cleared up many matters. I quite agree with you that we should do our utmost to absorb Government employees, Hindu or Muslim, who are otherwise desirable. I agree with you also that many of the Muslims who may be coming back will be very good and loyal servants of the state after their experiences.

But the question does remain, how are we to absorb them when vacancies are so terribly limited, if at all? We may gradually take them in as opportunities arise. Anyhow, we shall go fully into this question. Meanwhile, I should like you to supply us with as much information as you can about numbers, qualifications, kinds of service, etc. This will help in coming to a decision.

You can frankly point out our difficulty to the people who come to you, that difficulty being lack of vacancies. The original agreement was very much upset by subsequent developments in the Punjab, etc., and we took in a considerable number of the Hindu refugee employees.

If you have actually given your word to a few persons to send them to India, you may facilitate their return, if they are not too many, but you should make it clear that chances of immediate employment are very restricted and they may have to wait a long time because the waiting list is a long one. In regard to others no further commitments should be made.

I am writing briefly now but I do wish to assure you that there is no question of the personal element coming in or of your feeling that we have in any way bypassed you. Nobody ever thought or spoke in these terms. It was the problem which worried us, for on the one hand we were anxious to give effect to any undertaking that we had given and on the other hand the difficulties of doing so as pointed out above.

I know you have had a very difficult time in Karachi and that you have faced your difficulties with courage and efficiency. There is no question of your coming back at this critical stage. Each one of us has to shoulder his burden.

I shall write to you more later.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

24. Exodus from and to East Bengal¹

While I agree with much that is said in this note of the meeting held on 3 April, I feel that the whole subject is being viewed too narrowly.² We should not give up any advantage but we cannot take up any attitude of obstruction or delay or postponement of any issue. There is no reason why we should not put forward our whole case. If there is difficulty in agreeing on any particular subject or subjects then only need they be postponed for a subsequent meeting in Delhi.

The basic factor of this situation is that it is rapidly deteriorating and we may have to face a mass exodus from East Bengal and *vice versa*. I understand that there is some tendency now for Muslims to leave West Bengal also. If this kind of thing develops then we might well have to face a crisis of unprecedented dimensions which might well overwhelm us. This would also have repercussions elsewhere in Hyderabad, etc. It would be bad business to gain a small point, or some minor financial advantage, at the cost of disaster and vast expenditure later on.

Every effort should therefore be made to reach reasonable agreements on all possible matters so as to change the present atmosphere of West and East Bengal for the better. If we succeed in producing this psychological change we shall be the gainers in the long run and even in the short run. Our approach must therefore be as cooperative as possible and must aim at results. If this is achieved, the postponement of one or two items for further consideration will not matter much.

1. Note, 6 April 1948. File No. 26-190/48-Pak. I, N.A.I.
2. Senior officials of different ministries identified the exodus of non-Muslims from East Bengal to India to be the major issue at the forthcoming conference of Dominions in Calcutta. If Pakistan raised issues of wider import, India was to urge postponement of discussion of questions bearing on customs, central excise and trade.

25. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I am informed that in course of exchange of prisoners between East and

1. Undated, clearly written in April 1948. J.N. Collection.

West Punjab, West Punjab Government have in contravention of agreement transferred certain prominent non-Muslim prisoners from Lahore Jail to Rawalpindi Jail instead of sending them to East Punjab. On representation being made they stated that this was due to certain allegations made against East Punjab Government regarding exchange of Muslim prisoners. Allegations made were unfounded and explained. West Punjab Government thereupon refused to transfer these prisoners on ground that Government of India have not agreed to transfer all Muslim prisoners of Delhi. I am astonished and deeply grieved at this action of West Punjab Government, which can only have harmful effect on relations of two Dominions. We have tried our utmost strictly to abide by our agreement and assurances. We informed you that Delhi could not be treated on same level as Punjab because it was not affected in the same way. Nevertheless we undertook to apply same principle as far as possible to Delhi also with exception of offences against women and under-appeal prisoners whose cases will be considered separately. It was on this express understanding that exchange began. We on our part propose to apply principle of exchange in as generous manner as possible and we greatly regret that West Punjab Government has done something which is grossly unfair and which must lead to bitterness. I earnestly trust that you will not countenance this and will issue necessary directions for exchange to be continued as agreed.

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN³

II. Restoration of Abducted Women

1. Recovery of Abducted Women¹

Among the many problems that we have to face, one of the most urgent is the recovery of girls and women who have been abducted. We must strain every nerve to help these unfortunate women to go back to their homes. Their friends and relatives should welcome them back and give them all comfort and solace after their harrowing experience.

I am told that sometimes there is an unwillingness on the part of their relatives to accept the girls back in their homes. This is a most objectionable and wrong attitude for anyone to take up and any social custom that supports this attitude must be condemned. These girls require our loving and tender care and their relatives should be proud to take them back and give them every help.

So far as the Government are concerned they consider themselves responsible for these girls and they will do everything in their power to give them every kind of help and relief.² I hope that our people and the Government will cooperate in this vital work.

1. Public appeal, 16 January 1948. *The Hindustan Times*, 17 January 1948.
2. In order to instil confidence in these girls the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation organised a squad of over 100 women social workers to assist the mixed parties of troops and police for their recovery and also set up a women's section in New Delhi for the welfare of refugee women and children with Rameshwari Nehru as Honorary Director and Hannah Sen as Honorary Secretary.

2. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 21st about the deputation of Sikhs that met you.² A similar deputation met me also some time ago and made the same points.

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. A deputation led by Giani Kartar Singh, Minister of the East Punjab Government, met Rajendra Prasad on 21 January 1948 and demanded that Nankana Sahib be made a 'free zone' area like Jerusalem and free passage of pilgrims be ensured; the Ravi Kartarpur *Gurdwara* be exchanged with a village on the Indian side; a large number of abducted women still in Pakistan be rescued; properties attached to *Gurdwaras* not be taken away; political position of the Sikhs be secured; and Sikhs in Sind be evacuated.

About the *Gurdwaras* there is no difficulty regarding the principle that Sikhs should look after them. But there are obvious difficulties in practice at present. I am afraid it is quite impossible to talk about changing boundaries in the present atmosphere. Nor can Nankana Sahib be made into an autonomous state.

There is no doubt that there are a large number of abducted women still in Pakistan. But it is also true that there are still a large number of abducted women in East Punjab. Neither side has really tried hard enough to recover them.³

You have yourself answered the political point raised.⁴

We are doing everything in our power to evacuate Sikhs and others from Sind.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Up to 15 January 1948, the East Punjab Government had been able to recover 8,005 Muslim women and children. The progress in rescue operations in West Punjab had not been satisfactory because the provincial government had imposed restrictions on the movement of the Indian military and police personnel engaged in this operation.
4. In his letter of 21 January, Rajendra Prasad wrote that the issue of the political position of the Sikhs would be dealt with by the Advisory Committee on Minorities of the Constituent Assembly.

3. To Rameshwari Nehru¹

New Delhi
8 February 1948

My dear Bijji,

Your letter of the 7th February. I have shown it to Sardar Patel and he entirely agrees about Kamaladevi² going to the Frontier for the rescue of abducted women; also about your asking the United Council of Women³ to interest itself specially in regard to the recovery of Muslim abducted women from the Punjab States. I understand that the Maharaja of Patiala is here. I am going away almost immediately.⁴ I should like you to get in touch

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya.

3. The reference is to the National Council of Women in India founded in 1925 for raising the status of women through education, medical facilities, family planning, etc.

4. Nehru was leaving for Allahabad.

with the Maharaja of Patiala or ask Lady Mountbatten to do so. You might also ask Sardar Patel to mention this matter to the Maharaja.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Rehabilitation of Abducted Women¹

Brothers and Sisters,

In the last six months we have had to face strange difficulties. Many terrible things have happened and we feel ashamed when we remember them and stand guilty in the eyes of the world. But the worst thing that has happened is the abduction of girls and women and the difficulties they face. I do not know when we shall be able to solve the problems created by these developments of the last six months. But one thing that we shall remember most of all and which we shall feel most ashamed of relates to these girls and women. An individual or a nation associated with such treatment stands condemned. So what should we do about this? Whatever has happened has happened. Though we cannot forget it for a long time, we have to make every effort to try to undo the harm.

So we want to try and solve this problem to the best of our ability. I received reports about the abducted women and girls and I am deeply upset and filled with shame that they should have undergone such bad experiences. Whether it happened in India or in Pakistan, all of us have to feel that shame.

I was in Jammu yesterday. I met some girls there who had been in the Ali Beg Camp² and had come from there. They told me about the large number of women who are still there and the kind of life they have to lead. It saddened me so tremendously that I began to wonder what we were doing if such things were allowed to happen. I have talked of only one camp but similar cases are to be found all over. I do not want to fix the responsibility on anyone or to count how many women have been abducted. The whole thing is wrong and we, all of us, are guilty, whether we belong to India or

1. Speech inaugurating the rehabilitation of abducted women and children week, New Delhi, 16 February 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi.)
2. A camp of non-Muslim refugees was organised at Ali Beg, about 25 miles from Mirpur in the Jammu Division.

Pakistan or the States. So all of us have to make an effort to undo the harm. Recently the Governments of India and Pakistan, and the Governments of East and West Punjab met and took certain decisions about this.³ Decisions are easy to take; and we proclaimed loudly that we would rescue those women as quickly as possible and restore them to their homes. Some action has been taken and a few women have been brought back. But the fact is that the work is proceeding very slowly. We do not know what the obstacles are and why there are difficulties. This is a matter in which any human being with the least sense of shame and pity should willingly help. The wrong-doers should at least now try to undo their wrong and wash away the stains. As far as Government officers are concerned, they should spare no efforts and take the help of the army and the police in this task.⁴ Please remember, we may gradually forget any other hardship which we have undergone but this matter concerning our women will not be forgotten, either by our country or the world, and the longer it continues, the deeper will be our sense of shame. It will sow seeds for future bitterness and wars, and all kinds of difficulties will arise, so we cannot afford any delay in this matter. As you can imagine, this is such a matter that the longer it continues, the more difficult it becomes.

This week⁵ is being devoted to give momentum to this task so that we undertake this task with full strength and try to finish it as quickly as possible. It is the duty of every man to do whatever is possible without waiting to see what the other side is doing. I have often heard with surprise remarks, such as, 'we have done so much, what are they doing?', etc. When I went to Pakistan, I found the same thing happening there too—each one loves to weigh what the other does. Both good and bad are sought to be weighed. We have to do our duty whether others do or don't. We want that Pakistan should also make strong efforts and we will help them as much as possible in this task. But whether others do anything or not, our duty is to go ahead and complete this task. So I want to tell you that, as far as the Government of India is concerned, we will work with all our might, wherever

3. The Inter-Dominion Conference at Lahore decided on 6 December 1947 that the Military Evacuation Organisations of both the Dominions and the police departments of West and East Punjab should function in close cooperation and be assisted by non-official workers of one Dominion working in the other Dominion for the restoration of abducted women and forced converts.
4. At the Inter-Dominion Conference in Delhi on 18-20 December 1947, Pakistan had agreed to the Indian proposal to associate the Military Evacuation Organisations to expedite operations for rescuing abducted women and children but failed to carry out its assurance. At a later conference in Lahore, on 8 January 1948, Pakistan insisted that the responsibility for recovery of women and children was of the local police only.
5. 16-22 February 1948.

the task requires to be done, in East or West Punjab or in the States or anywhere else, without bothering about what other people are doing. We will help Pakistan to the best of our ability. I appeal to all individuals, whether in the States or elsewhere, whether they are officers, rulers of princely States or common people, to work together to create an atmosphere in which this problem can be solved quickly and we can save our unfortunate sisters and bring them back.

I would like to say one more thing, especially to those women who are the victims of all these hardships, that they should not feel that we have any hesitation whatsoever in bringing them back or that we have doubts about their virtue. We want to bring them back with affection because it has not been their fault. They were forcefully abducted and we want to bring them back respectfully and keep them lovingly. They must not doubt that they will come back to their families and be given all possible help. You must have heard Mahatmaji's voice on the radio a few hours ago.⁶ Mahatmaji is no more but his voice could be heard. I know how concerned Mahatmaji was about these women. He wanted that this task should be taken up and completed soon. You have heard his voice which is all that remains of him. So let us try to fulfil his wish. If you do this work, you will have achieved something good and also fulfilled the last wish of Mahatmaji. *Jai Hind*.

6. Recording of Mahatma Gandhi's speeches at prayer meetings were being broadcast by the A.I.R. at 5.30 p.m. every day.

5. To Rameshwari Nehru¹

New Delhi
1 March 1948

My dear Bijji,

I have your letter about the 175 abducted women who are being brought from Patiala. I appreciated the difficulty of the problem. There is the agreement with Pakistan and at the same time I just do not see how you can force these girls to go to Pakistan against their wishes.

The proposal you make is a good one. I feel however that the High Commissioner for Pakistan should be brought into the picture also. How exactly I do not know. You can tell him of the steps you are taking and ask for his suggestions. You may also send him a copy of the recommendations

1. J.N. Collection.

of your committee or tribunal of three women. If he wants to see any of the girls afterwards to make sure, he should be allowed to do so.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

6. To Sushila Nayar¹

New Delhi
2 March 1948

My dear Sushila,

Gurbachan Singh² has given me your report dated 1st March. It is a very good report, and I am glad to know of your success in recovering women. As for your difficulties, the principal one appears to be the reluctance of many of these women to leave their new homes. I think it should be made perfectly clear to them that no one of them will be forced to go to Pakistan against her will. It is desirable now, I think, for them to come out of Patiala to Delhi or some such place so that some kind of an inquiry may be made from them here. After that, if they so wish, they will be sent back to Patiala.

Dr. Wenger³ of the International Red Cross came to see me today and told me that he attended a conference in Lahore of various Pakistan officials as well as Sardar Ibrahim of the so-called 'Azad' Kashmir Government. It was decided there to send back soon all the non-Muslim men, women and children who were in their camps at Ali Beg, Muzaffarabad, Bagh and other nearby places. According to him there were about 3,600 persons there, most of them women and children. They are going to be removed from the 5th to the 7th of this month and brought to Lahore from where they will be brought to some place in India. Later they may go back to their homes in Kashmir. Wenger is going back to supervise this operation at Ali Beg and a British Red Cross officer⁴ is going to Muzaffarabad for the same purpose.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. A social worker who helped Sushila Nayar in the recovery of abducted women at this time.
3. Otto Wenger (b. 1910); Swiss doctor; served as a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross from July 1942 to February 1949; visited India four times in 1943-49 to study social conditions and customs and tropical diseases.
4. Maj.-Gen. Treffry Owen Thompson (1888-1969); joined Royal Army Medical Corps, 1914; Director of Medical Services in India, 1946-47; British Red Cross Commissioner for relief work in India and Pakistan, 1947-49.

7. To B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya¹

New Delhi

3 March 1948

My dear Pattabhi,

I have just had a telephone message from Sushila Nayar from Patiala. She has gone there to help in recovering abducted Muslim women. This is an urgent task which we are undertaking and we wish to complete it, if possible, within the next fortnight or so. We are having good results in these Punjab States, but she tells me that suddenly difficulties have arisen because of the Praja Mandal agitations in some of the Punjab States for responsible government.² These agitations divert the attention of the police and the work of recovery of women is held up. This applies to Patiala, Nabha, Faridkot and Jind. In Patiala, things are quietening down but in other places they are not.

I do not exactly know what is happening in these places and what the Praja Mandal people intend doing. I would hesitate to advise without full knowledge, but there are two considerations which I should like to place before you. The first one is that it would be a pity to obstruct in any way our plan for the recovery of abducted women and girls. We are concentrating on this and hope to achieve substantial results in a very short time. If once this is upset or delayed, then it may be difficult to start afresh on the same scale. Indeed, in such matters delay creates new and almost insoluble problems. Therefore, I should have liked all our energies, including Praja Mandal energies, to be concentrated for two or three weeks on this recovery of women programme.

Secondly, it seems to me a little risky at the present juncture to start any agitation which may have a distracting effect as between Sikhs and Hindus in these States. The political agitation may well be converted into a communal conflict and the political issues will be hidden. It would not help us very much to say that the fault was someone else's. The result would be the same and our cause would suffer. Punjab, that is all parts of it, has been so rudely shaken up by the events of the past six months that every step has to be carefully considered. I should have personally thought that any direct action movement just at present was rather a risky adventure.

1. J.N. Collection. Pattabhi Sitaramayya was at this time Vice-President of the States People's Conference.
2. Early in March 1948, the Praja Mandals of Faridkot and Nabha launched satyagraha movements for grant of responsible government. The Ministry of States negotiated with the State officials for the release of the Praja Mandal leaders and their sympathizers. By the end of March, the movements were called off.

As I have said above, I do not know the facts and, therefore, I am not competent to advise. I feel, however, that in any event nothing should be done which would come in the way of our recovery of women programme. Also, that the steps taken by the States People's Conference should fit in with the policy of the States Ministry; otherwise there would be confusion and some conflict in policies.

I am writing to you to draw your attention to these facts. I should like you to take such steps as you think proper. The matter is urgent so far as the recovery programme is concerned.

I had a long talk with the Maharaja of Patiala the night before last and he complained bitterly of the activities of the Praja Mandal in Patiala which had enraged the Sikhs there, the result being bad and communal passions having been roused. I have heard only one side of the story, but I am worried at these developments.³

Your sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In his reply of 4 March 1948, Pattabhi Sitaramayya alleged that while the Maharaja gave no occupancy rights to tenants, by increasing the number of land owners and giving vast acres of land to a few Sikh refugees, he was using them to thwart the democratic aspirations of the people of the State. He claimed that the Praja Mandal workers were assisting Sushila Nayar in the recovery of abducted women.

8. To K. C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
3rd March 1948

My dear Neogy,

I have just had a telephone message from Sushila Nayar from Patiala. She told me that the great majority of the women recovered refuse to leave their new homes and were so frightened of being taken away forcibly that they threatened to commit suicide. Indeed, last night 46 of them ran away from the camp through some backdoor. This is a difficult problem. I told Sushila Nayar that she can assure these women that no one is going to send them forcibly to Pakistan but we thought it desirable for them to come to Delhi so that the Pakistan High Commissioner and others could then find out what their desires were. This would finally settle the question. In any event, I assured her that we would not compel any girl to be sent to Pakistan against her wishes.

Sushila Nayar impressed upon me the urgency of removing the girls already recovered as it was a great strain to keep them there. I hope that your Ministry will be taking these urgent steps.

Work appears to be going on very satisfactorily but unfortunately just at this moment a difficulty has arisen owing to the Praja Mandal agitation for responsible government and constitutional change. Because of these the police force is engaged otherwise. There is not so much of this in Patiala now but in Nabha, Faridkot and Jind there is plenty of it. I wish this agitation could be postponed for the present at least. I am writing to Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya about it.²

The Pakistan High Commissioner has asked to see me urgently, presumably about this problem of abducted women. I am seeing him this evening.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. See the preceding item.

9. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
3 March 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose copy of a letter I am sending to Pattabhi.²

Sushila told me on the telephone that the work of recovery was proceeding well but a great majority of the women did not want to leave their new homes and this was a problem. I told her that an assurance could be given that they will not be sent away against their wishes to Pakistan, but it is desirable that they should come here first and then go back to Patiala after the whole matter has been finally settled here.

Sushila was anxious that these women should be removed from Patiala immediately as it was a strain to keep them there. I have written to Neogy and Lady Mountbatten on this subject.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, p. 255.

2. See *ante*, item 7.

10. Progress in the Recovery of Abducted Women¹

The Government of India have been anxious to carry on the work of recovering abducted women. They have agreed with the Government of Pakistan that this work should be expedited in every way in regard to the recovery of both Hindu and Muslim women in their respective territories. The work is of extreme urgency both because of the sufferings of the women and children concerned as well as their relatives and because delay produces numerous complications. In this work the International Red Cross and the Friends Service Unit² have rendered valuable help for which the Government of India are grateful.

So far as the Government of India are concerned, they propose to carry on this work with all speed and to try their utmost to recover every Muslim woman who has been abducted and who may be in eastern Punjab, Punjab States, Jammu and Kashmir State or in any other part of the Indian Union. They consider it their duty to do so and will continue to do so quite apart from the steps taken in this behalf by the Government of Pakistan. They trust however that the Government of Pakistan will also carry on this work of recovery with equal earnestness and speed.

The Government of Pakistan will, it is hoped, also render help in the recovery of women who have been abducted from Jammu and Kashmir State.

The women so recovered should be placed in camps conveniently situated in the respective Dominions, in the administration of which representatives of the International Red Cross and the Friends Service Unit should be associated. The Bishop of Lahore or his representative might also be associated in this work. It should be open to the representatives of each Dominion Government to visit the camps in the territory of the other Dominion Government.

Lists of recovered women and those in camps should immediately be prepared and exchanged to enable information about them to be sent to their relatives and later to restore them to their homes or their relatives.

Arrangements should be made for the recovered women to spend some days quietly in the main camps so that they may have the chance to decide freely where they want to go to. Every opportunity should be given to the representatives of the International Red Cross, as well as of India or Pakistan as the case may be, to satisfy themselves that the decision is according to the real wishes of the women concerned.

1. Note given to Mridula Sarabhai, 10 March 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. A Quaker body formerly called the Friends Ambulance Unit which had been engaged in relief and welfare work in India since 1942.

Orphan children and minor women should be sent back to their homes. In case there is any doubt about any orphan child or minor girl the matter should be referred to a Board consisting of representatives of India and Pakistan and the International Red Cross and/or the Friends Service Unit.

Miss Mridula Sarabhai has been helping in the recovery of abducted women from East and West Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir State.³ This note is given to her for her guidance as to the policy which the Government of India has been pursuing and intends to pursue in this matter. The Government is anxious to carry through this policy as fully and cooperatively as possible, avoiding needless discussions about minor points. They are anxious that the fullest restoration should be made in accordance with the wishes of the parties concerned. They will give every help and assistance in this matter both in regard to financing camps and supplying information about recovered women and tracing their relatives.

3. The headquarters of the women social workers working under the guidance of Mridula Sarabhai was in Lahore.

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

III. Border Issues

1. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. nil dated 5th January alleging movement of Dominion and Tripura State troops through Pakistan territory. This complaint has been investigated and it has been verified that there is absolutely no truth in it. Indian and State troops were given strict instructions not to violate Pakistan territory and it has been verified that these instructions are being faithfully observed.

1. New Delhi, 14 January 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.

2. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Continuation our telegram 670 of January 22nd.² Demarcation of boundary between East Bengal and Assam. We are informed that Deputy Commissioner, Sylhet, has crossed into Patharia Hill Reserve Forest³ on the border between Kusiara and Tripura State, has arrested section of Assam armed police consisting of 14 men sent to protect oil concessions in Patharia and is also reported to have arrested B.O.C.⁴ employees. Pathan troops are also said to have entered this area as reinforcements. According to map attached to Radcliffe Award, Patharia Hill Reserve Forest clearly falls within the Dominion of India, and I would request that East Bengal Government be asked immediately to withdraw their forces from this area. Failing withdrawal of Deputy Commissioner's party, we may have to consider other

1. New Delhi, 28 January 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.
2. In this cable the Government of India agreed to the setting up of a Joint Boundary Commission to settle the disputes which had arisen regarding the boundary between the Sylhet district in East Bengal and Assam in terms of the Radcliffe Award.
3. This disputed area lay in the Patharkandi *thana* of the Sylhet district. The Radcliffe Award had assigned the entire Sylhet district to East Bengal with the exception of the four *thanas* of Patharkandi, Ratabari, Karimganj and Badarpur which remained with India.
4. Burma Oil Company.

action. Until boundary has been demarcated by Joint Survey Commission,³ as already suggested by us, Assam Government should, we think, continue to be in undisturbed possession of this area. Incident emphasizes the need for a joint survey without further delay.

5. On 15 March 1948 the setting up of a Joint Boundary Commission was announced. Rohini Kumar Chaudhury represented India and Syed Mouzzimuddin represented Pakistan.

3. Telegram to Akbar Hydari¹

Your telegram No. 216-MSG dated 29th January.² We are in touch with our military authorities who are enquiring into the position, probably through senior officer. Meanwhile, in view of fact that Security Council is considering Kashmir issue, we think it desirable to act with caution and would suggest that no force be used until you hear from us.

1. New Delhi, 30 January 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.
2. Hydari, the Governor of Assam, had advocated use of force to clear the Patharia Hill Forest Reserve of intruders from Pakistan.

4. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Reference telegram 342 of January 31 from Foreign, Karachi.² Dispute between East Bengal and Assam regarding Patharia Forest Reserve. I am surprised that East Bengal Government should claim Patharia Forest Reserve as part of their territory. The latest gazette notification of the former

1. New Delhi, 2 February 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.
2. Liaquat Ali complained that Indian troops had entered the Patharia Forest Reserve and encamped within Pakistan territory. He requested Nehru to ask the Assam Government to act in accordance with the agreement reached with the East Bengal Government that, pending the settlement of the border question, the disputed area would not be disturbed.

Government of Assam published in 1940 clearly shows Patharia as part of Patharkandi *thana* and there is no subsequent gazette notification changing the boundaries of this or adjoining *thanas*. According to the Radcliffe Award, Patharkandi *thana* is definitely included within the province of Assam and, as I have already stated in my telegram No. 641 of January 20, in the map attached to the award Patharia Forest Reserve is clearly shown within Assam. I have also ascertained that Patharia Forest Reserve is in the possession of Assam Government. I would therefore repeat my earlier request that the East Bengal Government be immediately asked to withdraw their forces from the Patharia Forest Reserve which definitely forms part of the province of Assam and about which there can be no question of disputed possession.

5. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram 471 of February 10. Dispute Patharia Hills Reserve. Your paragraph 3.² We agree that dispute should be settled by a Joint Boundary Commission on which both Dominion Governments will be equally represented. We consider, however, that as at present there is no dispute elsewhere than on Sylhet-Karimganj border. In order to save time, Commission should be asked to investigate and report on disputes on this border only and not on possible disputes on rest of the border between Assam and East Bengal. We also agree that until the work of Commission is completed and decision is reached by the two Governments, all troops and armed police on either side should be withdrawn from Reserve. We suggest, however, that withdrawal should be only up to a distance of five miles beyond the periphery of the Reserve. We would add that as the question is not only one of exact location of a boundary but also of the possession of Reserve itself, civil officers of both East Bengal and Assam Governments should also be withdrawn from the Reserve. Please telegraph your consent.

1. New Delhi, 18 February 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.

2. Liaquat Ali proposed that the troops should be withdrawn from all points within ten miles or any other distance which Nehru might prefer from the periphery of the Forest Reserve. The Joint Boundary Commission should deal with all disputes between Assam and East Bengal on the borders of the Sylhet district, and not just with the Sylhet-Karimganj boundary.

Your paragraph 4 : We agree that there should be one representative of each Dominion Government on Boundary Commission. We note the name of your representative³ and will telegraph the name of our representative as early as possible. We also agree that each representative should be assisted by one or two experts who will not be members of Commission.

Your paragraph 2 : I stated in my reply to a question on the floor of the Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) on February 7 that we had been waiting for a reply to our telegram dated February 2, 1948⁴ and not to our earlier telegram of January 28.⁵ Your telegram 382 of February 4⁶ reached here after I had approved of the reply in draft, and I regret that the reply was not amended subsequently to make it clear that your reply to our telegram of February 2 had in fact been received.⁷ I assure you, however, that I had no intention of misleading the House about the attitude of Pakistan Government.

3. Syed Mouzzimuddin.

4. See *ante*, item 4.

5. See *ante*, item 2.

6. In this cable Liaquat Ali said that while the Governments of Assam and East Bengal could decide on the venue of the meeting, it was vital to remove "all possibilities of a clash."

7. In his cable of 10 February, Liaquat Ali said that he had replied to Nehru's cable of 23 January which should have reached him before he gave his reply in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative).

6. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Government of Assam have reported that flag marches by Pakistan armed police and troops have taken place in Patharia Reserve and foothills, that protection committees in villages near B.O.C. test well are being formed and Ansars² raised, and that forest beat house is being shifted somewhere within Reserve. In view of our agreement that dispute regarding boundary at this point between Assam and East Bengal should be referred to Joint Commission and, meanwhile, police and troops of each side should be withdrawn to specified distance from disputed area, I hope that you will issue instructions to Government of East Bengal to refrain from all provocative action.

1. New Delhi, 26 February 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.

2. A force raised by the East Bengal Government.

2. As regards your complaint (reference telegram No. 1745 dated 25th February) of movement of Gurkha troops from Assam to Patharia I have telegraphed for report from Assam Government and shall communicate with you as soon as I hear from them.³
3. The Government of Assam replied on 28 February that no Gurkha troops had proceeded to Patharia. The Assam Regiment had left for Silchar the week before.

7. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 239 of February 23.² Patharia dispute. I am anxious that we should lose no further time in setting up the Committee and make the following suggestions which I hope will be acceptable to you. It is true that, in our telegram No. 670 dated 22nd January, we agreed that the boundary between East Bengal and Assam on Sylhet-Karimganj border should be demarcated by survey to be conducted by a Commission. We consider, however, that the two disputes that have now risen—one regarding the Patharia Hill Reserve and other regarding the location of Kusiara river—should be first considered by Commission. As between these two, Patharia Hills dispute should be taken up first. After above two disputes have been settled, we might consider what is best way of demarcating rest of boundary.

We should have much preferred that civil officials should also be withdrawn from disputed area of Reserve Forest. Their absence is not likely to cause any damage to the forest. However, as we are anxious to have enquiry expedited, I would not make the withdrawal of the forest officials condition precedent to commencement of Commission's work.

I shall telegraph to you about our nominees for the Commission.

1. New Delhi, 26 February 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.
2. While insisting that the Joint Boundary Commission settle the entire sector between Kusiara river and Tripura State, Liaquat Ali had said that the Commission should decide whether priority should be given to the Hill Reserve dispute. He also requested that the forest officials be allowed to remain in the Reserve.

8. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Reference paragraph 1 of my telegram Primin 875 of February 26.² I have since received another report from Assam stating that Pakistan armed police carrying 303 magazine rifles are patrolling Patharia Reserve daily up to eastern boundary and that Pakistan forest officials are constructing beat houses and patrol huts at several places within Reserve. Grateful for immediate action on the line suggested in my earlier telegram and for information about action taken.

Your information that Gurkha troops are moving towards Patharia is incorrect. In fact there has been no movement of troops from Assam towards Patharia forest.

1. New Delhi, 1 March 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll., M.H.A.

2. See *ante*, item 6.

9. To Gopinath Bardoloi¹

New Delhi
8 March 1948

My dear Bardoloi,

We have already settled the personnel of the Commission to inquire into the Patharia dispute. I hope this commission will start work soon. Agreeing with you we are suggesting Calcutta as the venue.

I am glad to learn that there is a possibility of more oil being discovered in Assam. You should go ahead with this investigation as oil is one of the things we lack and it is most important.

I am afraid there is little chance of our Ministry of Defence being able to spare a brigade of the Indian Army for Assam.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

1. To Molly Flynn¹

New Delhi
8th January 1948

Dear Miss Flynn,

Thank you for your letter of January 7th.² I am very grateful to you and to Mr. Barger for all the trouble you have taken during the few weeks you have been here. I can assure you that your visit has been helpful to us in many ways and it has forced us to think over these urgent problems from different standpoints. I agree entirely with you that this work has to be done not as Government departments function but in terms of a national emergency.

I hope that I shall see you again before you go away.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File on U.N.R.R.A. Flynn/Barger Mission, United Nations Archives.
2. Molly Flynn and Evert Barger, special representatives of the Director-General of U.N.R.R.A., wrote that they had discussed on 6 January their three reports on absorption of refugees and reconstruction of East Punjab with Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Neogy and S.K. Kirpalani, and observed that vision, leadership and high powers of organisation were needed if India's men and resources were to be mobilised and harnessed to the task.
3. They were to leave India on 14 January.

2. Telegram to B. G. Kher¹

In view of developments² in Sind it has become urgently necessary to evacuate Hindu and Sikh population. Most effective method of doing so is by ship to Bombay.³ Fully appreciate your difficulties but in view of emergency would request you to arrange full facilities for reception and transit of these refugees from Sind. As far as possible they should be moved away immediately to camps in interior, old military barracks being utilised for purpose. Defence Ministry prepared to help in every way.

1. New Delhi, 8 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. The non-Muslims in Sind were being attacked and harassed.
3. The Controller of Indian Shipping had directed certain passenger ships to operate between Karachi and Kathiawar, and Karachi and Bombay for speedy evacuation of refugees from Pakistan.

3. To B. G. Kher¹

New Delhi
9 January 1948

My dear Kher,

I sent you a telegram yesterday about the Sind refugees. I know perfectly well how much trouble you have had in Bombay from these refugees. Yet the situation in Sind is bad and I fear we must face a large exodus. Inevitably most of these people will go to Bombay in the first instance by ship. We cannot leave them in Sind and we cannot allow them to drift about. As far as possible we should like them to move away from Bombay. Naturally the Government of India will help you to the fullest extent possible. I suggest that some effective arrangements might be made for their reception, transit and dispersal. There are a number of military camps available and they might be sent there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

4. To N. V. Gadgil¹

New Delhi
10 January 1948

My dear Gadgil,

At the Cabinet meeting this morning we decided that some kind of huts should be put up immediately for the refugees. I have been going into this problem again and have consulted Gandhiji and others. The result of this has been to impress upon me the urgent necessity of providing a large number of huts.² There is for the present no other solution of the problem of housing refugees in sufficient numbers. Gandhiji is very anxious that we should proceed on these lines. In order to avoid delay we need not stick to official routine and official machinery only. We can ask the contractors or others to take charge of part of the work so that we can immediately put up a large number of huts. I hope that you will take immediate steps in this matter as not only our reputation but the peace of Delhi depends upon it.

1. File No. 29(2)/47-PMS. Gadgil was Union Minister for Works, Mines and Power.
2. Ultimately the East Punjab Government spent approximately Rs. 2 crores on huts to accommodate nearly 250,000 refugees.

We do not know what further difficulties we may have to face because of the troubles in Sind or because of developments in Kashmir. Therefore the sooner we deal with our present refugee problem the better.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Central Help for Rehabilitation¹

In regard to the rehabilitation of refugees the Prime Minister pointed out that the problem of rehabilitation of refugees from western Pakistan, always an important and urgent one, had now assumed a new urgency. Evacuation from western Punjab and the Frontier Province had been practically completed, although some pockets of non-Muslims remained.² There was also the vital question of recovery of abducted women. Having more or less completed this evacuation rehabilitation had now to be taken in hand, not spasmodically and casually but in a planned way. Any delay might well lead to disastrous consequences. Even in Delhi city the vast number of refugees, numbering about 450,000, had become a tremendous problem and lately there had been disturbance.³ In East Punjab while the provincial Government had achieved a considerable measure of success in some respects a great deal had still to be done. It was doubtful if the resources of the East Punjab Government were sufficient for the purpose of tackling this problem. The other provinces in India had also to cooperate. Essentially therefore it was a matter for Central direction and Central planning. The Centre indeed was paying for all this, or nearly all, and it could not leave matters to drift or to chance. Normally governmental agencies were good in their own way but they were hardly suited for dealing with emergencies. What was required was some machinery which could tackle the problem rapidly, effectively and on a planned basis. Vision was necessary and there must be a note of urgency about the work...

1. Discussions at a Cabinet meeting, 10 January 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers. Extracts.
2. The number of stranded non-Muslim refugees was estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 at this time.
3. The police made a lathi charge on 6 January on a crowd of refugees who broke through the barbed wire at Khari Baoli in Delhi and wanted to occupy vacant houses in Phatak Habash Khan. The refugees made repeated attempts to take forcible possession of houses. About 30 refugees were arrested.

The Prime Minister stated that before any final decisions could be made it was necessary to consult the representatives of the East Punjab Government as well as other provincial governments.⁴ Meanwhile, it would be desirable to appoint a special Cabinet committee to survey the entire problem, to lay down the general policy, and to indicate the machinery to be used for planning and rehabilitation.

4. In the course of the discussion a clarification had been sought regarding the extent of financial help to be given to the provinces and it had also been said that help should be given on the condition that the general policy laid down by the Centre would be followed by them.

6. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
12 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

As you know, it has become necessary to make adequate arrangements for large-scale evacuation of non-Muslims from Sind. I think the situation in Sind is somewhat better but there can be no doubt that a wholesale exodus will take place. We are dealing with the Pakistan Government about removing the embargo on shipping and rescinding ordinances which come in the way of evacuation.²

It is clear that people from Sind can be evacuated easily only by sea. This means they are going to Bombay or Kathiawar. Liaquat Ali Khan was specially afraid of Muslims from Kathiawar going to Karachi.

The Bombay Government are anxious to prevent any further refugees reaching Bombay, but there is no help for it, and I am requesting B.G. Kher

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, p. 244.

2. The Sind Government had put an embargo on the entry of ships into Karachi. As soon as the ban was lifted, they introduced a system under which no non-Muslim was allowed to leave Sind except on the production of a permit. Such a permit was withheld until the individual in question had obtained clearance certificates from various public authorities that no payments were due from him. However, by 21 January, the Indian High Commissioner was able to report that he had cleared about 25,000 refugees. But over 1000 Hindus on the way from Sukkur to Karachi had been detained and several refugee trains cancelled.

to make arrangements for the reception of these refugees and their subsequent dispersal. We shall of course help the Bombay Government in every way.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. At the Bombay and Kathiawar ports, the Government of India had set up reception centres which provided temporary transit accommodation, food and train passages to all evacuees.

7. Telegram to B. G. Kher¹

Would again request you to give facilities for non-Muslim evacuees from Sind to go to Bombay and be dispersed from there. No other course open to us to meet grave emergency that has arisen in Sind. Central Government will help you in every way. We shall welcome suggestions from you as to what we should do to assist.

Navin Khandwalla, Manager, Bombay Steam Navigation Company, has been most helpful in Karachi in task of evacuation. We understand that Company is thinking of withdrawing him from Karachi. Please ask them to allow Khandwalla to remain in Karachi. We are prepared to attach him to our High Commissioner's office there especially for evacuation work.

1. New Delhi, 12 January 1948. File No. 51-6/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

8. To Tej Bahadur Sapru¹

New Delhi
13 January 1948

My dear Tej Bahadurji,

Thank you for your letter of the 8th January.² I fear we cannot do anything

1. T.B. Sapru Papers (microfilm), N.M.M.L.
2. Sapru forwarded a telegram from the Kashmiri Pandits of Skardu for help.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

preferment to somebody. I might mention that the Advocate General in the United Provinces till the partition was a Muslim Leaguer, who had continued from the old regime. He was a bit of a nuisance and yet Govind Ballabh Pant did not think it worthwhile to remove him although I was personally of the opinion that he should be changed. This man, Wasim,⁴ is now the Advocate General of Pakistan. What seems to me rather objectionable is not the fact of change but the manner of doing it.

There is no proposal about general elections being held at any time, but it is quite possible that some kind of elections might be held during the next cold weather. Anyhow, no decision is going to be made till the new constitution is passed, that is, probably in July next. It is true that the prospect of elections would lead to the administrative machinery being tuned in that direction and our general rehabilitation work suffering. But elections cannot be avoided. At the most they might be held up for a few months. If we can build up a planning and development machinery which can work on almost independently then elections will not matter so much.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Muhammad Wasim, an advocate of Lucknow and later Advocate General of the United Provinces; Advocate General, Pakistan, 1948-51.

10. Organising Rehabilitation¹

At this morning's meeting of this Committee stress was laid on the necessity of Central planning for the rehabilitation of large numbers of refugees who had come from Pakistan to India. Also that there should be Central control in regard to the working out of these plans. For this purpose some kind of a planning or development board should be formed consisting of a high-powered development commissioner and two or four other members. This board should have executive authority, the general policy being laid down by the Rehabilitation Committee of the Cabinet or the Cabinet itself.

1. Note for the Rehabilitation Committee of the Cabinet, 13 January 1948. File No. 29(36)/48-PMS. Extracts.

This central development board should confer with representatives of each province concerned in regard to development schemes of that province. Schemes for settlement of refugees should take into consideration the potential resources of the provinces or areas. Where such resources have been more or less exhausted or have run to a saturation point, it would be undesirable to have a fresh settlement. Thus although it may be easier, to begin with, to have a settlement and development scheme somewhere near the city of Bombay or Cawnpore, this would not be desirable in the long run as scope for expansion would be limited. Further, it is better to have a system of all-round planned development of the country rather than intensify development of certain areas.

It was suggested and generally agreed to that the Central Provinces offered the most suitable large areas for settlement and development schemes. These provinces are rich in forest and mineral resources, are relatively scarcely populated, and have a mixed population. It would be fairly easy for any group of persons from the Punjab or the Frontier Province or Sind to be settled there and to fit in with the local population. Among other areas, Orissa was also mentioned, but the extreme poverty of Orissa would probably come in the way of any rapid development of such schemes.

Assam was not mentioned but may also be considered as a suitable area from this point of view.

It would be necessary to have a rapid survey made of suitable sites in the selected areas.

In this planned scheme of development an over-all planning of India should be borne in mind as well as the various projects for river valley developments which are ripe or which are being prepared, so that the new development schemes should fit in with these.

The Advisory Planning Board which considered briefly the various plans made by Government departments or by other agencies presented a report about a year ago to Government. This report has unfortunately not been fully considered by the Cabinet yet. It should be considered very early so that some general principles might be laid down by the Cabinet which would guide the work of the Rehabilitation Committee and the proposed development board.

The development of small scale industries should be particularly emphasised in these new areas. For this purpose it may be useful to have experts from countries like Switzerland. If a suitable person is found, an expert can be attached to the development board as an adviser.

It is important that the development board should have full authority to go ahead and its work should not be delayed by the normal processes of Government.

11. Pakistan's Requisition of Hospital at Lahore¹

The Minister for Health made a mention regarding telegram from the Deputy High Commissioner at Lahore stating that the Ganga Ram Hospital at Lahore was being requisitioned by the Pakistan Government. The Prime Minister observed that it was difficult to object to the requisition as a huge hospital was lying empty except for a few Muslim and non-Muslim patients, whereas according to Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan there was a great demand for hospital accommodation in Lahore due to the presence of about 5 lakhs of Muslim refugees there. The Prime Minister had, however, asked the High Commissioner to keep a portion of the hospital for housing rescued women. Refugees injured in the recent attack on a non-Muslim refugees train at Gujrat were also being brought to the Ganga Ram Hospital and the Health Department had flown medical staff to Lahore for their care.

1. Minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 14 January 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.

12. Resettlement of Refugees¹

The Government has decided to appoint a high-power board to tackle the problem of rehabilitation of refugees. A Development and Rehabilitation Commissioner will also be appointed soon. The Commissioner will have wide powers and will work in close cooperation with the provincial governments. The Centre wants to implement the development programmes drawn up previously and link them with the rehabilitation work.

No doubt, there has been a delay in the preparation of an overall scheme for the resettlement of refugees. Many people will be settled in Delhi, Bombay and other places. But there is a limited scope for expansion in big cities. There is, therefore, a need for establishing new towns and cities. The high-power board will undertake the work as most of the money will come from the Central Government.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Delhi, 16 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 17 January 1948.



AT A REFUGEE CAMP, JULLUNDUR, FEBRUARY 1948



AT A REFUGEE CAMP, JULLUNDUR, FEBRUARY 1948

At Shadipur a few thousand plots of land will be offered to the refugees for constructing houses and Tihar, another village, will also be developed into a town.

We understand the difficulties which the people of Delhi are undergoing on account of the refugees who have come to Delhi. The refugees have lost all of their properties in the Punjab and are in trouble through no fault of their own. Many other issues are linked up with the problem of refugees. They have to be provided with temporary housing accommodation and then measures have to be adopted for their permanent settlement. Rehabilitation of lakhs of refugees is not easy. Within two or three days about 2,000 refugees will be provided with temporary accommodation.

13. Billeting in Government Accommodation¹

A suggestion has been made that some refugees should be accommodated by a process of billeting in houses. It is worthwhile exploring this suggestion as it is a good one. It should be possible for many of the officers of Government from Ministers downwards to be able to spare one room in their houses for a refugee family.² There are obvious difficulties in this chiefly because of our social customs and differences in modes of life. It need not be necessary for food to be provided to the refugee family from the common kitchen. Some other kitchen arrangement might perhaps be made.

Many officers of Government probably have already got some friends or relatives among the refugees who are staying with them. Any further demand can hardly be made upon them.

It may be possible also for two officers to live together in one house and vacate the other house for refugees.

I suggest that a circular letter might be sent to the officers of Government drawing their attention to these suggestions and enquiring from them how far they can give effect to them.

1. Note, 16 January 1948. File No. 29(2)/47-PMS.

2. To set an example to fellow ministers and Government officials, who had accommodation to spare, Nehru decided, on 19 January, to allow a refugee family to stay at his residence.

14. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
16 January 1948

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

I had a visit today from Hansraj Wireless² as he calls himself. He told me that you had referred him to the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Delhi so that he might be able to get some workshop for manufacturing various articles of his invention. He did not seem to have had much success there.

Hansraj seems to me to be a man of some talent and considerable inventive capacity. Whether this can be turned to practical account or not I cannot say. But he certainly deserves encouragement not from a personal point of view but from the public point of view. He says that he can employ three or four thousand persons in his factory once it gets going. This may be an exaggeration. But there may also be some truth in it.

Apart from what Hansraj said, it seems to me desirable either for your Ministry or for the Relief Ministry to take one of the big workshops that has been vacated and run it as a Government concern. You could engage Hansraj as an expert to advise you or you may engage several persons including Hansraj. It would be worthwhile giving him some scope and to watch results. If he fails it is some little loss. If he succeeds then we have not only produced something worthwhile but also given employment to a number of refugees. There is an advantage about this also in the sense that if Government takes possession of a vacated workshop it will hold it in trust for the owner as decided by the Inter-Dominion Conferences. To give it to a private person may not be in consonance with those decisions.

I suggest therefore that you might have this matter investigated by your advisers and approach the Custodian of Evacuee Property on the subject. I am sending copies of this letter to Neogy and the Custodian.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(41)/48-PMS.

2. (1909-1986); an amateur scientist; as a member of the Indian Revolutionary Party he was accused of a conspiracy to blow up the Viceroy's train in 1929 and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

15. To Uma Shankar Dikshit¹

New Delhi
19 January 1948

My dear Uma Shankar,²

Some time back there was a bit of a mess about the *Imambara* near the Birla Temple. Apparently the Deputy Commissioner had given it for occupation to Goswami Ganesh Dutt³ and you had allotted it to somebody else for a hospital. You were, of course, quite right in what you did. My name came in rather unnecessarily into the picture. What I had done was merely to enquire as to whether Goswami Ganesh Dutt could have the use of that building. Then I forgot all about it till I learnt of this slight confusion. Immediately I said that your orders must be carried out. Indeed, I have no business to issue any directions in such matters and I did not do so.

I am interested, however, in helping Goswami Ganesh Dutt to find some accommodation for his workers. He is a good man who had done a vast deal of work in the Punjab and even now he is doing good work among the refugees. If we can help him at all it would be a good thing. How this can be done it is for you to judge entirely. I suggest that you might send for him and have a talk with him. I want to make it perfectly clear that the *Imambara* should not be involved in this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(60)/48-PMS.
2. (b. 1901); Congressman from Kanpur; Custodian, Evacuee Property, Delhi, 1948-52; Managing Director, Associated Journals Ltd., Lucknow, 1957-71; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1961-76; Union Minister for Works and Housing and of Health and Family Planning, 1971-73; Minister Without Portfolio, 1974-75; Minister of Shipping and Transport, February-November 1975; Governor of Karnataka, 1976-77; Governor of West Bengal, 1984-86.
3. (1889-1959); active social and religious worker in Punjab, U.P. and Delhi; organised refugee rehabilitation work in Delhi after independence.

16. Accommodation for Refugees in Delhi¹

About ten days ago I stated that the Government was making every effort to provide some kind of shelter for the refugees in Delhi who lacked accom-

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 23 January 1948. *The Statesman*, 24 January 1948.

modation.² We have taken this up as an urgent problem of the highest priority because we did not want any single refugee from Pakistan to be without a shelter at least. The problem has been a big one, made all the more difficult by more and more people arriving.

The Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation and the local Delhi Administration have worked hard during the past ten days to make arrangements for providing this accommodation and shelter. Inevitably it is not possible to provide all the amenities that we should like to give but I am glad to say that some kind of accommodation and shelter is available now for those who lack it. No refugee at present in Delhi need be without this shelter which varies in quality.

It is important to remember, however, that Delhi cannot possibly absorb or accommodate fresh batches of refugees. If fresh batches come they will have to be sent on to Kurukshetra or other places.

We have provided additional accommodation during the past few days for about 10,000. Our first priority is to make this accommodation available to these refugees who have been residing in the mosques in Delhi, secondly, those on the railway station, thirdly, those at the Wavell Canteen. Any person who may have been absolutely shelterless will, of course, be given a high priority.

There are many camps in Delhi for these refugees. Among them the Kingsway Camp is the largest, and is meant for destitutes and others who are given free rations. In other places like Anand Parvat and Purana Qila free rations are not supplied but foodstuffs are made available through shops, etc.

Various other arrangements have been made to provide refugees with accommodation. These need not be detailed here. Any person desiring some kind of accommodation should register his or her name at the Town Hall.

I would earnestly request that no further refugees from Pakistan should come to Delhi as this will not help them in any way. They will merely add to their difficulties as well as ours. It is easier for us to help them in other places and we intend to do so.

These are temporary arrangements. The next step which we hope to take very soon is to begin to rehabilitate them in a more permanent way. A large number of plots of land in the Shadipur area of Delhi will be reserved for refugees. Similar areas in other places are also under consideration. Within a few days I hope that the announcement of the new capital for East Punjab will be made and no doubt many people would like to settle down there.³

2. See *ante*, item 10.

3. The Government of East Punjab, in consultation with the Government of India, decided on 24 January to locate the permanent capital of the province in the sub-mountainous area between Ropar and Chandigarh.

The Cabinet has decided to entrust the whole problem of rehabilitation to a special board called the Development and Rehabilitation Board which will be constituted soon. This board will have wide powers so that it may be able to achieve results with speed and without the delays normally accompanying governmental procedure. It is proposed to combine as far as possible the process of rehabilitation with development and many of the existing schemes of development will be utilised for this purpose. The board will plan for the whole of India and will have large executive powers.

This is a tremendous task and the Government seek the cooperation of all people including the refugees themselves in order to deal with it adequately and with speed.

17. To Lady Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

23 January 1948

Dear Lady Mountbatten,

Thank you very much for sending me the leaflet containing information about the activities of the United Council for Relief and Welfare.² May I congratulate you and the Council for the very good work done and for the spirit of service which has accompanied this work? During the difficult times that we have passed through, one of the consolations has been this spirit of service which so many have exhibited in giving relief to those who are in distress.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 29(67)/48-PMS.

2. The Council, set up in September 1947, was at this time coordinating the work of twenty-nine affiliated organisations working in Kashmir, Bombay, West Bengal, the Central Provinces and the U.P. It had started 'earn as you learn' industrial centres, nursery schools and creches, provided relief in cash as well as goods and assisted in running refugee camps.

18. A Pledge to Maintain Peace¹

Netaji Bose sacrificed his life for the cause of India's freedom. The most important lesson taught by him was that of unity. We have to remember that if India is to march forward and face the difficult issues such as those of Kashmir, it cannot be done if there are internal quarrels and people take the law into their own hands. If we follow a wrong path, we will come to grief. It was to tell us that we had strayed from the right path that Gandhiji undertook a fast. We have now pledged ourselves to maintain peace. If we dishonour the pledge we will not only lower ourselves but we may also not be able to face any external danger.

The present arrangements for the relief of refugees are more or less of a temporary character and we have to work for their permanent settlement. It is true that the sufferings undergone by them in Pakistan have deeply affected them but we have to think of giving them a fresh start in life. The work has to be put on firm foundations. It is true that a tremendous change has come in the country during the past four months. India has become free. The British power has gone, and in a few months it will go away altogether. But difficult problems face us. We have to be responsible enough and think how to save our country from troubles. Resettlement of our suffering brothers will be a firm step in that direction. Internal troubles, however, cause hindrance in this work.

The wealth of a country is made up of its sons and daughters. If the people are worthless the country will not progress. Personally, I am more worried about the effect of the happenings in Pakistan on our children than about the loss of their property. We have to look after our children so that they might not become waifs. Something has got to be done for them speedily.

Mere jobs in offices will not solve your difficulties. After all, we can employ only about 50,000 men. That itself is difficult as we are retrenching the surplus staff in various Government offices. The only way to solve the problem is to open fresh avenues of employment by implementing various development schemes. We have decided to link up the work of refugee rehabilitation with these schemes. This needs the cooperation of the refugees themselves. It is they who have to stand on their own legs. All that we can and will do is to give them the necessary facilities. I admit that we have committed mistakes in the past but we are coming to grips with the problems and will solve them.

1. Speech at a meeting of refugees at Delhi on the occasion of the fifty-second birth anniversary of Subhas Chandra Bose, 23 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 24 January 1948.

19. To F. R. R. Bucher¹New Delhi
23 January 1948

My dear General Bucher,

The Cabinet has decided to set up a high-power Development and Rehabilitation Board consisting of a chairman and three or four other persons.² This Board will have wide powers to deal with the question of refugee rehabilitation. The idea is that this should be tacked on to our development schemes all over the country. The Board will deal with the whole country. Among its members will probably be a public man, an engineer, a businessman and possibly a senior civil servant. We attach a great deal of importance to this Board and want to give it full freedom to function with speed and efficiency. It is likely to carry on for a year or two.

It has struck me that it might be a good thing for a suitable officer from the army to be associated in some capacity with this Board. He would bring organising capacity and a new outlook. I do not know if you can spare such an officer. Of course, there is no point in having a person unless he is really good for this particular job. I would personally prefer a youngish man, say someone in the grade of Lieut. Colonel. It may not be necessary for him to be associated with the Board throughout its career. If he is urgently required elsewhere he may leave it. But normally he would be required to remain with it. I think he would be an acquisition to the Board. Will you please think about this suggestion and perhaps we can talk about it later.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 29(36)/48-PMS.

2. A Rehabilitation and Development Board, consisting of Aftab Rai, M.C. Khanna, G.N. Naidu and D.K. Kohli as members and C.G. Kale and P.C. Mahalanobis as technical and statistical advisers, was set up on 7 February 1948. It was to plan and execute rehabilitation schemes, develop cottage and small-scale industries, and assist provincial and States governments in their schemes.

20. The Prime Minister's National Relief Fund¹

At no time has the necessity of giving relief to vast numbers of our suffering countrymen been so great and urgent as it is today. This is not merely a humanitarian task but one affecting the future of India. We cannot permit the real wealth of India, as represented by the millions of men and women, who have been dispossessed and driven away from their homes, to waste away with no opportunity of settling down again and taking full part in the creative and constructive activities of the nation. We cannot permit the growing generation to be deprived of home and education and training and opportunities of becoming efficient and productive citizens of India. We have passed through disaster and suffering on a colossal scale. The effort to overcome it and to rise superior to it must be on an equally extensive scale.

The Government of India are diverting their energy and resources to this end. But that is not enough; the cooperation of all our people, including those who have suffered, is essential in this vast enterprise. That cooperation has, to some extent, been forthcoming. Even more is necessary.

There have been many relief funds and generous donations have been given to alleviate suffering. Many donors have sent me spontaneously their contributions for relief work. I feel that it would be desirable to have a central relief fund which can be used for any type of emergency relief of distress but which must now be especially used for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan who have come to India.

I am, therefore, starting a fund called "The Prime Minister's National Relief Fund" and I invite donations to this Fund. To begin with, this Fund will be managed by a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the President of the Indian National Congress, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, a representative of the Tata Trustees, and a representative of industry and commerce to be chosen by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce.

This committee may be added to. Further particulars about the administration of the Fund will be announced later.

Donations, which will be announced in the press, may be sent to the Central Bank of India, New Delhi, or any of the branches or sub-branches of the Bank. They may be earmarked for specific purposes such as medical relief, education and care of orphans.

1. Appeal for contributions, New Delhi, 24 January 1948. From *The Statesman and National Herald*, 25 January 1948.

21. To K. C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
28 January 1948

My dear Neogy,

There have been odd reports in the press about your Ministry being wound up. I do not know who is responsible for this kind of thing. It irritates me greatly. I think it is very necessary for your Ministry to continue to function and I see no reason whatever for its being wound up. We are very far from having solved the problems arising from the partition. The fact that we are appointing a Development and Rehabilitation Board with considerable powers does not do away with the necessity of your Ministry.

But apart from this question of the future work of your Ministry, your own presence in the Cabinet seems to me to be essential. It may be that Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry has some additional work allotted to it, or some other distribution of portfolios takes place some time or other. In any event, I hope you will not think that your particular work is drawing to a close. We have enormous problems, as you well know, and all of us have to pull together to solve them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

22. The Rehabilitation and Development Board¹

It has been decided that the normal processes of Government are likely to be too slow to deal with the terrific problem of the rehabilitation of refugees. Besides the vast numbers who have already come to India, eight or nine lakhs more are to be expected from Sind. It has been decided to set up a Development and Rehabilitation Board, so that the two subjects can be dealt with concurrently. This will primarily consist of three persons, and will have expert advisers. It will be a planning and executive body, with full powers to go ahead on the Cabinet's policy. It will cover the whole of India. The question arises of its relations with provincial governments.

1. Remarks at the Conference of Governors, New Delhi, 2 February 1948. File No. 29(36)/48-PMS. Extracts.

I do not think that there will be very much difficulty in this respect in most cases. Some provinces will have more to do with the Board than others—East Punjab, for example, where most of the refugees are and the Central Provinces, which has vast resources. The Board should work in cooperation with provincial governments in the selection of areas but should be given full authority to develop an area once it is chosen.

The formation of the Development and Rehabilitation Board will be announced soon. It is hoped to go ahead very rapidly. It is to be hoped that all provinces will cooperate fully.

23. Measures for Rehabilitation¹

Sir, I beg leave to say a few words not directly connected with this Bill² which my honourable colleague has placed before the House but rather with the question of rehabilitation. I should like to inform the House of certain steps that Government intend taking in regard to this matter.

Government attach the greatest importance to speedy, effective and proper rehabilitation of the large numbers of people who have been displaced in northern India. So far, a very great deal of our attention has been absorbed, firstly, in evacuation, and, secondly, in giving relief. But obviously that is not good enough. In fact, the whole process of relief, unless it is accompanied by certain constructive and creative aspects of it, is likely to have unfortunate psychological and financial results. The proposal now is—which the Government is considering and in fact it has come to a decision—to appoint a Rehabilitation and Development Board. Of course, many boards and commissions are appointed and they may just produce reports. The idea behind this Board is that it should be not only a planning body but an executive body, that it should have large powers, that, in fact, it should be able to work much more speedily than the average Government department works. Governmental machinery sometimes—indeed very often—is rather slow; all manner of sanctions are necessary; all manner of references have to be made to various departments and hence there is delay.

1. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 3 February 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. I, 1948, pp. 178-180.
2. The Rehabilitation Finance Administration Bill was enacted in March 1948 and came into effect on 1 June. With a capital of Rs. 10 crores, the Administration was to provide financial assistance to urban refugees primarily but help agriculturists also.

Meanwhile, we have to deal with a human problem affecting millions of people, so that this Rehabilitation and Planning Board will survey, plan and execute and implement the plans in so far as it can.

Naturally, the general policy will be laid down by Government, the general sanction for various large schemes will come, but apart from that, they will be free to go ahead. We propose to appoint a Board—a relatively small Board,—working whole time, which will consist of three persons to begin with. I said to begin with, not that we need necessarily be adding to that but it may be that owing to developments we may have to add one or more members, but we would like to keep it a small Board. This Board of three will be assisted by technical advisers—for instance, an engineer, adviser, a financial adviser, a statistical adviser, and may be one or two others. This Board will consider first of all the existing development schemes. You will notice that we call it the “Rehabilitation and Development Board”, meaning thereby that we are combining the two functions or, rather, looking at the two problems—rehabilitation and development—together. We have been thinking of development for a large number of years, and I am sorry that so far all our thought has resulted in schemes rather than anything more definite and practical. But many schemes are ready and this new Board that we set up ought speedily to run through those schemes, specially from the point of view of rehabilitation and to choose such as can be put into operation quickly. The Board should also consider any fresh schemes from the point of view of rehabilitation, that is to say, schemes which give gainful employment. It may be that we have to set up certain townships in areas which are ready for development, such as river valley schemes and development of ports and other places. The Board will consider the whole country and will function for the whole country.

Naturally, it will have to function in many parts of the country in co-operation with the provincial governments. Generally we expect to have free play even in the areas under the provincial governments if the finances come from the Central Government. Where the provincial government and the Central Government share the finances there they will cooperate. Where the provincial government itself provides the finances, then this Board will function in an advisory capacity. We would like naturally to have the fullest cooperation from the provincial governments. At the same time we should like the provincial governments to give this Board full play also, that is, we want as little obstruction as possible. We suffer frequently from many checks and work cannot be carried on speedily. We should like this Board to function with speed and efficiency. Therefore we have chosen persons who we think will be able to function in that particular way. We would like this Board again to concentrate to some extent on the development of smaller industries. Major industries, of course, are in the big plans and they will have to look into them. The major industries take a considerable time. We

should like them to consider cottage and small-scale industries which can be developed almost immediately in these townships. That is the information I should like to give to the House. I am sure the House will approve of this and I hope this Board will lead to a fairly rapid rehabilitation of large numbers of people who are at present lacking in accommodation and sometimes home and shelter. The present scheme includes both town dwellers and agriculturists but primarily this Board will deal with urban people. They will no doubt deal with others but most of the rural refugees or a large number of them have necessarily to be settled in East Punjab. This Board will advise and will help in every way it can. But the very large number of urban refugees find it difficult to settle down and most of the Members know that Delhi is full of these urban refugees from other towns. So the problem for this Board primarily is one of rehabilitating urban refugees, secondly agriculturists.

24. To K. C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
20 February 1948

My dear Neogy,

I enclose a letter from Amrit Kaur.

I have been thinking what can be done in order to stop more refugees from coming to Delhi. I am afraid I can think of no effective method. I think, however, that it might be worthwhile for your Ministry to announce publicly that no arrangements will be made in Delhi for newcomers and that these will be sent off immediately to camps in Bihar or elsewhere. If this was done on one or two occasions, it might have salutary effect.

I understand that Kirpalani² is making some arrangements for housing the 1000 women and children who are due to arrive here soon from Lahore. I am told these women and children are from Kashmir. There is also a proposal to send them directly to some other place and Chakrata near Mussoorie has been mentioned. I am inclined to think that it would be far better to send them direct to some other place than to crowd them in Delhi, which is getting such an evil reputation because of the vast numbers of refugees. Chakrata is a delightful hill station with military barracks. The train would have to go to Dehra Dun and from there by car. I am sure both the Defence Ministry and the U.P. Government will help. These women

1. J.N. Collection.

2. S.K. Kirpalani.

are not likely to be kept for long. Probably within a month most of them can be sent back to their homes in Kashmir.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

25. To Syed Mahmud¹

New Delhi
25th February 1948

My dear Mahmud,

Thank you for your letter of 23rd February. We all agree that Delhi should be treated as a special case as the nerve-centre of the country and that life here should be quite normal. The city is certainly unsafe to some extent because of the large number of criminal elements that have come here. We have many lakhs of refugees also and as you might have seen Chandni Chowk² is hardly passable because all the pavements and parts of the roads are blocked by refugee stores. We are trying to do our best to ease this situation.

The East Punjab Government has committed many mistakes and will no doubt commit many more but the accounts we hear about it from its opponents are greatly exaggerated. You know how party faction has functioned in the Punjab. Each party curses the other.³ I have just returned from Jullundur and I found the situation had greatly improved since my last visit.

The Akali position is undoubtedly difficult. I spoke about it at my public meeting yesterday.⁴ It has to be handled very tactfully and at the same time firmly.

It is perfectly true that some of the Premiers of Pakistan provinces, notably Sind, are desirous of retaining their Hindu population because of their economic and financial difficulties. We have tried our utmost during the past few months not to encourage migration from Sind and partly also some other places, but about six weeks ago or more Gandhiji himself came to the conclusion after independent enquiries that it was quite impossible

1. Syed Mahmud Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. The main shopping centre in Old Delhi.

3. After independence, two factions, one led by Gopichand Bhargava and the other by Bhimsen Sachar, developed in the Punjab Congress. While Bhargava had the backing of the Akali group, Sachar was supported by Satyapal, Saifuddin Kitchlew and Sri Ram Sharma.

4. See *ante*, section 2, item 24.

for any Hindu to remain in the Frontier Province without danger.⁵ He, therefore, told us that for the present at least we must withdraw the Hindu population of the Frontier Province unless, of course, anyone wanted to remain there. We have had piteous appeals from these people in the Frontier; their position has become infinitely worse since the Kashmir raids. For many months they have lived in internment or in small parts of towns unable to go out of their houses.

In regard to Sind also conditions have very rapidly deteriorated and Gandhiji came to the conclusion that we must expedite the removal of non-Muslims from Sind. We made special arrangements accordingly. This is a big matter because eight lakhs of persons are involved. Recently there has been some toning down in the rate of migration. We shall welcome this if it continues because the burden on us is very great. But the fact is that no Hindu has any security in Sind, more specially in upper Sind, and he cannot carry on any business or vocation.

There has been I think some slight improvement in Lahore recently, more specially since Gandhiji's death. I shall be happy if this continues.

If you will give me a specific information about individuals, whether in the C.I.D. or elsewhere, I shall enquire into the matter. Generally speaking, we know that some of our officers are not wholly reliable. I think you are right in saying that police and local authorities in some of the provinces were much too zealous in their arrests of Muslim National Guards. I think this is being largely put right.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

5. In a speech at a prayer meeting in New Delhi on 7 January 1948, Mahatma Gandhi said : "I always said that Hindus could not live in peace in Sind. And not only Hindus, even others. That was proved yesterday. They had assembled in a *Gurdwara* (Karachi) awaiting evacuation. The *Gurdwara* was attacked."

26. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
29 February 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th February about the appointment of a Deputy High Commissioner in East Bengal. Dr. B.C. Roy has been

here and has talked to me about it. Other people from East Bengal have also been pressing me very much for this appointment. Dr. Roy entirely agrees with you and with us that we should not encourage migration of Hindus from East Bengal. He thinks however that the appointment of a Deputy High Commissioner might have the reverse effect.

I suggest that you might have a talk with him on his return and on having your and his views on the subject again, we shall consider the matter.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

27. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
2 March 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You will remember that we came to the conclusion two or three months ago that the areas in Delhi city which are now predominantly Muslim should for the present be reserved for Muslims. What exactly these areas are, it is perhaps a little difficult to define with accuracy and the local authorities will have to specify them.

Later the conditions laid down by Bapu at the time of his fast also referred to this matter² and we accepted these conditions. I believe that generally speaking this policy has been followed by the local authorities since then. I realise that this cannot be a permanent policy and some time or other we shall have to consider matters afresh. We cannot keep a large number of houses in Delhi vacant indefinitely. But for the present and for some time to come we must continue this policy both because we are pledged to it and because it is a right and soothing policy.

Our new Rehabilitation and Development Board will soon be coming out with some of their township schemes near Delhi. I suppose some time or other the East Punjab capital will also be announced. All these will make a difference and we may well reconsider the situation in the light of these developments.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 261-262.

2. One of the conditions laid down by Mahatma Gandhi on 17 January 1948 for ending his fast was that the Muslim residential areas in Delhi must not be encroached upon.

The policy I have indicated above has been followed thus far, but I understand that no formal orders to this effect have been issued by the Home Ministry, and the local authorities, therefore, have been functioning rather in the air. May I suggest that such orders might be sent to them to regularise their actions?³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Patel replied that, though he was looking into the matter, his impression was that since the question related to the reservation of vacant houses for Muslims, it was for the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation to carry out Cabinet orders.

28. To Albert Mayer¹

New Delhi
3 March 1948

My dear Mayer,

Thank you for your letters of January 27 and February 25.² I have read with great interest, specially your account of the informal discussion that you had with a group of experts. I am looking forward to your return to India with your selected group. We are full of work and worry, but whatever happens we want to go ahead with this planning for development.

As you must know we have had to face a terrific problem owing to large-scale migrations of people in the Punjab and elsewhere. We have had to provide for about five million people who have been uprooted and displaced. About four million go to the lands, but one million town dwellers are a much more difficult proposition. Such a problem ought to offer an ideal opportunity for planning both town and rural. But it came upon us so suddenly and in such a magnitude that we were rather overwhelmed and all attempts at planning faded away to begin with. We are trying to plan now to some extent and building townships in developing industrial areas, etc. You would be of great help in these undertakings.

I have sent a copy of your last letter to the U.P. Premier.

Sincerely yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In these letters Albert Mayer had informed Nehru that he had had discussions with leading agricultural experts and that a group of people was being got together for the U.P. assignment.

29. To N.R. Malkani¹

New Delhi
15 March 1948

My dear Malkani,

I have your letter of the 10th March.

Surely it was not necessary for you to tell me of your long record of national service. Nor is there any question of the machine being stronger than man in the present instance. The only question is how to carry on the work of evacuation, etc., most effectively. It is obvious that this can only be done effectively with some measure of cooperation from the Sind Government. Unfortunately the Sind Government has taken strong exception to our appointing you as a Deputy High Commissioner and anything that we do through you is held up by them. It was because of this that I suggested to you that you should not deal with the Civil Government directly. It was also for this reason that we have suggested that you should not officially be the Evacuation Commissioner. We thought that this arrangement will speed up work and even facilitate your own activities, as then the Sind Government would have less reason to object. The question before us was not certainly of your being a subordinate to anyone. If other difficulties had not intervened, that is, the difficulty of your being a Sindhi, you might well have been the High Commissioner there. But it is your desire and ours to push the work ahead, and hence our proposal. In effect you will do all the important work and advise us about all matters relating to evacuation. I do hope you will appreciate that there was absolutely no desire on our part to do anything which might affect your prestige or opportunity to do national service.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

30. To B. C. Roy¹

New Delhi
March 22, 1948

My dear Bidhan,

News from East Bengal continues to be disturbing and some of our friends

1. Saroj Chakrabarty, *With Dr. B.C. Roy and Other Chief Ministers* (Calcutta, 1982), p. 106.

here are upset about it.² I can understand that. Nevertheless, I think that we should have some clear policy in mind and not be diverted from it by minor incidents.

East Bengal will continue to feel neglected and bypassed so long as the centre of gravity is in western Pakistan. That centre of gravity is bound to continue to remain in the West, and this will lead to eastern Pakistan drifting farther and farther away.

Western Pakistan, I think, is likely to continue, though I hope that in future our relations with it will grow closer and there may be some common subjects like defence.

It is for this reason, among others, that it is wrong to encourage any large-scale migration from East Bengal to the West. Indeed, if such a migration takes place, West Bengal and to some extent the Indian Union would be overwhelmed.

The problem, therefore, before us is how to keep up the spirits of Hindus in East Bengal and how to help them in so far as we can. If they come over to West Bengal, we must look after them. But it is no service to them to ask them or to encourage them to join the vast mass of refugees who can at best be poorly cared for.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. About 50 people including Fazlul Huq, ex-Premier of Bengal, were injured as a result of baton charges by the police in front of various government offices in Dhaka on demonstrators demanding declaration of Bengali by the Government as the official language of eastern Pakistan and one of the state languages of Pakistan.

31. To B. C. Roy¹

New Delhi
26 March 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I appreciated your difficulties in regard to the increasing number of refugees from eastern Pakistan.² I hope that with your new Board³ you will be able

1. File No. 29(42)-PS/48-PMS.
2. It was estimated that one million refugees had reached West Bengal from East Bengal by this time.
3. In March 1948, the Government of West Bengal set up a Relief and Rehabilitation Board to collaborate with the Rehabilitation and Development Board at the Centre.

to deal with this situation more satisfactorily. I realise that these refugees, or many of them, will have to be accommodated in other parts of India and that will be the special business of our Relief and Rehabilitation Board. But I am quite clear in my own mind that if you raise the question of Dalbhum and Manbhum or any other area⁴ which you wish to be tagged on to West Bengal, you will raise a hornet's nest which will come in the way not only of your refugee problem but also of your Mor Scheme.⁵ As a matter of fact, we are not likely to appoint a judge to consider the question of Kharsawan and Seraikella States.⁶ We have suggested to the Premiers of Orissa and Bihar to settle this among themselves. I would, therefore, strongly advise you not to raise this question of provincial redistribution. I am quite sure this will not lead to any satisfactory result and will only cause us trouble. The very object we are aiming at will be defeated. That object is to find areas for the rehabilitation of people from East Bengal. Let us by all means find such areas outside West Bengal wherever this is suitable.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Manbhum and Dalbhum areas, which formed part of Bihar, were claimed by West Bengal on the basis of cultural, linguistic and geographical affinities. Finally under the Bihar and West Bengal (Transfer of Territories) Act, 1956, portions of Kishenganj subdivisions of Purnea district and portions of Gopalpur *thana* and Purulia subdivision of Manbhum district excluding the *thanas* of Chas and Chandil were transferred from Bihar to West Bengal.
5. The Mor Project, later known as Mayurakshii Project, envisaged construction of a dam on the river Mayurakshi, a 2000 KW generating power station and irrigation canals to irrigate six lakh acres of land mainly in Birbhum and partly in Murshidabad and Burdwan districts.
6. The two princely States were transferred to Bihar on 18 May 1948 following arbitration by the Ministry of States between Bihar and Orissa.

KASHMIR AT THE UNITED NATIONS

1. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
2 January 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st January about Colonel Kaul going to U.S.A. in connection with our reference to the Security Council of the U.N.O.

I returned from Lucknow this afternoon. On hearing that Thimayya was here I sent for him this evening to find out what was happening on the East Punjab border. In the course of our conversation I mentioned that Kaul might be sent to the U.S.A. He said that he had been hoping to keep Kaul with him for the organisation of irregular forces and had mentioned this to you, but that you had told him that in accordance with my request you would like to send him to the U.S. I thought about this matter again and I felt that if Kaul can be utilised more effectively here then probably it will be better for him to stay on and do a good job of work. The U.N. Security Council business is rather vague and one does not quite know when a person will be required and for how long. We shall have to wait a little for developments. If it is necessary to send an officer we can perhaps choose someone else. In our present need of competent officers here it might be unwise to send a person abroad who can be of definite use here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

2. Reference to the United Nations¹

As is well known now, the Government of India has made a reference to the Security Council of the U.N.O. in regard to the invasion of Kashmir by persons coming from or through Pakistan.² About 50,000 raiders are inside

1. Statement at a press conference, New Delhi, 2 January 1948. *The Hindu* and *The Bombay Chronicle*, 3 January 1948.
2. On 1 January 1948, the Government of India, under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, which entitles any member to bring before the Security Council any matter whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, asked the Council to take cognizance of the situation in Kashmir.

the Jammu and Kashmir territory and another 1,00,000 have gathered on the border and are being trained and armed for the invasion of Kashmir. This large force is using Pakistan as a base and receiving from Pakistan modern military equipment, training and guidance.

The Government desires to take the press and the public into full confidence in so far as it can, having regard to diplomatic decorum and propriety. It has waited thus far because it would have been proper for the Security Council to consider the matter first before any publicity was given to it, but in view of references³ being made to this subject by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and by others, it is desirable to state the facts briefly.

I have previously on several occasions placed before the country the facts relating to Kashmir ever since we sent our troops there on October 27, 1947. Our troops succeeded in saving the Valley of Kashmir and the city of Srinagar and drove back the enemy to Uri along the Jhelum Valley road.

Since then fighting has taken place on a large front along almost the entire border of the Kashmir State and Pakistan. Very large numbers of armed men, in battle formation and fully equipped with modern arms, have entered Kashmir State territory at many places, and still larger concentrations of these men have been made along the border on the Pakistan side.

These border areas of Pakistan have become the base of operations for these invaders and, from the security of these bases, large numbers come across and raid, burn and loot Kashmir State territory which is Indian Dominion territory.⁴

The Government of India would have been justified, in self-defence, to strike at these bases and thus put an end to the sources of supply of these invaders. It has, however, scrupulously avoided doing so, so as to limit the field of operations and in the hope that the Pakistan Government will cease aiding and abetting these invaders.

During the last two months, repeated requests have been made to the Pakistan Government to prevent the use of its territory for aggression

3. At a press conference in Karachi on 1 January 1948, Zafarullah Khan accused the Indian Government of inept handling of the communal trouble in the Punjab and of using force to secure the accession of Junagadh, Mangrol and other states. A similar campaign was said to be in process in Kashmir. He said that the Pakistan Government were yet to be informed officially about the reference of the Kashmir issue to the U.N. He charged the Indian Government with violating the financial settlement of December 1947 by refusing to transfer the cash balances and military stores to Pakistan.

4. This has now been confirmed by Pakistani sources.

in India. It has not only done so, but it is an established fact that these invaders, among whom are a large number of Pakistan nationals, have been helped in every way by the Pakistan Government.

They are allowed transit through Pakistan territory by motor transport and railway trains, supplied petrol, food and accommodation, and the arms they possess are manifestly the arms of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army personnel have also been captured by our troops in the operations in Kashmir.

Not only has the Pakistan Government not taken effective steps to prevent this invasion, but it has refused even to call upon the invaders to desist from their active aggression.

The Government of India cannot tolerate the use of a friendly and neighbouring country as a base for the invasion of Indian territory, but in its desire to avoid any action, unless it is compelled by circumstances to take it, it has decided to refer this matter to the Security Council of the United Nations.

On December 22, 1947, a formal request was made in writing to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In this letter, the acts of aggression of Pakistan and the forms of aid given by the Pakistan Government to the invaders were briefly stated and the Government of Pakistan was asked to call upon the Pakistan nationals to cease participating in the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir State and to deny to the invaders: (1) all access to and use of Pakistan territory for operations against the Kashmir State; (2) all military and other supplies; (3) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

The Government of India expressed its earnest desire again to live on terms of friendship with Pakistan and hoped that its request would be acceded to promptly and without reserve. It pointed out, however, that, failing such response, it would be compelled to take such action, with due regard to its rights and obligations as a member of the U.N.O., as it might consider necessary to protect its own interests and those of the Government and people of the Jammu and Kashmir State.

As no reply was received to this formal request, two reminders were sent.⁵ Ultimately, on December 30, a formal reference was made to the Security Council of the U.N.O. through the representative of the Government of India at the U.N.O. On December 31, a copy of this reference was sent by telegram to the Pakistan Government.

This reference stated the facts of the case and pointed out that they indisputably pointed to the following conclusions :

5. For Nehru's cables to Liaquat Ali Khan on 28 and 31 December 1947. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 397-398 and 420 respectively.

- (a) that the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan territory;
- (b) that they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations;
- (c) that they include Pakistan nationals;
- (d) that they draw much of their military equipment, transport and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and
- (e) that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise helping them.

There was no source other than Pakistan from which such quantities of modern military equipment, training and guidance could have been obtained. The Government of India requested the Security Council, therefore, to ask the Government of Pakistan :

- (1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating in or assisting the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State; and
- (3) to deny to the invaders: (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; (b) military and other supplies; (c) and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

The reference to the Security Council is thus limited to the matters mentioned above. There is an urgency about these matters, for the first step that must be taken is to put a stop to the fighting and this can only be done if the invaders withdraw. It must be remembered that all the fighting has taken place on Indian Union territory and it is the inherent right of the Government of India to drive back any invaders on its territory. Till the Kashmir State is free of the invaders, no other matter can be considered.

The Government of India deeply regrets that this serious crisis has arisen. It is not of its seeking, and it has been thrust upon it by invading armies from outside who have committed acts of barbarism against the inhabitants of the Kashmir State and destroyed and burnt a large number of villages and some towns. No government can tolerate such an invasion.

In its desire, however, to avoid any act which might lead to further complications, it has shown the greatest forbearance and made repeated appeals to the Pakistan government. Those appeals have been in vain and hence it decided to refer this particular question to the Security Council. It has naturally reserved to itself the freedom to take such action in self-defence as the situation may require.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in a recent press interview, has brought a large number of charges against the Government of India. I shall not go into these charges except to repudiate them utterly. What has happened during the past year is well known and we are prepared to stand the test of the closest scrutiny. Apparently all this variety of charges has been brought to cover up the Kashmir issue in a forest of other matters which have nothing to do with it.

It is completely untrue to say that the Government of India has tried to undo partition or to strangle Pakistan. The mere fact of our agreeing to what everybody recognized to be very generous financial terms is evidence of our desire to help Pakistan and to have friendly relations with it.

It is completely untrue that we have repudiated these financial agreements; we stand by them and shall honour them, but it is true that we have pointed out to Pakistan that we cannot make these payments at present when that money might be utilised for warlike operations against India.

The Kashmir issue stands by itself. If the methods of invasion of a friendly territory by a barbarous force are encouraged and submitted to, there is no future either for India or for Pakistan and, therefore, this has to be and will be resisted by us to the utmost, and the Kashmir State will have to be freed completely. Even from the narrowest viewpoint of self-interest, the Government of Pakistan should realize that the encouragement of such an invasion is perilous to its own future, because once the forces of unbridled violence are let loose, they endanger the whole security of any state.

It must be remembered that in Kashmir there is no communal issue as such. Large numbers of Kashmiris—Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, are fighting the invaders. It is a national issue for them to preserve their freedom, and we have gone there to support them. We have pledged our honour to them and we shall stand by our pledge.

I would appeal to the press for restraint in dealing with this issue at this critical stage and to avoid publishing unauthorized matter. We shall try to give full information to the press whenever it is possible. The publication of unauthorized stories is likely to do harm to the State and to the cause we represent.

Question : Is there any truth in Pakistan's complaint that India is violating the international boundary?

Jawaharlal Nehru : India has not yet attacked any area of raiders' concentration within Pakistan territory. The Pakistan Government has on many occasions protested that Indian aircraft flew over some parts of their territory and dropped bombs. Most of these complaints have been investigated and it was found that all of them were either untrue or grossly exaggerated. It is however possible that sometimes a bomb was dropped on the other side on account of an error of judgment. The Government of India has asked the Indian Army and Air Force to avoid stepping into Pakistan territory.

Q: What are your expectations from the Security Council?

JN: I hope the Security Council will take prompt action. The proposal

is a simple one and is not complicated. The Pakistan Foreign Minister's statement has become a vast enquiry into the past year's occurrences. It is clouding up and cloaking the whole Kashmir issue. Evidently the Pakistan Government does not fancy the consideration of the Kashmir issue as such. But the issue is a clear one. The Security Council can consider it swiftly and issue directions within weeks, not months.

Q: There is much talk of war in Pakistan. How do your countrymen react to it ?

JN: Of course, we wish to avoid war and I would say that if we are compelled to take some action against the invaders' bases, even that is not war, because we would be taking that action in self-defence when the Pakistan Government was unable to take that action. I certainly think that it is possible to avoid war. Anybody who tries to invade India will get a hot reception. The fact is that the fear complex on both sides is making people believe in rumours.

Q: Has the Government taken adequate precautions to meet any possible threat from the raiders on the East Punjab border?

JN: Anybody who tries to come into India that way will have a very hot welcome. But it seems to me that all these rumours result from a state of fear and panic in the public mind on both sides. This fear is a dangerous thing. It leads to panic and to all manner of suspicions and fantastic stories.

Q: What is your reaction to the report that Lord Mountbatten has threatened to resign.?

JN: It is fantastic nonsense. The report is no good evidence of the intelligence and reliability of the press, because it is just slightly over hundred per cent false. There has been no whisper of the Governor-General's resignation anywhere. Constitutionally the Governor-General naturally accepted the advice of his Ministers. At present the Governor-General functions in another capacity also—a very helpful capacity—as Chairman of the Defence Council.

Q: Has the Government of India sought the U.K. Government's advice in this matter ?

JN: There is no question of any advice being given but, naturally, in such an important matter, we kept the U.K. Government informed of the

steps we proposed to take and the steps we had taken. Not only did we inform the Prime Minister of the U.K. but we informed the various ambassadors here representing various other countries.

Q: Will it not be better for you to meet Mr. Jinnah to bring about a solution of the outstanding issues?

JN: The Ministers of the Government of India have been meeting the Pakistan Prime Minister and other ministers frequently. In the normal course there will be a meeting of the Joint Defence Council in a few days in Lahore. But you must remember that Mr. Jinnah is a constitutional Governor-General and is not expected to discuss these matters with anybody. .

Q: Has the Government of India repudiated the financial settlement between the two Dominions?

JN: The Government of India has not repudiated anything. We accept completely that decision arrived at by agreement just as we could have accepted a decision of the Arbitral Tribunal if the matter had gone to it. But having accepted that decision, the question arose of making these large payments. You can well appreciate that when we are charging the Pakistan Government with aiding and abetting an invasion of India, we can hardly make any large payments to carry on or to encourage these military operations and war against India. No state can do it. Normally, a state freezes the credits of the other party in such circumstances. We have not frozen anything in that sense. All that we said was that we accept this agreement but there must be an overall settlement and we shall honour it completely.

Frankly, the Government of India hoped that the fairly generous gesture on its part would help in solving the other difficulties, including the Kashmir problem. It did not and the consequence was, as had been pointed out to the Pakistan Government, in the present circumstances, it was just not possible for us to pour money into their coffers, which might very well be used against us. We are prepared to pay that money just as soon as circumstances permit, and we will pay it undoubtedly.

Q: What are your views on the Boundary Commission's Award?

JN: We accepted it in the legal sense because we had promised to accept it. I think the grossest injustice was done to India in the boundary award, more especially in several areas of Bengal, the Khulna District particularly, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It was our intention, having accepted the award legally, to raise these matters as between the two Dominions,

to come to some friendly arrangement and subsequently, if necessary, to raise it before some other court or to try for some kind of arbitration, international or other. Unfortunately we could not do that because of other occurrences, but we may do it still. But anyhow that would be a friendly approach to the problem, not by force.

Q: What are your views on developments in Ajmer and Junagadh?

JN: How can I say at what temperature Sir M. Zafrullah Khan's blood boils? What happened there two or three weeks ago is undoubtedly regrettable but the stories that have come in Pakistan newspapers about Ajmer are grossly exaggerated. The *Durgah* is perfectly safe. There were lootings and fifty or sixty people were killed in the rioting. A fairly considerable number of Muslims left Ajmer about that time. I will be going there tomorrow morning. I had intended to go a week ago but could not. I will try to induce people to remain there and ask those who had gone to come back.

The stories about Junagadh were also grossly exaggerated. There has been some looting and at one place two or three persons were killed on either side, but the situation was immediately brought under control. It was never really out of control and only some petty occurrences took place.

Q: Can you draw a parallel between Junagadh and Kashmir?

JN: There is no parallel between Junagadh and Kashmir.

3. The Kashmir Question at the Security Council¹

We have referred the Kashmir question to the Security Council because our intention is that whatever we do, we should do it in a civilized manner. The Government of India has positive proof of Pakistan being implicated in the Kashmir affair. The question of Kashmir is interconnected with other questions in India. It must be clearly understood that we undertook to defend Kashmir only on appeal for help from the Maharaja and the National Conference. However, before sending our troops we made it clear that ultimately the people of Kashmir alone would decide their future. We

1. Speech at Jaipur, 3 January 1948. Based on reports from *National Herald* and *The Statesman*, 5 January 1948.

also made the Maharaja hand over administrative authority to the popular leaders.

More than ninety per cent of the people of Kashmir are Muslims, and we have gone there to help them. They are with us and are fighting the Pakistan forces. This is a significant fact and an argument against certain happenings in India, particularly the attempt to drive out Muslims from various provinces and States.

Even the other States have been affected by the recent change in India. Smaller States of Orissa and Central Provinces have agreed to merge themselves with the neighbouring provinces and, except Hyderabad, all bigger States have acceded to India. The object of our entering into a one-year standstill agreement with Hyderabad was to avoid unnecessary conflict. We are not afraid of fighting, but we want to avoid it as far as we can. We want that Hyderabad should also join the Indian Union and a responsible government be set up there.

Great advance has been made in all States and constitutional reforms are being introduced in most of them. I hope Jaipur will give a lead to other States in this matter. I have little doubt about it.

Great changes have taken place in India recently. One chapter has closed and a new one has begun. On August 15 all eyes were set on the new-born free nation, but suddenly the catastrophe of communal disturbances gripped her and she lost much of her prestige abroad.

An indication of how our prestige has been lowered is our defeat at the U.N.O. on the question of Indians in South Africa.² Our enemies made capital of our difficulties; but the world again looked upon us with admiration when we successfully overcame the gigantic obstacles in our way.

I accepted the invitation to address you in order to meet you all and derive strength from the love and affection you show towards me. The high position given to me carries great responsibilities, and it will be difficult for me to shoulder them unless I have the affection and cooperation of the people. I, however, feel anxious about the growing communal bitterness among the younger generation. After all, we have done our duty and soon the younger generation will have to take over the responsibility from us. If young men go astray today the country's progress will be retarded.

I request you all to work for the peace and prosperity of our country. I want to take you into confidence. At times I wonder if we really are prepared for freedom. It is always easy to defeat the enemy from outside, and that we have done, but the real difficulty is in overcoming our own

2. The resolution moved by India on 20 November 1947 called on the Governments of India and South Africa to discuss at a Round Table Conference all pending matters and invited the Government of Pakistan to participate in the discussion. The resolution failed to obtain the requisite two-thirds majority.

weaknesses and shortcomings. Unless we conquer these we shall not be strong enough to shoulder the responsibilities of freedom.

4. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi

5 January 1948

Dear Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,

Your letter of the 30th December was received in New Delhi on the 1st January.² I had gone to Lucknow for the day and did not therefore get it until the 2nd. On the 3rd I had to visit Ajmer and yesterday, the 4th, was fully occupied with celebrations of Burma's independence and other business. This will explain the delay in my sending you a reply.

2. I do not think that any useful purpose will be served by my attempting to answer, at length, the counter-charges that you have laid against India in paragraph 18 of your letter.³ Pakistan's accusation that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was procured by conspiracy, fraud and force has been repeatedly made by you and was frequently denied and refuted by us. So far as the cases of Junagadh and Manavader are concerned, we maintain that there is no parallel between them and that of Kashmir.

3. Any impartial person familiar with the tragic happenings in the Punjab will recognise the complete baselessness of the suggestion that India organised the wholesale massacre of the Muslim population in any part of its territories. Massacres of non-Muslims began first in 1946 in Calcutta, and in March 1947 in the West Punjab. What happened in India against Muslims was by way of retaliation against the atrocities perpetrated on non-Muslims first in Calcutta, and, later, in territories which are now part

1. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, pp. 87-89.
2. Replying to Nehru's letter of 22 December 1947, Liaquat Ali had denied all charges of Pakistan aiding and abetting the raiders and accused India of conspiring with the Maharaja "in repudiation of the very principles" on which India had opposed Junagadh's accession to Pakistan.
3. These charges were that India never whole-heartedly agreed to the partition scheme and was out to destroy Pakistan which her leaders still regarded as part of India; that she stopped the transport of coal and rail transport to Pakistan, withheld Pakistan's share of funds and military stores, and killed Muslims in India; and that she occupied Junagadh, Manavader and other States in Kathiawar and fraudulently brought about the accession of Kashmir.

of Pakistan, e.g., Noakhali and the West Punjab. We have not only not encouraged, but openly and consistently condemned retaliation. We have also done everything in our power to protect Muslim minorities in India. We claim that we have done so more effectively than Pakistan.

4. I am not aware that there has been any stoppage of essential requirements, such as coal and rail transport, as a kind of sanction against Pakistan. Where delays have occurred these have been due entirely to other causes, e.g., shortage of wagons, or, in the disturbed areas of the Punjab, to dislocation of traffic owing to the disturbances.

5. There has been no deliberate withholding of Pakistan's share of funds and arms and equipment with intent to apply pressure on Pakistan. As I have already tried to explain to you, we stand by the financial agreement that was recently reached. Payment has been deferred because we cannot, while operations against Jammu and Kashmir State are being conducted from bases in Pakistan, with Pakistan's connivance and assistance, reasonably be expected to make available funds which might be used to intensify military operations against us.

6. The first two charges, viz., that India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme, and that India is out to destroy the State of Pakistan which her leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India itself, are completely devoid of foundation, and I must emphatically repudiate them. Had we not desired to accept the partition scheme, nothing would have been simpler for us than to refuse acceptance when the scheme was first put forth. India has no responsibility for the sequence of events which you regard as evidence of India's resolve to destroy the State of Pakistan. It is true that some of us have expressed the view that India and Pakistan must draw closer to each other. The facts of history and geography fully justify this conclusion. Two neighbouring States such as Pakistan and India can either be friends, or live in a state of veiled or of open hostility. No responsible Indian leader has ever thought that friendship between India and Pakistan, which is more desirable than mistrust or enmity, should be achieved by forcible compulsion of Pakistan into political union with India.

7. In conclusion I would add that while I fully share your hope that our approach to the United Nations Security Council will help to lay the foundation of friendlier relations between Pakistan and India, it is not possible for us to invite the intervention of the Council on all the matters

which you have mentioned.⁴ Peace between India and Pakistan is not threatened either by past events or by the entirely imaginary hostile motives that are attributed to us, but by the hostilities that are now in progress in general in Kashmir State between the Indian State Forces on the one hand and the invaders, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals, operating from bases in Pakistan and with assistance drawn from Pakistan, on the other. This is an issue at once clear-cut and urgent, and, unless valuable time is to be wasted on acrimonious debates, this is the issue for the settlement of which the Security Council must, in our opinion, exclusively apply itself.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Liaquat Ali Khan had written that Kashmir by itself would "look like a sentence torn out of its context" and that a reference should cover larger ground and later talks on "all the fundamentals of differences" between the two countries.

5. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
7 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

During your absence² the Kashmir situation, more specially in regard to the reference to the U.N.O., had developed and we have had to take a number of decisions. We have missed you here because your advice would have been valuable but we could not afford to postpone our decisions owing to the urgency of the matter. A part of our delegation to the U.N.O., including Gopalaswami Ayyangar, is leaving Delhi this afternoon at 1.30 p.m. for Bombay. From Bombay they will go tomorrow morning by T.W.A. straight to New York. We have avoided sending any of our men by B.O.A.C. *via* Karachi. Our delegation will have to be split up because of this lack of accommodation. Probably three will go tomorrow from Bombay, the others will go later.

We do not yet know what the Security Council might do and how long these preliminary hearings will last. Today's news announces that the first hearing might be on the 11th or 12th or latest 13th. Our first batch will reach there on the 10th.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. I, pp. 148-150.

2. Patel was on a tour of Assam and West Bengal during the first week of January 1948.

You will remember that it was our first intention to send Setalvad plus one or two assistants. Then we thought that Gopalaswami Ayyangar should also go and if possible Sheikh Abdullah. Gopalaswami is going today; Sheikh Abdullah is expected to arrive here today. He cannot proceed immediately and therefore he can only go with the second batch which probably will leave on the 10th from Bombay.

Our delegation has progressively grown. Apart from Gopalaswami, Setalvad and Abdullah, there will be Colonel Kaul and Haksar³ of the External Affairs Ministry. Kaul and Haksar have been thoroughly prepared and have collected all the necessary maps, papers and reports. Kaul has specialised on the military side; Haksar has been dealing with these matters in our Ministry for the last 2-3 months and knows all about them. He is a very capable young man and a competent lawyer who had a rising practice in Allahabad.

In addition to these, Gopalaswami was very anxious that we should send with him Vellodi and his own Private Secretary Parthasarathi,⁴ the latter he required more or less to look after him. I was rather reluctant to go on adding to this delegation, but because of Gopalaswami's wishes I felt it difficult to refuse. So we have asked Vellodi and Parthasarathi also to go. They will have to go by a subsequent plane as only three seats are available tomorrow. These three seats will probably be occupied by Gopalaswami, Setalvad and Kaul.

Setalvad again wanted to take a senior lawyer from Bombay, named Joshi,⁵ with him. I tried to dissuade him but felt ultimately that if Setalvad is really keen we should respect his wishes. We have pointed out to him, however, that accommodation is limited to begin with. Joshi can go by a later plane or he could wait till he receives instructions from New York after Setalvad's arrival.

You will thus see that our delegation has been swelling up and I do not know if it is complete even now. Of course, the matter is most important and we should not do anything which might impair the work of our delegation. Only I do not want to send wholly unnecessary extras.

3. P.N. Haksar (b.1913); joined Indian Foreign Service 1947; High Commissioner to Nigeria, September 1960-64, and Ambassador to Austria, 1964-65; acting High Commissioner in Britain, 1965-67; Secretary to Prime Minister, 1967-71; Principal Secretary to Prime Minister, 1971-73; Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, 1975-77.
4. C. Parthasarathy (1913-1955); nephew of N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar; appointed his private secretary, 1947; accompanied him to the United Nations, 1948; later Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Transport and Railways, 1953-55; killed in an air crash.
5. G.N. Joshi (1895-1986), an expert in constitutional law.

In your absence I had a talk with V.P. Menon and told him of these developments. I have been wondering whether you would like some special representative of the States Ministry to accompany this delegation.⁶ There is no doubt that the States question will be raised there in various ways. Junagadh, of course, will come up in some form or other in spite of our desire to limit the issue. We have, therefore, instructed our men to take all necessary papers relating to Junagadh.

From Mr. Ghazanfar Ali's statement in today's papers it appears that they are likely to raise in some form or other the question of massacres in some of the Indian States which have acceded to the Indian Union, for instance, Patiala, Nabha, Kapurthala, Alwar and Bharatpur.⁷ All these are, of course, entirely outside the reference and irrelevant issues but we should be prepared for everything so as to counter it effectively. In these circumstances, would you like to send someone specially representing the States Ministry with this delegation? I fear he will have to go by a subsequent plane.

On behalf of Pakistan, Zafrullah Khan, Mohammad Ali and another person are going.

Another question arises. Lord Mountbatten spoke to me two or three days ago insisting on proper publicity arrangements being made for our delegation. At that time I said that we might ask Kaul to function also as our public relations officer with the delegation and help the delegation. I sent a cable to Pillai in New York to ask Shelvankar⁸ to assist the delegation in publicity work.

At the instance of Lord Mountbatten I sent Kaul to see Campbell-Johnson.⁹ I have now received a letter from Lord Mountbatten in which he says that as a result of the talk between Colonel Kaul and Campbell-Johnson, it seems clear to him that we must send a first-class and full time public relations expert with the party. At Campbell-Johnson's suggestion he recommends that B.L. Sharma¹⁰ of the Information Department should

6. On 7 January, Patel replied that the association of a representative from the States Ministry would be of no particular advantage.
7. At Lahore, on 5 January 1948, Ghazanfar Ali alleged the existence of "a ruthless and deep-laid plan of exterminating" the entire Muslim population and destroying "Muslim culture" in every single Indian state in or bordering Punjab which had acceded to India. Kashmir was the "latest link in that chain of conspiracy."
8. K.S. Shelvankar (b. 1906); correspondent of *The Hindu* in London for many years; appointed Public Relations Consultant, Ministry of External Affairs, 1963; Consul-General to Hanoi, 1968-71; Ambassador to U.S.S.R., 1971-75.
9. Alan Campbell-Johnson (b. 1913); Press Attache to Lord Mountbatten, 1947-48; author of *Mission with Mountbatten*.
10. Principal Information Officer, 1949-54; Director in charge of Kashmir Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs for many years; author of *The Kashmir Story*, *The Pakistan-China Axis* and *Kashmir Awakes*.

be sent. He says that he is completely convinced that someone like Sharma should be there to cope with the urgent publicity problems that are bound to arise.

In view of Lord Mountbatten's insistence, and that insistence is in our interest, it might be desirable to send Sharma if you agree. I myself do not know Sharma well and I am not clear how useful he will be, nor do I know whether he is particularly in touch with the Kashmir situation. I should myself have thought that between Kaul and Shelvankar they might be able to deal with the situation, although Kaul of course is not a specialist in this kind of work. But Lord Mountbatten is so anxious about this that I do not like saying no to him. In any event if Sharma goes, he will have to wait for the next batch.

I should like you to consider these matters and to let me have your views soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram of 7th January.² My statement³ that India would be justified in sending troops to Pakistan bases near Kashmir border to stop invaders from entering Kashmir was mere repetition of what I have frequently stated. If India is attacked by people coming from Pakistan or *via* Pakistan territory, we are entitled to expect Pakistan Government to stop them and prevent invasion of India. If Pakistan Government is unwilling or unable to stop them, then India is necessarily justified in taking measures to stop them herself. We have however avoided taking any such measures because of our earnest desire to prevent further conflict, involving grave consequences. We shall continue this policy unless circumstances compel us to act otherwise. Even now I would request your Government to prevent the use of your territory for purposes of invasion of Indian Dominion territory.

1. New Delhi, 9 January 1948. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, p. 40.

2. Liaquat Ali requested the withdrawal of Indian Liaison Officers and troops from the districts of Sialkot, Gujrat, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Campbell's statement of Nehru's statement that India would be justified in attacking the "invader's" bases within Pakistan.

3. See *ibid.*, item 2.

In view, however, of your request we are withdrawing our Liaison Officers and troops from Sialkot, Gujrat, Jhelum, Rawalpindi and Campbell-pore districts. We would request you also withdraw your Liaison Officers and troops from Gurdaspur district.

We trust that your Government will make all necessary arrangements for evacuation of non-Muslims left in pockets and more specially abducted women. During last few weeks this process has slowed down very greatly on the Pakistan side while we have restored to Pakistan over 2,900 women. We propose to continue our efforts to restore abducted women and would earnestly request you to speed this process in Pakistan.

7. Arthur Henderson's Report of Talk with Nehru¹

The Government of India had no intention in present circumstances of attacking Pakistan territory. It was to be hoped, however, that the Security Council would take some action within a relatively short space of time. Otherwise the military situation in Kashmir might deteriorate and obviously if the Indian forces were likely to be placed in jeopardy the Government of India might then have to take the necessary action to secure their lines of communication. This would only be done by entering Pakistan territory. In addition action might have to be taken against the bases in Pakistan territory from which they were satisfied the raiders were operating.

2. The Pakistan Government were in their opinion behind the raiders. He believed that it was all part of a policy first to secure control of Kashmir and then to drive southwards through the East Punjab on to Delhi. If the Government of India had not taken action as they did in late October, he was satisfied that the raiders would have captured and looted Srinagar, and within a few days would have been in complete occupation of the State. He believed that their action had averted a situation which might have had the gravest consequences for their own security.

1. New Delhi, 9 January 1948. L/P&S/13/1933, I.O.L.R., London. Extracts. Arthur Henderson (1893-1968); Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, 1942-43; Financial Secretary to War Office, 1943-45; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, India Office and Burma Office, 1945-47; Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1947; Secretary of State for Air, 1947-51.

3. The Government of Pakistan could have no complaint that they were not informed of the Government of India's intention to send troops to re-establish law and order in a State which had really acceded to the Indian Union, especially in view of the fact that they disclaimed all connection with, or responsibility for, what was going on in Kashmir. They had, therefore, no right to be consulted.

4. The Government of Pakistan were fully informed of the Government of India's intention to raise the dispute before the Security Council. Even now the whole situation might well be changed, and certainly would be considerably improved, if they would publicly call upon their citizens to cease in any way supporting the activities of the raiders. While he admitted that there was opposition on the part of sections of the Muslim population in Kashmir, he maintained that the bulk of the fighting was being done by people from outside the State.

5. As regards his possible visit to London, he said that he would be very willing to come when circumstances permitted. Very reluctantly, however, he could not in present conditions agree to his visit being arranged to overlap with one from Liaquat Ali Khan, especially if it were desired to take advantage of the presence of them both to have conversations on the Kashmir dispute. He said that he took this view for the following reasons:—

- (i) There was nothing that could be discussed in London that could not be discussed by them both here;
- (ii) It would be impossible for any decisions to be taken by them without constant reference back to their respective Governments;
- (iii) He thought it would be by-passing U.N.O.;
- (iv) That it would have an extremely bad effect upon public opinion in India.

6. Nehru seemed somewhat doubtful as to how far the Security Council could bring about a cessation of fighting. He pointed out that the Government of Pakistan had expressly disclaimed any responsibility for what was taking place and he said that if this were so, the only Government directly concerned would be his own. He did not know how the Security Council could bring about the ceasefire so far as the raiders were concerned who were completely irresponsible. He went on to express some apprehension in those circumstances on the ground that the raiders even if they actually ceased attacking Indian Army positions would none the less be able to some extent to consolidate their position which would of course make it more awkward for the Government of India.

7. As regards the question of a plebiscite I asked him what his view

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was on carrying out the plebiscite. Who was to supervise it and what steps were to be taken to ensure that neither side was prejudiced? He replied that they would be willing for the plebiscite to be carried out in presence of foreign observers, but he was emphatic that he could not agree to any change in the administration. Sheikh Abdullah had the confidence of the great mass of the people of the State and it would not be reasonable to expect him to take part in an Interim Government which included those who were responsible for the present state of affairs in Kashmir. I pressed him on this point and produced arguments and precedents justifying the establishment of an Interim Government on a coalition basis while the plebiscite was being held but I could not budge him.

8. To sum up, I feel that Nehru's position is as follows. He is not in any circumstances prepared to surrender to what he calls the use of force by agents of Pakistan. He is however prepared as soon as circumstances permit to agree to the holding of a plebiscite and to accept its results. Meanwhile, however, the administration of the State must remain in the hands of what he would call the present constitutional Government. On all present showing he would be opposed to partition.

8. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Our military position in Jammu area has somewhat improved and fierce attacks by enemy are being repulsed with heavy loss.² Our troops following up advantage but no major change likely in near future.

2. Reports from various sources reach us stating that full preparations being made by Frontier tribesmen and others for combined assault on various parts of Kashmir State. Proposed attack to be made in second or third week of January during coldest part of season. Tribesmen trying to enter Kashmir from Frontier Province in guise of traders concealing their arms.

1. New Delhi, 10 January 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. On 6 January 1948, Indian troops beat off the attack by raiders on Naushahra. They followed this up by penetrating the raider-held areas around Bhimber, widening the perimeter around Poonch city and strengthened their hold on Uri. Indian troops intensified patrolling in the areas around the Akhnoor Bridge for protection of the supply lines to Jammu.

3. Kapur from Peshawar reports that on 8th January nearly 2000 Afridis and Mohamands passed through Peshawar on their way to Rawalpindi and Kashmir. From there they were sent in 30 or 40 lorries through main roads of Peshawar firing shots in the air. It is being said in Peshawar that 'Azad' forces will mount an all-out offensive soon so as to present accomplished fact to Security Council.

4. Suggest that in presentation to Security Council you might emphasize human and political aspects at first rather than legal aspect. Otherwise danger of main issues being drowned and our getting tied up in interminable arguments. Sudden invasion of Kashmir *via* Jhelum Valley brutal and without slightest justification. Valley completely peaceful. Invaders sack, burn, loot, kill and abduct women. If we had not gone to help at great risk, complete ruin of Srinagar and large part of State. This invasion completely unjustifiable even if Pakistan's allegations accepted. Our success in meeting it due to popular resistance to invaders. Essentially issue not communal.

5. We must oppose widening of issues. Our reference is not to a court about dispute with Pakistan. According to Pakistan they are not parties to sending invaders and are therefore no parties to dispute. Our reference consists solely in pointing out Pakistan's encouragement and help to invaders and requesting Security Council to call upon Pakistan to withdraw. No other issue arises. Even question of plebiscite does not arise until invaders driven and normal conditions restored.

6. In case proposal made of inviting 'Azad' Kashmir representative to Security Council we must oppose this. We can never admit their right to appear before Security Council. 'Azad' Kashmir not recognised by any state, not even Pakistan. They have no status.

7. Terrible destruction and killing at Mirpur towards end of November. Thousands of women were abducted. Many of these dispersed in West Punjab districts. Some thousand still kept at camps in Jammu Province e.g. Ali Beg, Samwal and Thothal. They are in terrible condition and are being subjected to sadistic practices. Their relief and recovery are urgent matters which cannot await long consideration.

8. In view of reports of extensive preparations for mass attacks on Kashmir urgently necessary for Security Council to direct Pakistan as we have suggested. Direction to include relief and recovery of abducted women.

9. Would impress upon you necessity of uniformity and consistency in approach to press through official spokesmen.

9. Minutes of a Meeting Convened by Lord Mountbatten¹

Mountbatten explained to Liaquat Ali Khan that the loan of 55 crores was being withheld temporarily because Indian public opinion would see it as the financing of Pakistan's attack on Kashmir and the Government would lose public support. The prior settlement of the Kashmir issue was therefore necessary.

Pandit Nehru asked Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan whether it was not a fact that the Pakistan expenditure required about 5 crores a month. Mr. Liaquat nodded his head; and Pandit Nehru then pointed out that the ten crores should tide Pakistan over for at least two months, by which time he sincerely hoped that the balance of the 55 crores could be paid since he felt certain that the Kashmir question would have been resolved by then.

1. Lahore, 11 January 1948. Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present were Mountbatten, Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan.

10. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Military situation in Jammu Province satisfactory. Some indication that invaders are getting tired of the reception they are getting but too early yet to form conclusions. Meanwhile, situation in Gujrat reported to be bad. Last night train containing non-Muslim refugees from Frontier was attacked by tribesmen at Gujrat. Preliminary official reports indicate thirty casualties but apparently situation very serious as troop reinforcements sent there from Lahore. West Punjab Premier has also gone to Gujrat and telegraphic, telephonic communications between Lahore and Gujrat have been cut off. We are awaiting further news. Liaquat Ali Khan's proposed visit to Frontier is supposed to prepare for any direction of Security Council for tribesmen to withdraw. Also in event of U.N.O. Council coming here.

1. New Delhi, 12 January 1948. M.E.A. files.

11. Cable to Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah¹

Thank you for your message from Bombay. Kashmir would be safe and will prosper if Kashmiris prove true to their homeland. As a Kashmiri I can never forget or forsake my homeland.

Sardar Patel visited Jammu with Jamsaheb and Maharaja Jaipur. Returned yesterday. Understand Bakshi taking oath as Acting Head of Administration. Mahajan leaving.

Hope you met Azzam Pasha in Cairo.

All good wishes.

1. 12 January 1948. J.N. Collection.

12. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Many thanks for your very full telegram No. 5-S dated 13th January about your interview with Noel-Baker² and others. I am in general agreement with the line that you took.

2. As regards Ismay's doubts mentioned in paragraph 4, Kaul has all available material bearing on supply by Pakistan to raiders of (a) arms and ammunition and (b) transport. You will doubtless consult him and make best possible use of evidence in his possession on this point.

3. I agree that question of confining tribesmen to tribal areas through joint defence organization between two Dominions is not one either for consideration by Security Council or as part of settlement of Kashmir issue. It is always open to Pakistan or us to deal with it through agency of Joint Defence Council. Until Pakistan shows a more cooperative attitude, there is no point in taking up such a suggestion with them.

1. New Delhi, 14 January 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. P.J. Noel-Baker (1889-1983); M. P. (British Labour Party), 1929-31 and 1936-70; member, British delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1946-47; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1947-50.

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4. I agree entirely with the line you took in dealing with Noel-Baker's comments on paragraph 13 of our message to Security Council. The suggestion that our real intentions in this matter should be made clear to the Security Council in our opening statement is sound and I hope you will act upon it.

5. As regards suggestion for appointment of small committee which would keep in touch with our and Pakistan Delegations and suggest to Security Council some formula for resolving "dispute", everything depends upon the scope of the reference to the committee. We would naturally wish the formula to be limited to Kashmir and, primarily, to cessation of hostilities. I see no objection to this procedure; indeed, its adoption may become inevitable if trend of debate in Council shows likelihood of inconclusive and prolonged discussion. Doubtless, you will consult us at appropriate stages during consideration of issue by committee, if it should materialise. Final formula will have to be considered by Cabinet here before our attitude towards it is defined.

13. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

I had a long conversation this morning with the Belgian Ambassador² who has just returned from a visit of consultation with his Government. The Ambassador emphasized that U.S. approach to Kashmir issue would be influenced less by intrinsic merits than by effect of solution on broad considerations of American world strategy in present state of tension between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. America is pursuing policy of support to Middle Eastern states from Greece to Iran in hope that they would, by providing bases and otherwise, assist America in event of hostilities with U.S.S.R. If Pakistan should be willing to cooperate similarly with the U.S.A., it is to be expected that the U.S.A. would try to befriend Pakistan in solution of her dispute with India over Kashmir.

1. New Delhi, 17 January 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. Prince Eugene de Ligne.

2. This is a possibility which we have energetically to counter. Pakistan has the geographic advantage of contiguity to Islamic states of the Middle East. Her religious affinity with these states is a psychological asset which America may not wish to lose by adopting a more friendly attitude towards us. Neither of these factors, however, can compensate for Pakistan's economic and military weakness as compared to India. In event of a world war Pakistan, even if she allows her territory to be used by U.S.A., would be a feeble bulwark against aggression. From the military standpoint, therefore, affiliation of Kashmir to Pakistan cannot be of much value in resisting this aggression. America, through its military commitments stretching from the Atlantic to Pakistan or even Kashmir, could not be in sufficient strength herself to put up effective resistance to aggression if this should be directed against north of Indian sub-continent in strength. It should be obvious to the Americans that, because of her manpower and economic resources, India alone can provide effective aid against aggression.

3. Our policy of non-entanglement with either bloc does not mean that we want Russians to enter any part of the Indian sub-continent, including Pakistan. We have not secured our freedom from the British to lose it to another Great Power. Any aggressive move will be resisted by us. Our friendship should, therefore, be of greater importance to the United States than the friendship of Pakistan.

What line America takes now in relation to Kashmir will profoundly influence both public opinion in India and the policy of any Indian Government towards the U.S.A. Friendship with the U.S.A. has been and still is one of the cardinal principles of our foreign policy. Differences of opinion between the U.S.A. and ourselves over certain issues which have come up before the United Nations Assembly do not in the least derogate from the strength of our desire to be on friendly terms with the U.S.A. Indeed, for carrying out our economic programme, we look forward to help from the U.S.A. If we have, simultaneously, tried to maintain friendly relations with Russia, it is not from any thought of hostility to the U.S.A. On the contrary, we have felt that the cultivation of friendly relations with both countries may help to avert a world conflict which might well be accelerated by a new nation of the importance of India openly aligning itself with one group or the other. In the unhappy event of such a conflict arising, India will not only defend her own frontiers but side with the party which stands for the principles for which India has struggled for nearly a century.

4. We think it important that our point of view should be clearly explained to the State Department not with a view to outbidding Pakistan for American support over the Kashmir issue but in the larger interests of world peace and Indo-American relations. If you agree, we should like

you to seek an early opportunity to explain, preferably to the American Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall, our position on lines indicated. Presumably, it will be possible to do so only in Washington and, to avoid any suspicion of canvassing on our part for American support, I would suggest that the visit should be so timed as to attract the minimum of public attention and of speculation regarding its purpose. Meanwhile, of course, if you think it desirable, you could also speak on these lines to Senator Austin³ who is America's delegate to the Security Council.

3. Warren Robinson Austin (1877-1962); Legal Representative in China for American International Corporation, 1916; Senator (Republican), 1931-56; Special Ambassador of the President and adviser to the U.S. representative at the United Nations, 1946-47 and U.S. representative at the United Nations, 1947-53.

14. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Received your telegram No. 24 dated 16th January containing text of Pakistan's communication to Secretary General.² Also Vellodi's telegram 10-S dated 16th January. Have also seen Reuter's messages containing resolution³ proposed by President of Security Council and statements made by you,⁴ Zafrullah Khan⁵ and others thereon. We are awaiting your further comments.

1. New Delhi, 18 January 1948. M.E.A. files.
2. On 15 January 1948, the Government of Pakistan presented its case in three documents. The first was a reply to the Indian complaint; the second, a counter-complaint about other disputes which Pakistan claimed were likely to endanger international peace and security; and the third document was in the nature of details substantiating the reply and the counter-complaint.
3. On 17 January 1948, the Security Council passed a resolution sponsored by the Belgian representative, urging India and Pakistan to help to ease the tension and "to inform the Council immediately of any material change" which might occur during the time the Council was seized of the problem.
4. Gopalaswami Ayyangar reiterating the Indian complaint urged the Security Council to apply itself to the "simple and straightforward issue" of Pakistan's abetment of the tribal raids on Kashmir and demanded that the Council should ask Pakistan to discharge its neighbourly duties.
5. Zafrullah Khan narrated a long tale of atrocities being committed in the subcontinent and claimed that neither side was free from blame.

Pakistan's statement astonishing mixture of falsehood, perversions and one-sided statements. Zafrullah Khan's speech as reported even worse. Liaquat Ali Khan's recent speeches in Frontier Province provocative and affording encouragement to tribal people.

You will no doubt give appropriate reply. Attitude taken by newspapers in England indicates either ignorance of facts or deliberate partiality for Pakistan.⁶ Probably this represents general approach of British Government also in silliest attempts being made to misrepresent facts and obscure what has happened during past two and a half months by mixing other issues and previous occurrences in one-sided way. This attitude typical of Pakistan's policy and British attitude seemingly neutral also typical. We cannot give up our fundamental position because of these attempts which must be resisted.

Delhi correspondent in London *Times* 13th January states : "That Pakistan is unofficially involved in aiding rioters is certain. Your correspondent has first hand evidence that arms, ammunition and supplies are being made available to Azad Kashmir forces. A few Pakistani officers are also helping to direct their operations. However much Pakistan Government may disavow, intervention and moral and material support is certainly forthcoming."

Regarding paragraph twentynine Pakistan's complaint to Security Council further facts will be sent to you although this matter no longer is issue after our payment of cash balances which has already been done. It is completely false to say that Government of India has exercised any pressure on Reserve Bank. As a matter of fact Reserve Bank gave ways and means for advance of one hundred million rupees ten days ago. This was quite apart from question of cash balances. Military stores are also being continually sent to Pakistan who have however held up ninety aircraft belonging to Indian Dominion in spite of agreement to send them.

6. For example, *The Times*, (London), stated on 5 January 1948: "There is much loose talk in India about the inevitability of war between the two Dominions, not only by men in the street but also by responsible persons who should know better. There are fears in Pakistan that border incidents may provoke India to enter her territory."

15. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegrams 11 and 12-S dated 18th January. We await result of your informal conferences with Zafrullah. We should have thought, however, that the attitude he has taken up in his statement and speech is so offensive, malicious and full of falsehood that there is little chance of informal conferences yielding result. He has accused us of every conceivable crime and regards us as no better than deceivers, conspirators and assassins. It is impossible to talk reasonably or amicably to any person speaking in this strain. The strongest objection should be taken to this. Indeed, his attempt to bring all this in might have been objected to right at the beginning.

2. Document II submitted by Pakistan to Security Council complains of (1) genocide, (2) danger to religion and culture of 35 million Muslims within the Union of India and (3) active aid by our police and armed forces as well as by Rulers of certain States in massacre and other atrocities committed on Muslim population. We consider it essential that these charges be categorically refuted. You will doubtless point out contrast between tranquillity now prevailing all over India and spirit of lawlessness and homicide all over western Pakistan as evidenced recently by (1) massacre and most extensive looting in Karachi, and (2) attack on non-Muslim refugee train from Bannu by tribesmen as well as local Muslims at Gujrat railway station in West Punjab resulting in large scale killing and in abduction of women. Even in eastern Pakistan conditions deteriorating and continuous migration taking place while there is no migration from West Bengal to East Bengal. We take strongest objection to Zafrullah's charges and consider that these must be answered or else we shall be gravely prejudiced in estimation of foreign public.

3. Perversity of Zafrullah's statement and speech is demonstrated by his ignoring completely what has happened in western Pakistan. In effect nearly all non-Muslims except those forcibly converted and abducted women have been removed from West Punjab, Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From Sind nearly one-third of non-Muslim population has come away already and others are awaiting transport. No such movement of Muslims from India now except in stray cases.

4. Part C of Document II dealing with Kashmir is a masterpiece of

1. New Delhi, 19 January 1948. M.E.A. files. Extracts. Paragraphs 11 and 12 containing routine details have been omitted.

perversion of truth and of admission of Pakistan's complicity which it is sought to extenuate by minimising its extent and attributing participation of Pakistan nationals to religious sympathy and passion for freedom. You have enough material to destroy this picture and to present a correct one to Security Council. During last two and a half months there has been burning and looting on a considerable scale in Jammu Province by the invaders and the terrible massacre at Mirpur from where it is estimated 10,000 women including Muslim women were abducted. No single instance of any major incident on our part even alleged except attack on convoy from Jammu early in November where our troops were not concerned. Since then complete order in territories under our possession and in Jammu city Muslims have returned to their houses and shops. Only trouble has been raids by invaders accompanied by arson and killing. Prominent Muslims in Kashmir State have issued statements expressing their deep abhorrence of invaders' methods.

5. In my telegram No. 495 dated 17th January you have been informed of our payment of Pakistan cash balances. Finance Ministry will be telegraphing to you separately regarding charges against Reserve Bank made in Document III.

6. Following are our comments on specific request of Pakistan Government to Security Council :

I (A). We have committed no acts of aggression against Pakistan. In spite of gravest provocation because invaders came from Pakistan we have issued strict orders to our troops and aircraft not to enter Pakistan territory. Specific charges made by Liaquat Ali Khan of violation by us are trivial and based according to him on police reports only which are thoroughly unreliable. Defence Ministry are being asked to expedite answer to these charges.

I (B) & (C). These have already been dealt with.

2 (A) to (D). We cannot allow Kashmir issue to be mixed up with other events. If Pakistan seeks enquiry into and remedies for consequences flowing from communal strife, this matter must be dealt with separately and on a reciprocal basis. We have no objection to such separate enquiry which deals with all aspects of the case. But this cannot be allowed to be mixed up with Kashmir. You will remember that our intervention in Kashmir was not due to communal strife in the Valley of Kashmir which was completely peaceful. It was due to brutal invasion of a peaceful people in the Valley.

2 (E) As regards specific request made in respect of Jammu and Kashmir State, Indian and State troops operating on State territory cannot be regarded as outsiders. Both legally and otherwise they have every right to

be where they are and to resist and drive out invaders from outside. These troops must remain in the State to maintain law and order and to prevent future aggression. It is impossible for us more specially after recent experience to leave door wide open to the adoption of gangster methods by tribal and other people sitting on doorstep of Kashmir State. India, however, has no desire to maintain a large garrison in Kashmir. Once normal conditions have been restored and danger of fresh invasion eliminated, she will, of her own accord, but in her discretion, progressively reduce her force in State. As regards nationals of State, e.g. Poonchis now fighting against us, it is not our intention that they should be expelled from State territory and all that they have to do is to cease fighting. We are sure that Sheikh Abdullah's Government will deal with them generously and try to win them over provided they stop fighting. You can discuss this matter with Abdullah.

7. Home Guards at present being raised in Jammu and Kashmir include all communities and are largely Muslims.

8. We cannot accept proposal for any other administration to be imposed on the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This would be an unwarranted interference with the Indian Dominion and Kashmir State. You are fully aware of steps that have been taken to popularise Government of the State. Maharaja now is only a constitutional ruler and entire administration is in hands of Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues. Maharaja has decided to ask Abdullah to become Prime Minister and nominate his Cabinet. He asked Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, acting head of Administration, to proceed with this plan immediately but Bakshi said he would wait till Abdullah's return. There can be no doubt that Sheikh Abdullah and National Conference which is largest political party in State represent effectively great majority of Muslims, Hindus and others. There is no reason why it should be thought that this administration will interfere with plebiscite.

Our attitude regarding plebiscite has already been stated. We shall gladly accept representatives of Council for purpose of (a) advising on measures under which free and fair plebiscite may be held, and (b) observing actual operation of plebiscite.

9. 2(F). Since we maintain that Kashmir issue alone requires immediate action by Council and must be kept separate from others, the question of Council devising machinery to assist in supervision and implementation of agreements between India and Pakistan does not arise.

10. Foregoing are our provisional conclusions. If, on receipt of report of your discussions with Zafrullah, any modifications or additions are called for we shall telegraph again. But it must be clearly understood that

we will not accept any scheme which interferes with present arrangement of Sheikh Abdullah being Prime Minister and choosing his colleagues.

16. Cable to N. Gopalswami Ayyangar¹

Zafrullah's speech is so full of falsehood and insinuations that it is difficult to deal with it briefly. Regarding his reference to his home in Qadian being destroyed,² we stand by our previous statement completely. We never said that there had been no disturbances in that district but we stated that Zafrullah's home had not been attacked and was there for anyone to see still. Indeed we have taken particular pains in regard to Qadian and Neogy, Mridula Sarabhai and General Thimayya have visited Qadian. Thimayya took General Nazir Ahmed³ of Pakistan Army with him. Please inform Zafrullah from me that I challenge his statement that his house has been destroyed and repudiate this and many other falsehoods in his statement utterly. I am surprised that any responsible person should use the language he has done in his speech without regard to truth and decency.

2. Regarding Junagadh we sent a long telegram to Foreign Karachi on 6th January in answer to their charges of killing and looting Muslims. In this telegram it was stated that charges made were wholly untrue. We have had special enquiries made by independent observers. Large sporadic disturbances in Junagadh under Nawab's administration but within 48 hours of our taking over at request of Nawab peaceful conditions were restored. Large quantities of hidden arms were recovered from some of the Muslim population. There was communal disturbance on December 18th when 26 people were admitted to hospital most of whom were Hindus. Some Muslims made a determined attack on a police station on December 26th

1. New Delhi, 19 January 1948. M.E.A. files.
2. Zafrullah Khan, in his speech in the Security Council on 15 January 1948, alleged that the Ahmadiya headquarters and his house in Qadian had been destroyed. In fact Qadian was the operational base of the Ahmadiyas who crossed into the non-Muslim areas of West Punjab. Indian military authorities searched this area, and recovered arms and ammunition.
3. Major-General Nazir Ahmad (b. 1908); commissioned in the Indian Army, 1932; the second Pakistan army officer to undergo Staff College training at Quetta, 1940; took part in Kashmir operation, 1948-49; held in "Rawalpindi conspiracy case" on 9 March 1951 and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

and hacked to death 5 Hindu policemen and injured some others but order was quickly restored and there was no retaliation.

3. Some minor incidents have taken place without loss of life and with slight damage to property. We have received telegrams from Muslims thanking us for protection afforded to them. Our Government has gone all out to protect Muslim life and property notwithstanding grave provocation.

4. Regarding Pakistan's basic complaint that Government of India have been trying to upset partition, this is on face of it absurd. If we had been opposed to partition we would never have agreed to it; nor would we have agreed to payment of large sums of money and stores to Pakistan. It was easy for us to delay matters by reference to Arbitral Tribunal. We tried our best to settle all outstanding differences and agreed to terms which are undoubtedly generous.

5. Far from desiring an annulment of partition now we would refuse any such thing if it was offered to us today because this would mean a tremendous liability to us and new and overwhelming problems. We have wanted closer association with Pakistan for the good of both States but this does not mean ending of Pakistan as a State. There can be no going back to pre-partition stage after all that has happened.

6. I am anxious that you should be careful about British delegation's attempts to play role of peace-maker. British attitude throughout has been unhelpful. Various foreign sources confirm this.

7. While we are anxious for peace we do not propose on any account to give up our fundamental position and give in to gangster methods and bullying in which Zafrullah seems to specialise.

17. No Desire for War¹

I was sorry to read Pakistan's reply to India's case on the Kashmir issue.

1. Speech at Delhi, 19 January 1948. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times* and *National Herald*, 20 January 1948.

It is full of lies. I was surprised that any responsible person could make such a statement.

Pakistan's case was that the Government of India, right from the start, was conspiring to destroy Pakistan. This is an absurd thing to say, because if that had been our intention, we would not have accepted partition at all, and would have resisted it with all our might. We agreed to the creation of Pakistan, much against our will, with the hope that when the present bitterness dies down, we would come closer. Of course, we realised that our old relationship, as in an undivided India, could not be re-established, but there was no doubt that the two countries would come closer to each other.

Since partition we have been guided in all our actions by a spirit of settlement with Pakistan. This is clear from the speed and manner in which we settled all outstanding matters between the two Dominions. We could have easily referred all the issues to the Arbitral Tribunal and thus delayed their settlement by months and months. It is, therefore, wrong on anybody's part, be he in the Pakistan Government or outside, to think that we want to absorb Pakistan. India and Pakistan have their own problems to solve, and if today the Pakistan Government were to ask for a reunion, we shall definitely refuse it as we don't want to burden ourselves with the problems they have created for themselves. We do not want a war with Pakistan, or for that matter, with any other country, because we feel that war is bad and also because we want to build up our country. Even talk of war is harmful for us as it creates unnecessary panic. However, this does not mean that we will not prepare ourselves to resist an invasion. But we want peace to develop and strengthen our country. We want to link up the problem of rehabilitation of refugees with our development schemes. In this effort, we want the cooperation of our people.

Though India has become free, still I don't find any significant change in the conduct of the people. Many young men still think and act as if they are inhabitants of a slave country. They must realise that the situation has changed radically and it demands a new approach. I do not mean to say that all movements and protests should be given up—let them continue. But agitations and movements in a free country and against a popular government must be conducted in a different spirit and style. As such, we have to change our attitude towards our army and police; now it is our own army and police. They are not to be used against us. They are for our protection.

In the past, we used to express our opinion freely and blame the foreign government and hold it responsible for all our ills. And, in most cases, our criticism was right. That habit unfortunately still persists. In the past, whenever disturbances or communal riots broke out, we blamed the British Government and this was true enough. If you read history, you will find

that it was the aim of the British Government to keep us divided so that we could not combine and fight against them. Unfortunately, the Muslim League created communal hatred in our country and poisoned the minds of the people. But what we have now to think is that we are citizens of a free country and should talk as free men.

But, at the same time, there is need for restraint. Some people rush to the press with their statements on various happenings without realising the effect such statements have on peace in the country and on her prestige abroad. Exercise of restraint is vital in the present circumstances. Freedom, it should be remembered, calls for a sense of responsibility.

As soon as India attained the status of a free nation, the attitude of other countries changed towards us. When we were under foreign rule, the Congress fearlessly expressed its opinions on various issues facing the world. People all over the world heard its views and respected them. But there is a great difference between the views of an organisation and a responsible government. Earlier, the British Government served as a kind of a screen between them and the rest of the world. Now our actions have to be carefully weighed for they affect our well-being. Even before August 15, other people looked with hope towards India's emergence as a free country. But the incidents of the past few months have been a source of disappointment to them. India has fallen in their estimation. People think that this new nation will not have much weight in the world as people quarrell here among themselves on religious issues.

A tremendous change has also come in our relationship with other nations. People do not seem to realize that Pakistan is now a different country and there are only two methods of dealing with a foreign country. The first is by negotiation and agreement, and the second is through war. There is no middle course. If something untoward happens in Bombay, we can ask our friends there to see that it is set right. Some people, however, seem to think that this Government should give orders to Pakistan. They do not realize that Pakistan is not a part of India.

Policies of important nations in the world are not so much based on justice as on their self-interest. In these critical times only that country counts, which is strong. And so when they see India and Pakistan fighting with each other—Pakistan has not been very strong from the beginning but India is potentially strong—they feel that these two will fritter away their energies and need not be taken seriously.

We must keep the pledge that we have given to Gandhiji because otherwise we will go down in our own estimation and damage our reputation. At the same time, we must not accept anything simply because it is desired by Mahatma Gandhi. Our approach to things must be rational. We must be thoroughly convinced of the correctness of our steps. Even looking from the narrow angle of self-interest, this is the only way. If we in India

follow the right path, we can march forward and play an important role in the destiny of the world.

Some people might claim that they were not to be blamed for anything; it was Pakistan that started it. I know this is so. But that does not mean that we too should stoop down to their level. It is a mistake to think in terms of turning out the Muslims. Even self-interest shows that it is wrong. If Pakistan persists in her policy she will be ruined. We have to understand that in India, for thousands of years, people of many religions have been living peacefully. There are Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Jews and Parsis. Turning out Muslims would mean that we would be following in the footsteps of Mr. Jinnah. Today, if we started exterminating the Muslims, tomorrow we might start with Christians, Sikhs, Jews and Parsis, and a stage might arise when Hindus would fight among themselves. Our freedom would be short-lived if we were guided by such questionable principles.

18. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram No. 25-S dated 22nd January. We do not understand Senator Austin's insistence on there being a settlement between India and Pakistan and establishment of stable peace conditions in the two Dominions before United States or its nationals could, with a sense of security, establish political and economic relations of a permanent character with India. When you see him next, I hope you will make it perfectly clear that we seek no favour from any country in field of political and economic relations. We have given ample evidence of our desire to reach friendly settlement with Pakistan. If we have not succeeded it is not our fault. So far as Dominion of India is concerned, conditions are stable and, with minor and transient exceptions, law and order are fully maintained. If, as we hope, American Ambassador in India has been reporting conditions impartially, he should have informed the State Department already of the truth of our assertion.

As regards composition of inquiry commission, I have already informed you that we do not wish representative of any of Big Five, including China, to be appointed.

We have made enquiries from Defence Ministry, who inform us that no incident of any kind took place at Pathankot. Pathankot, in spite of its name, has nothing to do with Pathans and Pathans have no business to be

1. New Delhi, 23 January 1948. M.E.A. files.

there. You might convey this to Noel-Baker and ask him what the source of his information is. In any case, we don't see the logic of the assumption that imaginary fears of attack by Sikhs or any other non-Muslims in India would justify attacks on India by Pathans or anyone else. It seems to us that, whatever Noel-Baker's sources, they are not reliable. On hearing from you what Noel-Baker's reply is we shall, if necessary, make further inquiries.

19. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
24 January 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I have your letter of the 24th. When the Governor General mentioned to me that the Defence Committee need not consider at present the question of our entering Pakistan territory, I agreed with him. But this does not mean that we should not be completely prepared to defend our territory or even to convert our defence to an attack on certain bases, if necessary, in Pakistan territory. I quite agree with you that the situation in West Punjab is deteriorating and we should be perfectly prepared for any action. My own impression however was that such a plan was being prepared and in fact had been prepared. If that is so then there need be no question of putting a stop to this planning. I saw no particular advantage in putting up the plan we had prepared before the rather motley crowd that attend the Defence Committee meetings.

If however you think otherwise we can have a talk about this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

20. Appeal for Restraint¹

After having heard the statements on the situation in Kashmir from

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 24 January 1948. *The Hindu*, 25 January 1948.

representatives of the Government of India and Pakistan, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted, on the 28th January, a resolution which called upon the two Governments to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeal to the people) calculated to improve the situation and to refrain from making any statements which might aggravate it. I am aware of the restraint which the press and public in India have exercised in the discussion of the Kashmir issue and would earnestly appeal to all concerned to continue to observe moderation in all references to this difficult and delicate question.²

2. Indian opinion had been surprised and disappointed by debates in the Security Council and especially by the attitude of Britain and the United States who were inclined to accept wholly the Pakistan case.

21. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

This morning's papers report that Indian and Pakistan delegations have agreed to draft plans for holding plebiscite in Kashmir. From Zafrullah's reply to Setalvad, which is also reported, Pakistan will ask :

(1) That, since it is mainly Kashmiri population which is fighting they must be assured that Muslims will not be persecuted and they will be free to decide their own government and constitution; (2) the people should have an assurance that Indian troops shall withdraw; and (3) that to enable a free choice to be made by Kashmiris in the matter of accession, a neutral and impartial administration shall be set up.

(2) In paragraphs, 6.2(E) and 8 of my telegram^a No. 600 of 19th January, all these points have been broadly dealt with. I think it important, however, to emphasize again certain aspects of our position:

(a) It is not correct to say that mainly Kashmiri population is fighting. Kashmiris may be fighting especially in Poonch but, in the main, attackers are outsiders, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals.

(b) Whatever might have happened in Jammu and Kashmir State before

1. New Delhi, 25 January 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. See *ante*, item 16.

we went, since we took over responsibility for defence of State, and Abdullah's administration assumed charge, full protection afforded to all communities. No specific instance of injury to Muslims in State even alleged. Indeed, we could not, as responsible Government, allow any such thing to happen. As against this, invaders are constantly raiding into Kashmir territory, killing, looting, burning and abducting women. Some villages in Jammu Province were burnt and looted only three days ago. How can Indian troops be withdrawn while these horrors are a matter of daily occurrence? Pakistan has expressed its inability to control these raiders. What guarantee is there that, even if raiders were to cease fighting temporarily in deference to United Nation's appeal, they will not resume their warlike activities as soon as our troops are withdrawn? In addition there are the Poonchi ex-servicemen who have been supplied with modern arms by Pakistan and who can terrorise whole State if not prevented from doing so. In brief, presence of our troops in Kashmir is only guarantee against continuance of barbarities from which State has already grievously suffered. There can, therefore, be no question of our agreeing to withdraw our troops, until normal conditions have been restored and all risk of renewal of raids eliminated. Once this happens, we shall consider reduction of our garrison. Presence of Indian troops need in no way prevent free expression by all Kashmiris, including those now fighting against us, of their views on question of accession during plebiscite. U.N. observers will be there to ensure that.

(c) There can be no question of changing administration of Sheikh Abdullah. Paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 600 of 19th January fully explains our attitude in this respect .

(3) If you make any detailed proposals regarding plebiscite, and time permits, I shall be grateful if you will telegraph them to us for comment before finalizing them.

22. To William Arthur Moore¹

New Delhi
27 January 1948

Dear Mr. Moore,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th January. I have no doubt that some kind of federal link will have to be evolved between Hindustan and Pakistan and possibly other countries. I fear however that this is no time to make

1. J.N. Collection.

this proposal. Neither side is in a mood for it and any attempt will be misinterpreted and give rise to all manner of suspicions. The recent speech delivered by Zafrullah Khan before the Security Council of the United Nations was such that no responsible person in India is prepared at present to have any dealings, other than the most necessary ones, with Pakistan. There must be some element of decency and respect for each other before we can talk. I fail to detect this on the Pakistan side.

I shall gladly meet you of course. But I do not think any purpose will be served in discussing this particular proposal at present.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

23. P.C. Gordon-Walker's Report of Talk with Nehru¹

I spent an hour and a quarter with Nehru in his office in the Council House. We were alone. We talked about Kashmir. Nehru is clearly in an unaccommodating frame of mind and will be hard to budge. His resentment seems not to be directed against us, but against the U.S.A.

He began by saying that India was receiving a very rapid education in the field of international relations. I came back to this point later. He went on to give me a long history of the Kashmir affair.

The decision to send troops to Kashmir was taken only at the last moment and unexpectedly. Up to 48 hours before they had assumed the Kashmir army would manage to hold things. They had some weeks before agreed to send arms to Kashmir. These had got held up and they decided to speed them up and thought this would be enough. They only decided to send troops at noon on the day before they were despatched.

Nehru emphasized that since India had been in Kashmir, no incidents (with one exception) had occurred in the territory under their control. Order and confidence had been restored. They could not possibly agree to a withdrawal of troops before order was assured as this would leave a vacuum.

1. New Delhi, 30 January 1948. The report was written on the next day. File No. L/P & S/13/1865, I.O.L.R., London.

P.C., later Lord, Gordon-Walker (1907-1980); Labour Member of Parliament, 1945-64 and 1966-74; Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, 1947-50; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1950-51; Foreign Secretary, 1964-65; Secretary of State for Education and Science, 1967-68.

The Indian Government wanted to withdraw troops as fast as possible but this would depend on :

- (a) the training of the Pathans, and
- (b) systematic handing over to a Kashmir administration.

Nehru said he had exhaustive evidence of Pakistan participation in the raid into Kashmir—prisoners, arms, etc. I said I saw the impossibility of withdrawing all organised troops before order was assured but this would have the consequence that the world would think that one party to the dispute was in control whilst the decisive election was held. I could not get Nehru to face or answer this point, though I tried several times. He simply said Sheikh Abdullah was the only man with a following—he would bring back order and confidence and establish a system of decentralised local government. He waxed eloquent about Abdullah—the only figure in Kashmir, the man about whom songs were sung etc. If the Indian army were in Kashmir during the election it would have nothing to do with it : it would only be holding posts. It might even be possible to withdraw it before.

He then turned to the charge that India was trying to throttle Pakistan and denied it with vehemence. Partition had worked a fundamental change in Indian geography. Even if Pakistan begged India to take it back, he would say : “No. Wait five or ten years and we will then look at it again. We can’t go back to all those problems.”

I then asked him what he meant by India’s education in international affairs. Did this mean any weakening of their support for the U.N.O. ? No, but it meant that Indian opinion was turning against the U.S.A. He particularly resented the way in which America belittled India and assumed an air of moral superiority. There was a big move of opinion against India having gone to the Security Council—moderate as well as extreme opinion.

I asked him what he thought were America’s motives and mentioned Patel’s idea that it was because Americans thought India was pro-Russian. He said with force that India was not pro-Russian and that if the U.S. State Department read their Ambassador’s reports they would know it. Grady was a good man “though rather nineteenth century in his economics.”

In Nehru’s view, the motives of the United States were to get military and economic concessions in Pakistan. The only motive of the United States was to secure positions for the next war and to weaken Russia. They had long ago had information from “a foreign ambassador” that Pakistan would “prostitute itself to America to secure its ends over Kashmir.” It wanted Kashmir in order to sell it to the U.S.A. Pakistan had probably offered important economic concessions and possibly military ones.

I then asked him what he thought of the possibility of a joint India-Pakistan defence of the frontier. “This must certainly come,” he said. It was in India’s interest. It couldn’t be done just now: but it was necessary in the end. If the U.S.A. thought of bases on the North West Frontier,

it was stupid to think the Frontier could be forced into a hostile India—India's defence interests extend to the Middle East and anyone invading the Middle East must regard India as its zero of defence in depth.

Nehru spoke with anger and contempt of the way in which the Palestine vote had been lined up. Zionists had tried to bribe India with the promise of millions. I tried to get him to go into details but he declined to. At the same time his sister had received daily warnings that her life was in danger unless she voted right.

At the end Nehru told me he had received a long memorandum from Krishna Menon asking for a great extension of India House as he needed much more staff. He spoke with affection of Krishna—and I thought with a touch of amusement in his affection.

I asked Nehru if there was any chance of his visiting England. He said that he hoped it might be possible to come in March or April.

24. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram No. 53-S of 30th January.² While I greatly appreciate desire of delegation to be with me in this hour of tragic bereavement,³ I do not think that you and your associates should come back for this reason. If delegation think it desirable to return to India for reasons connected with proceedings of Security Council, I shall be glad if you will telegraph specific proposals and we shall consider them in Cabinet and let you know our decision.

1. New Delhi, 31 January 1948. M.E.A. files.
2. Gopalaswami Ayyangar enquired whether considering the "gravely worsened" conditions in India, he could, with the consent of the Pakistan delegation, suspend discussions in New York and return home.
3. Death of Mahatma Gandhi.

25. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram No. 61-S of 1st February Security Council. You say

1. New Delhi, 3 February 1948. M.E.A. files.

Langenhove's² second resolution³ is innocuous. We go even further and say that it may make impossible the restoration in Kashmir of conditions under which alone a plebiscite can be held. Persistent raids into villages of Jammu Province have practically denuded it of its non-Muslim population, the greater part of its original inhabitants having gone to Pathankot and beyond. How does Council expect any expression of the popular will on the issue of accession if the people are just not there to express it ? To deal with the grave issue of the cessation of fighting, which is condition precedent to creation of conditions in which plebiscite can take place, in manner proposed in Langenhove's resolution, is wholly unrealistic. We would suggest that you point this out to Council and say that if Council still wishes to adopt this resolution, you will not oppose it but you would like the Council to realise that it can serve no practical purpose and that, therefore, the Government of India would not wish to be regarded as consenting parties to it.

2. As regards resolution on plebiscite, we agree that you should move amendment in form proposed in para 4 of your telegram.

3. If amendment is not accepted by Council, we would suggest your saying that you have gone as far as possible along the path of conciliation and that since Council has found itself unable to accept the very reasonable and moderate suggestions of your Government, you must ask for adjournment of the discussion to enable you to report the matter personally to Government in New Delhi.⁴ "Opinion here is very disappointed with attitude of majority of Council and Cabinet agrees that we should get out of this entanglement as gracefully as we can unless Council shows greater consideration for our point of view. What we are anxious to avoid is a complete break with the Council.

2. Ferdinand Van Langenhove (b. 1889); Permanent Representative of Belgium to the U.N., 1946-57.
3. This resolution introduced in the Security Council on 29 January 1948 provided that the Kashmir Commission was to "take into consideration that among the duties incumbent upon it, are included those which would tend towards promoting the cessation of acts of hostility and violence and which are of particular urgent character." The commission was also to "use every diligence to ensure that its mediatory action be exercised without delay."
4. On 8 February 1948, the Indian delegation asked the Security Council for adjournment as it had to return to Delhi for consultation. After a month the delegation returned to Lake Success,

4. For your information I might tell you that I have spoken frankly both to Mountbatten and to Gordon-Walker, Noel-Baker's Under-Secretary, about the wholly unsatisfactory attitude of the U.K. delegation⁵ and have warned them that the present attitude of the majority of the Security Council, if not modified, will have far-reaching repercussions on our international relations. Gordon-Walker has, I understand, telegraphed to Noel-Baker. Whether latter will change his position remains to be seen.

5. On 23 January 1948, Noel-Baker endorsed the Pakistan stand on the Kashmir issue and stated that fighting could be stopped only by assuring the tribesmen of a fair and speedy settlement. This argument was in opposition to the Indian contention that hostilities should stop first before further steps were undertaken.

26. Lord Mountbatten's Record of Meeting with Nehru¹

Nehru asked a lot of questions and appeared to get satisfactory answers from General Messervy, and by the end a really friendly atmosphere of candour had clearly been established between them.

General Messervy said that Mr. Liaquat had asked him to try and gauge the feeling in Delhi and to come back and advise him as to any useful step that Pakistan could take to try and bring the fighting to an end and reestablish good understanding, particularly in the atmosphere created by Mahatma Gandhi's death.

At this stage I intervened to say that it was my opinion that there were no serious points of difference between the two Governments over the Kashmir issue, since both sides had agreed that there should be fair and impartial plebiscite on the question of accession, and that this should be carried out by U.N.O. Both sides had agreed that all political prisoners should be released before the plebiscite and that only the regular inhabitants should vote and that they should be asked to return to do so. In fact, the stumbling block was no more than one of procedure.

I suggested that the best advice General Messervy could give to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan would be that he should accept India's requirement that the Pakistan authorities should first declare that they did not support the raiders and would not give them any facilities, and, in fact, would call upon

1. New Delhi, 5 February 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Also present was Gen. Frank Walter Messervy.

the tribesmen to withdraw and cease fighting. If this were first agreed to, then it need not be published until the second point had been discussed, namely the steps to arrange a fair plebiscite.

Nehru agreed that this would be a promising line to follow up, and General Messervy promised to convey this suggestion to his Prime Minister.

I told General Messervy that he could tell Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan that my Government had repeatedly declared that they had no desire whatsoever to retain in the Indian Dominion the people of Kashmir if it were clear that their will was to accede to Pakistan. General Messervy stated that only recently Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had made a precisely similar statement as the view of the Government of Pakistan. I drew attention to the fact that this meant that both Governments were resolved to abide by the will of the people, and would feel it an embarrassment to have a large population within their respective Dominions against their will.

I said that the next stumbling block was India's inability to accept the removal of Sheikh Abdullah's administration prior to the plebiscite. General Messervy pointed out that unless something were done to give the Pakistan Government some confidence in the Kashmir administration they would feel that the plebiscite could not be fair.

Nehru explained that the Government of India had already instructed their delegates at U.N.O. to offer to hold, as soon as possible, elections on as wide a franchise as might be desired for a new administration. In other words, Sheikh Abdullah would have to submit himself and his authority to the country for election, and that if they failed to retain their mandate, automatically the opposition party would get into power.

27. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Following facts emphasize still further need for directive to Pakistan to give effect to measures proposed in our memorandum presented to Security Council on January 1st.

(1) There is most distressing news about conditions in Ali Beg Camp where a large number of persons from Kashmir, mostly women, have been kept by raiders for several months. Our information is that considerable number of young men in these camps were simply taken out and slaughtered.

1. New Delhi, 8 February 1948. M.E.A. files.

Conditions under which women are kept are scandalous. A large number have died through exposure and cold. Yet raiders will not allow others to go away. Every effort of ours to get out these women has failed. Lorries sent to evacuate them have been kept as well as money sent by us to meet expenses. Fantastic stipulations are being made. For example, we are being asked for an equal number of women to be produced from Kashmir before they would let inmates of Camp to leave. We have offered to send any person who desires to go and 'Azad' Kashmir people were asked to send representative to find out who wanted to go. No advantage was taken of this offer.

(2) Organized attacks of great intensity continue to be made on our forces. On Friday morning attack in force was launched near Naushahra. This was heavily repulsed. We have counted 650 enemy dead. Two of these dead bodies were apparently of Europeans as seen from camp picket in minefield which had been cleared to recover bodies. Our own casualties are 29 killed, one officer and 90 other ranks wounded. Enemy estimated at 5,000 or 6,000 is still around Naushahra using machine-guns, mortars and batteries.

28. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

In view of repeated charges made by Zafrullah of autocracy of the Maharaja of Kashmir and by Argentine member² of Security Council against Indian States generally, it is not only necessary to point out that this autocracy has ended completely and cannot possibly be revived but also our general policy of constitutional reform in States. This policy is taking shape rapidly and has already resulted in far-reaching changes. Many of the States have not only accepted full responsible government as their goal but have actually gone a long way to give effect to this decision. Responsible ministries have been established in a large number of States, including Mysore, Gwalior, Indore, Kathiawar, Cochin, Travancore and Baroda, and new constitutions are being drafted. A large number of small States have been merged into India so as to ensure progressive administration. In Kathiawar all the States have joined together to form a single unit which is having full responsible government. This very rapid transformation of the States in India is proof of the pace and range of political reform, in princely India, under impact of our

1. New Delhi, 8 February 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. Jose Arce (1881-1968); Permanent Representative of Argentina to the U.N., 1946-48.

policy and of democratic forces at work in India. We have encouraged these forces aiming at full freedom. On the other hand, in the Pakistan States, even an attempt has not been made to effect any kind of change and Pakistan, which shouts so loudly about freedom in Kashmir, has done nothing at all in the States that have acceded to it. In Hyderabad, which has not acceded to either Dominion but has a standstill agreement with India, medieval autocracy still prevails and is encouraged by Pakistan.

29. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
8 February 1948

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am enclosing a telegram received from Gopalaswami Ayyangar.²

As you know we have been greatly distressed by the attitude taken up both by the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Security Council. So far as I am convinced this attitude of the U.S.A. and the U.K. is completely wrong and will have far-reaching results in our relations with them. The telegram that I am enclosing refers to an extraordinary conversation which Noel-Baker had with Abdullah. Noel-Baker refers to his own sources of information. This can only mean the British High Commissioners in India and Pakistan. We are, therefore, led to conclude that these High Commissioners are carrying on some kind of an intense activity against India.

I am just going to Allahabad but I thought I should draw your attention immediately to this telegram and to the whole background of the situation that has developed in the Security Council. It is commonly being said here that British policy, as previously, is anti-India and pro-Pakistan just as it used to be pro-Muslim League previously. If Noel-Baker has actually said what he is reported to have done, he has done an ill service to his

1. File no. 32(46)/48-PMS.

2. Gopalaswami Ayyangar informed Nehru of a conversation between Sheikh Abdullah and Noel-Baker in New York wherein the latter said that he was satisfied on the basis of his own sources of information that Pakistan was not assisting the invaders. Ayyangar requested Nehru to convey to Mountbatten his lack of confidence in the Security Council.

country as well as to India. You will realise that this kind of bullying tactics will have an effect reverse of that intended.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Mountbatten cabled to Attlee on 8 February his surprise at Noel-Baker's statement as both he and Ismay were convinced that the tribals were getting aid from Pakistan. He expressed unhappiness at developments in the U.N. "Any prestige that I may previously have had with my Government has of course been largely lost by my having insisted that they should make a reference to the U.N.O. with the assurance that they would get a square deal there."

30. Cable to C. R. Attlee¹

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, our principal representative in New York in connection with consideration of Kashmir issue by Security Council, has reported that, in course of conversation with Sheikh Abdullah, Head of Interim Kashmir Administration, Mr. Noel-Baker said: (1) that charges made by India against Pakistan of assistance and encouragement given to raiders and invaders are not true; (2) that his own sources of information presumably British High Commissioners in India and Pakistan had sent reports from which he is satisfied that Pakistan Government are blameless. I confess that these are astonishing statements to make. The least we could have expected from him was that, if he had received such information, he should have discussed it with our delegation in New York. Indeed, we should have expected that H.M.G. would refer matter to us. That *ex parte* conclusions of the kind attributed to Mr. Noel-Baker should have been reached, appear to us to be wholly inconsistent with impartiality which we have right to expect. You will forgive me if I say frankly that attitude revealed by this conversation cannot but prejudice continuance of friendly relations between India and the U.K.

1. New Delhi, 8 February 1948. File No. KS-2/47-K, M.H.A.

31. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
9 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 9 February² sending me a copy of the Maharaja of Kashmir's letter.³

It seems to me that the wisest policy he can pursue at the present moment is to do nothing at all. Certainly the idea of his cancelling the accession is completely wrong. That will only lead to trouble for him and for us. As for his going out of Kashmir for a while this might be feasible, but I rather think that he should just stay on for the present. You will have noticed the repeated references made in the Security Council about the so-called autocratic rule of the Maharaja. The system of Indian States finds little favour in foreign countries and Zafrullah has tried to make the most of this.

As for his advice that the Indian Dominion should carry on operations more effectively, certainly we have not desired to tone down our operations in any way. Indeed, we have done our utmost to push them on and have given these directions to our military commanders. If something has come in our way, it is not the fault of the Government. Our recent success in the Naushahra region is an important one and should have considerable results in that region.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 1, p. 15.
2. Patel had sent Nehru a copy of the Maharaja's letter pointing out that it differed from the account given by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.
3. The Maharaja wrote that the Indian Army was ineffective against the raiders. His own position in the State was anomalous because the civil administration was in the hands of the National Conference while the Indian Army controlled the military operations. With the growing public feeling that the U.N. would decide in Pakistan's favour, the Maharaja said that he would either have to take command of his forces along with the Indian Army or leave the State to avoid responsibility for the consequences.
4. Simultaneous attacks by raiders on Indian Army positions around Naushahra on 6 February 1948 were repulsed by the Indian troops who reopened the road behind Naushahra.

32. Record of Lord Mountbatten's Interview with Nehru¹

Mountbatten told Nehru that he felt that history would prove him right in approaching the U.N. for the settlement of the Kashmir issue.... Nehru said that he believed in Attlee's complete integrity and intellectual honesty but still could not understand what was going on at the U.N.O. He remained unconvinced that motives of power politics were not influencing the outlook of the majority of the members of the Security Council.

Nehru told him that nearly all the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Delhi had informed him that they considered that India's case was a good one. Why, then, was such a different line taken at Lake Success? He quoted in particular two conversations held with ambassadors. The first of these was with the Belgian Ambassador, who, on his return from Belgium on January 13, had indicated to Nehru his belief that, good as India's case was, it was likely to meet with grave difficulties because Pakistan would be ready to "prostitute" herself to America in return for a favourable award. The second story concerned Grady, the American Ambassador, who, on his return from the United States, had seen G.S. Bajpai, and told him that he considered that India's case was a good one, and had put up in writing his own suggested solution which was almost exactly similar to that which had been suggested by Gopalaswami Ayyangar. Nehru explained this apparent inconsistency on America's part by saying that Grady was an honest man who did not realise the part that power politics was playing in his own country's outlook.

On the question of the Russians, Nehru made it clear that there was no secret pact between India and Russia as to the course which the latter should take in the Security Council's discussions. The plain fact was that Russia's had been the only delegation which had been really friendly to the Indian delegation at Lake Success.

Nehru made it clear that the burden of his complaint in connection with what had happened at the Security Council was that India's original reference had been brushed aside, and months had passed without it having been properly considered. The Council had chosen to deal first with the details of the plebiscite, instead of ordering emergency action to be taken to put out the spark which was likely to set fire to the powder barrel.

1. New Delhi, 10 February 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Extracts.

Nehru said he feared that we would be unlikely to reach an agreement out of court, because the attitude of Pakistan was bound to have hardened now as they thought they were winning at U.N.O. I took the line that I could frighten Liaquat Ali Khan by pointing out that if they won at U.N.O., one of two things might happen: either India would not accept the award in which case Pakistan would lose any advantage they had got by the award except a certain moral righteousness in the eyes of the world, or, alternatively, if India decided to accept an unfavourable award, the present Government would fall, and I was quite sure that Liaquat Ali Khan would view the prospect of Nehru's losing control in India with horror and would be willing to pay quite a considerable price to avoid his going.

Nehru entirely agreed that it would be admirable if the case could be settled out of court, but he was not as optimistic as I was that this could be achieved.

I told him that General Bucher had come to me and volunteered to go to U.N.O. on behalf of India, as he felt he could help to put the case over. Nehru expressed great appreciation at this loyal offer, but felt, as I did, that it would be better to have an Indian soldier rather than a Britisher to represent India at U.N.O.

I then strongly recommended Major-General Choudhuri, the D.C.G.S. I reminded Nehru that I had specially selected him to organize Nehru's tour of Malaya;³ and I told him that I thought he was probably the best all-round soldier in the Indian Army today, and was undoubtedly going to be a great Commander-in-Chief one day. Nehru entirely agreed....

I also tried to persuade Nehru to appoint C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer, at least temporarily, to take Gopalaswami Ayyangar's place at U.N.O., since the former was already in America on his lecture tour. I argued that the very fact that he had been publicly at variance with Nehru over the Travancore accession⁴ issue would lend weight to his representation now that he was arguing on behalf of the Dominion of India. The Prime Minister unfortunately took the opposite view, namely that he would be regarded as a friend of the Maharaja's pleading the case of the Maharaja of Kashmir. I therefore regretfully dropped the matter.

3. Nehru had visited Malaysia in March 1946.

4. After Mountbatten's statement on 3 June 1947, Ramaswami Aiyer announced Travancore's refusal to participate in the Constituent Assembly. He agreed to the State's accession only on 29 July 1947.

35. Power Politics at the United Nations¹

It was at the request of the people of Kashmir that the Indian Government had sent forces into the State to save it from devastation by the invading tribesmen. But for this timely help on India's part, this beautiful valley would have been sacked, plundered and ravaged by the raiders. Despite our repeated protests the Pakistan Government has denied all complicity in these raids; but the fact remains that the marauders were all coming through Pakistan, be they tribesmen, Pathans or Pakistanis.

Faced with a difficult situation, the Indian Government, although it had sent its soldiers to help Kashmir to get rid of the enemy, had to devise some other method for permanently solving the trouble. We did not want the agony of Kashmir to be prolonged further. Nor did we want the hostility in Kashmir to develop into a full-scale fighting between India and Pakistan. After deep consideration, the Government referred the dispute to the U.N. Instead of discussing and deciding upon our reference in a straightforward manner, the nations of the world sitting on that body got lost in power politics. That has opened the eyes of India a bit.

During the discussions at the Security Council, the Pakistan delegate raised a number of irrelevant points of dispute between India and Pakistan.²

We are not afraid of these disputes being discussed there, but we do not think they are germane to the straight question which we had asked the Council to consider. Whatever we have done in Kashmir has been based on the principle of truth and honesty. India has nothing to hide. It was our duty to help the people of the State when they asked for help. At every step we have taken so far we had consulted Gandhiji and secured the approval of the saint of truth and nonviolence.

Mahatma Gandhi had been assassinated under terrible circumstances. A single individual killed him. Yet there was more than an individual's hand in it. Groups and parties have come to light. Who could even imagine such a thing?

I have heard that some people had distributed sweets on hearing of Bapu's death. I got very angry when I heard this. I do not know whether such people are there in Jammu also. If they are there, then what right have they to complain against the raiders? So long as I am at the head of Government there will be no room for such people in India. Everyone should denounce such traitors to the country.

1. Speech at Jammu, 15 February 1948. From *National Herald*, 17 February 1948.

2. Pakistan sought to broaden the scope of the debate on Kashmir at the U.N. by accusing India of 'unlawful' occupation of Junagadh, 'genocide' of Muslims and failure to implement several agreements between the two countries.

If there is even a single person who feels happy at Babu's death, I do not consider him an Indian. We shall give them no quarter, not an inch of ground, be it R.S.S. or any other organisation. Either they shall be exterminated or they shall wipe us out. There is no place for such persons to exist side by side with us in India.

I urge you all not to run away in panic but to stick to your places and fight the enemy alongside our troops. The Indian Army is here to protect you, but bravery and patriotism demand that the sons of the soil do not run away from the danger.

36. Commitment to Save Kashmir¹

We have not come here to rule; we have been called in here by the people, the leaders of the National Conference and the Maharaja to save this beautiful country and the people from the invaders; the enemy has been spreading the false propaganda that we have come here to forcibly rule over Kashmir. The truth is that we are here in Kashmir at the request of the people of Kashmir to help them against the enemy. We do not want to leave the people of Kashmir at the mercy of their enemies or at the mercies of the raiders.

Ever since the invasion began there have been many abductions, killings and looting before our troops marched into the State. I request you all as citizens of India to appreciate the straightforward, honest and open stand taken by the Government of India right from the very beginning.

Many big questions face India, and Kashmir is one of them. If India had not helped Kashmir, Kashmir would have been devastated. India stands committed to save Kashmir and the pledge will be fulfilled.

It is unfortunate that we no longer have Gandhiji amidst us to guide us in our actions. The nation has learnt many good things from him. I had discussions with Mahatma Gandhi frequently on Kashmir. Every step that we took in relation to Kashmir was in consultation with him and with his approval. I feel whatever we did and are doing is based on duty.

You have raised the status of India. You have done your duty bravely. I congratulate you for what you have achieved in Naushahra under Brigadier Usman. You have raised our prestige and that of the Indian Army. The world's eyes are on us. I am certain that we are proceeding on the right path. We shall be successful.

1. Address to Indian troops at Jammu, 15 February 1948. From *National Herald*, 16 February 1948.

37. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
16 February 1948

Nan dear,

We have passed through a strange fortnight and though India is much the same it was, yet it has changed and is changing. The tempo of events is faster is and I do not quite know how the future will take shape. Meanwhile, I am oppressed by the multitude of our problems and overwhelmed by the faith and confidence of large numbers of people in my ability to handle these problems. Every day I think unconsciously of running up to Bapu to consult him and then I remember that we have to stand alone now.

Tara said that she would send you a telegram about her going to Moscow. I have suggested to her not to go before the beginning of April. I hope you approve of this.

Gopalaswami and Abdullah returned today from New York, thoroughly fed up with the Security Council and of its works. I must say that, prepared as I was for untoward happenings, I could not imagine that the Security Council could possibly behave in the trivial and partisan manner in which it functioned. These people are supposed to keep the world in order. It is not surprising that the world is going to pieces.

The U.S.A. and the U.K. have played a dirty role,² the U.K. probably being the chief actor behind the scenes. I have expressed myself strongly to Attlee about it and I propose to make it perfectly clear to the U.K. Government what we think about it. The time for soft and meaningless talk has passed. I think that the U.K. and the U.S.A. will rather regret the attitude they have taken up. Of course we shall suffer in many ways and indeed we have had a hint already of what might happen. We are having difficulties in getting arms or petrol. Our choice of Czechoslovakia for the Security Council's Commission for India must have given the Anglo-American group a bit of a shock. Yet we had no other choice left. During the next few days we shall have to decide finally about our attitude in the Security Council in future.

With love from

Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.
2. During the Kashmir debate in the Security Council the British and American delegates had turned India's specific complaint to a larger question of Indo-Pakistan relations and insisted on India's withdrawing her troops, Sheikh Abdullah's government being replaced by a neutral administration and a plebiscite being conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The U.S. delegate disagreed with the Indian stand that outsiders (Pakistan) should be directed to withdraw support to the raiders. He insisted that India should first agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir.

38. To V. K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi

16 February 1948

My dear Krishna,

I write to you after a long while, made much longer by the events that have happened. I have been trying hard to find my bearings and I have not wholly succeeded. The problems that confront us are difficult enough. But what overwhelms me more than anything else is the faith and trust of many people in me. Apart from this, everybody seems to be so anxious about my personal safety that life is becoming quite fantastic. The security measures to protect some of us make me feel more of a prisoner than I have ever felt even in prison.

Aruna² has been here and she has been telling me about you and your worries. Do not attach much importance to what Bhandari or anyone else might say or do. This has no significance. Once some time ago Bhandari wrote to me. I sent him a rather stiff reply.³ Since then there has been no further correspondence.

The Security Council business has depressed and distressed me greatly.⁴ I could never have imagined that this Council could possibly behave so irresponsibly as it has done. I have felt very angry with the U.S.A. and the U.K. Most of the others do not count. Gopalswami and Abdullah arrived here today. They are of opinion that Noel-Baker has been the villain of the piece in spite of his pious professions. In private conversations with Abdullah and others he revealed himself even more than his public addresses.

As you know I addressed Mountbatten⁵ and Attlee⁶ on this subject and told them that this attitude of the U.K. Government was producing a powerful reaction in India which would no doubt affect our entire foreign policy and relations with England. Mountbatten also wrote something to this effect to Attlee.

We have now to decide our future line of action in the Security Council. I rather doubt if Gopalswami or Abdullah will go back there, though perhaps Gopalswami might agree to return. He has had a gruelling time.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Aruna Asaf Ali.

3. For Nehru's reply to P.C. Bhandari see *post*, section 12, sub-section III, p. 538.

4. The Security Council ignored India's specific complaint on the Kashmir issue, and virtually accepted Pakistan's general charges against India by replacing the 'Kashmir question' on the agenda by the 'Indo-Pakistan question'.

5. See *ante*, item 29.

6. See *ante*, item 30.

I think it is about time that we made it perfectly plain to the U.K. Government and their principal representatives what we really think of their general attitude and behaviour in regard to Kashmir. I have little doubt that, apart from their general policy to help Pakistan, two of the principal sources of trouble for India in Pakistan have been Mudie and Cunningham. Mudie is a poisonous reptile and Cunningham is a dangerous person who probably knows more about the Frontier and its tribes than anyone else. I cannot conceive that anything on a big scale can happen in the Frontier tribal areas without Cunningham's support. Indeed, we have some information that the political officers there have actively encouraged this business of sending tribal folks to Kashmir.

I think that the U.S.A. and the U.K. have rather overreached themselves in this business and they will be sorry for it later, if they are not sorry already. After five weeks of argument they have not even considered our original reference and they have taken up an attitude in favour of Pakistan which goes far beyond what the Pakistan people themselves said to us previously. I am very worried over this affair. Mountbatten is put out also and, as usual with him, imagines that a heart-to-heart talk with Liaquat Ali Khan will go a long way to bring about some settlement. Whatever chances there may have been of this happening, there are none at all now after the support given to Pakistan by the Security Council.⁷

There is so much more that I would like to write about. But I must desist. I have heavy work ahead.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

We have already had a foretaste of the kind of pressure the U.S.A. and the U.K. might exercise over us. The U.S.A. have practically refused to sell arms to us. The petrol position is also critical and our quotas from abroad are being reduced.

7. Ignoring the Indian demand that cessation of hostilities should precede a plebiscite in Kashmir, Britain and the U.S.A. supported Pakistan's stand that the discussion on the plebiscite issue and its subsequent implementation should receive priority from the U.N. Commission.

39. To V. K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
20 February 1948

My dear Krishna,

This letter is being taken by H.M. Patel who is going with General Bucher and Chanda² to London. The main purpose of their visit is to enquire about military equipment, specially arms, and make arrangements for their purchase; also to find out, if possible, how far we can increase our petrol quota. Rather suddenly and without any adequate reason this quota has been very seriously reduced. We are inclined to think that this is due to political reasons, that is a desire to bring pressure upon us. There is no doubt that if our petrol quota is substantially reduced, we shall be gravely embarrassed. To some extent this might even affect our military operations. So it is very necessary to get it increased. Of course, we do not propose to change any important policy of ours because of such pressure.

2. We are also anxious to explore possibilities of adding to our petrol production in India. There has been some talk of this for some time with oil companies, American I think, but thus far they have not accepted our conditions which meant some kind of governmental control. Unfortunately this search for petrol requires very specialized knowledge and great resources. Probably only a few major concerns can take it up. Apart from the Russian oil concerns, the rest are tied up in big combines. The Russians are beyond our reach and we are thus forced to submit to the terms of these major combines. There seems to be no way out. Naturally we shall try to get the best terms possible. I am not sure that H.M. Patel and company will be able to do anything in regard to this matter. You will advise them.

3. As a long-term policy, we are trying to push ahead with the production of power alcohol and liquid fuel from coal.

4. Bucher was not originally going with this party. But Mountbatten thought that he should go, and we have agreed. Mountbatten was of the opinion that he might be helpful indirectly in explaining the Kashmir situation to some people there, specially General Scoones³ and others who accompanied Noel-Baker to Lake Success. Bucher or others are not supposed to talk on a political level with Noel-Baker or anyone else. We have made that clear to them and told them that such talks should take place through

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Asok Kumar Chanda (1902-1972); joined I.A.A.S. 1926; Deputy High Commissioner in the U.K., 1948-49; Financial Commissioner for Railways, 1949-52; Secretary, Ministry of Production, 1952-54; Comptroller and Auditor-General, 1954-60.

3. Sir Geoffrey Allen Percival Scoones (1893-1975); General in the British Army; Principal Staff Officer, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1947-53.

the High Commissioner. But they have been generally informed of the present position and our stand. Bucher has done good work here and I rather like him. Over the Kashmir issue he feels strongly that Pakistan has misbehaved and is generally responsible for much that has happened. It might serve some little purpose if his independent view was placed forcibly before Noel-Baker, Scoones and others. Of course, this must be done rather informally. It is not his business or H.M. Patel's to discuss the purely political aspects of the question.

5. A telegram has been sent to you today informing you of our present position in regard to Kashmir. It is not basically different from that taken up by Gopalaswami Ayyangar before the Security Council. There are one or two minor variations to which we may agree if they are suggested by others.

6. Two other points might subsequently arise. One is the possibility of Kashmir being considered more or less independent and guaranteed as such by India, Pakistan and possibly the U.N. The other is the possibility of some kind of partition either by previous agreement or as a result of the vote. I do not fancy either of these; but I do not wish to rule them out altogether. We are not going to put either of these forward unless circumstances more or less compel us.

7. The British attitude, to begin with, that is six months ago, was definitely in favour of Kashmir going to Pakistan. Subsequently they have talked of partition, meaning thereby that Jammu should come to India and Kashmir Valley and the rest should go to Pakistan. This is totally unacceptable to us. The real bone of contention is the Kashmir Valley. Even Mountbatten has at various times hinted at partition. Recent suggestions referred to the Poonch-Mirpur area being added to Pakistan while Kashmir Valley, Jammu, etc., might remain with India.

8. As I have said above, I dislike all this and we do not propose to say anything about it. If, however, such suggestions are put forward by others, we might consider them at a later stage.

9. Gordon-Walker, the Under-Secretary, saw me this evening. We talked about Kashmir and, as is usual with such people, he was very friendly and understanding. It is impossible for me to make out how far this outward agreement leads to. We have had rather bitter experience. Almost every ambassador here has been assuring us of his understanding and sympathy for our position in Kashmir; and yet his Government goes against us in the Security Council.

10. Gordon-Walker admitted that there could be no question of our withdrawing our troops; further that he did not say much about any change in the Government. I pointed out to him that if necessary Sheikh Abdullah might agree to take in one or two members of the Muslim Conference in Kashmir. That was the farthest we could go. Then Gordon-Walker rather

vaguely asked me if voting could not take place in such a way as to facilitate, if necessary later, a possible division. He emphasised that he was not suggesting a partition but merely wanted to think in terms of possible contingencies. Of course, any voting by constituencies or zones can be used for this purpose.

11. If voting did take place in this way, it might result in a Pakistan majority in the Poonch-Mirpur area and Gilgit. Most probably the Kashmir Valley, the rest of Jhelum Province and Ladakh etc. would vote for India. If the worst comes to the worst, I am prepared to accept Poonch and Gilgit area being partitioned off, though this would mean a serious blow to the State and would make Srinagar's position insecure.

12. I am mentioning all this to you in confidence so as to keep you in touch with the working of our minds. But we are not going to put all this forward in any way before the Security Council. We shall adhere there to our previous position with, possibly later, the two variations that have been pointed out to you.

13. It is evident that the U.K. Government are rather apprehensive of developments. Gordon-Walker has been talking to Senanayake of Ceylon⁴ asking him if, in case of necessity, he could accommodate British evacuees from India. Walker mentioned this apologetically to me adding that he did not think that there was any chance of such necessity arising. I told him that we could have no objection to their removing Britishers if and when they wanted to do so; if necessary we would help them in the process; but I did not think there was any chance of this being necessary.

14. On the whole the possibility of a formal conflict between India and Pakistan has receded into the background. This has been one of the results of our reference to the U.N. The announcement that a Commission might come over to inquire led Pakistan immediately to break up some of their large concentrations near the Kashmir border and spread out these people in other parts of the Province of West Punjab. Reports also indicate that the general war atmosphere of Lahore and West Punjab has toned down considerably. I do not think, therefore, that there is much chance of war. We seem to have passed that crisis.

15. The military situation is, on the whole, favourable to us and appears to be steadily but slowly improving. It is quite possible that we may make some advances in the Jammu region within the next few days. The Banihal Pass will be open to traffic in another two weeks and this will enable us to send more troops to the Kashmir Valley. All this does not mean that we can push out raiders from the entire State territory. Poonch will be a hard nut to crack. It does mean that we shall be, on the whole, aggressive and will slowly advance.

4. Gordon-Walker had gone to Sri Lanka for the celebrations on Independence Day. For Gordon-Walker's account of the conversation, see *Post*, item 41.

16. A message was brought to me today from Attlee suggesting again that I might meet Liaquat Ali and try to come to a settlement. I do not know what Attlee means by going on repeating this. I suppose his main object is to get the U.K. out of the difficulty they are in. Gordon-Walker also pressed this. I told him that we are always willing to meet Liaquat Ali and in fact we have met him many times. But in the present context there was not the least possibility of his agreeing to anything worthwhile. The Security Council proceedings will not encourage him to come to terms with us. As a matter of fact we invited Liaquat Ali to a Joint Defence Council meeting next week. He has stated in reply that he cannot come here till the middle of March because of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. So that is that.

17. Gordon-Walker said that, according to his information, Pakistan must be very worried about the tribal people in West Punjab, and this might induce them to come to terms with us. I have no doubt that Pakistan is worried. But the rest does not follow. Indeed, any attempt to settle the Kashmir issue with us might well lead to large numbers of additional Pathans swooping down on West Punjab.

18. I suppose you will see Noel-Baker. He is your old Professor and friend. I think he has behaved very badly in the Security Council and he ought to be made to realise how we feel about it all. It appears that most of his advisers were of the wrong sort. It is evident that the U.K. delegation were pulling the strings at Lake Success. Some of the propositions made by the U.K. and the U.S.A. were monstrous.⁵

19. We are approaching the U.S.A. Ambassador here as well as other ambassadors on the lines indicated in our telegram to you. We hope that these diplomatic approaches as well as the realization on the part of the U.K. and the U.S.A. that we are not going to give up our position will make a difference. Legally and morally we are on strong grounds and I see no reason whatever why we should surrender either to the gangster tactics of Pakistan and the raiders or to the attempts at bullying by the U.K. and the U.S.A. Naturally we do not want to have to reject the final advice of the Security Council. But if this goes too far, then we have no alternative but to reject it and face the consequences.

20. Gopaldaswami will probably return about the end of this month or early in March. We would like him to pass through London and to see Attlee and others. Sheikh Abdullah will not go back. He is required in Kashmir. Probably within the next few days he will be made Prime Minister and will form his Ministry there.

5. The U.S. had proposed that an "independent" interim government be set up in Kashmir to ensure a fair plebiscite while Noel-Baker's remarks indicated that Britain doubted the truth of India's claims and preferred to believe Pakistan.

21. I have received your telegram about Katial⁶ taking Gandhiji's ashes. On enquiry made from Devadas Gandhi I found that he had given him a very small quantity for him to keep personally. He had expressly told him that there should be no public ceremony; if any public ceremony was intended, obviously it was for the High Commissioner to do it. Personally I do not think it is necessary to have any ceremony in London. I have the strongest objection to the ashes being thrown into the Thames.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

6. C.L. Katial.

40. To C. M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
20th February 1948

My dear Trivedi,

Your letter of the 15th February about the proceedings in the Security Council of the U.N.

Our reference to the U.N. was confined to the Kashmir issue. Nevertheless, we took care to prepare a brief on other matters and sent as full particulars as we could with our delegation. These particulars included a record of happenings in East and West Punjab. No doubt this record could be added to. I rather doubt, however, if any kind of full discussion on the subject can take place in the Security Council. Probably we shall know in the course of the next few days how things shape themselves there. If the Security Council wants to go into these matters the only possible method is to send a Commission to enquire on the spot. We have told them that we are prepared for any kind of enquiry provided it is not a limited one.

We wish to avoid doing anything which might put the Kashmir issue in the background. Our present instructions to our representative Vellodi are to answer briefly and not to enter into too much argument over these issues. Setalvad has already given a fairly full reply to Zafrullah.

I do not think it is desirable at this stage, at any rate, to think of sending some special representative of East Punjab to deal with the charges made by Zafrullah. If necessity arises, we shall consult you and your Government.

1. J.N. Collection.

It is desirable, however, for your Government to prepare as full a brief as possible as this might be required later on. Care must be taken that such a brief contains facts and more or less verified facts and not just vague hearsay. I think it will also be worthwhile for some East Punjab representatives to come to Delhi sometime before the end of this month to have a talk on these issues and to confer with Gopalaswami Ayyangar also. He is not going to return to America before the beginning of March.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

41. P.C. Gordon-Walker's Report of Talk with Nehru¹

I had over an hour with Nehru.

First I mentioned the matter of evacuation to Ceylon. I said that when the tension had been high over Kashmir, we had had to give thought to the question of our nationals in India. The responsibility for them was of course India's but I wondered if he would be prepared for us to help with aircraft if it became necessary. Nehru said that of course they would be glad to be of any help. He did not think that any large numbers of British could be involved—a few hundred at the most. Nearly all the British were in towns where they would be safe. I said that we did not anticipate any emergency and it had been extremely gratifying that there had been no anti-British actions since the transfer of power. The only reason I was mentioning the matter was that Ceylon was the only place to which we would fly people if they had to leave India and I had discussed the matter with Senanayake. I did not want Nehru to think we were doing anything behind his back. He said he thought it would be quite easy, if any area became dangerous, to fly people to safe places like Bombay, Calcutta or Madras. I left the matter there as I did not want to go into any details and had told him the essential points. He clearly did not think the matter of great importance or likely to arise. But if anything reached his ear from Ceylon he won't be surprised.

I then raised the P.M. Attlee's telegram to him suggesting a meeting with Liaquat. I emphasised that I had no instructions or brief, that I had been for 3 weeks in Ceylon and had only that afternoon read the various telegrams and documents.

1. New Delhi, 20 February 1948. L/P&S/13/1886, I.O.L.R., London.

He said he was of course always ready to talk but it was not worthwhile. He had spent hours in talk and had several times neared a solution, but it had always broken down. "Would you", I asked, "none the less be willing to talk once more if Liaquat is willing?" "Yes", he said, "I am always ready to talk." There could be a meeting of the Joint Defence Council which was due to meet at Delhi—but Liaquat had, only a few days before, refused to come. "That", I said, "was before the P.M.'s telegram."

There was, I thought, a special reason to meet now as the main U.N.O. debate was in abeyance. And perhaps Pakistan would be ready to talk as, from what I had heard, the tribesmen were becoming a serious trouble to them. I had no idea what their attitude would be: but they might be prevailed upon to talk.

"May be", said Nehru—but he clearly didn't expect any result from talks.

I then said that I realized he was very angry with H.M.G. and with U.S.A. for what he regarded as a wrong and hostile policy. I said I did not know the motives of other Governments, but he must know Attlee and Noel-Baker well enough to realise that our policy could not spring from power-political motives. We might have done things that had annoyed him, but our motives were only to restore peace. In this, friendship with India was one of our guiding principles. "Perhaps", he said, "your motives are clear, and I know Attlee and Noel-Baker are honourable men; but you have treated us on an equality with tribesmen."

He then spoke at considerable length about the history of Kashmir. India had not intended to send in troops up to twenty-four hours before; they had expected it to be a minor operation; it had grown step by step. He narrated graphically on the abduction of women, etc. They had accepted Kashmir's accession only at the last moment in order to save it from massacre. The only two conditions they had imposed were that there should be a democratic interim administration and an ultimate plebiscite. I put in that the present administration could hardly be called democratic in origin. That was true, he said; there had been no time to hold elections. They had acted "on the Mysore model."² It was only an interim administration.

If India had not sent troops there would have been total massacre in Kashmir and the tribesmen would have to be met in the Punjab and elsewhere. The Muslim League was recruiting volunteers in Pakistan with the slogan "Kashmir-Delhi."

Emphasizing again that I was speaking without instructions, I said

2. In Mysore, by an agreement between the Dewan and the Mysore Congress on 12 October 1947, an Interim Coalition Ministry was set up with power to convene a constituent assembly of elected members to frame the constitution. Such a constituent assembly would act as an interim legislature till the new constitution came into force.

that the real difficulty seemed to me that once the tribesmen had withdrawn, the plebiscite would be held with Indian troops in the country. It was therefore necessary to see that the plebiscite was absolutely and beyond question fair. Would India regard it was an acceptable settlement if the Security Council called on Pakistan to do all in its power to get the invaders to withdraw and simultaneously announced arrangements for a plebiscite? That would be altogether acceptable, he said. The interim administration must remain but it would appoint as commissioner in charge of the plebiscite anyone nominated by the Security Council. This commissioner would have full power to issue orders about plebiscite and to supervise it in any way. The press could fully report the proceedings. He was sure that considerable numbers of Indian troops could be quickly withdrawn once the invaders left and those that remained would not be at large in the country but would be concentrated at a few points. All this could be observed by the Security Council Commission.

I said that I thought it was important that all this should be publicly declared as some of the things Sheikh Abdullah had said to Noel-Baker and some of the speeches he had made must have frightened people about the probable conditions of the plebiscite. Sheikh Abdullah, I said, must be a dramatic and passionate man and he had perhaps said things he had not altogether meant ; but these things had none the less been said. He laughed and then started on a eulogy of the Sheikh. I then asked how the plebiscite could be organized. Would the whole of Kashmir vote together or in its four or five natural regions? The settlement of this point might make a lot of difference and might lead to a lot of discussion as one solution would exclude partition and the other would allow it to arise out of the plebiscite if the people so willed. He said they did not want any more partitions ; there were demands for making up existing provinces into new linguistic units which the Government was resisting (I said I thought most wisely). If Kashmir were partitioned it would strengthen these demands. But when I pressed him he said it might be possible to allow different districts to go to different Dominions. We went and looked at a map and he said he thought Gilgit and Poonch might vote mainly for Pakistan, the rest of Kashmir for India. Clearly Nehru did not like the idea of partition, but he did not exclude it if it arose out of a plebiscite. He said it was impossible in the long run to compel an area to come in if it really did not want to.

I then said I wondered whether it would be possible, if there were talks with Liaquat, to raise the broader question of the common Indian-Pakistan interest in the frontier. This might help to bring the Kashmir dispute itself, bitter as it was, into clearer perspective. Nehru said he would certainly be willing to discuss this. Thakin Nu had recently proposed a union of India and Burma and he was sure similar arrangements must be made with Pakistan.

At this point Nehru fetched in Sheikh Abdullah and said he would leave us to talk together. Before he left, he asked what answer shall I send Mr. Attlee ? "Why not tell him what you told me, that you don't expect much from the talks but are prepared to talk ?" He left me with the impression that this was what he would say. He would let Mountbatten see his answer and he could show it to me.

42. Cable to C. R. Attlee¹

Many thanks for your message which your High Commissioner delivered to me on February 20th.² We all appreciate your interest in friendly settlement of the Kashmir issue. As you are aware we have made every effort in the past to find a solution by direct negotiation with Prime Minister Pakistan and are quite ready to renew effort if there are reasonable prospects of successful outcome. Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Gordon-Walker was in Delhi for a few hours and we have explained our point of view to him. He is flying to Karachi today and will endeavour to ascertain reaction of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to idea of renewal of direct negotiations with us. When he returns to Delhi in a few days we shall know result of his talks. All that I can assure you of at this stage is that my colleagues and I will welcome every opportunity of settling this matter by direct talks.

1. New Delhi, 21 February 1948. M.E.A. files.
2. In identical messages to Nehru and Liaquat Ali on 20 February 1948, Attlee had pointed out that an "out of court" settlement on Kashmir might receive more satisfactory response and suggested a meeting between India and Pakistan before decisions were arrived at the U.N.

43. Minutes of Meeting Convened by Lord Mountbatten¹

Nehru drew attention to the difference in the approach to the Kashmir

1. New Delhi, 25 February 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present were Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Gordon-Walker.

problem, of India and Pakistan. The Pakistan case was based on the assumption that all Muslims automatically wanted to join Pakistan. This, unlike India's, was a purely communal approach, and, in his opinion, wrong—both fundamentally in the conception of the two Dominions and particularly, so far as Kashmir was concerned. After all, there were four million Muslims in India. He believed that Pakistan's approach had, unfortunately, seized and held the mind of the Security Council. Perhaps the Indian case in this regard had not been sufficiently strongly put. In his opinion, the whole problem could only be solved on a non-communal basis—even though account had of course to be taken of the communal aspect. There was no other way of solving it. The Government of India were at present laying the greatest stress on erasing communalism. Perhaps this policy would have some effect on the purely communal policy of Pakistan. He reiterated that he had no doubt in his mind that India's approach was the more correct, and that he much hoped that this position would be appreciated by the Security Council.

Nehru went on to say that he and his Government would hate to do anything which would shake up the U.N.O. structure or be construed as not carrying out a direction given by U.N.O. Such a conception was particularly painful after Mahatma Gandhi's death. So he and his Government were keen to find some way out in accordance with the wishes of the Security Council. On the other hand, a Government like the present one had to function under certain limitations. There were certain things which it could hardly do without imperilling the situation both for itself and indeed generally throughout India. Clear pledges had been given to the people of Kashmir. It would be a grave betrayal to walk out and leave them to the mercy of those whom they considered to be their enemies. So, if the decision of the Security Council went completely against what the Government of India had pledged themselves to do, peace would not be secured. He personally, in such circumstances, would not be able to continue in the Government.

Nehru said that it had been an act of faith by the Government of India, at a time when the situation was rapidly deteriorating, to make their reference to the Security Council in the first place. If this faith was now proved to be misplaced, the consequences would have to be borne by those who had made the reference.

Patel said that Nehru in particular had great faith in the institution of U.N.O. But the Security Council had been meddling in power politics to such an extent that very little of this faith was left. He pointed out that it had been the Governor-General who had induced the Government to make the reference to U.N.O. in the first place.

With this the Governor-General agreed. He said that he hoped very sincerely that his Government would not be made to suffer on account of their act of faith.

Nehru then said that he and his Government could not and did not want to hold Kashmir against the will of the inhabitants of that State. This was despite the fact that he had no doubt that the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan would mean the ruin of Kashmir.

Nehru then referred to the question of retention of Indian troops in Kashmir prior to the plebiscite. He pointed out that, if these troops were withdrawn, propaganda would be made to the effect that they had been pushed out, and were unable to help the inhabitants. The same objections applied to the supercession of the present administration. He supposed that there was perhaps a fear that the Indian troops might misbehave during the period preceding the plebiscite. It was difficult to give a guarantee that they would not—but they had an excellent record up to date. They had to remain because of the inherent danger of another invasion from outside. But it would be possible to guarantee that anything improper which was done by them would be known. He would have no objection whatsoever to U.N.O. observers being attached to them. He would certainly agree to a U.N.O. liaison officer being posted to each unit of the Indian Army in Kashmir.

Gordon-Walker asked how it was envisaged that Indian troops would ensure the maintenance of law and order in Poonch. To this Nehru was unable to give a ready answer. Gordon-Walker pointed out that Pakistan would also argue that the very fact that Indian troops were in Kashmir was bound to act as some sort of pressure. Nehru said that Liaquat Ali Khan had in fact accepted that Indian troops should remain there, concentrated at strategic points. Gordon-Walker said that he was sure that Liaquat Ali Khan would not say the same thing now. Nehru said that he believed that Pakistan would nevertheless prefer the retention of Indian troops to re-constitution of and occupation by the State army.

Gopaldaswami Ayyangar pointed out that the responsibility for internal security lay in the hands of the State Government. But it was nevertheless essential that army units should be available to go to the aid of the civil power if required—and it was essential that these army units should be from the Indian Army.

Nehru finally said that he would agree to handing over to the State's police in large areas. He would also certainly agree to a formula whereby the army would not exercise normal peace functions.

44. Minutes of Meeting Convened by Lord Mountbatten¹

It was pointed out that Indian troops must restore law and order in Poonch before an impartial plebiscite could be held. Patel agreed to withdraw them once order was restored.

Nehru said that he considered that the formula to which he had agreed the previous day, concerning the non-interference by the army in the affairs of the civil police, might be made to apply to Poonch—subject, of course, to the proviso that, if a grave emergency arose, the army would have to go in. He said that Sheikh Abdullah had told Noel-Baker in New York that it was his object to try to win over the people of Poonch to his point of view. The word “suppress”, in the course of this conversation, was only used by Sheikh Abdullah in a reference to what might happen if some people in Poonch continued with their revolt even after such efforts had been made.

Gopalaswami Ayyangar emphasised that the Kashmir State must administer Poonch prior to the plebiscite to enable non-Muslims to return without fear. Mountbatten suggested that U.N. observers be sent to Poonch with the Indian Army and a measure of autonomy be given to the area.

Nehru replied that he considered that this would be very difficult. He agreed that police for the Poonch area might be raised from the local inhabitants of that area; but it would be difficult to appoint ex-rebels. It was not a question of appointing Muslims or Hindus. The point was who the Muslim officers appointed were going to be. He agreed that another way of solving the dilemma might be by the proclamation of certain guarantees.

Mountbatten said that, if the plebiscite was run constituency-wise as Nehru confirmed, Jammu may vote for Pakistan and Kashmir for India. In that case, insistence on the integrity of the State might cause another large scale evacuation. He suggested that a vote for independence should be included in the plebiscite.

Gopalaswami Ayyangar said that if three choices were given in the plebiscite, first accession to India must be voted for and next should be the choice between independence and Pakistan. It was also suggested that general elections be held to produce an assembly and then a referendum may be held.

1. New Delhi, 26 February 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present were Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Gordon-Walker. Nehru's remarks have been given in full while the relevant remarks made by others have been summarized.

Nehru pointed out that the Indian proposals had already included the holding of a general election before the plebiscite; the Assembly thus chosen would form an interim government, which would organise the plebiscite itself. He confirmed that all the offers which had been made, that U.N.O. observers should come to the plebiscite, applied equally to an election.

Mountbatten felt that if the U.N. considered the State administration to be partisan, it would not consider a plebiscite fair. Gopalaswami Ayyangar pointed out the separate nature of the State administration and the plebiscite administration, which would have U.N.-nominated officers.

Nehru said that any question of widening the administration would have to be by the introduction of persons chosen by Sheikh Abdullah. People who represented the opposite viewpoint, but who would not set about sabotaging the Government, would have to be chosen. He was not prepared to call the administration, which would result from such a broadening, a "coalition ministry", nor to discuss with Pakistan the number and details of the personnel who would be introduced. The object would have to be to produce a team which would work together and represent large sections of the Kashmir population.

Gopalaswami Ayyangar indicated that Sheikh Abdullah would consider the possibility of including a member of the Muslim Conference in his cabinet.

Mountbatten referred to the difficulties experienced in the Indian Interim Government before the transfer of power.

Nehru pointed out that conditions in Kashmir at the present time would make the analogous difficulties in a coalition government very much worse. Furthermore, there would be no one like the Viceroy to compose the differences between the two parties in the government.

Gopalaswami Ayyangar said that the plebiscite should be taken as a political rather than an administrative issue, with each party presenting its case before the electorate.

Nehru made the point that the last election which had been held in Kashmir was completely bogus.² The Maharaja himself had indeed admitted to this. If the tribesmen's raid on Kashmir had not taken place, there would have been a further election and much progress towards responsible government by now.

2. In January 1947, elections were held in Kashmir but the National Conference boycotted them in view of the repression. Only 182, 800 voters out of 707, 419 had exercised their franchise and the rival organization, the Muslim Conference, won 16 out of 21 Muslim seats.

45. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
26 February 1948

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th February about the composition of India's delegation to U.N.O. I have been giving a good deal of thought to this matter and have consulted Sardar Patel and some other colleagues.

I quite agree with you that for some reason or other the presentation of India's case to the world had been unsatisfactory and this has led many people to think that we were in the wrong in Kashmir. I think this was largely due to inadequate publicity and perhaps a lack of the personal touch. Personally I think that the actual presentation of India's case in the Security Council was good. But somehow this was not put across the world. Also that the members of the Security Council were sometimes rubbed up the wrong way.

All these things count of course, but probably the real reason is a deeper one. Members of the Security Council started with some assumptions which led them along a wrong path. However, obviously we must try to do our best at the next session. There will be no difficulty in sending B.L. Sharma and Major General-Chaudhuri.² I have not asked the Defence Minister about Chaudhuri, but I suppose he will have no objection.

About C.P. Ramaswami Iyer there should be no doubt about his ability and personality. The fact that he is very unpopular in India at present and his choice would be severely criticised need not have come in our way, although it could not be wholly ignored. Possibly he might have been appointed right at the beginning. At this stage it will be a little difficult for him to get all the background information which is fairly important. He would no doubt deal with the legal issue with ability and force. The other issues are very mixed and he has been out of touch with them completely. Still he might have been coached up in them. The real difficulty is that he is a very forceful personality and cannot function as number two anywhere. He would not be able to get on at all with Gopalaswami Ayyangar and if we choose him we should have to drop Gopalaswami. If the two went together, which is highly unlikely, they would not be able to pull as a team and all manner of complications might ensue. I rather doubt if he would easily fall in with the policy we lay down. He is in America at present and we cannot even discuss the matter fully with him. If our choosing him means the dropping out of Gopalaswami, this would create a bad impression both in the Security Council and in India generally.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. J.N. Chaudhuri.

In a somewhat lesser measure, these considerations apply to Ramaswami Mudaliar. He is at present serving in some commission on our behalf. We shall have to pull him out from there and push him into this business. I fear that Gopalaswami is not likely to agree to lead the delegation if either Ramaswami Iyer or Mudaliar is included in it. For these reasons I feel that the balance of advantage is not in favour of our nominating either C.P. Ramaswami Iyer or Ramaswami Mudaliar.

I am however anxious to strengthen our delegation in every way. Two names have struck me, both good for the purpose. There is Girija Shankar Bajpai who would undoubtedly be of great help at Lake Success. He knows the American scene intimately and is personally acquainted with various people both at Lake Success and in the State Department. He understands our case thoroughly and is well qualified to deal with it, both formally and informally. Normally I would dislike very much his going away as he has been a tower of strength to me here and there is no one at all who might take his place in External Affairs. He has not even got a number two about him and our work here will undoubtedly suffer if he goes. Nevertheless, I attach so much importance to the work at Lake Success that I should be prepared to ask him to go there.

Another name which might be considered suitable is that of K.M. Panikkar. He also knows America and the people there and is both able and skilful in dealing with people. I suppose he would be able to go if pressed to do so.

I suggest therefore that we might add Bajpai and Panikkar, both or one of them, to the delegation. Sharma and Chaudhuri can also be attached to the delegation.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

46. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
February 28, 1948

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th February about the delegation for the Security Council.

We have decided to send Bajpai with the delegation. B.L. Sharma has also been instructed to go and he is being asked to see Campbell-Johnson.

About Major-General Chaudhuri, the Defence Minister tells me that

he cannot spare him from his Ministry at this particular juncture. The Commander-in-Chief is away and so is the Defence Secretary, both in London. The situation in Kashmir requires constant attention and the change in the weather is likely to lead to considerable activity on both sides. If Chaudhuri went away now there would be a serious gap in the Defence Ministry. I might inform you that we did send a Military Adviser with our Delegation on the last occasion. He is Colonel Kaul. He is a very able and bright young man who served as our Military Attache in Washington. He is still there but we are thinking of bringing him back and I believe it is proposed to send Major-General Chaudhuri's brother² who is a Colonel in the Army to replace him. Perhaps it might be possible to expedite his departure so that he could serve with the delegation.

Panikkar is somewhat out of reach now as he is in Bikaner and it is not by any means clear whether he will be able to go at short notice. There is no doubt that he is a very good man for the job. But there is a feeling that overloading our delegation might not produce good results. It might indeed produce other reactions. At present Vellodi is there. Setalvad will also be going. Bajpai's addition is I think from every point of view of value to us not only in the actual work at Lake Success but also in meeting people outside the Conference Room and in keeping in touch with the State Department which he knows well. I am inclined to think, therefore, that for the present we need not make special efforts to get Panikkar. The delegation will thus consist of : Gopalaswami Ayyangar, M.C. Setalvad, G.S. Bajpai, M.K. Vellodi, a military adviser, and a Public Relations Officer (B.L. Sharma). There is another very intelligent and bright young man named Haksar³ whom we sent with the delegation and is still there. There is a possibility of H.M. Patel⁴ and Chanda going from England to America very soon in connection with their own mission.

You may have noticed that Zafrullah Khan and Mohammad Ali are going to London.

We are also thinking of sending a representative of the States Ministry (probably Buch⁵, the Regional Commissioner in Kathiawar) to Lake Success.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Brigadier Dilip Chaudhuri.

3. P.N. Haksar.

4. (b. 1904); joined I.C.S. 1927; Secretary, Union Ministry of Defence, 1947, Food and Agriculture, 1953-54 and Economic Affairs, 1955; Principal Finance Secretary, 1957-59; Chairman, L.I.C., 1956-57; member, Gujarat Assembly, 1967-71; member Lok Sabha, 1971-80; president, Gujarat Unit of Swatantra Party, 1967-72; and All India Swatantra Party, 1971-72; Union Minister for Finance, 1977-79, and Home Affairs, January 1979-80.

5. M.N. Buch.

47. Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon¹

Many thanks for your telegram No. 4153 dated 28th. Since full text of message became available only today, I could not telegraph earlier.

2. I am highly satisfied with line that you have taken with British Ministers. Final appraisal of result must, as you say, await result of Zafrullah's visit to London.

3. Unless British Ministers themselves suggest interview with Zafrullah I would rather that you did not meet him. If you do meet him and Kashmir or other issues raised by Pakistan in Security Council are discussed, I would advise that you play role of listener and report to us what passes between you. He is a slippery customer and, since he will be returning to New York and, possibly, contacting Gopalaswami again, it is desirable that he should not be given opportunity of misrepresentation to Gopalaswami anything that you might tell him. He is quite capable of this.

1. New Delhi, 1 March 1948. M.E.A. files.

48. Foreign Nationals in Kashmir¹

V.C. Keshava Rao enquired whether nationals of any country other than of Pakistan were among the raiders and if the attention of the respective Governments had been drawn to this.

Jawaharlal Nehru : Members of certain tribes belonging to the Afghan side of the border have been identified among the raiders.

N.G. Ranga asked whether some American and British citizens joined forces with the raiders.

1. 3 March 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, 1948, pp. 1521-1522. Nehru's remarks are given in full while the rest of the relevant proceedings are summarized.

JN : One American, Mr. Haight,² I believe, was his name, did certainly take an active part, but then he was recalled by the American Government. I am not personally aware of any other Americans or British people who are taking part.

N.G. Ranga wished to know if the Government had seen press reports that a British citizen was taking part as a sort of 'mystery man'.

JN : Perhaps my honourable friend is referring to a certain person who is called mystery man. So far as I know that mystery man was more or less a junior Muslim officer in the Defence Department here for some time till the partition.

Maulana Hasrat Mohani asked whether the Government were aware that some of the raiders belonged to Chinese Turkestan or Sinkiang and that some foreign power was supplying war materials to them.

JN : No, Sir. The Government is not aware of this—in fact, it is positively unaware of it.

Maulana Hasrat Mohani desired to know the nationality of Sardar Ibrahim.³

JN : I must confess my ignorance about Sardar Ibrahim's ancestry and what he had done previously. I had never heard of this gentleman three or four months previously, and I do not think most other people had heard of him either. But I had a vague impression that he did belong to some territory round about the frontier in Kashmir. This is the first time I have heard of any suggestion that he comes from outside India.

Maulana Hasrat Mohani asked if it was a fact that Ibrahim was a Mongol and was called Mirza Ibrahim.

JN : I have not heard anything of this.

2. Russel K. Haight, an American soldier, had reportedly served the 'Azad' Kashmir government.
3. Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, as a young political activist in Kashmir, fled to Pakistan in August 1947 to escape arrest; at Murree he laid the foundation of a movement which later took the form of 'Azad' Kashmir Government; worked as co-leader of the 'Azad' Kashmir movement with Ghulam Abbas between 1948 and 1951.

H.V. Kamath asked if Nehru could assure the House that the statement made by Haight that the tribesmen were being supplied with Russian rifles was a fabrication.

JN : Any statement made by Brigadier—whatever his official designation is—Haight ought to be examined closely because he makes all manner of statements. But in regard to the question of a certain person having a rifle or not, obviously I cannot say what type of rifle a person has been using somewhere. But there is absolutely no ground for anyone to imagine that any kind of help or aid from the Soviet side of the border has come or can have come. So far as the Government of India are concerned, we are not worried about that in the least. In the course of the war, rifles have exchanged hands; there are plenty of rifles about of all makes; it is quite possible that some type of rifles may have been found there. But we have not captured any such rifles nor have we seen them.

Kamath enquired whether German and Russian ammunition were used by the raiders.

JN : I do not know anything about these questions; I do not know how to answer them.

49. The Facts of the Case¹

Sir, I crave your leave and the indulgence of the House to make a statement on Kashmir. I would beg the House to bear with me for a while, because there is a great deal to say, however briefly I might say it,—not that I am going to make any sensational disclosures, there is nothing very secret about what I am going to say and the facts have appeared in the public press and in other places frequently enough during the last few months. Nevertheless, it is right that I should place before the House some kind of a consecutive account of what has happened. In order to lessen my task and to help members of the House, we have prepared a White Paper on Kashmir which will be distributed to members. This White Paper does not bring

1. Statement in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 5 March 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. III, 1948, pp. 1648-1657.

matters right up to date. It is practically up to the period of the reference to the Security Council. It is not an absolutely complete paper in the sense that every telegram and every letter is included, but, on the whole, most of the messages that passed between us and the Government of Pakistan or connected messages have been given in this White Paper.

Now, before I speak on this particular Kashmir issue, I should like by your leave to say a few words on a wider issue of which the Kashmir issue is a part. We have been living through strenuous days; we have been passing through a period of dynamic history in India. Much has happened during the past six months, much that was good and much that was very bad. But, perhaps, when the history of India comes to be written, when much of the horror of today has been forgotten, one of the biggest things that will be mentioned will be the change that has come over India and that is coming over India in regard to the Indian States. We see something very remarkable happening. It is perhaps difficult for us who live in the middle of this change to appreciate the bigness of what has happened. But it is an upsetting in a very curious way—a peaceful way—of a structure that has endured in India for the past 130 or 140 years, more or less ever since the beginning of the 19th century.

We see the sweep of history suddenly coming, the big broom of history, and changing this 130 years' old structure and putting something else in its place. We cannot definitely and absolutely say what the final and precise outcome of all this will be, though the picture is clearing up fairly rapidly. It would almost appear that there is the hand of destiny functioning. What is happening is nothing that we did not expect. In fact, many of us for the last many years have had certain objectives in regard to the Indian States and we have worked for them both through our political and other organisations in India, through the people of the States, through the people of the provinces and otherwise. And, on the whole, what is happening today is in line with the objectives we had laid down. So, it is not surprising. Yet, may I confess to you, Sir, that even I who have been rather intimately connected with the States people's movement for many years, if I had been asked six months ago what the course of developments would be in the next six months since then, I would have hesitated to say that such rapid changes would have taken place. Many factors have gone to bring about these rapid changes. Ultimately, I suppose, they are the forces of history working—the unleashing of all manner of forces which had been repressed for so long. For we had a strange phenomenon during these 130 years. The British Government had constructed a State-structure in the course of a quarter of a century in the early days of the 19th century. Whether it fitted in, in reality, with conditions then existing in India or not, it is a little difficult to say, that is to say, minus the British Government what would have happened. Anyhow, that dominant power of the British created this system, no doubt, for their own advantage

as they thought it. That system continued, not because of any inherent strength, as is obvious today, but because of the continuance of that dominant power, of the paramount power as it was called. All manner of changes were going on in India and in the outside world and yet this Indian States structure continued. Many of us said that it was rather archaic, and out of date, it had to change and must change and so on and so forth. But now that protecting hand of a foreign government having been removed, the repressions are removed. The forces that had been kept in check suddenly began to function and we see them in rapid action. The forces are there. Of course, they have not been curbed by any of us, but I think in the manner of dealing with this situation—an intricate and difficult situation—this House will agree with me that we owe a debt of gratitude to my friend and colleague, the Deputy Prime Minister.

So it is in this mighty context of a changing India in regard to the States that we have to view any particular aspect of it. We saw unfortunately six months back a partition of India, a splitting up of India, a part of India going out of India. Immediately after that process of cutting off, another process started, or rather, always we have had these two processes—the process of integrating India. We have seen this process of integrating India going on in regard to the States, and to some extent even in regard to the provinces, but much more so in regard to the States. So, these two things have gone on together, a process of cutting away and a process of integration; and in the balance it is difficult to say how far we have gained and how far we have lost. It is difficult to say also how far this process of integration will go and where it will take us ultimately. Nevertheless, it is interesting for us living through this rather strange and dynamic period of India's history to look at it in some perspective, not as actors in the drama but rather as historians looking back on what has happened. The historian who looks back will no doubt consider this integration of the States into India as one of the dominant phases of India's history.

Well, Sir, the process is taking various shapes. There has been an actual merger of a large number of small States into India; there has been a bringing together of a number of States into Unions of States which form units of the Union of India and a certain number of major States remain as separate entities. But what is equally important—and if I may say so, even more important—is not this integration externally, but an inner integration, that is, the growth of democratic institutions and responsible government in the States, because that brings about a real integration—not at the top levels of government, but at the level of the people. Both these processes have gone on and both these processes, may I remind the House, are in line with the objectives for which we have laboured for many years.

Now it is in this context of changes in the States system that I would like this House to consider the particular case of Kashmir, although it stands

apart and many other factors come in the play. Today in India two States stand quite apart from the rest in regard to these processes. Those States are Hyderabad and Kashmir. I am not going at this moment to say anything about Hyderabad. In regard to Kashmir, it stands apart for many reasons, partly because it has got entangled in a certain external politics, that is to say, it has got entangled in the relations between India and Pakistan, and so the two essentially State issues there are somewhat submerged. It is an odd thing that it should get so entangled. That it got entangled is not odd, but the manner of its entanglement, because the Government of Pakistan have assured us time and again that they have nothing to do with recent events in Kashmir, raids and invasions etc.—they go on repeating that—nevertheless, they seek to profit by those events. They seek political advantages out of those events, so that while disclaiming all responsibility for what has happened, they do want to share in whatever they might get out of it. Anyhow, the Kashmir problem stands apart.

But for the moment, leaving out this external implication of the Kashmir problem, if you consider it, it is essentially the same problem, that is to say, a problem of the growth of the freedom of the people and the growth also of a new integration. Now, we have been aiming—the Government of India and the States Ministry have been aiming—at the growth of this inner freedom of the people of all the States. If many of the States have agreed to merge in India or come into closer contact it is not because the States Ministry took a big stick and threatened them with consequences. It is because of those forces, rising up from the people, other forces, and, fundamentally, the sudden withdrawal of an external force which had kept the States together, or rather the States system together, the might of the British Government and the sanctions behind it. That disappearing, immediately the structure began to collapse and it is an astonishing thing : this sudden collapse of a structure which seemed so solid just a few months or a year ago; not surprising to those who knew the facts, but undoubtedly surprising to those people who take a superficial view of things. So, essentially we have been aiming at the freedom of the people, knowing and realising that ultimately it will be for the people of the States to decide what their future will be. We are not going to compel them. We do not propose to compel them and indeed we cannot compel them in the context of the world today in any State. There are other compulsions, the compulsions of geography. That is true; one cannot ignore that. There are many other compulsions. And naturally in considering the problem, we, that is, the Government of India, have always to consider the interests of India as a whole—the interests of India in regard to security, defence, etc. But apart from that, we do not wish to exercise any other compulsion in the slightest over the growth of freedom. In fact, we want to encourage it in the people of the States. We know well that if there is that growth of freedom and freedom of decision

by the people of the States, it will be a powerful factor to bring them nearer to our people, because we hope that whatever constitution we might adopt in India, it will be based completely on the will of the people.

Now, may I say a few words before I go on to the Kashmir issue and that is this : in this matter I feel a slight difficulty because the matter is being or going to be again discussed in the Security Council of the United Nations and I would not like to say anything which might be construed, shall I say, into putting any difficulties in the way of coming to a settlement either in the Security Council or elsewhere. Because we earnestly desire a settlement, we earnestly desire that these great forces should be allowed to function normally and to achieve their results, because any other result will be an artificial result. We cannot impose a result. Certainly, Pakistan cannot impose a result; ultimately there is no doubt in my mind that in Kashmir as elsewhere, the people of Kashmir will decide finally, and all that we wish is that they should have freedom of decision without any external compulsions.

Now, there is one other factor which I should like to put before the House in regard to Kashmir. We have got too used in India unfortunately to thinking of every problem or many problems in terms of communalism, of Hindu *versus* Muslim or Hindu and Sikh *versus* Muslim and so on and so forth. That has been an unfortunate legacy of ours and the extent to which it took us cannot be forgotten by us and the tragedies that it has led to. We are trying, I hope, to get rid of the spirit of communalism in this country, in India at least. We hope to put an end to it, not suddenly perhaps, but certainly fairly rapidly.

Now in this context of communal conflict the case of Kashmir stands apart, because Kashmir is not a case of communal conflict; it may be a case of political conflict, if you like; it may be a case of any other conflict, but it is essentially not a case of communal conflict. Therefore this struggle in Kashmir, although it has brought great suffering in its train to the people of Kashmir, it has placed a burden on us—on the Government of India, and the people of India; nevertheless, it stands out as a sign of hope that there we see a certain cooperation, combination and coordination of certain elements. Hindu and Muslim and Sikh and others on an equal level and for a political fight for their own freedom. I wish to stress this because it is continually being said by our opponents and critics on the other side that this is a communal affair and that we are there to support the Hindu or the Sikh minorities as against the Muslim masses of Kashmir—nothing can be more fantastically untrue. We could not for an instant send our armies and we would not be there if we were not supported by very large sections of the population, which means, the Muslims of Kashmir. We would not have gone there in spite of the invitation of the Maharaja of Kashmir, if that invitation had not been backed by the representatives of the people of Kashmir, and may I say to the House that, in spite of our armies having functioned with

great gallantry, even our armies could not have succeeded except with the help and cooperation of the people of Kashmir. Now we are charged by the people outside, beyond the borders of India, for going to Kashmir to support an autocratic monarch. The House will remember that one of the conditions that we made at that critical moment, when we had to decide whether to send the Indian Army or not, whether to accept accession or not, one of the conditions was that there must be popular government there, and not as a goal and an ideal, but immediately. It was an immediate thing and it was given effect to immediately insofar as it could be given effect to. So, it is strange that this charge should be brought against us. Look at this charge in another context. Those people, men and women of Kashmir, who are with us and who are fighting for their freedom and liberty there, they are not newcomers in the struggle for freedom; for the greater part of a generation they have fought for the freedom of Kashmir in Kashmir; they have suffered for it and some of us have deemed it a privilege to be associated with them in this fight for the freedom of Kashmir against autocratic rule. These people are with us today. Who are their opponents, who are against them in Kashmir or elsewhere? What has been their record in the past ten, twenty years in regard to the freedom of Kashmir? It is an interesting speculation and an interesting inquiry, because these gentlemen who talk about the autocracy of the Ruler of Kashmir, who talk about autocracy there, what did they do during these last ten, twenty years? They never fought for the freedom of the people of Kashmir; most of them supported that autocracy; most of them opposed the freedom movement in Kashmir. Now because of entirely different reasons, they became the champions of the freedom of Kashmir. And what is the type of freedom they have brought into Kashmir today? The freedom so-called that they have brought into Kashmir is the licence to loot and murder and burn that lovely country and to abduct and carry away the beautiful women of Jammu and Kashmir State; and not only carry them away but place some of them in the open market-place for sale! So, let us have this background before us when we consider this Kashmir story. It is a stirring background of events and many of us have been distressed at the strangely narrow view that people in the Security Council have taken on this matter. I do not desire to enter into the details of what happened in the Security Council or not, but I do feel that this background must be appreciated. It is not a Hindu-Muslim question in Kashmir; it is not a question of certainly our standing for any autocracy or anything. We have already not only during the last fifteen, twenty years shown where we stand in regard to the States, the people and the rulers. In regard to Kashmir, more particularly, we have shown by our actions from the very first day we went there in October last, up to today, and I shall have something more to say about it before I finish, as to how we feel about the freedom of Kashmir.

Now, Sir, I shall go into some slight detail about events in Kashmir.

The House will recall the statement I made on Kashmir on the 25th November 1947.² In that statement I recounted briefly the course of events in Jammu and Kashmir State up to that day, the part played by the Government of Pakistan in these events, and our own objectives.

Our complaint against Pakistan was that it incited and aided tribesmen from outside and its own nationals to wage war on Jammu and Kashmir State. The month of December showed an intensification of military pressure on the State. Nearly 19,000 raiders had been reinforced in the Uri area. Fifteen thousand raiders were operating against the western and south-western borders of the State. Incursions by the raiders into State territory, involving murder, arson, loot and the abduction of women, were continuing. The booty was being collected and carried to tribal areas to serve as an inducement to tribesmen to swell the ranks of the raiders. In addition to those actively participating in the raids, a large number of tribesmen and others, estimated at 100,000, had been collected in different places in the districts of West Punjab bordering upon Jammu and Kashmir State, and many of them were receiving military training under Pakistan nationals, including officers of the Pakistan Army. They were being looked after in Pakistan territory, fed, clothed, armed and otherwise equipped and transported to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir State with the help, direct and indirect, of Pakistan officials, both military and civil. The equipment of the invaders included modern weapons such as mortars, medium machine-guns, the men wore the battledress of regular soldiers, fought in regular battle formation and used the tactics of modern warfare. Men-packed wireless sets were in regular use and even Mark 'V' mines were being employed.

More than once, the Government of India had asked the Pakistan Government to deny facilities to the invaders, facilities which constituted an act of aggression and hostility against India, but without any satisfactory response. On the 22nd December, I handed personally to the Prime Minister of Pakistan in New Delhi a letter in which the various forms of aid were briefly recited, and his Government were asked to put an end to such aid promptly and without reservation.³

As no reply to this letter was received for some days I sent a reminder by telegram on the 26th December.⁴ On the 31st December the Government of India informed their Ambassador in Washington to convey a message to the Chairman of the Security Council of the United Nations. This message was a reference to the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter of

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 340-45.

3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 391-93.

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 397-98.

the United Nations.⁵ On that same day the full text of the message was sent to the Prime Minister of Pakistan by telegram.

On the 1st of January I received a reply from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to my letter dated 22nd December. The contents of this letter revealed no helpful approach to a solution of the Kashmir problem. They consisted only of a series of fantastic charges against India, e.g., a determination to crush Pakistan, organised genocide of Muslims in India, and the procurement of the accession of Kashmir by force and fraud. This letter, even if it had been received earlier, could not have modified our decision to request the Security Council of the United Nations to ask the Government of Pakistan :

(1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military or civil, from participating and assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State ; (2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State; (3) to deny to the raiders (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; (b) military and other supplies; (c) and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

The House will remember the circumstances in which we had sent our forces to Kashmir. Kashmir State territory, that is, after accession Indian Dominion territory, was being invaded to the accompaniment of murder, arson, loot and the abduction of women. The whole countryside was being ruined. Fresh raiders were continually coming from Pakistan territory into Kashmir State. All the fighting was taking place in Indian Dominion territory. The invaders had their principal bases across the border in Pakistan, received supply and reinforcements from them and could go back there to rest and recuperate in safety. Our troops had strict orders not to enter Pakistan territory. The normal course to prevent raids on Indian territory would have been to deny the use of any bases to them in Pakistan. Since Pakistan was unwilling to cooperate with us in this manner, the alternatives left to us were to send our armed forces across Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders, or to request the United Nations to ask Pakistan to do so. Any resort to the first course would have involved armed conflict with Pakistan. We were anxious to avoid this and to try every available method to find a peaceful solution. Therefore the only course left open to us was to make a reference to the Security Council.

I shall not take up the time of the House with a detailed account of the proceedings of the Security Council ; these have been fairly fully reported in the press. I must confess that I have been surprised and distressed at the fact that the reference we made has not even been properly considered thus far and other matters have been given precedence. If the facts we stated

5. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, p. 421.

in our reference were correct, as we claim they were, then certain consequences naturally flowed from them, both in law and from the point of view of establishing peace and order.

On behalf of Pakistan there was a repetition of the fantastic charges against India which had been made previously in the letter of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to which I have referred. Pakistan refused to act at once, to deny assistance in men and material to our enemies in Jammu and Kashmir, to prevent further incursions through Pakistan into the State, and to ask the tribesmen and Pakistanis now in the State to withdraw unless a previous agreement was reached and announced to the effect that the Indian armed forces should be withdrawn completely from Jammu and Kashmir State and the administration of the State should be replaced by another administration. There were some other matters in dispute also but the principal ones were the two I have mentioned above.

In effect Pakistan not only admitted that they were aiding the raiders but made it clear that they would continue to do so till certain political objectives of theirs were achieved by them. This was a proposal to which the Government of India could not agree. For such an agreement would have been not only a betrayal of the people of Kashmir to whom they had pledged their word, but also a surrender to methods of violence and aggression which would have had disastrous consequences both for India and Pakistan. It was impossible for us to withdraw our forces without grave danger to the State and without handing over the people of the State who trusted in us to an unscrupulous and cruel invader who had already brought so much misery to the State and its people. Nor could we share the responsibility of protecting the people of Kashmir with any other outside force. It was equally impossible for us to agree to the replacement of Sheikh Abdullah's administration by any other. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir is now no longer an autocratic government; it is a government representing the largest popular party in the State and is under a leader who, during these many months of unparalleled stress, has sustained the morale of his people, has maintained an effective administration over the greater part of the State, and generally has inspired effective resistance to the brutal attempts of the invaders to overrun and destroy Kashmir. There is no alternative administration possible in Kashmir, unless that administration rested on coercion. If Sheikh Abdullah were not there by the will of the people, he could not have survived, much less could he have accomplished what he has done during these difficult months. It is for him to choose any national of Kashmir to assist him in his government and it would be improper for us to interfere with his discretion in this matter.

I regret greatly that the representative of Pakistan before the Security Council should have made many statements and charges against India which have no foundation in fact. A great deal has happened in India and Pakistan

during the last six months or more which has brought shame to all of us and I am prepared to admit at any stage and at any time the errors of our own people, for I do not think that it is good for the individual or the nation to lapse from truth. That is the lesson our Master taught us and we shall hold to it to the best of our ability. Many horrible things have happened in India and Pakistan during these past months and while we hold strong views as to the initial responsibility for all the frightfulness that has occurred all of us in a greater or lesser degree have a certain responsibility for it. But so far as the events in Kashmir are concerned, I am convinced in my mind that every action that the Government of India has taken has been straight and above board and inevitable in the circumstances. Our going there at the end of October was thrust upon us by the course of events. Not to have rushed to the rescue of the people of Kashmir when they were in dire peril would have been an eternal disgrace, a gross betrayal and a deep injury. We feel deeply about this matter and it is not merely a question of political advantage or disadvantage. It has been and is a moral issue with us apart from other aspects of the case, and because of this at every stage and at every step I consulted Mahatma Gandhi and had his approval. In the confusion of a welter of charges and exaggerated statements, the basic facts are apt to be forgotten. I should like to know from anyone who studies our record in Kashmir since that fateful day when the raiders swooped down at Muzaffarabad and started their career of rapine and arson, I should like to know what major step we took that was morally or otherwise wrong.

The role of the Indian Army in this conflict, which I repeat was not of our seeking, has been conspicuous for its discipline, impartiality, endurance and gallantry. They have extended their protection to every section of the people of the State. To suggest that they should be withdrawn before complete order is restored is to suggest something which is neither practicable nor reasonable and which is further a reflection on the exemplary record of our forces in Kashmir. We are in Kashmir and our forces are there because legally we are on unassailable grounds. But even apart from law the moral case of the Indian Union in Kashmir is equally unassailable. If we had not gone there and if our armed forces had not been rushed at great peril into Kashmir, that lovely country would now have been sacked, destroyed and ruined and its men and women who have been noted for ages past for their intelligence and their cultural traditions would have been crushed under the heel of a barbarian invader. No government in India could tolerate such happenings so long as it had the strength to resist it with all its might, and if such a fate befell Kashmir, what freedom or security would we have in the rest of India ?

We have only two objectives in Jammu and Kashmir State: to ensure freedom and progress of the people there, and to prevent anything happening that might endanger the security of India. We have nothing else to

gain from Kashmir, though Kashmir may profit much by our assistance. If those two objectives are assured to us we are content.

Our making a reference on this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations was an act of faith because we believe in the progressive realisation of world order and a world government. In spite of many shocks, we have adhered to the ideals represented by the United Nations and its Charter. But those very ideals teach us also certain duties and responsibilities to our own people and to those who put their trust in us. To betray these people would be to betray the basic ideals for which the United Nations stands or should stand. Even at the moment of accession we went out of our way to make a unilateral declaration that we would abide by the will of the people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum. We insisted further that the Government of Kashmir must immediately become a popular government. We have adhered to that position throughout and we are prepared to have a plebiscite, with every protection for fair voting, and to abide by the decision of the people of Kashmir.

Our delegation has gone back to Lake Success after full discussions with us. They have gone back with a clear appreciation of the position of the Government of India and of Indian opinion and fortified with the knowledge that they have our full support. I should like to express my gratitude to Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar and his colleagues for the ability and firmness with which they presented our case before the Security Council. Sheikh Abdullah has not gone back because his work lies with his people at this grave juncture. He has to assume a heavier responsibility. I feel confident that he will discharge this new responsibility with that strength and vision which have endeared him to Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in Kashmir. His place in the delegation has been taken by Shri Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, who has been a tower of strength to me during these difficult months.

I shall not say much about the military situation in Jammu and Kashmir. We have had our moments of anxiety, but at no time have I had any doubt about our capacity to meet the enemy and defeat him. Our officers and men are in high spirits, ready to meet any challenge. We have good reason to be proud of our officers and men both of the Army and the Air Force. In particular, I should like to pay a tribute to Brigadier Usman, whose leadership and success have been in keeping with the highest traditions of India's army.

The representative of Pakistan before the Security Council has brought in many charges against us which have little bearing on the Kashmir issue. He has talked of what he called our aggression in Junagadh and genocide and of much else. I do not wish to take up the time of the House in dealing with these matters. We wish to conceal nothing and if the Security Council desires any investigation we shall welcome it.

Now I should like to inform the House that today the Maharaja of Kashmir is issuing a proclamation and I shall briefly place the contents of that proclamation before the House : or I might as well read the whole proclamation.⁶

I am placing this proclamation on the table of the House...⁷

I should like to congratulate His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir on this decision that he has taken. But the burden now lies on Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues and the people of Kashmir. I have no doubt as to how they will discharge their burden, because they are not newcomers and we have seen them functioning in the face of all manner of difficulties during the last few months. So I look forward with a certain measure of assurance to the future of Kashmir in spite of all difficulties.

I am, Sir, also placing a copy of the White Paper on the table of the House...⁸

Shibban Lal Saxena asked for the allotment of a day for discussions on the issue.

Jawaharlal Nehru : I am in the hands of the House but I should have thought that a vague discussion would not serve the purpose, more especially when the matter is being discussed by the Security Council, and it is difficult to avoid saying things which might create difficulties. That is in fact one of the reasons why I have avoided for some time past to make any reference to this question in this House, because of this matter being before the Security Council. But I am entirely in the hands of the House in the matter.

6. By the Maharaja's proclamation of 5 March 1948, an Interim Government was formed on the principle of joint responsibility with Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister and a Dewan as the Maharaja's nominee in the Cabinet. A National Assembly based on adult suffrage and proportional representation was to frame a constitution, subject to the Maharaja's approval which would ensure protection of minorities and freedom of expression and assembly.

7 & 8. Not printed.

50. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
6th March 1948

My dear Nawabzada,
Will you please refer to your letter dated the 23rd February in which you

refer to the alleged violation of Pakistan territory by regular Indian and Kashmir State troops and armed bands of civilians from across the border of Jammu and Kashmir State, and ask that I should use all my influence and authority to stop such raids?

2. I am having the incidents referred to by you very carefully investigated and I shall write to you further about the results of this investigation. I would like to assure you, however, in the meanwhile, that we have given the strictest instruction to our defence forces not to violate Pakistan territory; and the investigation of previous complaints made by you has amply demonstrated that these instructions have been loyally carried out by our troops.

3. I would like in this connection to recall to your mind our conversation when we last met in Lahore at a Joint Defence Council meeting. You then gave me a long list of frontier violations. I pointed out to you that even if the allegations were correct their total effect was insignificant in the context of events in Kashmir. I must frankly repeat that it does seem to me extraordinary that you should send me this complaint at a time when armed raiders from Pakistan and from the tribal area are streaming in thousands into Kashmir territory devastating villages, looting property, murdering people, and abducting large numbers of women.

4. You refer in your letter to Gandhiji's supreme sacrifice and to the necessity of the best minds in both countries thinking seriously of the gulf between India and Pakistan. I am glad you have referred to Gandhiji and I agree entirely with you that both India and Pakistan should examine and constantly keep in view their conduct in the light of Gandhiji's approach to the problem. I would inform you, however, that, as I have stated in my statement to the Constituent Assembly this morning,² I had had the benefit of the constant advice of Gandhiji in the matter of our handling of the Kashmir situation, and the action that we have taken there had had his full support.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

² The statement in fact was made on 5 March.

51. To the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir¹

7th March 1948

My dear Maharaja Saheb,
Thank you for your letter of the 3rd March. I am very glad that the step

1. J.N. Collection.

we have all so long intended has been taken by you. I know that the delay has not been due to you and that you were anxious to take some such step. I hope that a new and more fortunate phase in Jammu and Kashmir State will begin now.

As you know, many of us here have given more thought to this Jammu and Kashmir issue than almost any other matter. We are intimately attached to Kashmir, and its future is of the most serious concern to us. Nothing would pain me more than for Kashmir to be separated from India. Mahatma Gandhi was also very greatly interested in this and we always took his advice in this matter. We have had very great difficulties all round, but we have faced them bravely. The stories that have come to me of our soldiers functioning there have heartened me. Our difficulties are not over yet. I am sure if we act correctly and rightly, the consequences will always be good.

It is true that I have been distressed in the past sometimes by your attitude. I felt that you were not appreciating the realities of the situation. However, as I have assured you previously, I have the friendliest sentiments for you and would like to help you to the best of my ability.

I earnestly trust that this new era in Jammu and Kashmir will bring good fortune to the State and to the people. I am entirely convinced that this depends on your reposing the fullest confidence in Sheikh Abdullah. Your assurance to this effect heartens me. I have spoken to Sheikh Abdullah also on this subject of his being fully cooperative, and he has appreciated my advice.

With all good wishes to you and regards to the Maharani Sahiba.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

52. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Please refer to Bajpai's telegram No. 4313 dated March 6th repeated to you from London regarding his conversations with Attlee and Cripps. The two suggestions on which he has asked for my views are :

1. New Delhi, 8 March 1948. M.E.A. files. Extracts.

- (a) that plebiscite authority should have an advisory committee selected from different areas in the State, and
- (b) that our garrison should be withdrawn from Poonch.

2. It is not clear to me how it is intended that an advisory committee should be set up. If members are to be selected on recommendations of Kashmir Government no harm would be done in accepting the proposals and Government could no doubt be asked to give due consideration to regional interests. If on the other hand and as seems more likely it is intended that members are to be chosen in some other way I foresee serious difficulty in the functioning of such an advisory committee. In that event because of conflicting advice there is bound to be friction between plebiscite authority and Government on the one hand and plebiscite authority and the advisory committee on the other and the position of plebiscite authority will become equivocal. I think it is far better that instead of appointing a formal advisory committee the plebiscite authority should have freedom to consult any individuals or bodies they like. They will doubtless refer to the Government whenever necessary the points arising out of such a consultation and Government would not fail to give the consideration to such points.

3. In regard to garrison at Poonch I am clearly of opinion that suggestion for withdrawal should be resisted. We have already stated that we shall locate our garrisons only in such places as are considered essential on strategic grounds for the purpose of preventing aggression. On this consideration we would have to locate a garrison in some part of Poonch. It will only increase difficulties all round if a garrison were to be located in the interior of Poonch. It would cause the least provocation to Poonchis themselves if the garrison were left in Poonch where it is at present....

5. Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad have been held up in Delhi because of bad weather but expect to return tomorrow. Sheikh Abdullah is shortly forming a Cabinet of ten, including the Dewan.² One of these places will probably be offered to a person who formerly belonged to the Muslim Conference, and one place will remain vacant. It is not proposed to offer a place to Ghulam Abbas. Ghulam Abbas has recently been released and is now on his way to Karachi to see Jinnah. His statements at Lahore have not been particularly satisfactory.³

2. M.C. Mahajan.

3. Ghulam Abbas, leader of the Muslim Conference, had, in an interview to the press at Lahore on 8 March 1948, supported accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, challenged Sheikh Abdullah's claim to represent Muslims of the State, described his government as 'a child of political blackmailing', claimed that 'tribal army of liberation' was welcomed with open arms by the people of the State and challenged Nehru to appoint a commission to investigate misdeeds of his troops.

53. Report of an Interview with John D. Kearney¹

In his interview with Nehru, Kearney² started by pointing out that India should not have been shocked or surprised by the attitude of the Security Council nor should he endeavour to find the reason for this attitude in any sinister motives of power politics. India herself had put her case before the Security Council on the lines that all she wished was a free and open expression of the will of the people. The Security Council had taken her at her word only to find that India was insistent on terms for a plebiscite which to say the least would be extremely favourable to India. A further reason for lack of sympathy towards India had been that she claimed that all justice was on her side and that her case was completely water-tight. This was bad pleading in any court whether international or legal. He had then told Nehru that India in fact wanted Kashmir for her own security, i.e., for strategic reasons. He had not mentioned the Russians but had skated round the point by talking of "foreign infiltration—possibly Afghanistan"—into Kashmir if the State remained a chaotic void. Nehru had smiled and said "You mean Russia" and had gone on to say that he and his Government were fully alive to the danger from that direction. Kearney had then pointed out that if India had adopted a somewhat more realistic approach in the Security Council and had informed the Americans and the Dominions that she must have Kashmir for strategic reasons her case would probably have been reviewed very much more sympathetically. All this seemed to impress Nehru who although would not admit that such indeed was India's desire had said "Well, we must face the realities of the situation".

Kearney had then put forward his plan for a plebiscite to be confined

54. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Please see your telegram No. 160-S dated March 14th. I need scarcely tell you that I am in entire agreement with the line that you have taken in regard to Sheikh Abdullah as reported in para 2 of your telegram. I am quite clear in my mind that we must not on any account resile from this position.

I have consulted Sheikh Abdullah about the suggestion in para 3 of your telegram that Government of India should appoint a plebiscite high commissioner on their own in Kashmir. He is agreeable to this proposal and I see no objection to it.

I think the suggestion that Ibrahim should be included in Sheikh Abdullah's government is a mischievous one. It would mean a *de facto* recognition of 'Azad' Kashmir government and will entail all manner of complications. Not only will it not mean a liquidation of difficulties in Kashmir but in the present circumstances it will only add to them and make functioning of Kashmir government virtually impossible. You must therefore resist it to full. I agree with you that you must take line that selection of personnel must be matter for Sheikh Abdullah himself.

1. New Delhi, 15 March 1948. M.E.A. files.

55. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram No. 177-S dated March 19th. We feel that our general reaction to Chinese draft resolution² should be of welcoming it and that we should not depart away from that welcome by too many criticisms and amendments which are not really material. Dr. Lo³, Chinese Ambassador,

1. New Delhi, 20 March 1948. M.E.A. files.
2. On 18 March 1948, the Chinese representative introduced a draft resolution providing that Pakistan should secure the withdrawal of invaders in Kashmir, and after this had taken place India must start a progressive withdrawal of her troops leaving enough for defence and security. India should further set up a plebiscite administration, in which international personalities were to be the top officers. In the meantime, India ought to try to ensure participation of all major political groups in the interim government of Kashmir.
3. Lo Chia-lun,

who has been using all his influence to help us strongly advises us to adopt this course. Subject to this broad approach we give below our views about your proposed amendments below and authorise you to take such action as you consider appropriate in the circumstances.

Preamble. Surely it is desirable to transpose sentences as suggested by you.

Preamble refers to question of accession to India or Pakistan and by implication completely rules out question of independence. We still feel that independence may lead to complications but we are reluctant to rule this out completely. It is conceivable that at a later stage this question may have to be reconsidered as a possible compromise. We do not suggest amendment of preamble at this stage from this point of view but would like you to bear this in mind.

Part A(1) (c). In view of (a) and (b) preceding (c) we do not have any vital objection to it as drafted. It may be improved but we do not think it is desirable to make this a vital issue.

Part A (2). It seems to us that it is implied in A(2) that any withdrawal of our troops will have to follow withdrawal of raiders and will be governed by considerations of defence and security. Proposed amendment hardly seems to us necessary and need not be moved.

Part B. Plebiscite. It has been pointed out to us that question of plebiscite is matter coming within purview of external affairs of Dominion Government. If so, no change need be made in the draft resolution on this point. I should like you to examine this point. I do not feel strongly about it either way. There appears to be a discrepancy in clauses (3) and (4) (a) and clause (4) (b). Para 10. We prefer your draft but it may be impolitic to stress too much any major change. Persons will not be excluded merely because they are in favour of Pakistan but we have sent you Sheikh Abdullah's views on the subject. Paragraph 11. We should not like you to give impression that Government of India are not prepared to exercise their influence on Kashmir Government to carry out obligations arising out of settlement.

previous evening.² Pandit Nehru expressed great pleasure at this attitude.

I then told him that I hoped he would telegraph to Gopalaswami Ayyangar along the lines suggested. He asked what the suggested line really amounted to, and I pointed out that it amounted to giving up the idea of allowing Sheikh Abdullah a free hand in charge of the Kashmir administration. I told him that I was convinced, from all I had heard from other reliable sources—both British and foreign—that Sheikh Abdullah had created the worst possible impression at U.N.O. by his bitterness about Pakistan and by the speeches he had made recently in which he said they would fight to the last man against Pakistan—words calculated to make the Security Council feel that he was a man incapable of running a fair and impartial administration prior to the plebiscite.

I told Pandit Nehru that what I recommended, in fact, was that he should give Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar authority to accept an interim government over which Sheikh Abdullah would not be able to ride roughshod.

Nehru said that this matter hardly arose, since the Security Council resolution already gave us more than this.

2. On 19 March 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan expressed to Mountbatten his confidence in Nehru's efforts to avoid a conflict between the two Dominions and promised to be responsive. He claimed that if a fair plebiscite went against Pakistan, he "would make no further effort to win Kashmir over to Pakistan". Mountbatten asked him to instruct Zafrullah Khan to cooperate with India at the U.N.

57. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Please see your telegrams Nos. 182-S and 183-S dated March 20th.

2. I entirely approve of line that you have taken in your discussion with Noel-Baker. I am telegraphing to Krishna Menon and asking him to keep on pegging away at Attlee and Cripps for acceptance in the main of Chinese resolution.

3. I agree also with the line that you have taken with Tsiang.² I cannot

1. New Delhi, 22 March 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. Tingfu F. Tsiang (1895-1965); Professor of History, Tsing Hua University, 1929-35; Ambassador of Republic of China to U.S.S.R., 1936-38; Permanent Representative of Nationalist China to the United Nations, 1947-62; Ambassador to the U.S.A., 1962-65.

really understand how it could be proposed that Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues should not take active part in canvassing support for their view before plebiscite.

4. There is evidently considerable prejudice against Sheikh Abdullah. Kearney, the Canadian High Commissioner, who saw Jengar yesterday and has been taking a great deal of interest in Kashmir case, mentioned the prejudice against Sheikh Abdullah. In order that Sheikh Abdullah's statements may not create any further difficulty, I am advising him not to make any speeches which are likely to cause us embarrassment. But on the main issue of jettisoning Sheikh Abdullah there can be no compromise whatsoever and you are quite right to have made this emphatically clear to Noel-Baker.

5. Dr. Lo, whose views, I have reason to think, carry considerable weight with his Government and with the Chinese representative on the Security Council, has telegraphed to his Government today stressing importance of passing Chinese resolution substantially as it stands. He has expressed fear that out of prejudice we might not do sufficient lobbying with Argentina and Colombia. I need scarcely say that I am sure you and your colleagues will do all lobbying that is necessary however poor the results may initially appear to be.

58. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram No. 189-S dated March 22nd. The Chinese resolution accepts our general approach and our viewpoint in regard to essentials. You are right in saying that this change is due to our firmness on essentials. It is also due to intensive diplomatic approaches made by us in Delhi and London. We must therefore be both firm on essentials and retain goodwill of countries supporting us. We realise fully that chances of settlement are not too bright chiefly because of British attitude which may influence others. The whole question therefore is now one of tactics and you and your delegation being on the spot are the best judges of what procedure to adopt.

We have nothing to add to what we wrote in our last telegram about most of your amendments. We agree with them but do not consider them of vital significance. If changes suggested by you can be made we would welcome them. Regarding paragraph 10 we agree that there is possibility of mischief in Chinese draft and your amendment is improvement.

1. New Delhi, 24 March 1948. M.E.A. files.

59. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram No. 197-S dated March 26th. We do not like at all changes suggested in the original Chinese resolution. As a whole they enfeeble Kashmir State Government, set up parallel governmental structure, and limit numbers and functions of our troops. We are consulting our military advisers about proposals relating to our forces and shall let you have their comments tomorrow (March 29th).

Meantime we give below our preliminary reactions to proposals.

A. Restoration of Peace and Order

(a) We agree generally with attitude you propose to take up.² On the question of defence we cannot give in. Indeed main purpose of stationing our forces in Kashmir territory is for possible and sudden incursions across Pakistan.

(c) From point of view of defence it is essential for us to keep some troops in forward areas such as Kohala, Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur. Our troops are already in Poonch and we cannot withdraw them wholly even after settlement.

B. Plebiscite

(1) We cannot agree to plebiscite commission controlling and supervising State forces and police. We agree that these forces should render all assistance to plebiscite administration.

(2) We are entirely opposed to any system of parallel courts.

All these proposals are evidently meant to reduce Kashmir Administration to complete ineffectiveness.

C. We do not approve of new proposal about State Government inviting major political groups to designate representatives, etc. We think that proposal as contained in original Chinese resolution went far enough and no extension is desirable. We specially object to any other political groups nominating representatives. This can only result in State Government becoming an arena of warring factions.

(2) We do not like the idea of assessor but at the most one assessor may be nominated by each party, i.e., India and Pakistan.

1. New Delhi, 28 March 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. Gopalaswami Ayyangar proposed to reject those parts of the Chinese resolution which dealt with the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian troops from Kashmir and the substitution of the government of Sheikh Abdullah by a coalition government. India was to agree, however, to confer with the proposed U.N. commission on Kashmir.

New developments indicate that no agreement is likely and Security Council will go on and on without coming to any decision. We cannot surrender on any vital point. It will be for your delegation to consider what we should do in case of indefinite prolongation.

Instead of permitting continuous undermining of our position as suggested by the proposed changes, it might be worthwhile considering alternative of guaranteeing independence as discussed by you with us. This may also lead to no settlement but it might put us right with world opinion and demonstrate that we have no desire to dominate over Kashmir. It is for you to consider when such an approach would be feasible and how it should be initiated.

60. Lord Mountbatten's Record of Interview with Nehru¹

I told Nehru I was aware of the exchange of telegrams between the two Dominion Commanders-in-Chief on the subject of the fighting in Kashmir: I told him that the very first talks on the subject had in fact taken place between General Gracey² and myself during his last visit to Delhi, but that I now understood that matters had developed considerably in my absence.

I told him that whereas General Gracey was apt to fancy himself as having some political knowledge and was less likely to keep the necessary close touch with his own Prime Minister, he could rest assured that General Bucher would never attempt to take any political action, and would keep close touch with his Prime Minister.

Nehru entirely agreed. I asked him if he minded my requesting General Bucher to send his complete file on this matter to me, and he replied, "Certainly, of course."

I spoke to him about the securing of the Bombay Yacht Club premises, and he offered to help. I told him I could ask the Defence Minister to get in touch with him about it before he took any action.

1. New Delhi, 30 March 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.
2. General Sir Douglas David Gracey (1894-1964); served in Indian Army from 1930; Chief of Staff, Pakistan Army, 1947-48; Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, 1948-51.

I showed him an extract³ from the letter Mr. Kingsley Martin⁴ had written to my Press Attache.

I took the advantage of pointing out that this merely confirmed what I had already heard from members of the *Corps Diplomatique* and from their friends in England.

I pointed out that so long as the head of the new administration in Kashmir expressed himself as publicly determined to prevent Kashmir from going to Pakistan, that it was impossible for members of the Security Council to feel that any reliance could be placed on his announcements.

I believed that it was partly on this account that they continuously pressed for concessions from India on this matter.

Nehru did not altogether agree. He pointed out that all the members of the Security Council, excepting of course Noel-Baker, whose well-known anti-Indian attitude precluded his taking an objective view, had been in favour of the Chinese resolution ; even including the U.S. representative Senator Warren Austin. It was not correct to say that it was mistrust of Sheikh Abdullah which was calling for concessions from India. It would be more correct to say that this was due to Sir Zafrullah Khan's intransigent attitude and the fact that the Security Council felt too meek to impose a decision and were anxious to obtain a decision agreed by both sides. Needless to say, in the forefront of such a movement was Noel-Baker himself.

I pointed out to Nehru that provided it were made really clear to the Security Council that concessions by India would only be given on the understanding that whether Pakistan agreed or not, the Security Council would announce their award on the basis of India's concessions, then I was firmly convinced that we should give as many concessions as would not endanger his personal position or that of his Government in the country.

Nehru was of the opinion that the more concessions that we gave, the more Sir Zafrullah Khan would dig his toes in and insist on further concessions. They were therefore disposed to limit the number of concessions they were now going to give and leave it to U.N.O. to bring pressure to bear on Pakistan by way of a change.

He informed me that at the Cabinet meeting the night before they had decided not to agree to Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar's suggestion that India should withdraw the delegation and certainly would not be party to the making of any intransigent announcement.

3. Kingsley Martin wrote that Sheikh Abdullah had done "appalling damage" to the Indian cause at the U.N. by repudiating "the very idea of a fair plebiscite and outraged everyone in the Council."
4. (1897-1969); editor, *New Statesman and Nation*, 1930-60 and editorial director, 1961-62.

I congratulated Nehru warmly on this decision and said that nothing could possibly harm our cause more than our taking up an unreasonable attitude after U.N.O. had come round so much in their attitude between the two Dominions.

I drew Nehru's attention to the military position. I told him then if the truce arranged between the two Commanders-in-Chief broke down, that the 3.7" howitzer battery which had apparently come from Swat would certainly open fire again and that the town of Poonch with its 40 thousand refugees could expect heavy continuous shelling as long as the ammunition lasted. I pointed out that if we failed to get a settlement at U.N.O. that the present war conditions would continue and that for every crore that it cost India, undoubtedly Pakistan would hardly have to spend a lakh. Thus the harm of going on fighting would be crippling to India, and to all Nehru's great ideas of raising the standard of living of the common people, whereas it would affect Pakistan very little if at all, for the money they spent on keeping the tribes supplied with ammunition, petrol, etc., would be reasonably well spent from their point of view in diverting the tribesmen from their own territory.

I think Nehru really appreciated this situation as he expressed his great wish for an early reasonable settlement.

I discussed with him the draft constitution for India, and mentioned that I had fortuitously run into Sir B.N. Rau at the Constitution Club the night before, and that he had told me, in the course of conversation, of Nehru's decision that all three words, "Republic", "State" and "Commonwealth", were to be printed in the draft constitution so as to leave a free choice. Sir B.N. Rau had informed me that he thought a Committee of 40⁵ were most likely to choose "State".

Nehru smiled and said Sir B.N. Rau had not much political experience and advised me not to place too much reliance on his forecasts. I then said, "Will you be taking the chair at the meeting of the Committee of 40?" He replied that he thought he would be, and I then put it to him that it would largely depend on the way he handled the Committee as to which word they chose. He surprised me by saying he had intended to leave all three words in for the matter to be debated in the Constituent Assembly. I told him I thought this would be a most unfortunate procedure if he really was trying to avoid using the word "Republic". Surely the thing was to get the Committee of 40 to support the idea of "State" or "Commonwealth" and then for it to be put before the Constituent Assembly in that form. On the whole Nehru seemed to agree with this view.

5. A Special Committee composed mostly of the members of the Drafting, Union Powers and Union Constitution Committees was formed to secure the widest possible degree of consensus for the proposals contained in the Draft Constitution. The Committee met on 10 and 11 April 1948.

61. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

In pursuance of para 3 of my telegram Primin-1026 dated March 30th, Iengar has been seeing heads of foreign missions in Delhi in turn. He has already seen High Commissioners for United Kingdom, Dominion of Canada and Ambassadors for France and United States of America. U.K. High Commissioner and French Ambassador took a completely negative role and merely said that they would communicate the substance of conversation to their Governments. The attitude of Levi was, if anything, somewhat unfriendly but this may be because he dislikes our hustling him on issue of French settlements. Dr. Grady said he was astonished at information given to him that delegates from U.K., U.S.A., etc., had been putting pressure on you to make substantial modifications in the Chinese resolution in favour of Pakistan. He said after the Chinese resolution had been introduced, he received from Washington a message to say that a meeting had been held in State Department at which representatives of certain delegations were present, that U.K. was represented by Patrick,² and that at this meeting it was decided that Chinese resolution should be supported subject to certain minor modifications in purely procedural matters. It was also agreed that pressure should be put on Pakistan by delegations concerned to accept Chinese resolution. When Dr. Grady was informed by Iengar of the nature of the modifications that had been suggested to you, such as the setting up of parallel courts and placing of police and magistracy under the authority of Plebiscite Commission, he said that these matters were fundamental and not merely matters of procedure, and they certainly were not the sort of modifications considered at the meeting in State Department. He said he could not understand what had happened since he had heard from the State Department, and promised to inform his Government that Indian Government have reached limit of their patience, that they are not prepared to yield any further ground, and that if these interminable discussions are to continue they would have seriously to consider whether they will continue to maintain a high level of delegation at Lake Success.

2. Kearney said that he had informed his Government that howitzers were being used against the beleaguered population in Poonch and that these could not have been brought into Kashmir without the connivance or at any rate the knowledge of Pakistan Government. Speaking quite privately as a friend and not as a diplomat he said that time had come when

1. New Delhi, 1 April 1948. M.E.A. files.

2. Paul Joseph Patrick (1888-1975); Assistant Under-Secretary of State, India Office, 1941-47, and Commonwealth Relations Office, 1947-49.

we should adopt tougher tactics than hitherto in dealing with suggestions for yielding more ground to Pakistan. He thought we had already shown too much consideration to Security Council in our anxiety for a quick settlement. He would himself have taken the line, after stating that we accepted the Chinese resolution in substance, that we were not prepared to discuss any amendments until we knew what line Pakistan proposed to take. He suggested that we should refuse to discuss any further amendments until Pakistan disclosed its hand, otherwise there was a danger that we would get pushed into making more and more concessions and find at the end of it that Pakistan did not accept them. Our tactical position would be worse after each successive phase of negotiations. He suggested that we should be more hard boiled and just refuse to be pushed any further.

3. It is clear to me that tactics which the Pakistan delegation are following are precisely those that Muslim League adopted in their dealings with Congress, and that in pursuit of these tactics they are getting support from members of Security Council. We have unfortunately no reason to suppose that countries such as the U.S.A., Canada and Belgium will follow an independent policy. They will doubtless continue to play second fiddle to U.K. and we must reckon with Mr. Noel-Baker pursuing his unfriendly part whatever may be his instructions from London. I am of opinion that, any impression that we are prepared even to discuss further concessions would be most damaging to our cause and I suggest that, in negotiations that may take place during this month, you take a firm line and point out that you consider it useless to go on discussing further amendments until Pakistan stated quite clearly what exactly was her position.

4. It is not quite clear to me from para 1 of your telegram No. 201-S dated March 30th whether it is your intention to accept after protest the suggestion that "the Government of India undertake to ensure that Government of the State notify major political groups to designate responsible political representatives to join in the conduct of administration of the State as full ministers". As I have already informed you in my telegram No. 1013 dated March 28th,³ I strongly object to formula that any other political groups should nominate their representatives. I would repeat that proposal as contained in the original Chinese resolution went far enough and no extension should be accepted.

3. See *ante*, item 59.

62. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

2. Please see your telegrams Nos. 212-S and 213-S dated March 31st. We have again given careful consideration to your suggestion that we should make it known diplomatically that offer of plebiscite cannot be kept open indefinitely. Following are difficulties in the way of doing so at this stage. Iengar has already seen heads of following missions, namely, U.S.A., U.K., France, China, Canada and Belgium, and in his conversations with them he has said nothing about withdrawing offer of plebiscite. It may give rise to considerable misapprehension of our attitude if so soon after these conversations and before any developments have taken place in New York, this point were now put forward. Moreover, a new Chairman² has taken charge and it will be desirable for us to wait and see what he does. If we disclose our hand now, the argument may suddenly shift from original Chinese resolution, which it should be our object to get passed by the Security Council, to entirely different issues. For these reasons we have come to the conclusion that it would be inopportune at this stage to say anything about withdrawing offer of plebiscite. We may consider the matter again after we know what line the new Chairman proposes to take.

3. On general question of tactics, I have already telegraphed to you in my 1047 of April 1st. Pakistan has not made a single commitment to Security Council and is apparently still holding fast to its demands that Indian Army should withdraw from Kashmir and that Sheikh Abdullah should not be head of administration. In the meantime we have committed ourselves in a variety of ways. We must take line that we accept the original Chinese resolution in substance and that we are not prepared to discuss any amendments until Pakistan expresses its willingness to accept the general framework of that resolution. If Pakistan does not accept that framework, the question of amendments would not arise. Recent information suggests that Pakistan is taking even more vigorous steps than before to assist the raiders in Kashmir. She certainly has allowed heavy guns to go to vicinity of Poonch and there are reports, as yet unconfirmed, that a mountain regiment and a battery have left for Kashmir. It looks as if Pakistan is interested less in a fair solution in Security Council than in a military victory.

4. Subject to general tactical approach mentioned above to which we attach the greatest importance, our comments on revised draft resolution are as follows :

1. New Delhi, 2 April 1948. M.E.A. files. Extracts.

2. Alfonso Lopez of Colombia was chairman of the Security Council for April 1948.

The proposals contained in this draft have been discussed in our recent telegrams and you are fully aware of our views on them. Para 4 of your telegram No. 213-S is generally in accordance with instructions that we have sent you. We still think that even your amended version of Clause 8 of revised draft is likely to lead us into difficulties and we think you should resist any extension of scope of original Chinese draft.

5. We notice that Clause 5 of revised draft provides for possible use of Pakistan troops in Kashmir territory. We fully agree that this should be resisted.

6. It is possible that U.K. delegate may have exploited theory that, if a resolution was passed which was not acceptable to Pakistan, there may be a *jihad* in which not merely Pakistan but other Muslim countries in the Middle East may join. The Belgian Ambassador mentioned to Iengar yesterday the possibility of such a *jihad*. It would be useful for you to know that Afghan Charge d'Affaires³ called recently and gave a verbal message from his Prime Minister⁴ to me that Afghanistan had taken strongest possible steps to prevent Afghan nationals from going into Kashmir and Prime Minister of Afghanistan was satisfied that there is not a single Afghan now in Kashmir. While we do not discount the possibility of an undertaken stirring up of feeling against India in tribal territory we are inclined to think that fears of a *jihad* are greatly exaggerated.

3. Ghulam Mohammad Khan.

4. Shah Mahmud Khan.

63. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Please see para one of your telegram No. 216-S dated April 1st. Having regard to the considerations stated in my telegram No. 1052 of April 2nd,² you will naturally not agree to piecemeal amendments that may be thrown out. I agree, however, that, as part of an overall settlement, we should not object to five-power committee of good offices.

2. Can you tell me what is the position regarding Pakistan's complaint both in respect of Junagadh as well as of other matters? Is it intention

1. New Delhi, 3 April 1948, M.E.A. files.

2. See the preceding item.

of the Chairman to bring them up for discussion, and if so, when? We have a high power delegation in New York and it is a waste of their talents that they should have to stay there indefinitely.

64. To Vidya Shankar¹

New Delhi
3 April 1948

Dear Shankar,²

I have given Kachru a letter for the Maharaja,³ a letter for Sheikh Abdullah⁴ and a brief note for Bakshi. I should like you to read these letters and then deliver yourself the letter addressed to the Maharaja.

From these letters you will see what my general approach is. In the course of your talks with him you should speak firmly, but of course politely, about this general approach and about the dangers of anything being done which leads to conflict between the Maharaja and his Cabinet. Nothing can be more dangerous than the possibility of such a conflict. It may lead either to a resignation of the Cabinet and a complete deadlock or to a defiance of the Maharaja by the Cabinet which will not be good for the Maharaja and which may lead to unfortunate consequences for him and others. That is the basic situation and I wish the Maharaja would realise it. Any impression which the people or the Security Council may get that the Maharaja is still strong enough to obstruct and oppose the people's representatives will weaken our case very greatly and come in the way of our winning the people of Kashmir to our side.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 1, p. 175.

2. (1908-1981); joined I.C.S. 1933; Secretary to Vallabhbhai Patel, August 1947-50; Special Secretary, Union Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1960-62, Secretary, 1962-64; Secretary, Ministry of Aviation 1964-66, Secretary of Defence, 1967-68; Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1977-79.

3. See *post*, next item.

4. See *post*, item 66.

65. To the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir¹

New Delhi

3 April 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahab,

Shankar is taking this brief note from me and will discuss various matters with you and convey to you what Sardar Patel's and my own views are about them. I was sorry to learn that at one of the earliest meetings of the new Kashmir Cabinet an argument arose as to what should be considered by the Cabinet and what should not. I thought it was quite clear that it is open to the Cabinet to consider every matter because every matter is intimately related to another and cannot be separated. Besides, we have to take a completely realistic view of the position.

2. As you know Kashmir has become a world problem and the Indian Union has poured its resources into this conflict. We shall deal with it militarily of course. But even more important than the military aspect is the political aspect of the problem. All our difficulties in the U.N.O. are due to this political aspect. All our military victories will yield little result if we do not work up this political aspect. As I have pointed out to you, the only way to do this is through Sheikh Abdullah and his organisation. Our opponents and enemies realise this fully and have therefore insisted on Sheikh Abdullah being pushed out of the administration. If he is weakened in any way, our whole case becomes weak and no amount of legal argument can help us.

3. We hope to succeed some time or other in the military sphere to a very large extent. But there can be no doubt that ultimately Kashmir's fate will be decided by the people of Kashmir. If we win them over in sufficient numbers, it is well and good. If not, then we cannot hold them at the point of the bayonet. We have neither the desire nor the capacity to do this and indeed the present-day world will not permit us to do it. Therefore the real political problem is to win the people of Kashmir in large numbers. This can only be done by and through Sheikh Abdullah and his organisation. Indeed, we are there today because of Sheikh Abdullah's influence and popularity with the people. We have stressed this repeatedly in the Security Council.

4. It is important that the people realise that freedom has come to them and that there is a new order of things. If this idea really spreads our political fight will be largely won. In order to spread it it is not only necessary to make them see this Government function freely and without obstruction but also for measures of reforms announced and carried out. This will have a powerful effect on public opinion.

1. J.N. Collection.

5. Both our military and civil authorities are of this opinion and indeed one of our principal activities must now be building up a strong political front. All this requires complete faith in and cooperation with the present Cabinet in Jammu and Kashmir State. If they feel that they are being interfered with and not allowed to function, then there can be no political front and a sense of frustration will seize the people.

6. You will appreciate that we have staked a great deal in Kashmir in many ways because of these serious entanglements. We are not sorry for this and we are determined to carry on, but that carrying on can only be effective if we can add to it political advance all along the line and create psychological conditions for success in the minds of the people.

7. I am sure you will appreciate this and view the problems we have to face in this larger perspective and give your full support to this approach.

With regards to the Maharani Saheba,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

66. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

New Delhi
3 April 1948

My dear Sheikh Sahab,

I received your letter which Dwarkanath brought, as also a copy of your letter to Sardar Patel. I think it is absurd for Pathania² to object to your Cabinet discussing army matters. This was certainly not in accordance with the agreement we arrived at. The agreement was, first of all, that the State forces would be in every sense, that is, operationally, organisationally, and administratively, under the command of the Indian Union Army during this period of conflict or till such time as we may determine. Secondly, that the Cabinet could discuss and consider every subject including those which technically, in terms of the old constitution, fell under the so-called reserved domain. The Maharaja gave the assurance that he would even on such subjects consult the Cabinet. In practice we did not wish to distinguish between these at all. Even if there was a case of disagreement on any vital

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Col. Baldev Singh Pathania (1897-1985); commissioned to the Kashmir Army, 1920; Head of General Staff, 1932-34; organised the defences of Poonch and Mirpur against Pakistan tribesmen till relieved by Indian Army in December 1947; Dewan of Kashmir, March-April 1948.

issue, the Union authorities might be consulted. You will have every support for this from us. The Maharaja acts very foolishly and even against his own interests. In the present circumstances one has to deal with him tactfully and I think one can make him do anything if a personal and tactful approach is made. Shankar, who is going with this letter, will speak to the Maharaja and convey Sardar Patel's advice as well as mine. I am also writing briefly to the Maharaja. It might be a good thing if you meet the Maharaja and discuss these matters in a friendly way with him.

2. It is absolutely clear, and everyone here, civil or military, realises it, that the political approach to the Kashmir problem is at least as important as the military approach. I know that you attach great importance to it. I wish the Maharaja understood this simple matter. The political approach means making the people understand that there is really a new order in Kashmir and that you and your Cabinet are in real authority. Further that definite reforms should be introduced wherever possible and the fullest publicity should be given to them. The political front has to be developed and it might be desirable to have a regular organisation for this purpose which could function in close liaison with our military authorities. There should also of course be a proper intelligence service. I was surprised to learn from Brigadier Usman that he came across some peasants there who still thought that you were in prison.

services to you or to the Kashmir Government for a stated period, say three months. What kind of work you would assign to him would be for you to determine, as also any possible designation for him. He would of course not leave his present post as one of my secretaries and he can come back to it whenever you can spare him. His position will be that of an officer of ours, namely, my Private Secretary, loaned to you for a period. How exactly this should be worked out is a small matter of detail and we can decide it at leisure. The main point is that he will be at your disposal and you can use him in Kashmir or occasionally send him to Delhi for consultation with the States Ministry or the Defence Ministry here. In the main he should function in Kashmir without too big gaps.

6. Kachru has developed many contacts here which will be useful to him and to you. He knows the Kashmir problem thoroughly and is personally acquainted with your principal leaders and workers in Kashmir. He has also a very clear appreciation of the political implications and the larger issues involved. He will thus be particularly helpful in discussing the many problems that arise.

7. No date has yet been fixed for my visit to Srinagar. I am up to my neck in heavy work and the next two weeks are particularly difficult. Soon after I have to go to Bombay. Lady Mountbatten tells me that she cannot find time for Kashmir before the beginning of May. If that suits you we can fix sometime early in May.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

67. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Krishna Menon has again seen Attlee and Cripps. He has pointed out that I have been greatly disturbed by divergence between instructions said to have been issued from London and policy actually pursued in New York by Noel-Baker. He has come away with the impression that difficulty has arisen from Noel-Baker not keeping to his instructions. Cripps told Krishna Menon that he is totally opposed to joint occupation and entirely sceptical of usefulness of bilateral talks which is Noel-Baker's obsession, that it is unrealistic to ask India to jettison Abdullah, that the authority of U.N.O.

1. New Delhi, 6 April 1948. M.E.A. files.

must be confined to process of plebiscite, that there cannot be two parallel authorities. Krishna Menon points out that the question of setting up parallel courts and of putting police and magistracy under Plebiscite Commission has no backing in London and is regarded merely as the fanciful hobby of Noel-Baker.

2. I thought you may be interested in the above though there is nothing new in it. Whether any further instructions will be issued to Noel-Baker and if so whether he will follow them, is a matter on which I consider it quite profitless to speculate. I am quite clear in my mind that instructions that we have recently issued to you must form the sheet-anchor of our policy. We must be absolutely firm in our refusal to go beyond the substance of original Chinese resolution, decline resolutely to consider question of parallel courts, and the likelihood of Pakistan Army being brought in, and in refusal to discuss any amendments till Pakistan accepts framework of that resolution.

THE INTEGRATION OF STATES

I. Hyderabad

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
21 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have been receiving from various sources, foreign and internal, reports of the frantic efforts that the Hyderabad Government has been making to procure arms from abroad.² We have informed the Defence Ministry and our High Commissioner in London who has been asked to investigate this matter. One report, which has come to us independently from two sources, indicates that arms are being supplied through Goa.³ Kher told me of this and complained that the Government of India's customs people had refused to help him in checking this traffic. I heard also at the Hyderabad end that these cases containing gun barrels had arrived from the Bombay side. The stocks of the guns are apparently made in Hyderabad.

2. We have taken steps to approach the Portuguese Government Ambassador in London on this subject to tell him that we object to this traffic.

3. Some information has also come to us about General Edroos'⁴ activities in Europe in pursuit of arms. This is not very precise and probably you know all about it.⁵

4. I am told also that Hyderabad State/are increasing the strength of their army which I imagine would be against the Standstill Agreement.⁶ I presume the States Ministry is taking steps in this matter. I realise, of course, that we should proceed cautiously and not make too much of a fuss at this stage, but if we submit silently to their breaches they would become bolder and bolder and do all manner of objectionable things.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 7, pp. 135-136.

2. The Hyderabad Government had been trying to buy arms and ammunition by directly negotiating with the trade representatives of Britain, the United States and Portugal and had also tried to acquire port facilities at Goa.

3. On 25 January, Patel replied that the Ministries of Commerce and Transport had been asked to coordinate their activities and check the flow of arms to Hyderabad through Goa.

4. Syed Ahmed Edroos, an Arab by origin; served in Burma during the Second World War; Commander-in-Chief, Hyderabad State Forces, at the time of police action.

5. Patel wrote that "no substantial quantities of arms appear to have been imported into Hyderabad as a result of his visit."

6. Sharing Nehru's scepticism over Hyderabad's intentions to abide by the agreement, which the Hyderabad Government had signed with the Indian Union in November 1947, Patel wrote that he would discuss the issue with Laik Ali on 29 January.

5. The question of arming the Bhopal army is also worthy of consideration. That army is practically a non-Bhopal army of Pathans, etc., and we might be a little careful in giving them too much in the way of arms.⁷

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

7. Patel replied that he would be issuing instructions to Hyderabad and Bhopal States to readjust their armed forces "in order to create more confidence amongst the non-Muslim majority."

2. Importance of Right Means¹

Friends and Comrades,

I am very happy to be here after many years, happy to come away from the oppressive atmosphere of New Delhi, happy also to come to these lovely surroundings and to see so many friendly faces and old friends. I have received a number of addresses of welcome and I thank those organisations who have presented them. But more than those addresses of welcome, I have seen the welcome and the affection in your eyes since I arrived here this morning, and that love and affection has heartened me, and to some extent rather pained me, for I wonder how anyone, least of all I, can be worthy of so much affection and confidence, as you, in your generosity, confer. So I thank you for it, I am grateful for it. But then it is not enough for you and me to exchange compliments. We have big work ahead. I have passed through, like many of us, very difficult times and the difficult times are not over. Indeed our burdens grow. And Mahatmaji's assassination has set all of us to test and to a challenge ahead, not only some of us in Delhi or in the higher ranks of the Congress, but each one of us in India. Have we shouted Mahatma Gandhi's name in vain all these many years, or have we at all understood his message and are we prepared to live up to it? That is the question, and that is the challenge which we have to face. There are people in this country who have openly repudiated that, and who have

1. Speech at a public meeting, Vishakhapatnam, 14 March 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

indulged in many mad deeds and, worse than mad deeds, they have committed the murder of Mahatmaji. Well, what are we to do in answer to this? I read in the newspapers proposals to put up statues and monuments to Mahatma Gandhi so that people may go there and worship that statue, as many people of India are very fond of doing so. Remember this, that very often those whom we worship, we fail them. It is a sure way of not doing our duty by a person to put him aside and worship him. Mahatma Gandhi wanted work to be done, not worship to be offered, and he always told us that true worship is service to our brethren. For the service to the common man and the oppressed man is the best worship. It is the service, if you like, to our country, and the country needs men and women of this country to serve her. Well, are we going to perform this kind of worship which he taught us, or are we going to add to our innumerable temples and churches and what not another idol here or some other symbol there and think that we have done our duty? If we do that we shall betray the Mahatma and we shall not be his worthy followers.

But the real question before you is this, has your conscience been awakened by all that has happened, or has it not? There is evil abroad in this country, evil which is entering into the soul and spirit of this nation, evil which, if we allow it to go on unchecked, may very well destroy the freedom that we have won, and destroy it in a surer way than any external enemy can destroy it. There is evil within us, within our ranks, and it is time that we woke up to face it and to curb it and to end it. Now that is my first point that I would like you to appreciate. I said this in a different language. But I repeat it because it is the most important thing. It is infinitely more important, if you will permit me to say so, than whether you have an Andhra province^a or not. Not that the Andhra province is not important. May be it is. But where will your Andhra province be if India is not free, or if India falls, or if India collapses and cannot defend herself against outer or inner attack? Therefore, before you talk to me about this provincial problem or that, first of all think in terms of protecting India, protecting the heritage that we have got, of protecting all that Mahatma Gandhi, through tremendous labour and sacrifice, built for us in India. That is the first thing we have to do, and if we cannot do that then we cannot do anything else either.

So if we want to be true to the methods of Mahatma Gandhi then we have to follow and observe that message and act accordingly. We have to remember what he told us always that if we want to get something good, we must do nothing evil in order to get it; we must follow the right path to achieve right ends. Now I repeat that to you because there is too much mischief and wrong and violence.

2. During his visit to the Andhra areas, Nehru received representations from numerous organisations demanding early formation of a separate Andhra province.

I am told that in the Andhra *desh* specially, there is a growing tendency towards violent action. Now, unfortunately, armies are kept for violence, if necessary to protect the country; the police is kept to protect people from wrongdoers. They function on behalf of the state and they should only function in order to protect the people or the country. But when other people, other than the army and other than the police, start functioning violently, then what could be the results? Complete disorder, chaos and mischief! I am told that this is what is happening in parts of Andhra *desh*. Partly the situation in Hyderabad State may be responsible for this. I shall deal with that matter a little later. But I am told that certain Communist organisations are indulging in violence in this province.³ We have more or less a democratic constitution functioning in India, in the Centre and in the provinces. It is open to any person to agitate against the Government or for any theory or ideology which he or she chooses. It is also open to people to change that Government by democratic process. That is how it is done in a democracy. But if people who are unable to change the Government were to impose their wishes by getting the majority to support them, try to impose a minority will on the majority, that is the method not of democracy, but of dictatorship of a small group. We have to choose between these two. We have talked about *janta ka raj*, *prajatantra raj*,⁴ and so on and so forth. We have always said during the last thirty years that we want a democratic form of government, right from the village up to all-India level, and we have said that we want every man, whatever his religion, to have an equal share in that, and to have an equal opportunity, because in India, a free India will not be a free India for one religion only, one group, but for every person in India who is an Indian. Therefore, we have to decide about this, whether we want a democratic form of government or not. If we do want a democratic form of government then there is no meaning in violence. Violence only comes in if we discard the democratic form of government. You have to decide that and each one of us has to decide that, because I stand for democracy in India, because I stand, if I may say so further, for socialism allied with democracy in India, call it social democracy, except that social democracy has come to mean something rather different in Europe. I can understand that we might grow into socialism through the democratic process. Therefore, for my part I wish to oppose these incursions into violence. Also

3. On 28 February 1948, the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India declared at Calcutta that the Indian "freedom struggle had been betrayed" and called upon all true revolutionaries to launch a final struggle to win "real freedom and democracy." The programme aimed at the overthrow of the government by violence with the help of Kisan Sabhas, trade unions and student and youth organisations. Soon after these disturbances broke out in parts of Bengal, Maharashtra and the Andhra and Malabar regions in the Madras Presidency and Telangana in Hyderabad.
4. People's rule, democratic rule.

because I am convinced in my own mind that this violence will not lead to socialism, it will only lead either to chaos or to dictatorship of a group, probably more to fascism than anything else. I, therefore, want you and others to consider these questions in all their aspects and come to a clear decision, for at the present moment, specially in India, we cannot have doubts about these matters. We live in danger from outside as well as from inside, and if we weaken within our borders by these mental and other conflicts then we cannot prepare ourselves to face the dangers, internal or external. We stand, therefore, for opposition to communalism. We stand for democracy. We stand against all private armies, because private armies in the present context specially, and generally in any event, are totally opposed to the democratic concept.

I want to say a few words about Hyderabad State, not that there is very much to say. You know how we have dealt with the States problem in India during the last few months.⁵ It is a difficult legacy of British rule, something which the British formed 130 or 140 years ago, and which they imposed on us, and which continued because of British power behind them. As soon as British power was withdrawn, you have seen a sudden change come over the scene and so many of these States have ceased, having been merged into our provinces or having joined together to form larger units. The process continues, and no doubt it will continue till an entirely new picture of India emerges. These States have given trouble in different ways. One is Kashmir, and the other is Hyderabad. In Kashmir our armies are fighting not to impose our will on Kashmir but to prevent raiders and invaders who came in ruthlessly across from the Pakistan border for imposing their will on the people of Kashmir. We have said a lot about Kashmir recently and I shall say no more. The matter, as you know, is before the Security Council of the United Nations.

Now about Hyderabad, as about any State, our policy has been that ultimately the people of that State must decide. We shall abide by that decision in any State. That is the policy we laid down, many months ago, in August last. That applies to Hyderabad as well as to any other State. We stand by that. Our policy has been that there must be full responsible government in every State, there must be an equal measure of freedom there as in the rest of India. We cannot have various gradations and degrees of freedom in India, in any part of India. We cannot have autocracy in any part of India, because autocracy and democracy cannot pull on together.

5. Five hundred and fifty States were in existence when British rule ended. The Government of India brought about the merger of some States into neighbouring provinces as in the case of 39 Orissa and Chhattisgarh States and combined a large number into provisional units as in the case of 280 Kathiawar States and Estates. Only fifteen States were entitled, by resources and importance, to qualify for separate existence.

One will overcome and swallow the other. And there is no doubt that the democracy in India is not going to be swallowed by anything else. So it is the autocracy that has to end. Responsible government in the States has been our policy. In regard to accession or in regard to any other matter, the people of the State are to decide. That is the policy which has been before Hyderabad so far as we are concerned for these many months. We have not pressed for this nor made it an immediate issue, because we realise that the situation in Hyderabad has been a difficult one. We cannot always logically follow a certain course of action. One has to take other matters into consideration, so as to avoid perhaps a worsening of the situation. So we did not press this. And we had a Standstill Agreement for a year. That agreement has not prospered and many things have happened since then which are hardly in keeping with the letter or spirit of that agreement.⁶ Still we have been patient. I do not use this word in order to show that we are very generous about it. Not that, but because we are anxious and eager to solve this problem of Hyderabad by peaceful methods. It is to our advantage, obviously as much as it is to the advantage of the people and the present Government in Hyderabad, to solve this by peaceful methods, because any other method may yield results, and will no doubt yield results, but at a big cost which we would rather not pay. These methods may not cost us so much, but cost the people of Hyderabad, who might suffer greatly. Therefore, we have avoided any other course and we shall go on avoiding other courses as long as we can, as long as we have any hope of a peaceful decision. But I must say that as the situation is developing in Hyderabad, it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to look from a distance as to what is happening. The kind of speeches⁷ that are delivered in Hyderabad, by people who occupy responsible positions as heads of big organisations, are speeches which would be extraordinary even if they came from a lunatic asylum. I am amazed that any man should dare to say that in India or anywhere in the world. I am astonished that any man, who is the head of an organisation or even a humble member of it, should have the temerity to say it under issue of threats as he has done, and I want to say clearly that if this kind of thing represents the spirit and the Government of Hyderabad, then we have had

6. The breaches of the Standstill Agreement were : the loan of Rs. 20 crores by Hyderabad to Pakistan, the banning of the Indian rupee in Hyderabad, and the banning of the export of all precious metals and precious stones.

7. Muslim spokesmen in Hyderabad State proclaimed their readiness to die rather than surrender to "Hindu *banta*" rule. They also said that they would launch a *Jehad* which would rouse "every Indian Muslim to action and bring down the whole sub-continent in chaos."

enough of Hyderabad.⁸ There are certain limits to the utterance and to the actions of individuals, wherever they may be. We have many people on our side, I have no doubt, who speak rashly, who often indulge in rash actions. I wish they would not. But, nevertheless, I think the kind of speech, and the kind of action that has been going on in Hyderabad which represents, I take it, the spirit of that organisation, the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, then all that I can say is that the State of Hyderabad is a pretty powerless one. If that is the ideology behind the speech and the action, I am afraid Hyderabad is going to suffer greatly, because out of such an evil speech and evil action, only evil can result.

But now you are on the borders of Hyderabad and sometimes I hear cries from the Andhra *desh* which are full of excitement, which are full of apprehension and the like. Now I do not like people to get excited. When there is a problem to face we have to be cool and collected. The Hyderabad problem is, no doubt, a serious problem and it should be tackled seriously. Nevertheless, it is not a problem over which the people of India should grow terribly excited or hysterical.⁹ India may have many problems and many difficulties but let there be no doubt about it that India is, has been and will be, strong enough to deal with the Hyderabad problem. So be wary and vigilant and alert. That is true. At the same time do not grow hysterical about it.

Now, in another connection, I talked out to you about the Communists using violence.¹⁰ It is possible that I may be told that the violence comes from the people of Hyderabad State, may be the police or other people. That is perfectly true. I know it. Now the way to meet that violence is not the petty violence of the people on our side. That is a wrong way. The way to meet it, if necessary and where necessary, is by the organised forces of the State. If, obviously, any incursion of our territory takes place from Hyderabad

8. Kasim Razvi said that they should know that as soon as the Indian Union entered Hyderabad, the invaders would see everywhere burning bodies of one crore and sixty-four lakhs. Muslims would not spare others when they were not allowed to exist. The invaders would have only to collect ashes.
9. Some Indian spokesmen had said that "Hyderabad is a Muslim dagger pointed at the belly of India" and it must be removed. They claimed that Hyderabad was a rallying point for the 40 million Muslims in the Indian Union and must therefore be "liquidated."
10. The Communists, operating mainly from adjacent areas of Madras province, raided into the Nalgonda and Warangal districts of Hyderabad State. On 7 March 1948, five policemen were shot dead and two seriously injured as a result of a Communist attack on a village in Nalgonda district. A goods train belonging to the Hyderabad State Railways was derailed near Vijayawada when a railway bridge was dynamited.

territory, any violence, then, obviously, the forces, police or other, or the army, if necessary, ought to meet it. But it is totally wrong for people, that is to say private people, to organise gangs to meet the official or non-official violence from Hyderabad State. If that happens a tremendous confusion arises and it is not easy then to say where blame ultimately lies. We complain, the Government of Madras complains, of incursions from the Andhra *desh* often. Whether those incursions are Communist incursions or other, I cannot say without inquiring into each one of them. But it does make it a little difficult for us to deal with this question in a simple and straightforward manner when on either side this kind of thing is happening. Therefore there should be no attempt, as this kind of private attempt, at meeting such a situation. Naturally there should always be a private, as well as, a public attempt to defend oneself where one is attacked. No one should tolerate an attack. If there is no sufficient protection at the moment from the forces of the State then the private individual, or the private group, has every right to protect itself from it and they can exercise their right and they should on no account run away.

I shall now say a few words about the Andhra province. Now there really is not much to be said about it, because so far as this question is concerned, so far as the Congress is concerned, long years ago it accepted the idea of the Andhra province specially, as well as certain other linguistic areas to be converted into provinces. The only question that has arisen in the past is how to do it, in what form, and when exactly. Now we are all committed and there can be, I think, no valid reply to the demand for an Andhra province. But the question you and I have to consider has always been, how best to do it? Now if you shout out at me, 'go and do it immediately', that has no meaning to me. I just do not understand it. Things are not done immediately, things require a lot of working out and thinking, and if you try to do them immediately you fail to do them, you upset something, without creating something else. It may happen. I do not think in the creation of an Andhra province, any very vital difficulties need be faced. Nevertheless, when you cut up anything that exists today every consideration has to be borne in mind, so that confusion and chaos should not occur. Therefore the matter has to be considered not from the point of view of a slogan and a shout but rather of how to work it out carefully so as to create the least disturbance and carry the greatest goodwill and agreement behind it. We propose to appoint at the next session of the Constituent Assembly, immediately, a committee or a commission to go into this matter, and not, to begin with, into details of boundaries etc., but rather to go into the broader question, and to report; and immediately after that, if we consider necessary, we shall appoint a regular boundary commission. Now our desire is to proceed about it logically, reasonably and with a view to avoiding any future diffi-

culties. Without considering all the matters involved, you can take it from me that the Andhra province would have a very bad start and would be entangled in difficulties right from the beginning. You would not be happy. Why did you want an Andhra province? Because you want as far as possible to develop your own cultural and other life in this Andhra *desh*, to live according to your wishes. Quite right. You have every right to wish that. But if you start living like that, entangled in a mesh and with all manner of conflicts behind and before you, you will not have time even to live your lives, just as we have been entangled in meshes in India in many dangerous complications and we have had to put aside consideration of all our major problems. Therefore I say let us set about it as speedily as possible, but in the only right way, consider every aspect of the problem, how to do it, that it has to be done has been admitted long ago. Consider the question how to do it in the best and the speediest possible way, and for that purpose the Constituent Assembly is going to appoint a committee next month when it meets. So much for this question of the Andhra province.

Now I want you again to remember that all these questions, howsoever important, are rather secondary questions in the context of the world today. In the outside world there is talk of war and huge armies line up to the right and to the left. In India we have seen this foremost tragedy of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi and behind that so many evil forces are working, in hiding today because of popular wrath, but nevertheless, they are there, and they have to be found out and rooted out. Now if we allow ourselves to be lost in them, then there is the major and the big problem, the big economic problem, which affects labour and peasantry and industry altogether. And here in the Madras Presidency, you know there is this terrible shortage of food which is exercising your Government here tremendously, and which is exercising the Central Government tremendously. Naturally we cannot permit, and we cannot allow, a single person to die of starvation. And yet if the most urgent steps are not taken, starvation may be faced by millions of people in this province. It is a terrific problem which we must shoulder, which we will shoulder. All these are big problems and then there is the major economic problem of raising standards, raising wages, etc., creating more wealth, more production, better distribution. These are the big problems. Let us not divert our attention from them and get caught up in secondary problems. Here you are in Vishakhapatnam, a growing city, with a bright future before you. I would advise you, if I may, that build it up, build this city, make it a great industrial and a great educational city, and other things will follow from it. Make Andhra province great in many ways. Concentrate on that. Avoid industrial trouble as far as possible. I hope that your provincial Government, and I hope that our Central Government in Delhi, will see to it that no injustice is done to labour, that if there is a dispute there is a fair tribunal to decide that dispute, because at the present moment strikes,

etc., which come in the way of production, ultimately come in the way of solving most of our problems in India. Therefore, these are big problems we have to face and consider. We have to build now, let us not destroy, let us not hold back our hands when we have work to do.

I have spoken about the food situation in parts of this Presidency.¹¹ I want to repeat to you that bad as the situation is, we have every hope of dealing with it satisfactorily, we shall try our utmost, and we will succeed. But I want your help, and this Government of Madras wants your help, and the help of all others in this province, as well as, of course, in the rest of India. For fear, perhaps, of scarcity which exists, many people may hoard the foodgrains that they possess. But it is not a right policy to adopt, it may perhaps be considered justifiable in the narrow sense of the word, but at the present moment it is not a right policy. The Government of Madras and the Central Government are going to do their utmost to see that food reaches every person in the province, and those who may have small or big hoards should bring them out and thus relieve the situation.

And so I thank you again and wish you good fortune in the future.
Jai Hind.

11. A food crisis was caused by the failure of the north-east monsoon in many districts of the Madras presidency and the Government sought to import grain, procure it from surplus districts, distribute fertilisers at reduced prices and introduce rationing,

3. Need for a Peaceful Settlement¹

Very soon most of the 600 States will have merged or will form themselves into separate unions and there will be only 20 or 30 large ones left, the rest functioning as units of the Indian Union or being absorbed in India. You know how we have dealt with the States problem which is a difficult problem. It is a difficult heritage of British rule and since the withdrawal of the British power, we have seen a tremendous change. So many of the States have ceased to exist or have been merged in the provinces or have joined together to form larger units.

Our policy with regard to every State has been that there should be full responsible government and equal measure of freedom as in the rest of

1. This text is based on Nehru's speech at a women's meeting at Vishakhapatnam, 14 March 1948. From *The Hindu*, 15 March 1948.

India. We cannot have varying degrees and gradations of freedom in different parts of India. We cannot have autocracy in any part of the country. Democracy and autocracy cannot pull on together. One will overcome and swallow the other. There is no doubt that the democracy in India is not going to be swallowed by anybody and so it is autocracy that has to end. Responsible Government in a State or any other matter must be decided by the people of the State.

4. To Mir Laik Ali¹

New Delhi
March 26, 1948

Dear Mr. Laik Ali,²

I have received your letter of the 21st March and have given it careful consideration.

We are anxious that the All India Radio should give publicity only to facts and in that there should be no exaggeration. We should like the press also to follow a like policy. Not only is this desirable in itself because it is always wrong and harmful for false or exaggerated accounts to be published, but, in view of the strained relations existing in regard to Hyderabad, it is particularly necessary to avoid saying anything which might have injurious effects.

You must know that the Government have no control over the messages sent by special correspondents of newspapers and news agencies nor is it possible for the Government to check the accuracy of these messages. So far as the A.I.R. is concerned, they rely for their broadcast on official reports from the provincial governments concerned and, in a few cases, on the reports of accepted news agencies like the Associated Press of India and the United Press of India. These agencies appear to have special correspondents on the spot.

In your letter you refer to what you call a few glaring instances of deliberate falsehood. I cannot go into these individual instances unless there is a regular enquiry into each of them. It is quite possible that there has been exaggeration in some of the reports of these special correspondents as

1. J.N Collection.

2. Businessman who joined politics and was Prime Minister of Hyderabad State, 1947-48.

the public, both in Hyderabad and in India, is considerably agitated about the position³ in Hyderabad and the activities of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and the Razakars.⁴ On the other hand, you will appreciate that it is difficult for us to accept total denials issued by the Hyderabad Government as these denials have not always been found to be correct.

So far as the All India Radio is concerned, they will exercise every care in this matter. But the real difficulty, you will appreciate, is that the situation in Hyderabad is steadily deteriorating owing to various factors, more especially the activities of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and the Razakars. Recently the President of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen delivered a speech in which he openly threatened a massacre of the Hindu inhabitants of the State, that is the vast majority of the population. Anything more astoundingly outrageous than this statement I cannot conceive. Irresponsibility can go no further. Is it surprising that when such statements are made publicly by persons holding important positions in public life, the public, both in Hyderabad and in India, should be agitated and alarmed? The merchants and lawyers in Hyderabad have in a body expressed their apprehension at the activities of the Ittehad and the Razakars and an atmosphere of total insecurity is created. It is generally believed that the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and the Razakars are closely associated with H.E.H. the Nizam's Government. When the Government apparatus itself indulges in or encourages disorder and violence, then surely the people become shelterless and panic-stricken. All manner of rumours are disseminated which may or may not have much truth behind them but the fundamental fact remains that the situation is one of grave disorder in the promotion of which the Razakars have had a considerable part. It is for the Government of Hyderabad to consider how to deal with this situation.

So far as the Government of India are concerned, we do not think that any problem can be solved by violence or vilification. We have endeavoured, thus far without success, to deal with this situation in a friendly way because we want peace and mutual understanding. We want to discourage wild and unverified statements, but the kind of activities that are taking place and the statements that are made in Hyderabad are themselves largely responsible for this state of affairs.

3. In June 1947 about 5,000 persons were arrested in the satyagraha movement of the Hyderabad State Congress. Swami Ramanand Tirth was arrested for hoisting the Union flag, but was released in December 1947 in a partial amnesty designed to renew negotiations for expanding the cabinet by the inclusion of Congress nominees. He was rearrested when he announced that he would offer satyagraha again.
4. The Razakars were the private army of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen. They stood for the perpetuation of the feudal Muslim rule of the Asaf Jahi dynasty. They had four representatives in the Nizam's cabinet.

If any particular instance occurs where there has been misrepresentation or exaggeration, please draw the attention of our Agent General⁵ to the matter and he will, no doubt, take the necessary steps.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. K.M. Munshi.

THE INTEGRATION OF STATES
II, Other States

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
9 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

N.C. Mehta² came to see me today and casually mentioned about some developments in Indore.³ I do not know anything about them except what I have read rather hurriedly in the newspapers. Even now I do not know much except that some crisis has developed in Indore. The Maharaja there is, of course, a completely useless individual and can be relied upon to do the wrong thing.

I do not know whether you intend taking any special action in this matter and if so what this is likely to be. Action is obviously justified, but I have no doubt that you will take into consideration the effects of any strong action on the other rulers. We have a good many problems on our hands at present, notably those of Kashmir and Pakistan. Anything that might add to our difficulties would have to be considered carefully in this all-India context.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. (b. 1891); joined I.C.S. 1915; served in various capacities in the United Provinces; Prime Minister, Indore, September 1947-January 1948; Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, January-April 1948; Chief Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, 1948-50.
3. Early in 1948, Yashwant Rao Holkar, the Maharaja of Indore, terminated the services of N.C. Mehta and appointed M.V. Bhide as Prime Minister and made several other high military and civilian appointments in disregard of the agreement reached with the Ministry of States. At a public meeting on 5 January 1948, the Praja Mandal leaders protested against these appointments and demanded immediate removal of the "reactionary" officials and asked for a representative government on the Mysore model.

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
11 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 10th January about Indore.

1. J.N. Collection.

I entirely agree with you that the Maharaja has forfeited every claim to respect or indulgence and that we would be perfectly justified in taking any steps against him. He is a complete moron and it is astonishing that a man like him should be in a position affecting large numbers of people.

I wrote to you in order to find out what was happening and to know if any action was intended. I think you are right in leaving him for the moment to stew in his own juice. Obviously we may have to take action if necessity requires it. Probably it is as well that the Praja Mandal should do something.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram 58/S dated January 31. Papers relating to paragraph 2(b), item 4 of para.3 of document II and para. 12 of document III are being forwarded to you separately.

2. Following are answers seriatim to points raised by you regarding Pakistan's allegations :—

(i) Our troops entered Junagadh and Mangrol. Mangrol has acceded to the Dominion of India and signed the Instrument of Accession. Pakistan may argue either that Mangrol being a feudatory of Junagadh had no right to accede separately or alternatively that the accession of Mangrol was secured by coercion. The reply to these arguments would be, first, that Mangrol was always treated as a separate entity and never recognised the suzerainty of Junagadh. Secondly, whatever arrangement existed between Mangrol and Junagadh it was entirely the product of Paramountcy and lapsed with the lapse of Paramountcy. The Sheikh of Mangrol himself came to Rajkot and voluntarily handed over his Instrument of Accession to the Secretary, Ministry of States. Entry of our troops into Junagadh was on an invitation by the Dewan, who had obtained Ruler's consent, and by

1. New Delhi, 5 February 1948. M.E.A. files.

Executive Council of Junagadh State supported by representative public opinion. Troops were led into Junagadh by Harvey-Jones,² Junior Member of the State Council and Member-in-charge of the State Forces. Junagadh was taken over without firing a shot. Our troops are still in Junagadh and Mangrol. Manavadar, Sardargarh (including Sultanabad) and Bantwa were petty States attached to Junagadh under the Attachment Scheme of the late Political Department and on the lapse of Paramountcy the Attachment Scheme also lapsed. This decision was announced on 13-8-47 when India was still undivided. The administration of these States had however completely broken down and consequently management of the States was taken over by the Government of India. Our troops never entered these States.

(ii) It is not correct that Rulers of these States have been kept in detention. The Nawab of Junagadh and Chiefs of Bantwa and Sardargarh left their States and have gone to other places of their free will. The Khan of Manavadar and the Sheikh of Mangrol are staying at Jamnagar and Porbandar respectively in State palaces and treated with all courtesy as guests of the Rulers of Jamnagar and Porbandar. Neither Ruler has expressed any dissatisfaction with the arrangements made for them. It is entirely untrue to suggest that these Rulers have been subjected to any pressure to wean them from Pakistan. On the other hand Pakistan tried to coerce Mangrol to renounce his accession to India, judging from statements made by him from time to time. The Nawab of Kurwai, the maternal uncle of the Sheikh of Mangrol, spent several days with him at Porbandar.

(iii) The present administration of Junagadh, having been voluntarily and lawfully made over to the Government of India, is being carried on by the Regional Commissioner³ assisted by an Administrator. The Nawab of Junagadh, and his duly constituted Council, after consulting public leaders handed over the administration of the State to the Government of India as they were unable to maintain law and order. Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto's letter of 8th November handing over the administration was delivered personally by Harvey-Jones, senior member of the State Council, to our Regional Commissioner. Dewan's letter itself admits that the administration of the State at the time the letter was written had completely disintegrated. The Government of India entered Junagadh, in response to importunities of the State administration and to put an end to lawlessness in Junagadh, in the list of territories of States which had acceded to India. The Nawab had not been deposed but removed himself to, and is staying of his own free

2. Captain M.S. Harvey-Jones.

3. M.N. Buch.

will, at Karachi. Technically and formally the Junagadh administration is carried on in the name and on behalf of the Nawab. It may be pointed out that the State administration with the full connivance and knowledge of Pakistan approached the Regional Commissioner for States of Rajkot (the Government of India) to take over complete charge of the administration. The action of the Government of India was thus not an act of aggression against Pakistan. Moreover, the proviso to Section 7(1) of the Indian Independence Act continues all existing agreements between *inter alia* Junagadh and the Government of India relating to customs, transit and communications, posts and telegraphs and other like matters, which shows that Junagadh was intimately bound up with India.

(iv) Pakistan has been informed, from the beginning, of our intention to hold and abide by a plebiscite in Junagadh.⁴ The plebiscite is due to be held in the third week of February. A press communique in this respect was issued on the 15th January 1948. Date of plebiscite has not been specially notified to Pakistan.

Referendum is being held by a senior judicial officer, Mr. Nagarkar,⁵ who is neither a Hindu nor a Muslim. He is a Brahmo. It is quite unnecessary to hold the plebiscite under the authority of the United Nations but if the United Nations and Pakistan press for this and if the United Nations thinks it desirable it may straightaway send one or two observers to report on the arrangements made for the holding of and the actual conduct of the referendum. Under no circumstances should we agree to postponement of the plebiscite to enable the U.N.O. and Pakistan to send their observers. Subject to this we may not raise any serious objection to such a proposal.

In all these areas the present situation regarding law and order is being maintained and complete protection is available to all sections and communities and life is normal. In a statement issued on 19th January 1948 Muslim leaders of Kathiawar had themselves expressed satisfaction with the administration.

4. In February 1948, Junagadh decided in favour of accession to India by 190,779 votes to 91 against it.

5. Chandrakant Balvantrao Nagarkar (b. 1894); joined I.C.S. 1921; served in Bombay as assistant collector and magistrate; sessions judge, May 1930; Registrar, High Court, Bombay, 1931-35; district and sessions judge, 1945-46; Judicial Commissioner and later Chief Commissioner, Ajmer-Marwar, western India and Gujarat States Agency, 1946-50; member, U.P.S.C., 1950-56.

4. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
2nd March 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

As you know the recent visit of Dr. Pattabhi to Patiala² has led to complications. I am afraid Pattabhi has been rather indiscreet.³

I feel that it would be advantageous to all concerned if there was some kind of closer contact between the States Ministry and the All India States' People's Conference. This Conference has largely achieved its purpose and has not got very much to do except in a small number of States. Nevertheless I think it should continue for some time at least and then its future fate can be decided. In fact the change in the Congress constitution also will affect it.

Meanwhile, as I have suggested above some contacts with it will be appreciated by them and may prove helpful to the States Ministry. It was for this reason that at my suggestion the States, People's Conference appointed a small committee consisting of Dr. Pattabhi, Jai Narain Vyas and Hira Lal Shastri and asked them to keep in touch with the States Ministry and co-operate with them. Hira Lal Shastri has now undertaken a job at Jaipur and will be Premier. Jai Narain Vyas is likely to be busy in Jodhpur. Nevertheless these people will be coming to Delhi from time to time and can meet representatives of the States Ministry. Actually I think nothing very much will result but, psychologically speaking, it would have a good effect. The States People's Conference will get some kind of general guidance about the policies of the States Ministry and will adapt themselves to them as far as possible.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Pattabhi Sitaramayya visited Patiala from 27 to 29 February 1948 to attend a conference of the State Praja Mandal.

3. For Nehru's letter to Sitaramayya on this subject see *ante*, section 4, sub-section II, item 7.

5. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
2nd March 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai.

I have written to you separately about the All India States' People's Conference.² This Conference cannot possibly continue in its present form for long. It may have to be wound up completely or merged into the Congress. But this can only be done by the Conference itself when it meets in full session. It is proposed to have a general council meeting after about two months when the situation will be clearer and possibly the Congress constitution will have been passed. Meanwhile, it will continue in some form. As a matter of fact it has been rather inactive except for local work in some States. Generally speaking it has adapted itself to the circumstances. But in the smaller States of the Punjab the Punjabi element has never been wise or even courteous. We have to keep these various elements in some kind of order and check their exuberance. I think the best way to do is to keep some contact with the States' People's Conference as suggested by me in my other letter.

The pace of change in the States has been very great and you have accomplished a wonderful piece of work. I think the time has come for some kind of a review of this work by Cabinet and more specially the consideration by it of the general policy governing it. What are our objectives? What States are likely to remain as separate units? What are going to be merged in the provinces? What are going to group themselves together in a unit? Also what the internal structure of the States should be in the new order?

Perhaps it is not possible to give a precise answer to all these questions as the situation is a changing and dynamic one. But it should be possible to lay down the general policy that is going to be pursued. I would suggest that your Ministry might draw up a note on this subject for the consideration of the Cabinet.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1 J.N. Collection.

2. See the preceding letter.

6. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
2 March 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

We are having to deal with frontier problems all over the place. The Rajputana border is coming into the picture more and more. I had a talk with Panikkar yesterday and he told me that the position at that frontier from our point of view was bad and the States cannot do much to improve it. He made a suggestion which appears to me to be worthy of consideration. This was that a frontier belt might be separated from the States of Bikaner, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer and that this belt might be put directly in charge of the Central Government, that is to say of our Defence Ministry. The belt need only be about 10 to 15 miles in width. We can then evolve a uniform frontier policy for that area. At present communications there are very bad and the States' capitals are hardly in touch with their borders. I understand that there will be no difficulty in the States agreeing to some such proposal, because this will give protection to them also. The people living in the border regions will also feel more secure. At present there is a tendency to migrate leaving the border unoccupied. This is an invitation to raiders and others.

I do not think this should involve any considerable military commitments. It is largely a question of better organisation.

If you approve of this idea your Ministry and the Defence Ministry might consider it first and then later further steps can be taken.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Baldev Singh.

I might add that Panikkar was rather worried at certain developments in Rajputana more specially in Jodhpur where an aggressive fascist organisation of the Rajputs had taken shape. This is called the Durga Horse.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

7. To A. Vaidyanatha Iyer¹

New Delhi
18th March 1948

Dear Mr. Vaidyanatha Iyer,²

I have your letter of 14th March about the merger of Pudukottah State.³ There is no question of ignoring the wishes of the people of the State. Kashmir and Junagadh stand on a different footing completely because of our conflict on those issues with Pakistan. The question there was one of accession, not of merger.

You will remember that it is undesirable in the long run to have a large number of small units in the Indian Union. Some kind of test of size, population and more especially economic resources has to be applied. The smaller States, therefore, have to be merged into the provinces or made to group themselves together to form a larger unit. Real and rapid progress will only come then. In having these mergers, it is perfectly true that we have to deal with States which vary in regard to their administration and economic condition. Pudukottah, as you yourself pointed out, has been one of the better-run States. Surely it will not lose that advantage but will rather have greater resources at its disposal in the new order of things. We have to look at all these matters from a long distance. There can be little doubt that this requires larger self-governing units.

In any event, I wish to assure you that there was no desire to bypass the people. On the whole we have been flooded with demands from the people of the smaller States for merger and we have rather resisted them. If each small State was allowed self-determination in regard to its internal autonomy, we would then have a very complicated chessboard of units with no uniformity.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1890-1955); Congress worker from 1921; imprisoned three times during the freedom struggle; President, Tamil Nadu Harijan Sevak Sangh, from 1936; organised constructive work in Madura and Ramnad districts; member, Madras Legislative Assembly, 1946-52.

3. Pudukottah, a small State with an area of 1,200 square miles and a population of 4.5 million, had merged in the neighbouring district of Tiruchirappalli in the Madras province on 3 March 1948.

8. The State of Kalat¹

The Prime Minister explained the events leading to the accession of Kalat to Pakistan.² He particularly referred to the statement attributed to Mr. V.P. Menon according to which he was alleged to have stated that Kalat had offered to accede to India and that the offer had not been accepted by us. Mr. Menon had in fact made no such statement and it appeared that his references to Kalat had somehow been distorted by the All India Radio. It was significant that no newspaper had referred to the story of accession as given out by the All India Radio.

1. Minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 29 March 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. Kalat had acceded to Pakistan on 28 March 1948.

9. The Accession of Kalat¹

I am glad to have this opportunity of clearing up a misapprehension that has unfortunately arisen. I greatly regret that owing to an error in reporting the All India Radio announced on the night of the 27th March that His Highness, the Khan of Kalat, had approached the Government of India about two months ago through his agents to seek permission to accede to India but the Government of India did not agree. This statement is incorrect. No mention has been made at any time either by the representative of the Ruler of Kalat or by the Government of India to the accession of Kalat State to India. In view of the geographical position of Kalat State, the question did not arise at all.

I might also add that certain reports, which have appeared in the foreign press about political negotiations between the Government of India and Kalat State, are also completely without foundation. The statement that any sum of money has been paid to Kalat State on behalf of the Government and that the Government have sought air bases in Kalat are also wholly without foundation.

1. Reply to a question by Balkrishna Sharma regarding Kalat State on 30 March 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. IV, 1948, pp. 2744-2745.

The facts are as follows : In August last, soon after the declaration of independence in India, the Government of Kalat drew the attention of the Government of India to a press communique in which it was said that the Government of Pakistan had recognised Kalat as an independent sovereign State, in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status different from that of the Indian States. They invited the Government of India to make a similar declaration. Some time later a request was made on behalf of Kalat State for permission to establish a trade agency of the State in Delhi. No formal reply was sent to either of these requests. Informally the representative of Kalat State was informed that these requests could not be considered then. No further communication of any kind has passed between the Government of India and the Government of Kalat.

LETTERS TO THE
PREMIERS OF PROVINCES

P

New Delhi
5 January 1948

My dear Premier,

I am sorry for the slight delay in sending you my fortnightly letter. I have been out of Delhi during the past few days visiting Lucknow, Jaipur and Ajmer.

2. This is my first letter in the New Year. Inevitably on such an occasion one looks both back and forward. We have had a tough time during these past few months but I think any impartial judge will say that we have dealt with the situation with courage and with a measure of success. Taking an overall view of the situation, it can definitely be stated that in spite of difficulties we are stronger and more firmly established than some months ago. We have to be vigilant and be prepared for all consequences. At the same time we are confident that we have the strength, the resources and the will to overcome the dangers and difficulties that surround us. It is on this note of confidence that I wish you and your colleagues and your Government not just a happy New Year because that would be a banal phrase but rather a New Year of fulfilment and achievement, a New Year of service to the nation and to the common man in India.

3. Yesterday we celebrated the independence of the new Republic of the Union of Burma. That event was undoubtedly of great significance to us and to Asia. Through travail and sorrow Asia forges ahead. In China a civil war rages and the future is dark.² In Indonesia, there is a continuing struggle and freedom is not yet assured.³ In Palestine there is organised religious conflict on an intensive scale, probably the prelude to large-scale disorder and battle.⁴ In India we have military operations going on in

1. File No. 25(6)-47-48-PMS. The letters in this section have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru—Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 1 (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 42-94.
2. A full-scale civil war had been going on since July 1946 between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China. At this time the Chinese Government and the Communist troops were fighting the battle of the vital railway junction of Mukden.
3. Indonesia became independent only on 27 December 1949 following three years of intermittent negotiations and armed conflict. At this time the United Nations Good Offices Committee was mediating between the Netherlands East Indies Government and the Indonesian Republic for a truce.
4. In Palestine, the city of Jerusalem, had been sealed off in December 1947 following a gun-battle between the Jews and the Arabs in which heavy casualties were suffered by both sides.

Kashmir, in fact a little war is being waged even though it might not have been declared to be so.

4. The outlook the world over is also not promising and at no time since the last World War have relations been so strained between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and their respective blocs. People talk complacently of another war coming and prepare for it. The outlook is not bright, yet I do not think that any war on a large scale is likely to take place in the near future.

5. For us in India the Kashmir issue has become dominating. Indeed, this has been raised to an international level by our reference to the Security Council of the United Nations and most of the Great Powers are intensely interested in what happens in Kashmir because of its strategic position. The course of military operations in Kashmir has not always been satisfactory and there have been some petty setbacks. Recently, however, our troops have given a very severe hammering to the invaders. Our morale has gone up and no doubt the morale of the enemy has gone down to some extent. As I informed you in my last letter, we are dealing with this Kashmir issue in all seriousness and taking such steps as we may consider necessary to provide for future developments.

6. We have referred the Kashmir issue to the Security Council of the United Nations and my colleague, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, together with Shri Motilal Setalvad, will represent us at the hearing of this Council. We have done so because we wanted to avoid, insofar as this was possible, any development which would lead to war between the two Dominions. War is never to be lightly thought of though sometimes it becomes inevitable. So while on the one hand we have taken all necessary precautions, military and other, on the other hand we have requested the Security Council to call upon the Pakistan Government to refrain from helping and encouraging invaders. Our reference is a limited one but the Pakistan Government evidently wishes to bring in all manner of things which have nothing to do with Kashmir. It is possible that the Security Council may send a Commission to India in the near future for an enquiry on the spot.

7. In view of the dangerous implications of the situation in our frontiers it is of peculiar importance that there should be peace and order everywhere in India and that there should in particular be no communal trouble. Any communal disturbances will weaken our front against the enemy and discredit us before the United Nations. All those, therefore, who preach communal hatred are doing a very grave disservice to the country. You will always remember that this Kashmir affair is not essentially

a communal affair and that we are fighting side by side there with the Kashmir national movement under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. It may also interest you to know that one of the Brigadiers in charge of our forces in the Jammu province is a Muslim officer.⁵ He was asked for by name by the Commanding General, who is a Sikh,⁶ and I have been told that he had displayed great keenness and ability in his work. Communal trouble in India reacts unfavourably on the Kashmir situation as well as on the all-India situation. We cannot and must not do what Pakistan does in its territory. At present the position of Hindus and Sikhs in Sind is becoming very difficult and we are trying to organise their evacuation as methodically as possible.⁷ The Hindus in East Bengal are also in a bad way though there have been no major occurrences there. The well-to-do classes have left and those who remain are poor and weak and without much local leadership.

8. Muslim communalism in India is too weak now to raise its head though undoubtedly there are elements of mischief still present in India. Muslim communalism functions now as a state in Pakistan. Within India the communalism we have to deal with today is essentially Hindu and Sikh communalism which has lately become more and more aggressive and intolerant. The R.S.S. has played an important part in recent developments and evidence has been collected to implicate it in certain very horrible happenings. It is openly stated by their leaders that the R.S.S. is not a political body but there can be no doubt that their policy and programmes are political, intensely communal and based on violent activities. They have to be kept in check and we must not be misled by their pious professions which are completely at variance with their policy.

9. The problem of rehabilitation of the vast number of refugees from Pakistan must be considered as one having the highest priority. Not only have we to prevent as far as we can human suffering but we have also to prevent large numbers of embittered people, who have lost much, from becoming homeless wanderers. Even from the point of view of the security of the state this is undesirable. Among these people there are many who could serve the state with distinction given the chance in various fields of constructive activities. We cannot lose this fund of ability. Others also have to be made into productive citizens of India and given opportunities of progress.

5. Brigadier Muhammad Usman, who commanded an Indian Army brigade, was killed in action in July 1948.

6. Major-General Kulwant Singh.

7. The Government set up on 14 January 1948 the Directorate-General of Evacuation to organise the transfer of 54,000 refugees from Karachi to the Kathiawar port by ship and from Hyderabad and Mirpur Khas in Pakistan to Marwar in India by train.

10. In regard to this question of rehabilitation two points must be clearly borne in mind. Firstly, that it is a colossal problem and requires the fullest cooperation of the whole of India in solving it. This necessitates co-operation and coordination under Central direction. Secondly, in facing any big problem, it is necessary to have priorities laid down. Otherwise an attempt to do everything at the same time meets with failure all along the line. Something definitely achieved is of greater help in the next steps than a spread-out effort which does not yield results. Rehabilitation on a large scale offers excellent opportunity for economic planning. Economic issues are, of course, always before us and recently they have become very pressing. We must deal with them as a whole and lay down definite policies.

11. Recently at a conference held in Delhi it was decided to have a three-year truce between labour and capital and to concentrate on production as well as, of course, equitable distribution.⁸ This was a great achievement but unfortunately there have been labour troubles since then.⁹ I earnestly hope that these troubles were temporary phenomena and that the conception of industrial truce will prevail.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. The truce between labour and capital was reached at the Industries Conference in December 1947 at Delhi.
9. The dockyard and port trust workers in Bombay went on strike for higher wages and the workers in Kanpur struck work on 2 January 1948 demanding leave with pay. Besides, the workers in the Kanpur textiles mills also went on an indefinite strike. On the whole, from 226 strikes in 1947 the number fell to 123 in 1948, and many of these strikes were not successful.

II

New Delhi
17 January 1948

My dear Premier,

Since I last wrote to you, everything that has happened has been completely overshadowed by Gandhiji's fast. It has come on us suddenly and stunned even many of us who know him well. I am writing this letter with a prayer in my heart—which I have not ceased to make ever since I first heard of the fast—that we may be spared the supreme tragedy. It is not necessary that I should write and explain to you the significance which Gandhiji attaches to the fast; he has done it himself and it is impossible for others, however

closely associated with him, to interpret his unique approach any more clearly than he can. There is, however, one aspect which may be useful for me to mention, particularly to those Premiers who are far removed from the gruesome events of Punjab and Delhi.

2. The last prolonged fast which Gandhiji undertook was in 1943 when he was a prisoner.¹ That fast was for a purpose which the man in the street understood and wholly sympathised with. His recent fast in Calcutta was also for an easily understood purpose which had the support of the overwhelming bulk of the people. The fast which he has now undertaken is less easy for the general public to understand; and in fact there are sections of them, more particularly among the refugees, who do not sympathise with it and are in a sense antagonistic to it. Therein lies its significance and supreme courage.

3. We are faced, particularly in East Punjab and Delhi, with the psychological problem created by the events of the last few months. These have created in the minds of people, not merely among the refugees but also among others, a bitterness, a sense of desperation and a desire for retaliation—in short, a serious spiritual malaise. This is wholly understandable but nonetheless extremely dangerous. We have all of us done our best to cure it but have not succeeded except only to a limited extent. The difficulties have been partly due to our inability to tackle effectively the problem of rehabilitation about which I shall write further in this letter and partly to the continuing evidence of hostility and barbaric conduct towards the minorities in Pakistan. The result has been that sections of the Hindu community are not in tune with and do not understand Gandhiji's approach to the Muslim problem in India. They resent his approach and think that it is somehow or other inimical to their own interests. And yet any person with vision can see that Gandhiji's approach is not only morally correct, but is also essentially practical. Indeed, it is the only possible approach if we think in terms of the nation's good, both from the short and long distance points of view. Any other approach means perpetuating conflict and postponing all notions of national consolidation and progress.

4. This is not the occasion to analyse—no one can analyse them—the complexity of urges which must have driven Gandhiji to take this supreme step but quite clearly its main purpose is to make the majority community

1. Mahatma Gandhi undertook a fast for 21 days from 10 February 1943 in the Aga Khan Palace at Pune in protest against the Government accusation that he was responsible for the disturbances in the country after 9 August 1942. He also considered the fast as a measure of self-purification.

in India search its heart and purge itself of hatred and the desire to retaliate. In the atmosphere in which it has been undertaken, it displays a degree of heroism of which only Gandhiji is capable. The ordeal has been made worse for him by the tragic events that have occurred in Pakistan in the last few days—the murder and wholesale looting in Karachi² and the revolting attack on a non-Muslim refugee train in Gujrat in West Punjab.³ But these incidents, in Gandhiji's conception, are not merely wholly irrelevant but only increase the urgency of the step that he has taken.

5. I am sure you will mobilise all your resources to emphasise to the people of your province, by every possible means, the meaning and purpose of the fast and thus help to create a situation in which Gandhiji may break it. I regard the emergency created by the fast as at least as grave as the disease that has given rise to it; and if we do not go all out to meet it, history will not forgive us.

6. The Karachi killing and looting have brought to a final crisis the problem of non-Muslims in Sind. There is at present no place for Hindus in Sind. Even if they suffer no bodily injury, it is impossible for them to lead normal or secure lives or to carry on their professions or vocations. They are harassed and insulted and often pushed out of their houses. This is not done by the Sindhi Muslims with whom they have had friendly relations, but by vast hordes of Muslim refugees from the Punjab who continue to pour in. We have now to arrange for the wholesale evacuation from Sind of the non-Muslims. Over 400,000 have already left; about a million still remain.⁴

7. In the Gujrat train tragedy the initiative appears to have been taken by the Frontier tribal people and Pathans who swarm all over West Punjab now. The train was bringing Hindus from Bannu. The actual deaths were about 300 but many are still missing. After the tragedy the Pakistan Government took energetic steps to give relief. Law and order have ceased to function in the northern and eastern districts of West Punjab and the Pathans there ignore the administration.

2. On 6 January 1948, a mob attacked Sikh refugees collected in a *gurdwara* in Karachi. The *gurdwara* was set on fire and all but a few Sikhs were killed. Later, murder and looting of minorities spread to other parts of the city.
3. On the night of 11-12 January 1948, a mob of Pathans attacked a refugee train at the Gujrat railway station in Pakistan, overpowered the Indian military escort, massacred or kidnapped about 1,700 of the 2,400 passengers and looted their property.
4. By 21 January 1948, 25,000 refugees had reached India, and by March 1948 nearly 10 lakhs of non-Muslims had migrated from Sind to India.

8. We have in the last few days begun to devote increasing attention to the problem of rehabilitation. Amidst the preoccupations caused by the task of evacuating several million people, I am afraid we did not devote to the subject all the attention that it deserved. Any further delay in tackling it is likely to lead to disastrous consequences. In Delhi city alone, the vast number of refugees, numbering about 450,000, has become a tremendous problem and lately there have been disturbances. In East Punjab, while the provincial Government has achieved a considerable measure of success in some respects, a very great deal still remains to be done. It is doubtful if the resources of the East Punjab Government are sufficient for the purpose of tackling this problem; and it is necessary that every province in India should also cooperate. Essentially, therefore, it is a matter for Central direction and Central planning. We must devise a machinery which could tackle the problem rapidly, effectively and on a planned basis. Vision is necessary and there must be a note of urgency about the work.

9. The Cabinet has appointed a sub-committee with the following terms of reference :—

- (a) To survey the problem of rehabilitation of refugees coming from western Pakistan, more specially those coming from urban areas;
- (b) To lay down the general lines of policy and to make recommendations for an overall planned system of rehabilitation;
- (c) To suggest the machinery necessary to ensure putting into effect of this general plan ; and
- (d) To examine the financial implications of such a plan both in the Centre and in the provinces and States concerned.

The committee will naturally consult the provincial and State governments concerned before finalising its recommendations. When you are consulted, I am sure you will deal with the matter as one of top priority. It is proposed to have a high-powered Development and Rehabilitation Board with a Rehabilitation Commissioner with wide powers for planning and execution.

10. The military situation in Kashmir has shown further improvement since I last wrote to you. Our troops have undertaken vigorous offensive patrols in several directions and have penetrated deep into the territory occupied by the raiders, causing severe casualties to them. For the moment it looks as if the raiders do not want to risk a head-on offensive and there are in fact exceptionally quiet in several sectors of the front. But this may be a mere lull; and in any case our main military problem remains unchanged, namely, that the enemy have a series of strong bases inside the Pakistan frontier from which they can launch attacks at virtually any point of our extended lines of communication and to which they can retire easily for

recuperation and reinforcement. You will have noticed that in our reference to the Security Council, we have taken the line that it is open to us to hit these bases inside Pakistan territory. We do not propose, however, to do this pending developments in the Security Council.

11. Developments in Hyderabad have caused us a good deal of anxiety. You have seen references in the newspapers both to the currency ordinance which the State has issued and to the loan of securities for Rs. 20 crores to Pakistan.⁵ Recently, it was announced by the State Government that the Nizam has sanctioned with retrospective effect a pension to Mr. Ghulam Mohammed.⁶ By itself this is a trivial matter, but the fact that the announcement has been made just at this stage is not without significance. There are also reports of border incidents; there was a serious one a couple of days ago when State troops entered our border in Madras and indulged in looting and destruction of houses and carried away a couple of people.⁷ There was an earlier border incident in which the State police shot two of our people. We have reliable information to show that the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen is in close touch with Mr. Jinnah and doubtless derives considerable inspiration from him. It is necessary for all of us to be alert in regard to Hyderabad and I can assure you that we in Delhi are keeping a very close watch on the situation there. At the same time, we cannot afford to take precipitate action which might make matters worse at a time when we are heavily committed elsewhere.

12. The Madras Government has been pressing us for a large number of rifles for their police units and Home Guards particularly for those intended to protect the Hyderabad border. Several other provinces have also been making similar demands, the total amounting to nearly 200,000 rifles. We have so far been able to despatch 60,000 rifles to all provinces but there is still a very considerable deficit. We are doing our best to recondition certain army rifles which, we think, may be used by the police and are taking steps to import a large number. In view, however, of supply difficulties from other countries this might take some time but I would like to assure you that we are dealing with this matter as one of great urgency.

5. In December 1947, the Nizam's Government issued an ordinance declaring Indian currency to be non-legal tender in the State and advanced a loan of Rs. 20 crores to Pakistan in the form of Government of India securities of equivalent value.
6. (1895-1956); Finance Minister of Hyderabad State, 1942-45; Finance Minister of Pakistan, 1947-51; Governor-General of Pakistan, 1951-55.
7. The incident took place on 1 January 1948 in Tiruvur village in the Krishna district.

13. I am sure you are keeping a very close watch on the situation created by the policy of decontrol of food. You will recollect that in my letter dated 2 December 1947 I emphasised the importance of doing this so that, if the situation deteriorated, you could retrace your steps. There is one province⁸ which has already got into some difficulties over this. They have derationed almost the whole province and have given up monopoly procurement except in a small area. This means that the Government will not get into its hands the surplus of produce in the rest of the province and that the unrationed rural population will now have to rely on the law of demand and supply to get their food. The total production in the province this year is smaller than normal owing to the failure of the monsoon and it is feared that the consequences are likely to be serious. The matter is engaging the attention of our Food Ministry and appropriate advice is shortly being given to the province. But this example illustrates the necessity of not taking decontrol steps faster than we can retrace them if necessary.

14. Speaking of the country as a whole it is too early yet to assess with any accuracy the effect of decontrol. But the indications are that prices have been going up compared with control prices but are substantially less than the black market prices. What proportion of the population depended on the black market I do not know and probably no one does. But clearly we must reckon, so far as the wage-earning and the salaried classes are concerned, with an increase in the cost of living. This increase has been going on for some time quite apart from decontrol. Between November and the third week of December the general index figure went up from 296.7 to 317.7 (about 7%). Food prices alone have gone up about 8%. I hope you have set up within your Cabinet a sub-committee which studies these matters closely. I fear we will have to face many more squalls before we settle down.

15. You will have read the decision of the Government of India to implement immediately the financial agreement between India and Pakistan by paying to the latter Rs. 55 crores minus certain sums which have to be set off against this. This decision was undoubtedly taken under the influence of Gandhiji's fast, though the fast itself had nothing to do with it. To some this may appear a quixotic gesture. But I am convinced that it was not only the right thing to do in the circumstances but eminently wise from the larger point of view of India's good. It shows to the world on what high plane India functions. A little more or less money does not make much difference in national conflicts, but it does make a great deal of difference how a nation

8. The Madras presidency.

behaves even in the midst of crisis. It must be borne in mind that this decision does not alter in the slightest degree our resolve to stand by the people of Jammu and Kashmir State and to redeem the pledge we have given them. Indeed, we have taken this step in order to strengthen our position in Kashmir and the struggle that is going on there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III

New Delhi
5 February 1948

My dear Premier,

When I wrote to you last,¹ Gandhiji was in the middle of his fast. A little more than two weeks have been elapsed since then, and yet it seems as if it was distant ages ago, for so much has happened and all of us have experienced shock and unutterable pain. The suddenness and magnitude of what has happened benumbed us for a while, and yet we felt immediately that we have to take action and swift action.

You are already aware of some action that we have taken. You must have seen the resolutions,² issued by the Government of India, on this tragedy and know that we have banned the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh organisation. Investigations are proceeding. But enough has come to light already to show that this assassination was not the act of just an individual or even a small group. It is clear that behind him lay a fairly widespread organisation and deliberate propaganda of hate and violence carried on for a long time. It is significant that for the first time after a long period we should have political assassination in India and that too on the highest level. Even apart from Gandhiji's death by such assassination, the fact that there are people in this country who have adopted this method to gain political ends is of the gravest import. Perhaps, we have been too lenient in dealing with these various elements in the country. We have suffered for that. But it is time that we gripped the problem fully and dealt with it adequately. There can be no half-measures.

It would appear that a deliberate *coup d'état* was planned involving the killing of several persons and the promotion of general disorder to

1. See the preceding item.

2. See *ante*, section 2, items 3 and 4.

enable the particular group concerned to seize power. The conspiracy appears to have been a fairly widespread one, spreading to some of the States.³ It is not proper for me now to say much more about this except to warn you of its widespread ramifications.

I am and have been a believer in civil liberty and the democratic processes, but it is absurd to talk of democracy when the very basis of it is challenged by terroristic activities; it is equally absurd for civil liberty to be granted to those who wish to seize power by murder and violence. Therefore we are compelled to take action to restrict certain liberties of groups and individuals in order that the people generally should not be deprived of all liberty. I will suggest to you, therefore, to take every possible step to meet this grave situation and to root out the evil that confronts us. We must remember that the people opposed to us are thoroughly unscrupulous. They will say one thing and do another. I have had messages of condolence from some persons of note who are believed to be associated in this conspiracy. I cannot, therefore, just take any person's word for granted. It is fairly well known that attempts have been made, and these have met with some success, in having cells of these conspirators in all manner of governmental places, services, etc. We shall have to purge these and purify our administration and services.

The popular reaction to the murder is understandable.⁴ It was scandalous in the extreme that any person in India should have the temerity and the meanness to celebrate by distribution of sweets or by slogans the assassination of Gandhiji. If the mass of the people resented this and took action of their own accord I can understand it and even appreciate it to some extent. But it is clear that any widespread disorder plays into the hands of our enemies and weakens such action as Government might take and are taking. Unfortunately some people have encouraged this disorder and rather exploited it for particular purposes. While one can understand spontaneous action for a while, one cannot appreciate the exploitation of this sentiment. This kind of thing can only lead to civil strife on a large scale and a confusion of issues. We have many currents and cross-currents agitating the stream of Indian life today. The ending of British rule released many forces and we saw the terrible Punjab disaster. Some of these forces gathered strength

3. There were rumours of a conspiracy with ramifications in Pune, Gwalior, Delhi and Bombay and aimed at all top-ranking leaders. In the *National Herald*, 7 February 1948, it was said that reports from Rajputana and the central Indian States revealed that important jagirdars, officials and Hindu Mahasabha organisers had prior knowledge of the assassination plot. Later in the month, the Government carried on investigations into the complicity of the States of Alwar and Bharatpur in R.S.S. activities.
4. There had been attacks on known supporters of the Hindu Mahasabha, burning of their houses and shops and also attacks on Mahasabha offices.

exploiting that disaster and they have now done this evil deed. The death of Mahatma Gandhi, who was the tremendous cementing force of India, has again weakened our political and social fabric. At this moment the first essential is that we must hold together and subordinate our minor differences in order to face the common peril.

May I mention here a personal matter? It has distressed me greatly that a whispering campaign should go on, sometimes encouraged by those who should know better, to the effect that there are great differences in the Central Cabinet⁵ and that all manner of manoeuvres and intrigues go on. Certain differences in outlook or opinion or approach, which exist in every set of human beings, have been magnified out of all proportion and attempts have been made to exploit these rumours and allegations. I want to assure you that all this is grossly exaggerated and that the Central Cabinet is going to face this crisis jointly and with the single desire to serve the country without any personal considerations coming into the picture. Many of us have worked together for a quarter of a century or more and have gone through all manner of perils and dangers together. It is fantastic to imagine that we are so little-minded as to put our personal selves above the country. Each one of us has undertaken this heavy responsibility because of a sense that duty must be performed. Now when Gandhiji is dead it is all the more incumbent upon all of us to subordinate our little selves and work together for the country's good. We propose to do so in whatever sphere of activity we may be.

Gandhiji has gone and now it becomes more evident than ever what a tremendous stabilising influence he has been in all our problems. We have the mounting economic difficulty—falling production, rising prices and a general disequilibrium. We have strikes and lockouts, we have communalism which hides itself under the cloak of nationalism. We have the Indian States. There has been rapid movement and change in the States and schemes of merger have been put through in regard to the many of the minor States.⁶ Hyderabad remains a problem, not only in regard to its relations with India but also because of its internal set-up. It is an extraordinary combination of medieval autocracy and rabid communalism right in the heart of the country. It is patent that it cannot continue in this fashion. Trouble has occurred on the borders of Hyderabad and there has been some excitement about this. We have naturally to be prepared for all consequences. But there is no reason why we should grow excited over petty border troubles and

5. The reference is to the differences between Nehru and Patel on the powers of the Prime Minister. See also *post*, section 10, items 1, 2 and 3.
6. Thirteen Deccan States, including Sangli and Miraj, agreed to merge with the Bombay province. The rulers of Bundelkhand in Central India proposed to form a United State of Bundelkhand, and 449 territorial units in Kathiawar decided to merge into a United State of Kathiawar.

disputes. We must see things in proper perspective or else our picture will be wrong. Violent action in the political field always precipitates a situation which otherwise might take time to come to a head. So the assassination of Gandhiji has accelerated many changes. There is tense anxiety as to what might happen next. In this state of affairs the heads of Governments and their colleagues must keep cool and at the same time vigilant. They must take action rapidly and they must not allow any complacency to delay action. The army above all has to play an important role when violence is threatened. We know that many attempts have been made to tamper with the army but we also know that the army has withstood these attempts and is a magnificent force, disciplined and loyal to the Government.

There is a strong opinion in the country, with which I sympathise, that no political-religious organisation or rather no organisation confined to a particular religious group and aiming at political ends should be allowed to function. We have suffered enough from this type of communalism whether it is Muslim or Hindu or Sikh. This matter will have to be considered carefully. I do not want, of course, to suppress any legitimate political activity. But the combination of political activity with a religious group is a dangerous one as we know from experience. You will have to give thought to this matter as to what should be done.

It is clear that a good part of our troubles are due to a thoroughly irresponsible press. I do not, of course, refer to the many responsible organs of public opinion. But in recent months especially a spate of thoroughly irresponsible sheets have come out and they spread hatred, communal bitterness and the cult of violence. *This must be ended. Some of our processes to deal with such papers are slow. They have to be speeded up.*⁷

Today more than ever we have to rely on proper intelligence. We are dealing with secret and underground people who have no scruples. I trust, therefore, that you will pay special attention to the development of an intelligence organisation. In this matter care has to be taken that the wrong kind of person is not kept in it. It has come to our knowledge that some of our intelligence officers are not wholly reliable.

The Kashmir issue in the Security Council has given us a great deal of trouble. The military situation has not changed much. But I must confess that the attitude of the Great Powers has been astonishing. Some of them have shown active partisanship for Pakistan. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a man of sound and balanced judgment, has more than once telegraphed to me his disgust at the fact that the Kashmir question is not being discussed fairly and that considerable pressure is being brought to bear against India. This is another heavy burden which we have to bear. Our experience of interna-

7. The publication of some English, Hindi and Urdu daily newspapers in Delhi was banned on 9 February 1948.

tional politics and the way things are done in these higher regions of the United Nations has been disappointing in the extreme. No doubt all this will affect our international relations in the future. I might inform you that while we have tried and shall continue to try to have a peaceful settlement, we have no intention whatever of giving in on the fundamental points. We cannot betray the Kashmir people who have put their trust in us, and we cannot surrender to gangsterism.

We have recently had a Governors' Conference here and the discussions were interesting and fruitful. I had occasion to meet many of the Governors separately and discussed provincial matters with them as well as all-India matters. Naturally no decisions could be arrived at in the absence of the Premiers of the provinces. I have no doubt that the Governors will inform you of the trend of our discussions.

We have decided to form a Rehabilitation and Development Board with large powers. This will function for the whole of India and I trust your Government will give it full cooperation in your province. I shall write to you more about this later.

Your Governor has been given an urn containing a small part of Gandhiji's ashes. He has been asked to deliver this to you. The major part of the ashes will be immersed at the junction of the Ganga and Jamuna in Allahabad on the 12th February. It is suggested that some part of the ashes should be immersed on the same day, if possible, in the other major rivers of India. It is for this purpose that we have sent you these ashes through your Governor. I hope you will make suitable arrangements for this ceremony.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

IV

New Delhi
5 February 1948

My dear Premier,

This is an addendum to my other letter.¹

I take it that you have been pushing on the organisation of the Home Guards. Indeed, continuous demands are made on us for rifles for these Home Guards. I should like to know, however, if you are taking any steps for training people in towns and villages for self-defence work even without

1. See the preceding item.

arms. In the United Provinces I understand that apart from the Home Guards they have started a Raksha Dal which may ultimately include several hundred thousand young men and even women. This Raksha Dal is given some training without interfering with the profession or work of the individual concerned. They are not paid any salary or allowance. I was rather impressed by the Raksha Dal I saw in Aligarh recently.

I think some such organisation should be formed on a fairly extensive scale in other provinces on behalf of the Government. The question of arms does not come in. Where possible the Raksha Dal volunteers may be taught how to use a rifle. But they need not be given rifles. Indeed, rifles are not available. But the arms part is the least significant. What is necessary is to discipline them and give them some training. Also to encourage them to play organised games, etc. This will have a salutary effect on the public mind and more specially on the mind of those engaged in this training. There is a strong demand for such training and the success of some organisations like the R.S.S. has been largely due to their supplying this need. There is also a certain feeling of apprehension in the public mind about the possible trouble. This is not justified. But it is as well to remove this apprehension. The Raksha Dal scheme should cost very little money and should be easy to put through. The only difficulty might be to find enough instructors. I suppose many of these could be found locally or through the military authorities. Instructors need not necessarily be soldiers.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

V

New Delhi
20 February 1948

My dear Premier,

We have completed six months of our existence as an independent nation. What a period it has been of crisis following on crisis and all the trials and tribulations we went through during that period culminating in the supreme disaster of the assassination of Gandhiji! There were many in this country and quite a number outside who thought that we could not survive the shock of this tragedy and that we would be engulfed by chaos out of which a wholly reactionary group, based on hatred and violence, would rise to power. That this has not happened is due both to the innate good sense of our people and to the vigorous action that has been taken by the various Governments in India. We are not wholly out of the wood yet; and I know of at

least one province in which the forces of communal reaction are still adopting an attitude of some bellicosity. But by and large I think we may say we have successfully weathered the storm. The army has stood by us like a rock; the police have functioned well; and the civil services have carried out their tasks with loyalty.

2. Investigations are being vigorously carried on to disclose the conspiracy which lay behind Gandhiji's assassination. There is no doubt that this was a well-thought-out plan and many persons were involved. A number of them have probably gone underground. Provincial Governments will, I hope, be very vigilant not only in regard to this investigation but also in the suppression of communal organisations. Nothing can be more foolish than to grow complacent.

3. Remarkable changes in our political structure have taken place in the six months that have gone. The Hindu Mahasabha, as a political organisation, has liquidated itself.¹ The R.S.S. has been banned and the reaction to this throughout the country has been good. The U.P. Parliamentary Muslim League has also liquidated itself² and I think we may look forward to the gradual disintegration of the Muslim League in India as a political organisation without any external pressure from the Government. These events have, of course, been precipitated by the assassination of Gandhiji, but they indicate a wholly healthy development in our political life. They are necessary steps to the creation of what we have been ceaselessly trying to achieve, viz. a democratic, secular state in India.

4. If one looks at the developments both in India and in Pakistan during the last six months, one can see them as manifestations of a clash between the forces of communal reaction and progress in the two Dominions. I think we can say that in India the forces of progress are winning. These forces were subject to terrific strain during the time of the disturbances but thanks to the remarkable genius of Gandhiji and the courage and idealism with which he sustained us, reaction never succeeded in getting the upper hand. If only we are not complacent and do not relax, I am sure we can achieve the objective which Gandhiji set before us. In Pakistan, on the other hand, all indications at the moment are that the forces of reaction are winning. Mr. Jinnah has been talking more and more of an Islamic state based on the laws of the *Shariat*; and narrow provincial jealousies seem to

1. On 15 February 1948 the Hindu Mahasabha, by a resolution of its working committee, suspended its political activity.
2. On 15 February 1948, the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Party decided to liquidate itself with effect from 29 February 1948.

have become so aggravated in Pakistan that he has had to issue a stern warning.³ How long it will take for the forces of progress in Pakistan to reach a stage when they can dominate the government it is impossible to forecast, but it looks as if it will be some considerable time. But whatever happens in Pakistan, quite clearly our task in India is clear; we must pursue with even greater determination than in the past our efforts at forming a secular state in which men of all communities can walk with their heads high.

5. I have from time to time written to you with some pride of the political consolidation effected by the merger of States or their union into larger-size units. The last day of our six months as an independent nation saw what I think will go down as a remarkable development in this direction, viz., the formation of Saurashtra or the Kathiawar Union. Six months ago, it would have been considered an idle dream to think of an administrative merger of the hundreds of Kathiawar States, let alone such a merger accompanied by full responsible government.⁴ The peninsula was ridden by factions and jealousies; and it was a crazy patchwork of States of varying degrees of sovereignty with only one thing common, viz., autocratic rule. On the 15th of February, the whole peninsula became one unit under the responsible government. This is an achievement for which Sardar Patel has deservedly won high tribute.

6. My mind has been full, during the last few days, of Kashmir. I went to Jammu on the 15th and visited a number of military units and refugee camps. The military situation in Jammu is getting definitely better. But, diplomatically, we have reached almost a crisis over the Kashmir issue. Our delegation to the Security Council has just returned and I have been engaged in consultations with them. They have had to contend against exceptional difficulties in New York and I think they have done a very good piece of work, particularly Gopalaswami Ayyangar who has shown great firmness combined with balance and dignity. All that he, Shri Setalvad and Sheikh Abdullah have told me have confirmed the impression which I conveyed to you in my last letter that the Great Powers have shown active partisanship. One can only speculate on the reasons for this attitude, but so far as I can gather, quite a variety of factors, but none of them connected with the merits of the Kashmir issue, seem to have led to this development.

3. On 25 January, Jinnah said that Pakistan would not scrap the *Shariat* and wondered why "the future constitution of Pakistan" would be "in conflict with the *Shariat* laws." It was a curse that many thought of themselves as Sindhi, Punjabi, Pathan and Delhi Muslims. He asked all Muslims to banish sectionalism and provincialism.
4. The Union was inaugurated by Vallabhbhai Patel on 15 February 1948 and the Jamsaheb of Nawanagar was sworn in as the Rajpramukh, U.N. Dhebar as Chief Minister, Balwantrai Mehta as Deputy Chief Minister and four others as Ministers.

7. I think I ought to tell you of the situation that has developed regarding the supply of petrol and oils generally.⁸ During the current quarter, our supply has been reduced, particularly in respect of diesel oil, fuel oils and aviation spirit. The cuts have been so heavy that I am afraid they will interfere seriously with both transport and industrial production. We are almost wholly dependent for oil supplies on outside sources, and virtually on the Anglo-American-Dutch combines.⁹ The whole situation is being reviewed by our Cabinet here in the next few days and our Ministries of Works, Mines and Power and Transport will be communicating to you how we think the situation should be met. It may be necessary for us to introduce tighter rationing than at present; and our policy regarding the leasing of mineral rights in oil may also have to undergo some modification.

8. The difficulty of obtaining sufficient petrol is compelling us to think urgently of exploiting our own resources. We have not only to explore the possibilities of finding oil in the country but also to expedite the manufacture of power alcohol. A committee of scientists is examining the setting up of a plant for the extraction of liquid fuel from coal.

9. You will remember that in my letter of the 15th November last I mentioned the need for the provincial Governments keeping in close touch with my Finance Ministry before they enter into heavy commitments. I should like to reiterate that suggestion. With the Centre's own large commitments ahead and the present state of the money market, the ways and means position is becoming difficult and before launching on big schemes, in which the provinces may be counting on Central assistance for grants or loans, it is necessary that the Finance Ministry here should be consulted. I should also like to suggest that as far as possible the provinces should send us a consolidated statement of their requirements from the Centre each year and not individual items as at present. Without such a statement it will be impossible for the Centre to take an overall view of the situation, and plan for the best way of utilising the available resources.

10. The dollar situation is becoming extremely serious and it is becoming quite clear that India, like the rest of the countries in the sterling area, will have to restrict expenditure in the dollar and other hard currency areas

8. Shortage of oil was attributed to its increased consumption by the industrialized countries after the Second World War. For example, the United States, which had been the principal exporter of oil before the War, was now importing it.
9. After partition, India was left only with the Digboi oil fields which could not meet the current demand of four million tons of petroleum and other products.

until the situation becomes easier. It will be necessary for the Central and provincial Governments to explore sources of procurement of essential goods in the sterling area, before entering upon commitments in the dollar and hard currency areas.¹⁰

11. The Constituent Assembly of India has just passed legislation for the setting up of an authority to develop the Damodar Valley. I consider this in many ways to be the most notable piece of legislation that has ever been passed in this country. It is true that in the past we have had large irrigation schemes carried out by different provinces and States, and inevitably a certain degree of inter-governmental agreement was involved in many of them. But this is the first time we are embarking on a river project which combines in itself three great features—the magnitude of the project itself, its multi-purpose character and the close cooperation, both in the constructional stage and subsequently, of the Central and two provincial Governments. We have before us the model of the Tennessee Valley scheme which has revolutionised the economy of a large countryside in the U.S.A.; and we must use all our resources to see that the Damodar Valley scheme¹¹ becomes as great a success as the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. Under the sterling balances release agreements of August 1947 and February 1948, Britain made available to India £83 million for the period from July 1947 to June 1948 but about £80 million of this was carried over unutilised. When this sum was again made available together with a fresh release in July 1948, the country not only ran through it but had overdrawn £81 million within a year as a result of the Government's Open General policy of August 1948, liberalising imports.
11. A multi-purpose scheme costing Rs. 55 crores designed to control floods, irrigate about 7,63,800 acres of land and supply power to the provinces of Bihar and West Bengal.

VI

New Delhi
February 23, 1948

My dear Premier,

I am writing to you about the ex-I.N.A. personnel. I have previously referred to this in my letters to you and suggested that every effort should be made to give employment to them. A number of them have obtained employment during the past year. But a considerable number still remain unemployed and are in distress. We have to tackle this question in all its aspects soon

and settle it more or less finally. Meanwhile, I am taking the liberty to remind you again of our responsibility in this matter and to request you to help us in discharging this responsibility.

Two major demands have been put forward on behalf of the I.N.A. personnel. One is reinstatement in the army and the other is payment of all arrears of pay, allowances, etc., that is to say, treatment as prisoners of war for the entire period of their service in the I.N.A.

Both these demands are difficult for us to accede to. So far as reinstatement in the army is concerned we are not taking in any large numbers in the regular army at present. Apart from this many of the personnel are probably, by reason of age or otherwise, not very fit for active service. But the main consideration is that taking into the army the I.N.A. personnel as a group would probably introduce into the army a disturbing factor at a critical moment. Many of the officers and men of the Indian Army are on the whole prepared to take them back. Many of them are not so prepared for varying reasons. If they were taken back an argument would arise in the army about them and all manner of political currents would be let loose in the army. At any time it is undesirable to have such a development in the army. At the present delicate moment it would be even less desirable. Some of the I.N.A. men have got entangled in narrow party politics and have associated themselves with groups like the Forward Bloc, etc. All this will tend to introduce a novel and confusing element within the army.

Probably most of these considerations apply only to a relatively small number of them, chiefly officers, and others are free from them. Nevertheless, there is this difficulty and it is unsafe for us to take a step which might lead to consequences which we do not like. The army is too delicate an instrument for us to take any such risks with it. We feel, therefore, that it is better not to reinstate the I.N.A. personnel as a group in the army.

It will be remembered of course that about a third of the I.N.A. personnel are in Pakistan and we are not responsible for them in any way.

As regards payment of arrears which are said to be due to them, some rather complicated questions arise, apart from the large sums involved, which is in the neighbourhood of a crore and a half, plus recurring expenditure in the shape of pensions. The responsibility for pay, etc., for that period rests with the U.K. Government as they were serving abroad. But it is obvious that we cannot even suggest to the U.K. Government to consider their case. While they were serving in the I.N.A. some payment was made to them by the I.N.A. and we can hardly duplicate this payment. To treat them as prisoners of war would raise intricate and difficult questions and a great deal of controversy, both national and international.

I am placing all these considerations before you so that you may know the various aspects of this question which we have to consider. The Government of India would have to decide soon and I shall inform you of their

decision. Sardar Patel has, meanwhile, called a meeting¹ of the I.N.A. Enquiry and Relief Committee which will no doubt discuss this question from their point of view. We realise that we owe a certain duty to these young men, many of whom are in great distress, and we want to help them.

Whatever our decisions may be some forms of help should certainly be undertaken even more vigorously than in the past. The first thing is to find employment for them. As I have already told you all avenues of employment are open to them, except the regular army to which I have referred above. They can not only be taken in any civil employment but also in the police, constabulary, Home Guards, and all like services. They should be peculiarly suited for these services. There is a considerable demand for instructors for the Home Guards. The I.N.A. officers and V.C.O.s² will prove good instructors. I suggest that your Government might make a special effort to absorb these I.N.A. men in some such way.

When the I.N.A. personnel were removed or dismissed from service they were divided into various categories, "white", "grey" and "black", and very often their character rolls had a remark against them.³ These remarks and this division in various grades of demerit should not come in the way of their employment because this was done for entirely different and political reasons and has nothing to do with their character. Of course, any person employed in any service must be considered suitable for it as an individual. There should be absolutely no bar against him because he was placed in the black list.

I shall be grateful if you will interest yourself in this matter and take such steps as you can.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. At the meeting on 29 February 1948, Vallabhbhai Patel explained the Government policy regarding the I.N.A. and heard the views expressed by I.N.A. officers in their individual capacity. The Government was opposed to re-employment of the ex-I.N.A. personnel in the regular army. See also *post*, section 8, sub-section v items 4 and 5.
2. The cadre of Viceroy's Commissioned Officers was created in 1942 to meet the demands of field units. Permanent serving civilians were allowed to elect for combatant status for the duration of the emergency or such periods as their services were required.
3. The "whites" were permitted to remain in service, the "greys" were discharged and the "blacks" were dismissed or convicted.

VII

New Delhi
3 March 1948

My dear Premier,

During the last fortnight we have slowly recovered from the shock of Mahatma Gandhi's death. We can never wholly recover from it, but inevitably life demands that we should carry on our normal activities. Throughout this past month I have been deluged with messages of sympathy and condolence on Gandhiji's death. I have personally received over fifteen thousand telegrams, apart from letters, and a large number of these have come from foreign countries. It is astonishing how the world has reacted to Gandhiji's death. Great as he was in his life, his death and the manner of it suddenly made the world realise what a mighty person had left us. Many of the messages received are far from being formal ones. They are moving and eloquent tributes from the heart. We feel today, even more than we ever did before, the universality of Gandhiji, and we thus have this curious paradox of a person who was intensely national and yet completely international. No person who did not have this tremendous international appeal could have evoked the remarkable response that he did.

2. Gandhiji has gone, though his vivid personality still surrounds us, and the burden is now upon us. We have to adjust ourselves to this burden and carry it to the best of our ability. I have no doubt that in spite of difficulties we shall succeed in overcoming the many obstacles that face us.

3. The two most important issues before us have been Kashmir and the budget. In your province you have also been dealing with your budget. The preparation of a budget involves consideration not only of the immediate problems but also of the wider objectives of social policy. I fear that we have not arrived at the stage of having precise governmental objectives of social policy, except in the vaguest terms. The recent report of the Congress Economic Programme Committee gives us some kind of a social objective to aim at.¹ This has been generally approved by the A.I.C.C., though further consideration of it will have to take place at the next meeting. We may for the moment, therefore, consider this economic programme as

1. At the A.I.C.C. meeting in New Delhi on 21-22 February 1948, Nehru, Chairman of the Committee, submitted the report explaining the broad principles of the programme. The A.I.C.C. considered and generally approved of the report which called for growth of the economy based on decentralisation and equitable distribution of income and wealth. The report was to be considered in detail at the Bombay session from 24 to 25 April.

the general direction of our policy, without necessarily accepting every detail of it.

4. But the more difficult question is how to shape our present policy to that end. The question of timing becomes highly important. A right step taken at a wrong time may lead to unfortunate consequences and even disaster. We live in an extremely dynamic age with ever recurring crises. It is a hand-to-mouth existence and we hardly have time to look far ahead. Hence the difficulty to adapt immediate programmes to distant objectives.

5. This difficulty is apparent in the budgets, both Central and provincial, that have been framed. They are no doubt open to criticism from many sides and will be so criticised. They are in the nature of things more of a temporary expedient to meet present difficulties than a sweeping advance along any line of pre-determined policy. Generally speaking, the objectives must necessarily be :

- (i) to increase wealth by production ;
- (ii) to lessen the disparity in the distribution of wealth and to promote as far as possible a tendency to economic equality.

Both of these are probably admitted by all groups. The burden of taxation should, therefore, progressively fall on those most capable of bearing it and greater stress should be laid on direct taxation. Yet we see indirect taxation still holding its own and indeed increasing its domain. It is true that this indirect taxation is normally on luxury articles which is right.

6. The question of nationalisation of industries has also become one of immediate significance. Generally speaking, we are committed to the nationalisation of key industries. But obviously a sudden scheme of all-round nationalisation might well lead to a breakdown of our economic system and to a tremendous lessening of production without immediately giving us something else in its place. The resources of the state are limited, both in money and in technical personnel. I suggested, therefore, in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) that we should concentrate on the state owning and controlling new key industries, public utilities and the like, rather than acquiring old ones except where this was considered essential. This may not be very logical but it would not interfere with present production and at the same time enlarge the sphere of nationalised industry. Indeed, as industrialisation proceeds, the state ownership of industry will also rapidly increase.

7. In regard to the Reserve Bank and the Imperial Bank we have already decided to nationalise them after some months.

8. In the Finance Bill, no doubt, all these proposals will be considered fully by a Select Committee. It is rather unusual to appoint a Select Committee on the Finance Bill, but we have decided to do so as we wish to give the fullest consideration to these proposals. The Finance Bill gives definite relief in taxation to industry.² We felt that we could not afford the industry to languish and production to go down at this stage. Our primary objective is not to benefit industrialists as such but to give an incentive to the flow of investment in industrial channels and to increase production. We hoped that this would lead to stabilising the price structure of the whole country which would be of benefit to all sections of the community.

9. Our fundamental economic problem today might be said to be that of inflation and a continuing disequilibrium between purchasing power and production. This problem is a world problem and most countries are suffering from it in varying degrees, including the U.S.A. Russia also suffered from it but it has tried to solve it in a spectacular way by devaluing currency.³ This may achieve the objective in view but at the cost of considerable suffering to many people. I am not competent to judge of what is happening in Russia because of the very special considerations which apply to problems there and their different economy.

10. This business of inflation leads to the cost of living index rising. It has already risen far beyond the expectations of the Pay Commission and we have to face a very difficult problem now. Are we to increase⁴ dearness allowance because of this or are we to allow this dearness allowance to remain where it is? It becomes a vicious race between prices and wages. The British Government have recently set their face against any general increase of wages and profits.⁵ The French Government have had a most harassing time dealing with this problem and at the moment they have obtained only a temporary respite by a series of improvisations.⁶ We hope

2. The tax on the profit of businessmen and companies was reduced and the super tax limit was revised on all incomes.
3. A rouble was equal to ten old roubles.
4. The First Pay Commission, in its report of 1947, recommended scales of basic salaries for Central Government employees on the assumption that prices would stabilise at a level when the price index would be between 160 and 175, taking the pre-War price index as 100. Actually the wholesale price index rose to 307 in 1947-48.
5. In order to arrest the continuous rise in prices the Labour Government had in February 1948 tied increase in wages with increase in production and imposed a ceiling on profit on the sale of several consumer products.
6. On 26 January the French Government devalued its currency fixing the exchange rate at 464 francs to a pound as against 480. A free market in gold and hard currencies was set up in spite of objections from the International Monetary Fund which prohibited multiple currency practice. On 29 January all 5,000-franc bank notes were recalled.

that the recent increase in the cost of living in India is temporary and due to a disequilibrium caused by partial decontrol. We hope that the index figure will come down soon. We propose, therefore, to leave matters where they are and not to allow any increase of dearness allowance.

11. During the last fortnight we have given a great deal of time to the Kashmir issue. We have conferred with Gopalaswami Ayyangar and his colleagues on their return from Lake Success. After all these discussions we have not found it necessary to vary our general attitude in any major degree. We are prepared to make some minor alterations in it. During this period we have also been communicating with the U.K. Prime Minister and the diplomatic representatives of other countries in Delhi and have explained to them fully our position in regard to Kashmir. Our High Commissioner in London has been in touch with Ministers of the U.K. Government. Mr. Gordon-Walker, Under Secretary for Commonwealth Relations in the U.K. Government, has also been here and has discussed this matter fully with us. In all these talks we have been told that our attitude is generally reasonable. On the whole it may be said that the political aspect of the situation is somewhat better than it was. But I should not like to prophesy. We have had a bad experience of what takes place in the Security Council.

12. Our delegation for the Security Council has left for Lake Success. The delegation is the old one except for one major change. Sheikh Abdullah is urgently needed in Kashmir and is, therefore, staying behind. His place has been taken up by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai who is peculiarly suited for this task. As you know, he has been functioning as Secretary-General in our Foreign Office here and he has done his work with great ability.

13. I propose to make soon a statement in the Constituent Assembly on Kashmir and we are issuing a White Paper containing documents and correspondence.

14. The food situation, especially in Madras, is very bad and we shall have to tighten our belts in other parts of the country in order to help Madras. Our Food Ministry is considering this matter urgently and we may have to address you on this subject separately.

15. One of our special headaches is the petrol and oil situation. We are having great difficulties in getting a sufficient quantity of this and the big oil combines are not giving us a square deal. Unfortunately we are not in a position to bring any great pressure upon them. We are doing our utmost to get the best terms possible. But it may be necessary for

us to cut down our petrol consumption.

16. I have been deeply distressed by recent strikes in the Tata collieries.⁷ The strike was illegal and without notice and has resulted in great damage to the plant. The strike is over. But this kind of irresponsible behaviour is exceedingly harmful not only to industry but to the community as a whole and it has become essential for us to devise means to prevent this happening.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. The workers in the Jharia coal fields in Bihar went on strike demanding better service conditions.

VIII

New Delhi
9 March 1948

My dear Premier,

As you are aware the food situation in Madras is a very grave one, more specially in south-east Madras and Malabar. The crisis period is likely to last from the middle of May to probably in October, 1948. Both the Governor and Premier of Madras have drawn our special attention to this impending crisis, which, if not adequately met with, may result in a tragedy of vast proportions. You will realise that both the Centre and the other provinces must do their utmost to avert this catastrophe. We cannot wait for large-scale starvation before we take steps. We must, therefore, get moving immediately and do all in our power to prevent this happening. So far as the Central Government is concerned we shall do our utmost. I am sure that your Government will also help in every way. Though the area specially affected is part of the Madras province, should disaster overwhelm it the whole of India will be powerfully affected. Last-minute attempts to help will fail of their purpose and will only upset our economy. We have, therefore, to move now and I solicit your full cooperation in this joint effort to help the Madras province.

Our Food Minister, Shri Jairamdas Doulatram, has already visited Madras and conferred with the responsible authorities there. He is holding other conferences in Delhi and is giving constant attention to this problem. He will be addressing you on this subject from time to time and pointing out ways and means of how your province can help. It is his intention to call

a conference of all Premiers of provinces and probably States to consider this problem. I hope to attend this conference.

Surplus provinces and States will be requested to divert the maximum quantities of foodgrains possible to the Madras province and to take steps to eliminate wasteful consumption in their respective areas. Deficit provinces and States will be requested to reduce their demands for imports to the utmost limit. Fortunately the *rabi* crop in northern India is a very promising one and this should help.

In some provinces there is plenty of gram available. Other food substitutes are also going to be used. Every avenue of help has to be explored immediately and I earnestly invite your cooperation in this urgent task.

One of our immediate difficulties is that of transport. Our Transport Ministry will no doubt give every help in taking foodstuffs to Madras.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

IX

New Delhi
17 March 1948

My dear Premier,

The recent developments in Czechoslovakia culminating in the suicide of Dr. Masaryk,¹ the Foreign Minister, have naturally had grave repercussions on the international situation. Progressively the world becomes divided into sharply defined and armed camps and the expectation of war in the future increases. In eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia and to a large extent Finland have been brought within the Russian fold. In western Europe the idea of a union has developed far. Danger points in future appear to be Italy, Norway and France, where there may be a tussle between groups favouring either of the principal power blocs.

2. This tense situation finds its repercussions in every phase of international activity whether it is Korea, the Middle East or elsewhere. The Middle East is supposed to be a possible theatre of war in the future and hence a great deal of manoeuvring for position is going on there. The Palestine problem grows more and more insoluble and is now before the

1. Jan Masaryk.

Security Council. Indeed, it has rather pushed out the Kashmir issue from the Security Council for the time being.

3. I am mentioning this international background because it is bound to produce reactions in India and in case of graver developments our own policies will have to be carefully considered. Even our domestic policies may be seriously affected. We have, therefore, to be on the alert and not to be taken unawares by the developments. I do not personally think that there is going to be a war on a big scale in the near future chiefly because of the fear of war and yet everything points towards conflict and people in Europe and America are being worked up to a frame of mind which looks upon war as inevitable.

4. As I have said above, the Kashmir issue has been postponed in the Security Council. There is Palestine and there is the Czechoslovakian matter which the Security Council will consider. We do not know when the Kashmir issue may be taken up again. This is very disconcerting as some of our colleagues who are badly wanted here are held up in America. On the whole the position in the Security Council appears to be a little better on this occasion from India's point of view but no great importance need be attached to these varying phases. There are still major obstacles in the way of an agreement or a decision which we could easily accept. We are being pressed again in private conferences to push out Sheikh Abdullah for some time at least from the Kashmir administration. This is one of the points on which we cannot give in. To do so would be to desert the national movement of Kashmir and to encourage all the reactionary elements. We, therefore, propose to adhere to our position in this matter. As a matter of fact, as you are aware, the Maharaja of Kashmir has issued a proclamation² forming a new interim government with Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister and this step of his has been acclaimed by large numbers of people in the State.

5. Nothing much has happened in the Kashmir State during the last fortnight except abundant rain which has practically stopped all means of communication within the State as well as to the State. All military operations had to be toned down because of this rain and snow and even Sheikh Abdullah was unable to return to Kashmir as there was no way of getting there either by air or by land.

2. Issued on 5 March 1948, the proclamation covered the establishment of popular interim government in place of the emergency administration, with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers to assist him.

6. Recent reports from Kashmir have given us a fairly vivid account of the way our soldiers and airmen are functioning there under extremely difficult conditions of cold and snow and slush. The reports speak very highly of the way our men have faced this inclement weather, to which they were not at all accustomed, as well as the attacks of the enemy. The rain has now stopped and a change in weather is coming in. This will no doubt lead to a quickening of military operations on either side. We have received reports of the enemy sending reinforcements on all the fronts and preparing for some kind of an offensive. We are fully prepared for it.

7. I might mention that the 'Azad' Kashmir Government, of which much is heard, exists largely on paper. From eyewitnesses' account we learn that there is no functioning of this Government, no proper offices or officers and it is more or less of a facade put up for external consumption.

8. No settlement has yet been arrived at with Hyderabad and the Standstill Agreement has been chiefly honoured in its breach. There have been discussions in Delhi but they have yielded no results. Probably there may be further discussions after a while but, meanwhile, the situation there deteriorates both internally and on the Andhra border. The President of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen has recently delivered some speeches which are amazingly rabid. The Nizam's Government either is powerless to deal with the Ittehad or generally supports them. The chief difficulty of the Hyderabad situation is that we have to deal with people who are completely unreasonable and unrealistic. From any long distance point of view there is no need for any of us to take a dismal view of the situation in Hyderabad but undoubtedly there are possible dangers for which we should be prepared. It has been and is our desire to arrive at some kind of a friendly settlement because any other course would lead to trouble and unhappiness on a large scale. We are not anxious to force an accession or even to expedite it. We are prepared to wait but the people should decide about it. Nor can we accept the position that Hyderabad can continue as an autocratic feudal State while the rest of India becomes democratic. For the present we would be content if the Standstill Agreement was honoured fully and there was no trouble internally or on the borders.

9. I have addressed you separately about the Madras food situation and asked for the full cooperation of your Government in dealing with it.³ I am glad to say that many of the provinces have offered their cooperation.

3. See the preceding letter.

The Food Minister spoke in the Assembly on the subject today and he gave a slightly more optimistic account than he had done previously. That, however, should not lead to any relaxation on our part or complacency. The situation is undoubtedly a very difficult one and requires every effort of the Centre and the provinces to meet it. I do not think it is desirable for any of us to talk too much in public about approaching starvation and famine for large numbers of people. This produces depression all round and does not help. But the fact remains that we have to be as wide awake as possible. We shall take every single step to avoid any catastrophe.

10. The problem of food brings us to consider the multi-purpose development schemes affecting more than one province. From the point of view of the general development of the country and more especially food production, any such schemes are worth consideration. At the present moment they are more specially urgent and important. Because they affect more than one province, the cooperation of several provinces becomes necessary; they cannot be viewed from the point of view of one province alone. Sometimes there has been a tendency for one province to think of its own interests and to ignore the interests of other provinces. I need hardly point out to you that this approach is a disastrous one and injurious even to the particular province which may adopt it. All planned development necessitates taking the larger view and full cooperation between various units.

11. The Standstill Agreement between India and Pakistan with regard to trade and commerce lapsed on the 29th February, and from the 1st March Pakistan has been declared foreign territory for the purpose of customs or excise tariff. We have, however, issued instructions that various types of perishable goods should not be subjected to any customs or other tariff. Our declaration of Pakistan as foreign territory for this purpose has been severely criticised in Pakistan and described as an act of hostility and an attempt by India to sabotage the existence of Pakistan. This, of course, is not true and it is our earnest desire to have a long-term agreement with Pakistan relating to all matters of common concern. Our past attempts to arrive at a certain agreement received a very cold response from that country. There is a possibility of all these matters being considered afresh as between two Dominions.

12. Since I wrote to you last the petrol and fuel oil situation has shown some improvement. The cut on our fuel oil supplies has been restored and it is expected that petrol supplies will be better. To some extent we are indebted to a delegation of the Defence Ministry that visited the United Kingdom

recently for this change for the better.⁴

13. The position under which we are dependent for the bulk of our petrol on foreign countries is extremely unsatisfactory. We have, therefore, decided to explore all other possible sources. The production of power alcohol must, of course, be pushed wherever possible in the provinces. We are also going to prospect every source of oil in the country. A scheme for the production of synthetic petrol from low grade coal is also under active consideration. This process is a well recognised one now and the only difficulty is that it is very costly.

14. There has been a boundary dispute between us and Pakistan on the Assam-East Bengal border. This relates to the Patharia Hill Reserve Forest as well as to another place on the Assam border. The area concerned is a small one but it is important as there is possibility of oil there. In agreement with Pakistan both Dominions have withdrawn armed forces from the area and a joint commission has been appointed to consider and report on this matter.

15. The recovery of abducted women has not been proceeding as satisfactorily as we had hoped and there has been much controversy with Pakistan about the procedure to be adopted. Our Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation went to Lahore yesterday and had a prolonged conference there. This conference resulted in some agreements on various matters such as refugees' property, etc., but it did not lead to any satisfactory arrangement about the recovery of abducted women. The matter is being pursued. On the whole we have been successful in recovering a fairly considerable number of Muslim women from East Punjab and the Punjab States but the recovery of non-Muslim women from Pakistan has been slow. Many of them have been spread out in the Frontier Province and even beyond, or are in the Gujrat area where we are not allowed to have a liaison officer, probably because of Kashmir operations.

16. A large number of refugees from Mirpur and other parts of Kashmir, many of them being women, have been kept for months in various camps on either side of the Kashmir-Pakistan border, notably at Ali Beg and Muzaffarabad. These people have suffered greatly, many have died from

4. An Indian defence delegation comprising F.R.R. Bucher, H.M. Patel and A.K. Chanda visited the United Kingdom between 21 February and 10 March 1948 to discuss with the British Commonwealth Relations Office defence matters arising from the transfer of power and to conclude administrative and financial details for procuring military stores.

exposure and cold. The women specially have had a very bad time. Agreements have been arrived at for their removal to Lahore and subsequently to India but thus far no special step has been taken to give effect to this agreement, perhaps because of the tremendous rains which prevented movement.

17. You may have read in the papers of my recent visit to Vizagapatnam where I launched a new India-made ship of 8,000 tons built by the Scindia Company.⁵ This was a historic occasion and I am sure that the ship-building industry in India will develop rapidly and Vizagapatnam will be a principal centre of it. This town has also got one of the principal bases of the Indian Navy and I met the officers and ratings. I was sorry to learn that a sufficient response is not coming from the public for the Navy. I think it is an excellent career for our bright young men.

18. The general economic situation is a very disturbing one and prices continue to keep up. The Central Government is giving the most earnest thought to this matter. You will have noticed that just before and after the Central budget was presented stock exchanges and markets behaved in a very curious way. One is inclined to think that this behaviour was deliberately organised in order to influence the policies of Government.⁶ If this presumption is justified, then we have to take care not to be influenced by such tactics indulged in by particular groups.

19. May I venture to remind you that in the context of the national and international situation today we must discourage in every way every disruptive tendency in the country? Sometimes even good causes cannot be encouraged because they may tend towards encouraging disruption. We have to hold together to face our perils and difficulties and we cannot afford to be too provincial just as we cannot afford to be communal. The question of redistribution of provinces on a linguistic or other basis has been before us for a long time and we have accepted the main principles that should govern this. It is proposed that the Constituent Assembly should appoint a committee to look at the broad aspects of this question before another committee or commission considers the details. Meanwhile, it will not expedite matters to try to rush through things or to agitate the public mind continually on this matter. I can very well appreciate the desire in some parts of the country for a separate provincial existence. Nobody challenges that but sometimes we have to take first things first and any reversal of that order may even delay the thing we press most. Therefore this question of

5. On 11 March, Nehru launched *Jala Usha*, the first ocean-going steamer made in India. See section 8, sub-section II, item 18.

6. Shares had slumped very low in stock exchanges and industrial circles were critical of insufficient relief to industry and of the Congress economic programme.

new provinces should be viewed in the perspective of all-India and the world situation today. We cannot afford to lose ourselves in heated debates and unending arguments. We have to concentrate all our energy to meet immediate crises.

20. I trust that you will not slacken your attempts to root out communalism in all its aspects. Owing to the strength of public opinion against communalism many of these communal bodies decided to lie low but they are still there and we cannot afford to forget about them. We have suffered enough from their activities and we can take no further risks.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

X

New Delhi
1st April 1948

My dear Premier,

The international situation continues to be tense and the next two months are supposed to be critical. I still hope that the crisis will somehow be got over, at least in the sense that there is no war, but I fear that even otherwise the crisis will continue for it is a deep-seated one and the antagonisms are very great. I am convinced that India's role should be, as far as possible, to continue to remain apart from any particular bloc. This is safest for India and it may in the future give some chance to India to play a pacific role. We cannot place this too high for we are not strong enough at present to exercise much influence. Nevertheless, it would be equally wrong to ignore the fact that we can and do count in international affairs. It would be a very short-sighted policy for us to line up with any group in order to gain some temporary advantage. We are trying to remain as friendly as possible to other countries, and in present circumstances our contacts and economic relations are, of course, far greater with England and America than with other countries. This is likely to continue.

2. The international situation affects to some extent many of our own interests, like the Kashmir issue, French possessions in India,¹ the policy

1. In 1948, the French territorial possessions in India were the towns of Pondicherry and Karaikal on the Madras coast, Yanam on the Andhra coast, Mahe on the Malabar coast and Chandannagore in West Bengal.

to be pursued in regard to the Communist Party in India, and generally our relations with Asian countries. We have to proceed cautiously in all such matters bearing in mind what the consequences of a particular step might be on other issues.

3. To give a minor example : certain steps taken by us in our domestic sphere relating to some Afghans and tribal Pathans, who have been functioning as money-lenders, have given rise to difficulties both with Afghanistan and the Frontier Province Pathans.² Afghanistan has been very friendly to us and we desire to retain the friendship. In the Frontier Province we have no desire to do anything which might irritate Pathans as a whole, many of whom have friendly feelings towards India. As a matter of fact there is no major problem of Afghans or Pathans in India at present. The normal summer migrations of *Pawindas* have ceased because of the partition, and the large number of nomadic money-lenders who came have stopped coming. Therefore we should proceed cautiously in dealing with Afghans or tribal people in India. So far as citizens of Pakistan are concerned we have an understanding that they would be treated as before in regard to ingress or egress. The Government of India have issued a communique on this subject³ to which I should like to draw your attention. I would suggest that no sudden steps be taken to extern any person of this type. We must consider this carefully and give sufficient time.

4. Again in regard to deportation of any foreigner from India, this involves our relations with the foreign country concerned and no steps should be taken without reference to the External Affairs Department.

5. The recent development in Kalat State⁴ is evidence of how a wrong or careless word can have serious consequences.

6. In the Security Council there is a complete deadlock over Kashmir and from today onwards the new Chairman, Dr. Lopez of Colombia,⁵ will

2. In February 1948 all Afghan nationals without valid passports were declared foreigners and were asked to leave India by 31 March. These orders were not applicable to Pathans and other Pakistan nationals. Difficulties in respect of Afghan nationals were discussed between the Government of India and the Afghan embassy and the matter was kept in abeyance pending further investigation.

3. The communique was issued on 31 March 1948.

4. The ruler of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, had announced on 28 March the accession of his State to Pakistan. See also *ante*, section 6, sub-section II, item 9.

5. Alfonso Lopez (1886-1959); founder and Vice-President, American Mercantile Bank of Colombia; President of Colombia, 1934-38 and 1942-45; Permanent Representative to the U.N., 1947-48; President of the Security Council in April 1948.

function. The Security Council has lost a great deal of its prestige owing to recent developments in regard to Palestine. It hardly seems likely that it can arrive at any satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problem. The instructions to our delegates are that while they should make every effort to arrive at a settlement, they cannot give in on any major issue. It is possible that if matters prolonged themselves much more, part of our delegation might return to India.

7. Military operations in Kashmir State have been proceeding though at a somewhat slow pace. There may be further developments soon specially in the southern area. The position of Poonch city is not satisfactory. Although there is no military danger but it has become a little difficult for our aircraft to go there because the enemy have obtained some Howitzers, presumably from Pakistan, and these guns shell the city and the airfield. Skardu in Baltistan is a remote area very difficult of access at this time of the year. Some of the State troops there have been cut off and the position there is very unsatisfactory; otherwise the general military situation is favourable. The return of Sheikh Abdullah to Srinagar after a long interval has been hailed with great enthusiasm by the populace.

8. The French Government is creating a lot of difficulties about the future of French possessions in India. Recently there was a petty upheaval in Chandernagore and it is clear that conditions in these settlements are far from static. We do not want to fall out with France over this issue but we have made it clear that a decision should be made in the near future according to the wishes of the people concerned.⁶

9. The resignation of members of the Socialist Party from the Congress is a major event in our domestic politics. However most of us might view this, there is general regret that many old Congressmen should have found it necessary to leave the old moorings. From every other point of view it is desirable that nothing should be said or done to add to the rift that has been created. The times are too critical for us to add to our differences and our difficulties.

10. The recent communal outbreak in Godhra is a warning to us of the forces still functioning in India. From the accounts we have received this outbreak was caused by the refugees, mostly from Sind. Very exaggerated

6. On 8 June 1948, the Government of France declared that the people of French India would determine their own future. In September the municipal elections were held in Chandannagore and the party favouring union with India secured a large majority of seats.

accounts of the casualties have been published. As a matter of fact the casualties were not great, probably less than 50 altogether, but there was large-scale arson and the fires spread, practically destroying the town of Godhra including both Hindu and Muslim houses. This has resulted in large-scale migration of the population of Godhra and round about. It will be realised that such an occurrence can be and is being utilised very much against us in the world outside and more especially in the United Nations.

11. I should like to draw your special attention to two statements made by me recently before the Assembly. One of these related to the ex-I.N.A. personnel.⁷ Except for reinstatement in the army we have thrown open every avenue of service to them. We are giving them pensions that were due and, in addition, a sum of Rs. 30 lakhs has been set apart to help them. We have undertaken to find employment for them and provincial Governments are specially requested to help in this. They can be employed in the Home Guards, Armed Constabulary, police and all branches of the civil services.

12. The other statement referred to the threatened strike of the Central Government employees in Calcutta.⁸ That statement is a long one and I need not add to it. We have no desire whatever to come in the way of legitimate industrial activity including strikes but it seems clear to us that the Calcutta strike was something much more than this. We have evidence of deliberate trouble being created in the security services also and there is a fear of sabotage. Many people talk about violent methods. This kind of thing can obviously not be tolerated. We made it clear therefore that any Government employees joining in the strike in Calcutta will be liable to be dismissed.

13. In this Calcutta strike as well as in other parts of the country, the Communist Party has played a leading role and many of their members have openly declared that they are out to fight the Government in every way. The West Bengal Government, as you know, has banned the Communist Party.⁹ This was done without any reference to us. Normally this procedure is undesirable because any such action leads to repercussions and is therefore to be considered in its larger context. The Government of India later suggested to provincial governments that any members of the Communist Party

7. See *post* section 8, sub-section V, item 12.

8. On 30 March 1948, Nehru, in reply to a question, made a statement in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) urging the employees of the Central Government offices in Calcutta not to resort to strike from 2 April 1948. Also see section 8, sub-section II, item 22.

9. On 25 March 1948, the Government of West Bengal declared the Communist Party of India illegal in the province.

and sentimental reasons, do deserve special treatment. Facilities of higher education are denied to them in the countries of their adoption and they therefore naturally and legitimately look to the mother country for assistance.³ The Ministry of Commonwealth Relations is sending an official letter to your Government requesting the waiver of these fees in the case of students coming from South and East Africa and I trust that the request will receive the sympathetic consideration that it deserves.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Because of the colour bar Indians in South Africa did not have enough facilities for higher professional and technical training. In East Africa institutions for imparting such education did not exist at all.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

I. Political

1. Congress Committees and Ministries¹

When I read in the papers that Babu's statues and memorials were being erected all over India and that a seventy nine-foot high statue of Gandhiji was to be erected at Bombay, it gave me pain. Babu's work which we should follow is his true memorial.

The prestige of the nation and the strength of the Congress now depend entirely on its workers. Gandhiji, who was a never-failing source of inspiration to all of us, is no longer alive. It is your turn now to carry on the work he had carried on. Let us have a two-year truce between various groups of Congressmen so that Government has the time to settle things. The greatest danger to the country today is from Congressmen who quarrel among themselves and indulge in irresponsible criticism of the Government.

The prestige, which India earned after August 15 in the international sphere, was lost to her due to internal disturbances and at present it is at its lowest ebb. If India had been morally strong she could have, by that moral strength and otherwise, stopped the disturbances in Pakistan. But similar incidents took place in India too, depriving her of her moral right to speak on a high level. Mr. Jinnah has for long spoken of the two-nation theory and thought along those lines. But that is not the way we wanted to behave and therefore there is a greater need for self-examination on the part of the Congress workers.

The relations between Congress Ministries and Congress committees are an indication of the Congress strength and it is absolutely necessary that there should be perfect cooperation between the two. The Government cannot place every item of its activity before Congress committees. But it is very necessary that all major items and all policies should be jointly discussed. If these two limbs do not cooperate, that will affect the strength of the Congress. The strength of the Government is the strength of the people and not the strength of its police or army. It is true that the Congress committees should not interfere in day-to-day details of administration. On economic and other policies Government should take the advice of Congress committees.

The Congress till this time was the instrument for winning freedom and now it has to do constructive work. Differences in policy develop on account of economic and other reasons, but looking at the state of affairs in the country, we must take the next step in unity and in majesty.

1. Address to Congress workers, Nagpur, 12 March 1948. From *The Hindu* and *The Hindustan Times*, 14 March 1948.

2. Need for a Broader Perspective¹

I am greatly disappointed with the address which seems to forget that there is such a thing as India and does not seem to realise the crisis confronting her. I wonder if such an address² could emanate from any wide-awake body of persons at the present juncture in the country and the world. Will you expect me to consider your deliberations when you dwell on your local problems at a time when the world is shaking and India is passing through a great crisis? There is something wrong about the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee if it thinks so much about these and of nothing else. It simply shows that you have lost all perspective and not seen the danger to India. Do you imagine you are going to have an independent state in the Andhra province? But you seem to think in such terms as if India does not count much and India's problems do not count and only the Andhra province counts for you. That is not the way to serve even Andhra, much less India.

In a few days' time I would be broadcasting to America about "One World".³ There is this conception today and I believe in it. I believe there is no way out except the "One World" conception. The only alternative to it is world disaster. The "One World" conception is too wide perhaps for the present and I will suggest you should confine yourselves to the conception of "One India" and "One Citizenship" for India, realising that what is harmful to India as a whole is bound to be harmful to each component part of India. India is a living body and its partition has cut up a living body with terrible evil consequences. I, therefore, urge you to beware of doing anything which loosened the bonds that knit India together. I am urging you these considerations because I am apprehensive that men's minds are drifting away from the concept of "One India".

Question : Will you give your views on the relations between Congress Socialists and the Congress ?

Jawaharlal Nehru : Whenever the question of Socialists leaving the Congress arose, I advised them in private not to do so as I am convinced that we have not reached a stage when we should split up into parties

1. Remarks at a meeting of the Andhra Provincial Congress workers, Vishakhapatnam, 15 March 1948. From *The Hindu*, 16 March, and *National Herald*, 17 March 1948.
2. Obula Reddy, General Secretary, Andhra P.C.C. in his address of welcome to Nehru, demanded the formation of an Andhra province.
3. See *post*, section 11, sub-section I, item 5.

whose ideology is primarily economic. The stage for it might have come after August 15, but for the troubles and disruptive forces that came into play. Therefore, I am strongly of the opinion that Socialists should not go out of the Congress. But events have taken such a shape that it has become very difficult for any such group to function separately and oppose the parent body and yet be in it. In the present context we may examine the Congress constitution calmly, and, whether the Socialist Party or any other party went out, let us not fight about it or bear illwill. It is quite possible that it might prove easier to cooperate with parties outside than inside, with continuous friction.

Q : Are you happy with the Congress Party ?

JN : There is no doubt that the Congress of today requires radical, root and branch reform. Whether it is possible or not, I do not know. Apart from parties and groups, there is such a thing as the character of individuals or parties. The Indian temperament thought more of an individual character than of the party to which he belonged and I think it is a good thing. For, if men are to be judged by slogans, a good man may shout a slogan as also a scoundrel and mere shouting of a slogan should not be a reason for supporting a scoundrel. It is true that ultimately people respect men of character rather than slogans. The pity is that men of character fall out for other reasons and difficulties. Mahatmaji, after all, is loved and revered because he was a man of supreme character.

Q : What are your views about handloom weavers ?

JN : The Government will do all it can to encourage handloom weavers but I cannot, off-hand, give details of how we are going to do it.

Q : What are your views about the cooperative commonwealth recommended by the Congress ?

JN : I am sorry I cannot elucidate on this point. Generally we want to end all exploitation and the profit motive and we stand for a socialistic society.

3. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
March 15, 1948

My dear Jayaprakash,

You are meeting soon² and are likely to take vital decisions. What you decide will naturally have an important effect on this country. You have sometimes discussed these matters with me in the past and I told you how I felt about them. I think the time has come when you must decide for yourself and no one else should seek to interfere with your decisions. So I do not propose to say anything about it.

But I should like, if I may, to express the hope that whatever the decision may be, it will be taken in a friendly spirit to others and with a desire to cooperate to the fullest extent possible. I know you feel that way and it is hardly necessary for me to stress this point. Still I am doing so as I feel the weight of our internal controversies greatly during this period of stress and trial. The internal situation is difficult enough, the external one is full of peril, and no one knows what horror might descend upon us before very long. We must therefore try our utmost to pull together and face these dangers together.

With all good wishes,

Yours affly.,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. S. Vijayalakshmi (editor), *Sri Jayaprakash Narayan—Sixtyfirst Birth Day Celebration : Commemoration Volume*, (Madras, 1962), p. 148.
2. The Socialist Party was to hold its sixth annual conference at Nasik on 19 March 1948 to consider continuance of its association with the Congress.

4. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
18th March 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have your letter of the 13th March regarding the Mor Scheme.² As a matter of fact, before I received your letter I wrote to the Premier of Bihar on this

1. File No. 17(52)/48-PMS.
2. B.C. Roy had said that Bihar's objection to the Scheme was based on the fear that the displacement of Santhals would prejudice her claims to the Santhal Parganas in any future plebiscite. Stressing the urgency of expanding irrigation in West Bengal he had urged Nehru to intervene. For the Mor Project see *ante*, p. 163., fn. 5.

subject³ and strongly urged his Government to offer their cooperation to you. I propose to pursue this matter.

As you say, Bihar's fears are due to an apprehension that that part of Bihar may go over to Bengal through a plebiscite or otherwise. Indeed the Bihar Premier has written to me, quite apart from the Mor Scheme, protesting against the agitation in West Bengal for the inclusion of certain Bihari areas. I am quite clear in my own mind that any agitation of this kind for rectification of provincial boundaries is entirely misplaced at present. It just adds to people's excitement and passion without achieving any results. I trust that this agitation will not be encouraged as it will otherwise come in the way of your various schemes.

I have written to the Bihar Premier that no question of rectification of frontiers arises and he should consider the Mor Scheme quite apart from this. If you could also write to him to the same effect, it would go a long way to get the Bihar Government to agree to the Mor Scheme.

Thank you for your note sending me particulars about the Muslim League National Guard leaders who have been arrested.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *post*, sub-section II, item 17.

5. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Your letter March 14th most interesting. We have specially appreciated letter of Austrian Ambassador to Czech Ambassador.

Three days ago West Bengal Government declared Communist Party illegal and arrested a number of prominent Communist workers. This was done curiously enough without any intimation to us and we learnt of it from newspapers next morning. Explanation was that news was in danger of leaking out and hence quick action was necessary.

There is no doubt that Communist Party in India are making a dead-set against Government and trying to create trouble in every direction. Pooran

1. New Delhi, 31 March 1948. File No. 28(2)-EUR/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I. Vijayalakshmi Pandit was Ambassador to Russia at this time.

Joshi has been pushed out as an appeaser² and Ranadive³ is now their General Secretary. Calcutta has become their principal centre of activity. There is danger of interference with security and possible sabotage. It is not our intention to ban Communist Party in other parts of India but some selected prominent workers are likely to be arrested soon all over India.

On April 2nd some organisations under Communist control have proclaimed general strike of Central Government employees in Calcutta. This is to be sit-down strike plus hunger-strike and there are indications of preparation for violence. We have decided to take strong line and dismiss any government servant who joins this strike.⁴ At the same time we are doing our utmost to meet legitimate demands of those being retrenched from war-time occupations. I made long statement in Assembly today on this subject.⁵

Kashmir issue in Security Council is at standstill. Zafrullah waiting for Colombia President next month.⁶ We have reached the limit of concessions and it is difficult for us to keep our delegation indefinitely in New York. However, we do not intend taking any precipitate action but we are informally telling representatives of other countries here and in New York that we cannot carry on for long in this way.

2. At the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India from 28 February to 6 March 1948, the already dominant group led by B.T. Ranadive removed P.C. Joshi and others from key positions in the party and adopted a programme of insurrectionary activities for installing a "revolutionary" government in the country.
3. Balchandra Trimbak Ranadive (b.1904); member, Central Committee and Politburo, C.P.I.; 1943-48, General Secretary, 1948-50; member, National Council, 1958-64 and, after the split in the C.P.I., of the Politburo of C.P.I.(M) from 1964.
4. On the fourth day of the strike, the Central Government asked all employees in Calcutta to sign a declaration of non-participation. Employees who refused to sign or participated in the strike were suspended and asked to show cause why they should not be dismissed. By 9 April 1948, 80-95 per cent of the employees reported for duty and nearly four hundred were arrested.
5. See *post*, sub-section II, item 22.
6. Alfonso Lopez, the representative of Colombia and Chairman of the Security Council in April 1948, along with the representatives of Belgium, Canada, China, the U.K. and the U.S.A., sponsored a draft resolution on the Kashmir issue which changed the Chinese draft resolution in its essential particulars in such a way as to make it unacceptable to India.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

II. Economic

1. To S.S. Bhatnagar¹

New Delhi
14th January 1948

My dear Bhatnagar,

I have received information that one of the big ships of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company, the *Jala Kanta*, is proceeding from Calcutta to Madras and from there to Quilon. It will take a cargo of sand from Quilon to America. Presumably this sand will be the radioactive sand in Travancore from which you get uranium and thorium.

I want to know whether this is in order and whether it comes in the scope of the agreement between our Atomic Committee and the Travancore durbar.² If not, then some step has to be taken in the matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(4)/47-PMS.
2. A joint committee consisting of six members of the Board of Research on Atomic Energy and three representatives of the Travancore State was set up in June 1947 to advise on matters connected with atomic research and utilisation of radioactive raw material.

2. The Crisis in Production¹

Friends and Comrades, I am supposed to speak to you about the production crisis. But my mind is full of other matters and other crises. We talk of the production of many things, but perhaps the most important for a nation is to produce men and women, good and true. One such person is in India who, through his goodness, truth and power of spirit, brightens this ancient land and casts his radiance on us, weak and erring mortals, and stops us when we go astray. We have strayed enough from the right path and wasted our inheritance, and our good repute. We have had enough of this now. We must go ahead on the path of creation and construction and cooperation and goodwill to our fellowmen.

1. Broadcast from Delhi in the series "Produce or Perish", 18 January 1948, A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

Production means wealth. If we do not produce we have not enough wealth. Distribution is equally important, so that wealth does not accumulate in the hands of a few. But, nevertheless, before we think of distribution, there must be production.

You know we have many problems to face today—economic problems and other. There are questions of control and inflation and so many other problems. There is, again, the scarcity of goods. The changeover from wartime to peacetime economy has been very slow. And, indeed, instead of progress there has often been going back. Now, this is the most urgent and serious matter for us to consider, because, as this trend goes on, there is a kind of creeping paralysis of our economy, and the whole of India and the whole nation suffers. Today, in addition, we have to face tremendous problems of vast migration and colossal numbers of refugees. The refugees are not producing. East Punjab is not producing much and all these people become unfortunately a burden, they are not capable of producing, but circumstances have forced them into this unhappy position. So we have to think of production as an urgent problem, even more urgent than what we have otherwise done.

We want a stream of wealth pouring out from our fields, factories and workshops and reaching the country's millions, so that ultimately we may be able to see our dreams for India fulfilled.

We talk of freedom, but today political freedom does not take us far unless there is economic freedom. Indeed, there is no such thing as freedom for a man who is starving or for a country which is poor. The poor, whether they are nations or individuals, have little place in this world. Therefore, we have to produce in order to have sufficient wealth distributed by proper economic planning so that it may go to the millions, more specially to the common man. Then not only the millions prosper, but the whole country becomes rich and prosperous and strong. Many people have belief in all manner of dangers and some people talk loosely of conflicts with other countries. I hope there will be no such conflicts.

Nevertheless, a new country—a new state, which has recently achieved its independence—must take great care to guard its freedom. It has rightly been said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. How are we to effect this? How are we to put into effect the schemes of reform or schemes of constructive development unless we have the wealth to put into them? We cannot live on borrowed money for long, and even if we borrow money, we must have the credit for it. We must be strong enough to invest it along proper channels. All these require production—production in the immediate present to fulfil our immediate needs, so that we may have something to lay by for these productive schemes of development. Therefore, we come back to the basic need for production at this moment. Now, production means hard

work, unremitting labour; production means no stoppage of work, no strike and lockout.

Now, I am the last man to say that labour should be denied the right to strike, for the weapon of strike has been a much valued weapon by means of which labour has gradually gained a position of strength and eminence in most countries. Nevertheless, there are times when strikes are dangerous, when strikes not only injure the cause of a nation, but also ultimately the cause of the worker himself. We are passing through one of those times, and it was for this reason that a short while ago, at a conference held in Delhi, the representatives of the Government, labour and industry decided, almost unanimously, that we should have a three-year truce, during which there should be no strikes or lockouts. Obviously, if we have decided on such a course, we must have a machinery to see that it is followed. Otherwise, some will take advantage of this decision. Therefore, in that conference it was further decided to have this machinery, so that the worker, labourer or peasant, would have his due, would have a fair deal and would even take some part in the management more specially in regard to his own needs. If we have fair and impartial machinery of this kind, then strikes and lockouts would have no meaning.

Of course, strikes and lockouts should have no meaning in a properly constituted state, where everyone has his due. Strikes and lockouts are the symbols of something radically wrong in our economic system. Well, a great deal is wrong in our economic system today, not only in India, but in other parts of the world as well. We have to change all this, but in changing we have to take care that we do not smash what we already have. There is the danger that in doing something rashly, we may go further away from the objectives that we aim at. Therefore, at present, with all these crises facing us, it is most important for us to have a period of industrial calm and peace so that we may all join together to increase the production in the country, and build up the country by putting through the vast schemes of development.

You know that we have had these schemes for a long time. Unfortunately, many of them still remain on paper. It is time that we gave effect to them. There are among them great river valley schemes which would not only irrigate the land, prevent floods, produce hydro-electric power and prevent malaria and other diseases, but generally produce conditions for the rapid development of industries and modernisation of our agriculture. Do you realise that India is heavily populated, but still has vast tracts of land where no man lives, because these tracts have no water and the soil requires treatment.

Our present population can easily be fully employed, thereby we do not only remove unemployment but increase the wealth of the country. No country can be considered over-populated if there is work for everyone.

We propose to have this work, and if we have to succeed in our endeavour, we shall have to give up the fear of unceasing conflict in the economic and labour fields. But that again, as I said, can only be solved if the worker gets his due and if he is not exploited.

We must, therefore, devise something soon for this purpose. To some extent, this has been done but a great deal is yet to be done. Meanwhile, we must decide to give full effect to this three-year truce which we have decided upon.

So let us get on with work, real hard work. Let us produce, but what we produce is not for some individual pockets but for the nation, to raise the standard of the people and the common man. If we do that we shall see India progressing rapidly. Many of the problems that face us today will be solved. It is not an easy task for us to rebuild India. It is a very big problem. Though we are large in number, there is no lack of resources, there is no lack of human beings—capable, intelligent and hardworking. We have to use these resources, this manpower in India.

It also depends on peace, international peace, national peace, economic peace, and peace in the labour world and in the industrial world. At the present moment, I am talking to you particularly for industrial peace and let all of us join together in this campaign of production. We should remember that this production is not for enriching individuals, but it is to enrich the nation. For if India lives, we also live. *Jai Hind*.

3. To Gulzari Lal Nanda¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Gulzari Lal,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th January and the other papers that you have sent.

I have been myself greatly distressed by the strikes that are going on. I have no doubt that the token strike² was wrong and that the present strike of the Port Trust employees³ is also wrong. What worries me however is the

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The reference is to the one-day strike by workers of over 60 labour unions of Bombay on 29 December 1947 to protest against compulsory arbitration and the lifting of controls.

3. Over eight thousand workers of the Bombay Port Trust went on a 45-day strike beginning on 24 December 1947 against the sudden reduction in the number of paid holidays and the "high-handed" attitude of the Trust officials.

fact that we have got so cut off from large sections of the public that we cannot influence them sufficiently. Right or wrong, the fact that our lead is not followed is itself a matter of significance. The Congress prestige has diminished tremendously although individual Congressmen are still respected.

I suppose the problem of Socialists within the Congress will solve itself very soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Increase Production in the Battle against Poverty¹

We fought the battle of freedom and achieved it. But Swaraj cannot be completed unless the difficulties of the people are removed and there is proper arrangement for food, clothing, houses and education. We have to fight another battle to remove the poverty of the masses. In this battle we have not to fight against anybody else but to work in a way which would increase production. The number of *kisans* is the largest in this country and agriculture is our main industry. Similar to other countries it is necessary to increase the fertility of the land to bring prosperity to the peasants and the country.

1. Message on the initiation of a compost-making drive by the U.P. Government. From *National Herald*, 28 January 1948.

5. A Flexible Economic Policy¹

Sir, I should like to say a few words right at the beginning of this discussion in order to indicate the general policy of Government in this behalf. The

1. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on a resolution moved by Kazi Syed Karimuddin urging the Government to accept and implement a socialist economy, 17 February 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, 1948, pp. 825-834.

honourable mover has referred to various statements previously made by the National Congress, by me personally and by others; and then he has drawn attention to other statements made by members of Government and pointed out certain discrepancies between them.² There may be different viewpoints and certain discrepancies if various statements are compared; but I think the real fact of the matter is—and I plead guilty to it—that Government as such have not put forward before this House or before the country any fully worked-out policy in regard to these matters. Not that the Government do not attach a good deal of importance to them, but for the simple reason that events of various kinds rather overwhelmed us, and these could not be dealt with—if I may say so with all respect—in the manner that the honourable member suggests, by a kind of resolution vaguely talking about nationalisation and putting everything into effect immediately. It is a much more intricate matter. We may call ourselves by any name we like, Socialists or any other name, but if we have to tackle these problems, we cannot tackle them in vague terms. We must tackle them precisely. And it is Government's business certainly to deal with long-term policies, and even more so with the immediate present. And so, as we have had these other difficulties to face, many matters which we would probably have considered by now have had to be postponed. For instance, it was our desire to consider the appointment of a Planning Commission which could be given general terms of reference, and which would then precisely lay down priorities, how to plan and coordinate various sectors of our economic life. We have been unable to do that, I am sorry to say. I hope that, before very long, we shall be able to take some steps in that direction. Meanwhile, as the House is aware, in a very small way we have appointed a Rehabilitation and Development Board which, though it primarily concerns itself with rehabilitation of the refugees, is also intimately concerned with development, and it will have to consider the various development schemes and try to plan them with the object of rehabilitating the refugees.

In the past few years I have had occasion to express my general views on this subject many times, and for some years I was Chairman of the National Planning Committee³ where all such matters came up for discussion. We did a lot of good work in that committee. Unfortunately, this work did not bear fruit in the shape of a final report, but the reports issued by a large number of sub-committees and a considerable number of our own resolu-

2. Karimuddin had referred to these statements to point out the "ambivalence" in the Government's stand on nationalisation.

3. The committee was constituted in October 1938. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 9, pp. 367-402. Its work, suspended in 1940 when Nehru was imprisoned, was resumed in 1945. It dissolved itself on 26 March 1949 having published 26 volumes containing the reports of the sub-committees.

tions bear witness to the work that has already been done. I am glad to say that many of these reports of the sub-committees are now available for such persons as are interested in them. If they read these reports as well as the other materials which we have, they will find that these questions are extraordinarily intricate and overlapping, and that they cannot be solved by a mere formula.

The formula gives the mental outlook of the person who uses it. That is true, but a government cannot speak in vague formulae. The Government has to consider every aspect of the question and more especially what it can do for the immediate present. Now, it is well known, and we have often stressed this, that production is perhaps one of the most important things before us today: that is, adding to the wealth of the country. We cannot overlook other factors. Nevertheless, production comes first, and I am prepared to say that everything that we do should be judged from the point of view of production first of all. If nationalisation adds to production, we shall have nationalisation at every step. If it does not, let us see how to bring it about in order not to impede production. That is the essential thing. It is not so easy as the honourable member seems to think that we can legislate and then, by some kind of jugglery, we can produce results. To take such a step may possibly lead to some kind of disaster, actually a graver crisis may follow. So it is not merely a question of adopting a certain economic outlook, but also of timing, of priorities, of how to do it, in what manner and when to do it—these are the most important factors. It is not enough to put aside or break up a certain system, but you have to put another system in its place. All these factors have to be borne in mind.

The resolution that the honourable member has put forward suffers from all manner of defects, including the kind of defect that he was blaming us for. It is vague. It has little meaning except to show the goodness of his heart. It talks about doing things immediately, all over the place in agriculture and industry. I just cannot conceive how any government, whatever its views may be as regards economic problems, can accept such a resolution. Most of us—and, so far as I am concerned, I too,—believe, that the time has come for a rapid change in the economic system, not only of India but of other parts of the world. I think far too many of our friends and our countrymen here and those in other countries continue to think in terms which were applicable to an age which has more or less passed. They continue to adhere to what might be called the 19th century economic ideology, which may have been very good in its time, but which is largely inapplicable today, and I think many of the ills in the world today are due to the fact that the particular economic system, which grew in the 19th century, does not fit the circumstances of the middle of the 20th century. We find, therefore, all over the world an economic malaise, and it may be that many of our political ills are due to the fact that we are not settling down all over

the world in a more sensible manner befitting the times. However that may be, the point we have to consider is not just destructive criticism, but what we can do constructively to meet it. What we can do to meet it depends a great deal, of course, on circumstances in our own country ; partly, also, on circumstances in the world outside because these events act and react on one another.

In judging of the circumstances in our own country, we have to consider all manner of factors and we have to plan accordingly and go ahead, step by step, so as not to break up something we have without replacing it immediately by something better. It is fairly easy to break things up.

It is not so easy to construct. It is quite possible that, in an attempt to change the economic system, you may have a period of semi-disaster. You may even stop production which we aim at. Ultimately, perhaps very gradually, you may build up a new kind of apparatus. But for the moment you will break up the existing apparatus. That is undesirable when all our energies have to be concentrated on production.

The honourable member referred to a certain report which was issued by a sub-committee of the All India Congress Committee, of which I had the honour to be the Chairman.⁴ I would recommend him and other members to read that report carefully, because that report was a carefully drafted document. It was not by any means a final report. It was a report to be considered first by the Working Committee of the Congress, and secondly by the All India Congress Committee. The report itself states that it is only a rough blueprint and that these matters will have to be considered by the Planning Commission.

Now, this document, which I have referred to, by the Economic Programme Sub-Committee of the Congress⁶ has given rise to a great deal of criticism, or, in any event, to some criticism, on either side. Some people think it does not go far enough, and others think it is a revolutionary departure which will upset our economy, and that it is, in fact, a sudden jump to socialism. Of course, it is nothing of the kind either way. It is very far from socialism. It is the continuation of a process which is going on all over the world, including the capitalistic countries of the world, excepting perhaps the biggest of them all, the United States of America. In other countries you will see this process going on in some places, and in some faster than in other countries. This report merely indicates a strong tendency towards socialism, with certain industries earmarked for earlier socialisation than others, and even in this report it is stated definitely that every step should be taken so as not to interfere with production.⁷

I should just like to read to the House one or two passages from it. First, "it is emphasized that the report is not a blueprint, but an outline programme, the details of which will have to be filled in by the permanent Planning Commission which has been recommended." Then, it referred to definite and key industries, and here again, may I say, that the use of the word 'key' industries is very vague. Opinions may differ as to what is a key industry, whether we are referring to a few or many. Deliberately it has been left vague, because the stage of defining these industries will come later, when the matter is considered by the Planning Commission. Quite apart from defining them, the question of nationalising them and the timing of it, would also depend on the commission or whatever authority that might consider the problem.

There is another matter which has been referred to in this report. We have specifically stated that, apart from certain obvious industries of vital importance, we consider that the state should nationalise or start nationalising new industries of a particular type, that is to say, we should not waste our resources at the present moment in trying to nationalise existing industries, except where it is absolutely necessary, but rather conserve our resources and start new industries. I thought that a very sound principle, because, after all, whatever we may do, it will have to be limited by our own resources. We have to choose which to take up first. If we squander our resources in merely acquiring for the state existing industries (that we have acquired them may be for the nation's good), for the moment we have no other resources left, and we would have rather spoiled the field for private enterprise too. So it is far better for the state to concentrate on certain

6. See *post*, item 7.

7. The report stated that the transition to public ownership should avoid dislocation of the economy, a fall in production, uneconomic acquisition of assets and diversion of resources from more urgent uses.

specific, vital, new industries than to go about nationalising many of the old ones, though, as I said, in the case of some specific vital industry of national importance that might be done.

This has many advantages, one advantage being, as I said, that the state's resources are applied to new industries, according to the requirements of production, without interfering with the existing apparatus except where it is absolutely necessary. All the work that the state would do would be to add constructively to production rather than merely effect a change-over. After a period (which is hinted at in this report), after five years or so, the state may reconsider the problem and see what else it can do, how far it can go.

Now, what is the point in putting in this five-year period? As a matter of fact, whatever period might be put in has little significance in the present changing, dynamic world. One does not know, and I doubt if any member of this House can say, what will happen in India two years hence or three years hence, in either the political or economic domain, so that putting down any time-table or programme does not help much, except that it gives us some picture in our minds to which we can work up to.

Why five years was the time put down was really to give a kind of assurance to those who might be somewhat put out by the prospect of these changes, that is to say, that we are not going to upset existing things, we are leaving them as they are more or less, but that we are enlarging the domain in other fields, more or less specified fields, so that there may be no grievance that something is done which upsets the existing structure.

I have been surprised to read criticisms of this rough outline report, criticisms from industrial magnates and others,⁸ because I thought that this report had carefully considered many of the problems that face the country, even from the point of view of industrialists and others. We had provided for many of those things, may be some things had to be overlooked which can be considered later, but generally speaking, we had carefully provided that there should be no sudden change which might upset the present structure without its being replaced.

After this report was drawn up, this House decided on the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and the Imperial Bank of India.⁹ Changes go on

8. The president of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries had declared that the report would drastically affect the industrial structure. The Bombay Shareholders' Association was apprehensive of the results of implementing the report. On 30 January 1948, a group of Bombay industrialists stated that it would damage the economic structure and sidetrack the work of the Industries Conference.
9. The Government's decision to nationalise the Reserve Bank and the Imperial Bank was announced on 4 February 1948. While the Bill to nationalise the Reserve Bank was passed on 2 September 1948, the Government announced on 1 February 1949 that it was not feasible as yet to nationalise the Imperial Bank of India.

taking place in that way. It may be that if we merely talk in terms of big changes all over the place, the result would be no change at all, because that would be merely a paper decision which could not easily be given effect to. Therefore, I submit that the proper way of dealing with this matter is not to pass a resolution of this kind, but to consider it carefully in the context of what can be done, the general policy being laid down, the general outlook, or, if you like, the general objective. The ultimate objective may not have to be reconsidered, but many of the things leading up to it may have to be reconsidered from time to time, because, meanwhile, all manner of changes are taking place.

For instance, if I may put one aspect of the case before the House, I think that the progress of technology and of science is so enormous and so rapid that within a fairly short space of time, let us say fifteen years, the whole conception of modern industry will change completely. New sources of power will be discovered and those sources of power will upset the methods of production that exist today much more so than the Industrial Revolution did 150 years ago in England and in the rest of Europe. All these enormous changes are going to take place and I find that many of us, whether we call ourselves Socialists, Communists or capitalists or by any other name, are singularly unaware of the big changes that are taking place. We are so unaware of this that we think merely in terms, not of the greater wealth coming into existence by fresh methods, but rather only of changing the ownership of industry which, of course, may be important from the point of view of advancing towards equality. Distribution is very important, but what is far more important is the dynamic future. In the changed situation all over the world, new sources of power might completely revolutionise our agriculture as well as our industry. Therefore what I think most important for the state is that whatever may happen to the existing sources of production, these new and novel sources of production should always remain in the hands of the state. We should not allow them to go into private hands and thus become private monopolies. And in regard to the existing sources, we should proceed step by step, and avoid any drop in production or disturbances of the economic structure as far as possible.

The House knows that we have a large number of big schemes or projects dealing with river valleys. These schemes deal with construction of big reservoirs, hydro-electric works, irrigation canals, prevention of erosion, prevention of malaria and so on and so forth. These schemes are going to require a vast deal of money and by far the most important thing is that they will be the basis of all future growth. They will go a long way to solve our food problem, to provide that power which is essential for industrial growth. Once you have that power you can go ahead pretty fast. So the Government decided to concentrate on the rapid development of these river valley schemes and not to fritter away their energy on temporary expedients here and there.

If we are going to concentrate on these big schemes are we going to divert our energy from them in acquiring this or that little industry which may make only some or no difference at all, which will create upsets here and there and not lead to that basic foundation on which all industry should rest in the future? Therefore, even from the point of view of socialisation, we should proceed with the foundations first, lay them down, have a system of priorities and timing, take over a sector of the national economy and socialise it only when the time is ripe for it. When the time will be ripe I cannot say. We require not only money but, what is far more important, trained human material. In fact, in the ultimate analysis, that is the only essential thing whether it concerns industrial or any other department of life. Let us admit we do not possess a sufficient quantity of that trained human material in any field of life in India today. We have produced competent persons in every department of life—in science, in industry. We have some of the finest scientists in the world. Nevertheless, they are few. They are not enough. The House may remember that the Government appointed a Scientific Manpower Committee¹⁰ a little time ago because we attach the greatest importance to using the scientific manpower we have, to increasing it and rapidly augmenting it. That Committee reported and its report was considered by the Government. Many of its recommendations were adopted. We are trying our best to increase our technical and other personnel by sending people abroad, and getting people from abroad to teach our students here. All this is the real basis, the foundation, that is being laid down for future progress, and the other approach, that is a theoretical and doctrinaire approach, merely stating we are going to make these big changes, does not help much. On the other hand, it gives a completely wrong picture to the people, who do not realize what is to be done or what preparations have to be made before the various steps can be taken. Therefore, I submit that a resolution of this kind will not be helpful at all. I hope that sometime during this session, if it is possible, we may come up before this House with certain specific proposals or statements of policy in regard to industrial programme. Naturally, whatever programme we may adopt would have to have the sanction of this House.

To refer back to the Congress sub-committee's report, naturally, if any programme, economic or other, receives the final sanction of the All India Congress Committee and that Committee calls for that programme to be adopted, most of us in this House are bound by that mandate. The final authority, no doubt, is this House for any programme that has to be adopted, but most of us are bound by any programme definitely and precisely put forward by the All India Congress Committee, and we shall have to place it before this House for adoption. But the All India Congress Com-

10. See *post*, sub-section IV, item 1.

mittee, after all, is not an executive body; at the most it is a policy-laying body. It will lay down the general policy, again, naturally, leaving it to this House or to the Government to time it as it thinks it expedient, to give certain priorities and to go ahead with it at a pace which may be considered right and proper.

The House knows that in regard to the land system, our general policy has been to put an end to what is being called the zamindari system. The pace has been slow, not due to any lack of effort, but because all manner of difficulties have cropped up. Still, I hope that the matter will be gone through fairly soon. That again is one of the foundations on which we can build everything else. There has been talk about collective and cooperative farming. I should like to have collective and cooperative farming in this country. I hope that, in any event, if not on a large scale, at least on a small scale, we shall begin soon with cooperatives, and, may be, with collectives. But it is obvious that before you can think of them, you have to put an end to the present land system which prevails in the greater part of India—first of all the big zamindari system, and then perhaps other aspects of it, and that is not such an easy matter. It is not a matter of a few, whom you might call capitalists, disliking it, but possibly a very large number of peasant proprietors disliking it. Obviously, whatever decision we may make must have the consent of the large number of people. We cannot force it down the throats of the vast majority of our peasants. We have to convert them. The best way to do that is to give them a living example in cooperatives, and show them how they will function; and then only can they be converted. India is a huge country. We may have various types of agricultural economy side by side, and gradually the one that is best suited to the land will prevail. Even in cooperatives, there are so many types. I cannot say immediately which is the most suitable; it may be that one type may be suitable in one part of the country and another in another part.

Finally, therefore, I would assure the House that as far as we are concerned, we are very anxious to draw up a particular statement of policy in regard to our industrial programme.¹¹ I do not think at this stage that

11. The resolution embodying the Government's industrial policy was placed before the Constituent Assembly on 6 April 1948 and approved on 7 April. Reserving to itself full control over munitions, atomic energy and railways, the Central Government listed six industries in which it would have exclusive rights to establish new undertakings. Nationalisation of existing concerns in these industries was, however, to be postponed for ten years. Eighteen industries which would be subject to central regulation were listed. The development of cottage industries, industrial relations, social justice and the attitude to foreign capital were also covered.

that statement will go very far into the future. It is risky to go far into the future. It is for non-official organisations to look far ahead into the future, but for a government to commit itself to the long distance is not safe. I should like to assure others who may not be in the House that whatever we may do, we want to put production first. We think it is most essential. Production obviously depends on a very great deal of cooperation among those people who are most concerned with production. Obviously, we want the goodwill of the industrialists of the country. The question is often asked, "Have you the personnel to nationalise industries?" Well, as I said just now, we have not enough. But the question rather surprises me, because it is the same personnel that might be used whether industry is nationalised or not. The personnel which function in private industry will not leave the country when it is nationalised. It is the same personnel, including the captains of industry, who will also be utilised because of their very special ability—managerial, executive, etc. Now, the point is that in any programme that we put forward, we must have the largest measure of goodwill. We must not allow it to affect production. At the same time we must lay the foundations of future progress in the direction we aim at. That was the outlook with which we framed the sub-committee's report. That is a document for you and the country to consider. We paid very special attention to this so that we might not have a break, nor any big upsetting factor, but gradually, though nevertheless fairly quickly, a changeover might be made in those sectors of economy which are most capable of using it to the national advantage, and then making other changes. I would therefore *beg the honourable member not to press a resolution which on the face of it cannot be given effect to.*

6. To R.K. Shanmukham Chetty¹

New Delhi
19 February 1948

My dear Shanmukham,

I have seen a copy of a telegram which the Governor of West Bengal has sent you regarding your budget proposals. I am myself rather worried about the public reaction to some of your proposals. Separately, I think, each can be justified but taking all together, they would undoubtedly raise opposition in the public and give rise to the impression that we are conceding too much to particular classes. Our opponents would exploit this position to

1. J.N. Collection.

the utmost. As I pointed out to you previously we desire not to do away completely with the business profit tax though the scales and the rates might be lowered.³ In effect, the burden is reduced all round as desired and at the same time the adverse psychological effect is avoided.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In the budget proposals for 1948-49, Shanmukham Chetty, the Finance Minister, stated that to meet the cost of reconstruction and refugee rehabilitation, the business profit tax had to be retained. However, as proposed in his 1947-48 budget, he allowed a reduction of Rs. 1 lakh till 28 February 1948 or six per cent of the capital employed, whichever was larger, and fixed the rate of the tax at 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. In the new budget the abatement was to be Rs. 2 lakhs and the rate of tax was to be reduced to 10 per cent.

7. The Congress Economic Programme¹

The questions with which the report deals are important as well as complicated. While preparing or considering a report like this, one cannot attach too great an importance to mere words. What really matters is the effect that these words will have or the change that they will bring about in the economic life of the country.

It is my considered opinion that socialism will go a long way in alleviating distress; but coming to the practical meaning of the word, one realises that it can be given many different interpretations. While deciding the principles, an organisation like the Congress must also see that those principles can be put into practice. There is no point in recommending noble principles if they are not practicable. The very basis of socialism is an understanding of the situation and action in accordance with it. Members of the A.I.C.C. must keep this in view while considering the report.

The world is undergoing a constant and rapid change. But, unfortunately, most people do not take those momentous changes into account. They are still planning for situations and times which exist no more. New sources of energy are being discovered and they will usher in a revolution in all phases of human endeavour. Our way of thinking, therefore, should not be static.

1. Intervention at a discussion on the report of the Economic Programme Sub-Committee at the A.I.C.C., New Delhi, 22 February 1948. From *National Herald*, 23 February 1948.

Complaints have been received from one section that the report does not go far enough towards socialism while another section complains that it is revolutionary and will destroy the entire fabric of Indian industry.³ The fact was that those who make these complaints have not read the report properly. A thorough and intelligent study of the report will reveal that while it does not aim at complete and immediate socialisation, it goes that way in as far as circumstances prevailing in the country and the interests of the people permit.

I agree in principle with the idea of nationalising industry. But the question today is where to draw the line, and while dealing with this question, we must bear in mind the larger interests of the country. Whatever industrialisation has taken place in India till now has been haphazard and irregular and we must see that future industrialisation proceeds on planned lines.

The report has recommended that the present land revenue system should be replaced by a progressive taxation of agricultural income. But I am not sure what exactly will be the effect of the abolition of the land revenue system on the agricultural economy.

It is proposed to acquire the Reserve and Imperial Banks in a few months time, and I feel that by nationalising these two banks the foundation of Indian banking system will be nationalised, and that for the present there is no need to touch the other smaller banks.

I also agree that insurance should be nationalised.³ But we must decide the appropriate time and manner of effecting the change.

2. The report of the Economic Programme Sub-Committee of the Congress was criticised by the business community for its recommendation of nationalisation of industries, and by the Socialists for postponing the issue of nationalisation for five years.
3. The bill to nationalise life insurance in India was passed by the Lok Sabha on 23 May and by the Rajya Sabha on 30 May 1956.

8. To P.S. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
25 February 1948


My dear Deshmukh,²

Thank you for your letter of the 25th February.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. (1898-1968); member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-49; elected to Lok Sabha in 1952, 1957 and 1962.



AT THE ANDHRA UNIVERSITY, WALT AIR, 14 MARCH 1948



CONVOCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DELHI, 19 MARCH 1948

I never thought that the resolution³ you gave notice of had anything to do with communalism. Indeed, no one mentioned this to me. I felt, however, that it was not a resolution which was helpful in dealing with the very matter that you have at heart. I quite agree with you that a certain priority should be given to the rural population. That, as you know, was Gandhiji's line throughout his life. But how are we to give that priority in services, etc.? I do not understand how this business can be connected with recruitment for services. The only way to help the rural areas is to raise their standards—educational, economic and the rest. Inevitably they will find their place in services, etc. Any other way will simply lead to a deterioration of standards. We all suffer from this because of our communal percentages etc.

Apart from this it is not easy to see who belongs to the rural areas and who does not. Large numbers of our people who happen to be living in towns now have their homes in villages. That is a natural trend in every country. It would be therefore difficult to define a person coming from the rural area. If you can suggest any specific method of raising the level of the rural population, I shall very gladly consider it and try to give effect to it. The main thing is, as you yourself say, that the backward and illiterate peasantry and labourers should be helped in every way to advance. That cannot be done through services. At the most a few more can be taken into the services. Some more radical measures have to be taken. I think it would be correct to say that a progressively rising number of people from the villages are making good now because of educational facilities. That is not good enough and we have to go much faster.

I really do not understand why you should think that it was for lack of desire to help the vast mass of our population that your resolution was considered unsuitable.

So far as caste is concerned, I shall be very glad to help in any way to remove it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Deshmukh's resolution of 17 February 1948 in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) regretted lack of representation of "the rural communities" in government services. He did not press his resolution.

9. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
27 February 1948

My dear Jairamdas,

Your letter of the 26th February.² I entirely agree with you that something should be done to divert the flow of pulses and other foodstuffs from Pakistan to scarcity areas, like Madras, in India. Why does not your Ministry take steps in the matter and address the provinces concerned directly? I shall gladly support you in this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31/47-PMS.

2. Jairamdas Doulatram had informed Nehru that large quantities of pulses and other foodstuffs were going to Pakistan from the Khidderpore docks in Calcutta. He had also suggested that grain and foodstuffs, of which U.P. had a surplus, be diverted to Madras.

10. Telegram to Jayaprakash Narayan¹

I am informed that, after thirty days strike in Tata's collieries was over on 14th February, fresh illegal strike has begun without notice at Tata's Digwadih colliery.² Leader of the strike apparently Tripathi³ who is said to be member of Socialist Party. Owing to this strike important pumps getting drowned.⁴ One already drowned. As procurement of pumps and machinery

1. New Delhi, 3 March 1948. File No. 26 (7)/48-PMS.

2. In January, strikes in various Bihar collieries had begun over the demand for rice of better quality. Though the strikes ended on 14 February, the banksmen and on-setters of the Tata Digwadih colliery had again struck work on 1 March 1948 demanding wages for the days from 22 to 29 February on which they had not worked. The number of workers involved was about 2,327.

3. Bhagwat Tripathi; member of the Socialist Party; joined trade union movement in 1945; Vice-President, Koyla Mazdoor Panchayat of the Hind Mazdoor Sabha; joined I.N.T.U.C., 1951.

4. In the coal-mining industry the unions customarily avoid stoppage of work in essential services like pumps even when they go on strike, for flooding can damage underground machinery and delay the opening of the colliery even when the strike is over.

almost impossible within two years this might mean complete stoppage of part of plant for a long time. We are likely to lose at a critical moment large quantities of coal and to have unemployment for 2500 miners for considerable period during which colliery will be put out of action. Situation very grave. I am greatly distressed by such illegal and irresponsible strikes which do grave injury to nation. Would earnestly request you to intervene immediately.

11. To Jagjivan Ram¹

New Delhi
3rd March 1948

My dear Jagjivan Ramji,

Thank you for your letter of today's date. I am very glad that the strike at Tata's colliery has been called off. I am myself very much perturbed by the irresponsible action of some people who are doing their best to ruin our coal-fields. I agree with you that we should consider what action could be taken to prevent this kind of thing.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

12. Telegram to Jayaprakash Narayan¹

Your telegram. Strike has been called off but I am greatly perturbed at utterly irresponsible activities of Tripathi. From accounts received by us Tripathi indulges in violence. Strike of safetymen has resulted in serious damage to the pump which cannot be replaced for two years.

1. New Delhi, 4 March 1948. File No. 26(7)/48-PMS.

13. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
5 March 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

I am greatly worried about the labour situation in Jamshedpur. The recent strikes there have been ominous and violence seems to be growing. We have had repeated instances of workers using violence against officers. I am told that a person named Tripathi is specially addicted to violence.

I am writing to you briefly on the subject now. But I wanted to draw your attention to the matter of grave import. There is a great deal of criticism here about the weakness of the Bihar Government in dealing with these situations. I trust you will personally interest yourself in this matter and take firm action more specially to suppress the slightest evidence of violence. If necessary even the military should be used to control violence.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(7)/48-PMS.

14. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
5 March 1948

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

I am rather worried about the industrial policy statement that is being prepared. I am quite sure that if the last draft was adopted and issued to the public, it would shock public opinion greatly. The whole approach is against our repeated professions and against the spirit of the recent report of the Congress Economic Programme Sub-Committee. This latter report has been generally adopted by the A.I.C.C., though this does not mean a commitment to every item in it. There will be a detailed consideration of it at the next meeting of the A.I.C.C.

Our budget is generally considered to be definitely inclined towards capitalist elements in the country. To some extent circumstances made that necessary. But on other elements it produces the reverse effect. We complain

1. J.N. Collection.

about the intransigence of labour. Labour has undoubtedly been misbehaving and we may even have to take strong action. But the main problem is even more psychological than economic. We have to produce a definite impression that we are giving a square deal and that the benefits of higher production will not largely add to a few individuals' incomes.

It is in this context specially that I have been considering our industrial policy statement. It is not so important whether we include one particular item in the nationalisation programme or not, but it is highly important what our general objectives are and how we approach them. I should like you to consider this statement from this point of view. I am sending you two copies of the report of the Congress Economic Programme Sub-Committee for reference.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. To O.P. Ramaswamy Reddiar¹

New Delhi
9th March 1948

My dear Mr. Ramaswamy Reddiar,
Please refer to your letter of 26th February regarding the food situation in your province and other matters.

Both the Food and Agriculture Minister and myself are greatly concerned about the food situation in Madras province and are anxious to do everything possible to prevent a calamity there. The Food and Agriculture Minister, who recently visited your province to acquaint himself personally with the situation,² is very actively considering ways and means of helping you and must undoubtedly have generally acquainted you with the steps he proposed to take. There are three methods of tackling the problem, viz.,

- (i) putting the internal food resources of the province to the best advantage ;
- (ii) diverting as much surplus of the surplus provinces and States, as may be possible, to the Madras province; and
- (iii) allotting more foodgrains to Madras out of the imports.

1. File No. 31(PMS)/47-PMS.
2. The Food and Agriculture Minister, Jairamdas Doulatram, had visited Madras on 15 February 1948 to tour some villages affected by drought and to discuss the food situation.

You would doubtless be taking every possible step under (i) and it is needless for me to point out that efficient arrangements to procure the surplus foodgrains of your surplus districts, to eliminate waste and to distribute the foodgrains so secured equitably and efficiently to the deficit districts will help greatly.

The Minister for Food and Agriculture will shortly be calling a conference of all Premiers of Provinces and principal States³ to consider the question of the difficulties of Madras. I expect to attend this conference. The Ministers of the surplus provinces and States will be requested to divert the maximum quantities of foodgrains to Madras province and to take steps to eliminate wasteful consumption in their respective areas. The deficit provinces and States will be required to tighten their belts further and to reduce their demands for imports to the minimum. Some provinces and States have already come forward with offers and, as the *rabi* crop in northern India is expected to be good, more offers are expected.

As for imports, as you know, they are limited by all the allotments of the International Emergency Food Council.⁴ Efforts are being made to get more imports but they are limited by currency considerations and non-availability. We, however, are hoping for more imports from Pakistan, Egypt, Burma and Vietnam and if these hopes materialise you will, of course, have prior claim on whatever additional quantities of foodgrains we are successful in securing. In the meanwhile, your allotment for the year has already been increased from 2 lakh tons to 4 lakh tons.

We are also exploring the possibility of utilising other food substitutes such as sweet potatoes. An officer of your province has already been invited to discuss this matter with a committee that has been set up specially for this purpose.

The situation is undoubtedly difficult but with the active cooperation of the provinces and the States, which we are confident of securing at the conference, it should be possible to tide over the difficulty. The problem of Madras is the problem of the whole of India and you can have my assurance that the Union Government will spare no efforts in assisting you.

Replies to the other matters mentioned by you will be sent shortly.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I am sending to all Premiers of Provinces.⁵ A similar letter will also be issued to the States.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The conference was held in New Delhi on 28 April 1948.

4. The Council, set up in May 1946, was to allocate foodstuffs in short supply for the duration of shortage of food. Its task was taken over by the World Food Council.

5. See *ante*, section 7, item VIII.

16. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
9th March 1948

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

In the Assembly yesterday there was a cut motion about planning.² A demand was made for a full day's discussion about planning and our industrial policy.³ I promised to give a day sometime during this session. I think it is desirable that this matter should be dealt with fully in the Assembly, as otherwise there is likely to be a great deal of justified discontent.

This means that we must hurry up with our policy statement. For the next two or three days I am very fully occupied and then I am going to Wardha and Vizagapatnam. I return on the 15th evening. After my return I want to take up this matter as one of first priority with you. I think it will be desirable if you and I first discuss it thoroughly. Later, the Economic Committee might consider it and I think the private meeting of the party should consider it, before we finalise it for the Cabinet. We shall be in a position then to fix a day for discussion in the Assembly.

I hope you will be ready with your new draft by the 16th of this month. The approach in this draft should be generally the approach in the Congress Economic Programme Sub-Committee's report. The objectives should be generally the same though in regard to details we may make variations. Any other approach would meet great opposition in the party as well as in the country.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(42)/-PS/48-PMS.
2. The cut motion on planning was moved by T.T. Krishnamachari.
3. The demand was made by Biswanath Das.

17. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
10th March 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

I am writing to you about an old scheme for the construction of a dam at Messanjore within the border of Bihar but near to West Bengal. This scheme was apparently conceived fifteen years ago for harnessing the waters of the river Mayurakshi or Mor which has its origin in the province of Bihar and enters West Bengal above Suri. The scheme aimed at the construction of a

1. File No. 17(52)/48-PMS.

dam at Messanjore in the Santhal Parganas about 15 miles from the place where the river enters West Bengal. It was proposed to erect a barrage, irrigation channels, etc., and to generate 4,000 kw of hydro-electrical power. The total area affected by the irrigation will be 600,000 acres capable of yielding about 3 lakh tons of paddy alone, a part from *rabi* crops.

From the point of view of general development of the country and more especially food production, any such scheme would be worth considering. At the present moment with the food problems in a perpetual state of crisis, the scheme demands urgent consideration and a decision. The scheme involves two provinces, Bihar and West Bengal, and would necessitate full cooperation between the two. The Central Government is obviously deeply interested in any such development because it looks upon the problem from an all-India point of view as most development schemes should be looked. We have already appointed a Rehabilitation and Development Board with large powers. We are likely to appoint an All India Planning Commission fairly soon² which would consider the rapid development of the country in a balanced way and to lay special stress on food production.

Such a scheme should necessarily have the goodwill of the provinces concerned, but essentially it should not be viewed from a provincial point of view but the all-India point of view. I understand that the matter has been repeatedly discussed with the Bihar Government and that Government has expressed its inability to agree to it because they felt that Bihar gained practically nothing from the scheme and that it would be undesirable to dislodge about 22,000 persons from that area, which would be necessary if that area was flooded out.

As this matter will necessarily have to be considered by the all-India planning authorities, I should be grateful if your Government will give further consideration to it and look upon it from the wider point of view. Naturally we have no desire for the interests of Bihar to suffer. Indeed, the interests of Bihar or any other province are bound up by the development of India as a whole. Even Bihar is bound to profit by such a scheme which would yield a great quantity of hydro-electrical power as well as irrigation facilities to Bihar. I understand that 3,700 kw was proposed to be guaranteed to Bihar. This should be a great help to Bihar in developing industry.

Apparently the difficulties in the way of Bihar are two. One is that the scheme involves the flooding out of 22,000 people of whom about 9,000 are likely to be Santhals. Every such scheme results in the dispossession of a number of people. That cannot be helped. What must always be done, however, is to see that no one who is dispossessed suffers ultimately. They

2. Following the recommendation of the Congress Working Committee made on 19 January 1950, the Government announced on 28 February 1950 the establishment of a Planning Commission.

should be fully compensated and provided with lands and houses within their own province. I understand that this has been taken for granted and it will be for the West Bengal Government to see that this is done in a generous way.

The other apprehension of the Bihar Government appears to be that any such dislodgment of people might prejudicially affect Bihar's interest in any plebiscite which might be held to decide the question of inclusion of these parts in the province of West Bengal. I do not know how a question of plebiscite arises and why this should worry us at all. I beg you to consider that a narrow provincial view of such matters is gravely prejudicial to India's development and ultimately to the development of that province itself. I hope we shall fight provincialism in all its aspects. But this particular question does not arise here at all. It may be made clear that no rectification of Bihar's boundary is intended. It would be a great pity if an obviously worthwhile scheme was to be discarded because of a narrow provincial viewpoint which does not benefit anybody but only leads to the injury of some. I should have thought that such a scheme, which does not cost Bihar anything, would be welcomed by the Bihar Government, for undoubtedly Bihar will profit by it without any expense of its own. A certain temporary dislocation will take place, but this will be balanced and more than balanced by the gains. Everything, of course, should be done as far as possible to avoid dislocation.

As I have mentioned above this matter has to be considered from the point of view of all-India planning and no doubt our planning authority will so consider it. But we are anxious and eager to have your cooperation in this and I am sure that in view of the implications involved in rejecting an urgent and eminently desirable project, the Bihar Government will not come in the way.

I understand that for some time past various operations have already commenced in regard to the scheme, and machinery worth about Rs. 35 lakhs has already been purchased. Our food situation is desperate and we cannot allow it to worsen for any narrow consideration. I would beg of you, therefore, to let me have your answer³ so that our central planning authority might be in full possession of your viewpoint before we come to a final decision.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Sri Krishna Sinha explained that the Bihar Government wished to go slow in the matter due to fear of unrest in the Santhal Parganas. However, the West Bengal Government could itself canvass support in the area for the project. Bihar stood committed to the decisions reached at the inter-provincial conference of 2 March 1948 at New Delhi and would choose between the two resettlement schemes to be drawn up by West Bengal.

18. The Ship-Building Industry¹

I have great pleasure in naming this vessel *Jala Usha* and wish her every success. May good fortune and prosperity attend her in the future!

Walchandji,² Ladies and Gentlemen,

This is a very auspicious occasion in a sense, a historic one. I would like to congratulate you, the Scindia Company and all those who have helped in building this ship.³ Building a ship is a very complex task and requires hundreds and thousands of minds and hands. Those who are sitting in big offices are responsible for the arrangements for building ships, and those who have invested the money for it are certainly to be congratulated. But the actual accomplishment is that of the people who build something lovingly with their own hands. A ship is their baby and therefore the engineers and the builders of this ship are to be congratulated. But the task has been accomplished by everyone together and such big tasks cannot be completed without the cooperation of all the people concerned. A ship thus becomes a symbol of a number of people cooperating and working together, and such cooperation is very essential in our country today. After a long time a large ship has been built in our country but the process has begun and it will continue to develop. As you know, it is a well recognized fact that from ancient times till just 150 years ago, a great many ships used to be built in our country. In fact, our country was famous for ship-building. But this process was interrupted as were many other processes. Now we are embarked on a new era which has started perilously, with a thousand storms and stresses. But in spite of all that, we are going ahead and will go very far. So when I came here today and watched the ship gliding into the sea it seemed to me like the symbol of what is known as the ship of the nation which has navigated in stormy seas in the last six to seven months and yet continues to go strong and will do so in future. I hope this work will progress in Vizagapatnam. Other shipyards too will come up but this one will be specially large. As you know, this is not merely a ship-building dock, but also a big naval base. We wish to expand our Navy and hope that our promising and capable youngsters will join it and serve the nations, whether they work at building ships or serve in the Indian Navy. We want them to

1. Speech at the launching of the S.S. *Jala Usha* at Vishakhapatnam, 14 March 1948 A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.
2. Walchand Hirachand was the chairman of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company.
3. *Jala Usha* was the first steam ship of 8,000 tons to be built within the country.

cross the seas and carry the message which India has for the world. Therefore I am very happy to be here. Pictures of our ancient past as well as the future come to my mind and I dream of the time when our country will make rapid progress and hundreds and thousands of our ships will go out into the world, but not to fight. Our country is not interested in fighting with any other country. But we will defend ourselves if anyone attacks us. I want our ships to go out carrying the message of our love and to increase wealth and love and unity in the world because you must remember that the sea is a very strange thing. It separates one country from another and it unites them too. It is a sort of a bridge between nations and therefore ships too can forge bonds between nations. *Jala Usha* which has been launched today will also serve our country in this and many other ways and increase our contacts with other countries.⁴

Mr. Walchand and friends, in launching a ship all manner of thoughts come to the mind, specially on such an occasion when this is the first Indian ship of this size that is being launched for nearly a century and a half. Inevitably one thinks of past ages and of the famous ship-building industry of India that lasted for so long and which even in recent times produced ships that won the praise of experts in other parts of the world. That ship-building industry died, and now in the new order of things it has been revived as it should be. Somehow we catch up with that past age and with the Middle Ages which have done much good and also much ill for the country, but have formed a part of our history. In doing so one thinks partly of ship-building as you have said in your address, or more so, on the fate of the country itself. Somehow, the launching of a ship inevitably brings to mind an analogy of the ship of state which was also launched a few months back in India and which has gone through stormy weather during these few months. We have survived the storm, but we have plenty of storms more to face in India and abroad. Indeed, all over the world, there is a continuation of storm and there are many wrecks on the way. But I think we have shown that we are strong enough to survive these storms. And so I thought that this launching was symbolic of this ship of state going on and on into that sea, which is the future of India. India is an ancient land and I have always thought of India as the offspring of the mountains and the seas, the Himalayas in the north, and the sea embracing her on two sides. And so, I have always thought of India not as a country isolated from the rest of the world, but as a country eminently suited for closest and widest intercourse with other countries of the world. Unfortunately, in recent years, two hundred years, especially in the last hundred and fifty years, we did become isolated, cut off both by the mountains and by the sea. Our close contacts with the western world and chiefly with England were mainly by sea. All contacts are good

4. Up to this point the original speech was in Hindi. Nehru then spoke in English.

but somehow other contacts were ended and cut off. We lost touch with the highlands of central Asia and eastern and western Asia and our sea contacts too were tremendously limited. It is bad for a country to lose contacts with other parts of the world. We lost them really in an earlier age, because all our ancient history tells us of great enterprises across the seas and across the mountains—great cultural and sometimes even military enterprises. We were not an isolated people in those days, we looked forward across the seas and ventured across them and we spread the message of Indian culture to far-off countries. Somehow, in a later age, we grew narrow-minded in spirit and in custom and we had the temerity to say that to cross the sea was a sin against religion. What kind of religion is that which prevents human beings from meeting one another? What kind of religion is it that confines? We have had enough of this religion. We have had enough of this confinement and narrowness and limitedness, and if this country is going to be a big country, we shall have to tear up everything which makes us narrow and limited in our minds or religions or anything. So a narrowness descended upon us, and we grew afraid of the sea—our mother—and if one grows afraid of his mother and his father, of his brother and sister, where shall one rest when one is in danger? If we were enveloped in danger in this country, why should we then be surprised, because we had really killed our spirit and ourselves, before others came to slaughter.

So let us go back to our mother—the sea—and send forth our ship fearlessly, and let that become a symbol for us to venture forth into the sea of the future with stout heart in the ship of our state, that is India, and in this way not only to develop India and increase her stature but to cooperate with other nations in the great adventure of our age, because today, and more and more in the future, no country can stand apart from the others. Isolation means death and ruin for a country's future. However great a country, isolation means, in a sense, standing apart from the world. It means that it is left behind in the progress of the world. It means gaining not the friendship of others but the ill will of others. Therefore, in that future in which we are venturing forth with stout heart we are not looking forward to this state of isolation, we are not looking forward in order to interfere with the lives of others in other countries. We seek no dominion over others. We seek the friendship of all, the cooperation of all, and at the same time we shall brook no interference in our parts also.

So it is in this spirit that I have launched this ship and in this spirit I hope that all our ventures in the sea, whether they are mercantile or naval, will be carried on. In this port of Vizagapatam, we are not only building up this ship-building industry but it is also a very important naval base. It is the most important one on the eastern coast of India and I should like this naval base to develop, and I should like our young men, our bright young men to join the navy in various capacities and if I was a young man, I think

I would myself be greatly attracted to this unless I chose the air. I do not know of a third line that would attract me so much as my being on the air or on the sea. But, unfortunately, life is dreadfully unkind to me and makes me sit in office chair which I hate above everything else. So I hope that our youngmen will join the new Indian Navy that is coming up, and may I say that I should like our young men not only to join the commissioned ranks of the Navy but other ranks also. People of this part of the world, people from Orissa and other neighbouring places, have applied—I am told of applications from the fishermen of Orissa who want to join our Navy. I welcome those applications and I should like them to join it. But unfortunately, certain standards have to be attained before we can take them. Therefore, it is up to us to facilitate their attaining those standards by schools and other means, so that the real people of the country may become partners in these great enterprises that are coming up. So, all these thoughts come to us, of the past, of the present and of the future, in launching a ship.

You have spoken, Sir, in your speech about the Government helping industry, financing industry, and you have used strange words, strange phrases, in your speech about harmony between Government and industry.⁵ That is an astounding thought which never struck me previously. Harmony between Government and industry—what is industry? A rival of Government and harming the Government? That is an amazing conception. If industry does not function properly, Government interferes and takes it over. Take it from me the Government is going to do everything to encourage the ship-building industry and if the ship-building industry fails to function with a hundred per cent efficiency, it will become a hundred per cent Government industry. Ship-building will not suffer in this country. It will go on at all costs. How it is going on is another matter. It depends on how much peace there is in industry between the worker and the employer; it depends on how much efficiency there is. It depends on a hundred factors; it depends ultimately on what is good for the country because that is the only test and the final test to everything being done in this country. So rest assured that the Government is intimately interested in encouraging the ship-building industry in this country.

We are beholden to the Scindia Company for the enterprise it has shown in the past. Enterprise should always be encouraged. It has shown enterprise, it has faced risks in the past, it has stood up for the sake of Indian interests against other vested interests in the past and, therefore, we are beholden to them and we want them to go ahead. But I have no doubt that ultimately, when I cannot say, inevitably, these vital enterprises of the state

5. Walchand Hirachand had welcomed Nehru's presence as symbolising a harmony of interests between the Government and industry. He had contrasted it with the hostile attitude of the British Government.

must, more and more, be controlled by the state. After all, the people who build the ships—from the top men sitting in your office to workmen who actually do the job—remain the same, whatever happens. The technical personnel, the managerial personnel and the people who contribute to the making of that magnificent thing—a modern ship—all remain the same. It is only somewhere at the top that certain changes with regard to control of policy and control of profit etc. take place.

However, that is not the question which arises immediately. I do not know when it will arise but I thought I should tell you what possible development I can see because we must, all of us, consider this question from the sole point of view of increasing the production and the productive activity of the country, increasing the wellbeing of the country. We want in India no interest, even a vested interest, if it comes in the way of the good of the people of the country, we want to have things in a way which is for the good of the largest number of people of the country.

I am glad to learn that in your dock there prevails a feeling of amity and comradeship between employer and employee, and that you are following the principles of industrial truce that we have laid down some time ago. I think now the most important thing for us to realise today is that industrial warfare injures the nation, weakens the nation, at any time, of course, but more especially today. When we have just launched our ship of state and if the crew starts non cooperating with it how then will our ship of state go forward? I am glad, therefore, that here in Vizagapatnam there is industrial peace, and I hope that if there is any kind of trouble, it will be resolved by friendly methods of arbitration, conciliation etc. and not by the somewhat cruel method of strike.

In the Madras Presidency, not here, but in some parts of it, I have been following reports from a distance of other kinds of strike, of industrial strife. I am not prepared here, nor is it a fit occasion, to say much about the merits or demerits of it, but I have a feeling that the things are not well in some parts of the Madras Presidency. Some people are out for strife, regardless of the good of even the workers and much less of the industry or of the country. Now this kind of thing cannot be tolerated and it is up to the Government of Madras and, insofar as we can, up to the Government of India to prevent this strife if it has for its object just strife which does good to no one. No doubt, in some parts of the Madras Presidency the spirit of violence is abroad. But that cannot be tolerated. We are a democratic country and we want to give the largest measure of freedom of opinion, of action, or expression to each group, even to those who might differ from us. But freedom does not mean violence or instigation to violence, and if there is this instigation to violence, as there is in some parts of this Presidency, it has to be dealt with firmly. We are living in serious and even critical times not only in this country but in the world

at large. No one knows what the morrow may bring. Therefore, we have to be wide awake all the time. We have to look at things in a proper perspective, not get excited or hysterical at everything that is happening. We must see things in this broad perspective and take action, and strict action, wherever necessary and work and keep this ship of state moving, even though the waters may be stormy. You may have heard of events in countries—these have been greatly disturbing. The world goes more and more into rougher and rougher weather. We do not want to get entangled in the world's difficulties and problems, yet we cannot escape them either. We can only guard ourselves and our freedom and take an active and effective part in maintaining the peace of the world, if we have peace and order in our own country, and if we lead a disciplined life and if we solve our own problems, industrial and other. Therefore, I hope that industry, which seeks the help of Government, and has a right to do so, will seek to solve its own problem with its own workers. Certainly with the help of Government and certainly with the help of arbitration and conciliation boards, etc., it will solve them. And I hope that workers too realise that if ever there is a time for a strike, this certainly is not the time for it. There are too many perils and dangers ahead for us. Strike has been a special and valuable weapon of the worker, and so long as our present industrial system endures, so long as there are no proper alternatives to strike which we are trying to forge, strikes may remain an inevitable method of protecting workers' interest. However, strikes and lockouts are barbarous ways of settling a question. Any system which depends on periodic conflicts is not a very reasonable or sane system. Therefore, we have to devise methods of avoiding those conflicts by arbitration or otherwise. Ultimately we have to aim at a structure which benefits all equally and in which all equally share, and in which, therefore, no question of a strike arises. So I congratulate you again on this venture. May this ship, that we have launched today be the beginning of many other ships, big and small, and may it carry the message of India to all parts of world.

Jai Hind.

19. The Wealth of India¹

Brothers and Sisters,

Please forgive me for not speaking to you in Telugu. The ship *Jala Usha*

1. Speech at a gathering of workers shortly after the launching of the ship *Jala Usha* at Vishakhapatnam, 14 March 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi.)

has been launched. You have seen it being built and participated in building it. It is a product of your labour. First it was an idea in the minds of some and then it was gradually translated into reality. So it is your own creation, a huge hulking creation but your own. It is natural that you should view it with affection because when a man builds something, it is like his own child. You have built a ship and I have heard that many of you are farmers. You were working until a few months ago in the fields and have acquired this new skill now. I believe you have learnt very quickly. It shows how capable the people of India are of learning new skills quickly and intelligently, if they get the opportunity to do so.

It is an auspicious day when we have launched a new ship built by you. This work will now grow and more ships will be built as they should be. Why should our ships be built in other countries? We must try to produce whatever we need in our own country. It will benefit the people and the country. You have made a demand for justice in the *manpatra* that you have presented me with. I was happy to hear that there are no problems here. It is crucial for us to produce, as quickly as possible, new wealth in the country. We must increase production of essential goods which is the wealth of a nation. Only then can we distribute that wealth. Unless the wealth of the nation grows, what can we distribute?

Gold and silver are not wealth. The real wealth of a nation is that which we produce in the country. So it is very essential that we should produce enormous quantities of goods by every available means, from land, from the factories and, in other ways like building ships. You need steel to build ships and unless we produce steel in vast quantities, there will be delay in building ships.

We have to do all these things quickly, for the faster we produce them, the greater will the wealth of the nation be. It will mean more employment and people will become better off and India will become strong and stable. As you know, India got independence seven months ago, and ever since then we have been facing grave problems. There have been terrible riots in north India. Otherwise we could have done much more. Everything had to be stopped for a while. But now the time has come for us to work hard in harmony so that the common people can benefit. We must not do anything which will slow down our work. All disputes must be settled amicably. Violence and chaos will harm you and the nation at large.

My greetings to you on this auspicious day on which your creation *Jala Usha* has been launched. *Jai Hind*.

20. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
18th March 1948

My dear Pantji,

Thank you for your letter of March 12th giving me some account of the progress being made in the province. I am naturally particularly interested in the U.P. and I am very glad to learn of all the steps your Government are taking to improve conditions there. I hope that you will go ahead with the Nayar Dam scheme with all speed. The other scheme concerning the Rihand Dam need not be postponed.

The reclamation of land in Terai and other places by means of tractors is pleasing information.

I am glad to learn that you have opened a camp for training in social service and rural life. Who trains these people? Social service is a highly organised and technical science now and it is desirable to take advantage of modern technique. The only people I know in India who know something about this are the Tata School of Social Studies. It might be worthwhile for your Government to keep in touch with them and get help from them.

I told you that I would try to come to your police rally on April 5th, but I fear it would be difficult. Those are the last days of our Assembly and the work I have to face is formidable. However, I shall bear this in mind.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

21. Nationalisation and Private Enterprise¹

Mr. President² and Members of the Federation,

I am present here today at your orders and have heard the long speech in

1. Speech at the inauguration of the annual session of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, 28 March 1948. Nehru spoke first in Hindi and then in English. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.
2. M.A. Master (1884-1970); prominent figure in the shipping industry; founder and honorary secretary, Indian National Steamship Owners Association, 1930-48; member, Reconstruction Policy Sub-Committee on Shipping, 1945; Trustee, Port of Bombay, 1937-56; President of Indian Merchants Chamber, 1945, and of Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 1947-48.

which you have put several questions to me and expressed your views on many issues. I am in a bit of a dilemma. For one thing you will forgive me if I am unable to speak for very long because I am not feeling very well. Secondly, the issues raised in your address are those on which there is going to be a debate in Parliament within the next few days and so it would not be proper for me to comment on them just now. Yet, there are certain broad facts which are not open to any argument. You have mentioned that we must be aware of realities and see the world as it is and not as it should be. That is all right, but if we do not see the world as it should be, in which direction are we to move? That does not seem quite proper. If we wish to progress, we must look ahead and form an image of the world and India that we wish to build and then take steps accordingly. We have to see where we are as well as where we wish to go. If we forget this, we will stumble and fall. But there is yet another thing towards which people often look, that is, the world as it was. It is all right to look forward but when people's sight is fixed on the past, it becomes extremely dangerous. Sometimes I feel that our attention is so engrossed in the world that has gone by that we fail to perceive the world of today, let alone the future. The fact is that we are living in revolutionary times and good as well as bad things are happening. You and I and all of us assembled here today are aware that war clouds are gathering once again. I do not think that there will be a world war immediately. Please do not think that I am trying to create a panic for that is not my intention. But the fact is that the world is going very rapidly on a dangerous course and you cannot imagine where it may lead us. If there is a war, all the plans that you have talked about or the Government have drawn up will become useless. Even if there is no war, the climate of cold war that prevails has been detrimental to normal activities. You have asked me where we will get our capital goods if President Truman were to escalate military preparations in his country.³ What am I to say? We shall get them from wherever we can and if we cannot get them, we shall do without them. After all, we cannot get them by magic. If we cannot get them, it will mean more hard work and sweat and toil in order to become self-reliant. There is no other way. The fact is that self-reliance is absolutely essential in this day and age. I have never been of the opinion that we should not have relations with other countries for purposes of trade, etc. We cannot remain isolated from the world. But the fact is that looking to the world situation, if we depend too much on other countries, we do not know when we will be let down and become isolated. Therefore, as far as possible, we must be self-reliant and at the same time maintain friendly relations with other

3. Master had said that if, at the call of President Truman, the United States switched over to a semi-wartime economy, it would become impossible to obtain capital goods from there.

countries too. The situation in the world is so fluid today that one does not know when some new development will force us to change all our plans. It is worth noting why the world is in such a situation. It is absurd to say that all the human beings in the world are useless or stupid or quarrelsome, for there are capable, intelligent people all over the world who want peace and to lead normal, peaceful lives. And yet circumstances force them into this trap. Time and again, they face ruin and expose their ancient buildings to destruction. Why? I cannot go into the reasons just now but I would like you to think about it.

It was mentioned just now that the business community is somewhat perturbed because of last year's taxation policy and though there has been some improvement this year, the feeling of panic still persists.⁴ You have hinted at these things. At the same time, towards the end of the address you have talked about the great progress that has been made in India and the courage and spirit of enterprise shown by the commercial and business community here. The two things do not go together; panic and courage. But, anyhow, the fact is that these two things are found together among human beings and nations. There is a certain courage and, at the same time, weakness too. All of us have them. Therefore we must think what the malady is. It is extremely complicated and I am not a doctor to prescribe the remedy for it. But it is obvious that it is a malady. Production went down in India and that became an important issue. It is obvious that you will have to pay a great deal of attention to finding a remedy for it and not think only about your capital. The problem is that even the capital, already invested, is not paying dividends; let alone the question of investing new capital. We are not getting the full benefit from it. There are all kinds of strange reasons for it. You may say that there is labour trouble, frequent strikes, production time is lost, etc. All that is true. But how are those things to be brought under control? It is not enough to say that a few people are responsible for inciting them. You have to get them to work by a judicious mixture of threats and advice. You have yourself mentioned in your speech about the undue advantage taken by some people during the last war when the world was facing tremendous problems. I have still not been able to understand this. I will not go into higher mathematics but I cannot understand how, with taxation of 15 annas in a rupee, people managed to make millions. There is some slip-up somewhere. There is some loophole which makes it possible. Well, the general suspicion is that justice is not being done to labour. When that feeling spreads, there is bound to be trouble. It is not a question so much of increasing wages or giving some other concessions. The basic

4. The President of the Federation had said that the taxation policy announced in March 1947 had obstructed the flow of capital into business and that, even though the Finance Minister had since given some relief, confidence had not yet been restored.

question is of confidence and the assurance that justice is being done or at least an effort is being made to do justice. It is only when that confidence is lacking that there is trouble and tension and the trouble makers raise their voices. It is rather difficult to give full assurance.

You have raised the issue of nationalisation.⁵ It is a complex problem and to some extent the Government's point of view has been put before you. It will become clearer soon and I am in agreement with you in this matter that there should be complete clarity on this point so that the whole country knows what our policy is. There should be no apprehension in people's minds about these things. I am firmly convinced that there should be clarity on this matter. It is one thing to adopt a high-flown principle of socialism or something else. But it does not seem wise to me for anyone, especially in the India of today, to say that we shall follow this 'ism' or that. In this changing world we must understand the circumstances and try to follow some principles. There is no use talking in the air. The principles that we follow must be relevant to the circumstances in the country. It is obvious that we have neither the strength nor the resources to nationalise everything on a large scale immediately, apart from the fact that in the process we could be killing public enterprise. Therefore we have to be careful about what we choose to nationalise. It is obvious that for a long time now this has been in the air though you may not have paid attention to it. As far as the Congress is concerned, it had declared nearly 17 or 18 years ago, at the Karachi Congress, that the big industries should be under state control.⁶ This has been an accepted fact for a long time now all over the world except in one or two countries. In short, the question before us is what should be nationalised first and what can be done a few years hence. There may be other sectors which we have no intention of nationalising, though we cannot give a permanent guarantee about that. Another problem that arises in this connection—you have also hinted at⁷—concerns the big river valley schemes and projects which the Government is taking up. The question is whether we ought to use our resources in these new tasks or carry on some of the old ones. It is obvious that it would be better to utilise them for these new tasks. So we have to take a decision. In some sectors of industries, there will be no private enterprise, especially in

5. Master had said that businessmen wanted to know where private enterprise stood with reference to the issue of nationalisation.
6. The resolution on economic policy was adopted at the Congress session in Karachi in 1931. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 4, pp. 551-553.
7. Master had said that the Government had to deal with vital problems such as the Damodar Valley project and other projects for educational, sanitary and social improvement.

the key industries as in defence, etc. In some others, there can be both public and private enterprises. In yet others, it can be left wholly to private enterprise. Even in the sectors in which we wish to ban private enterprise eventually, it is better not to interfere just now because we wish to utilise our resources in new enterprises instead of in the old ones though planning will certainly mean a certain amount of interference in all industries.

Anyhow, I have given you some hints. I agree with you entirely that there should be clarity on these points so that everyone knows where he stands and what the state is going to do. I would like to say something about your suggestion that there should be a new ministry for international affairs.⁸ I am happy to hear your suggestion and though I do not agree with it entirely, I myself feel that it is essential to build up our relations with the various countries and to have one ministry to speak on behalf of all the departments at international conferences, etc. It is not a good thing for each department to speak separately. There is no doubt that this suggestion ought to be acted upon. So on principle, I accept it entirely. It is no doubt a small suggestion that there should be a separate ministry. But you ought to be fully aware by now—and I have also learnt from experience, which makes me feel scared—that it becomes extremely complicated. We open a new department or a new ministry and a minister is appointed. Immediately there is a search for a secretary who has to be of a particular seniority drawing a certain salary. A junior officer cannot be appointed. It is of secondary importance as to how far the officer concerned is interested in the subject or qualified to handle it. It is felt that if an officer of a particular seniority and scale of salary is selected, he will somehow understand the problem later, even if he does not know anything about it to begin with. Then there has to be a deputy secretary. There are joint, deputy, additional and assistant secretaries. After a year and a half, I have still not fully understood all their ramifications. Anyhow, there is a large army behind the officers. Then the question arises as to where they will sit, etc., and months elapse in looking for rooms etc. In short, the first six months pass in merely looking for tables and chairs, and secretaries, joint secretaries and additional secretaries. Then they are ready to start work. But the first thing to be done is to establish relations between the new ministry and the other existing ministries for they are inter-linked. This is an extremely complicated problem and each ministry has preconceived ideas about those things. In short, a great deal of time is wasted in settling these rudimentary things. So I have become a little scared about this business of setting up new ministries, for they sow the seeds from which a great

8. The President had suggested the constitution of a Ministry of International Affairs—as distinct from the Ministry of External Affairs—to study international questions, to promote the coordination of delegations, to weigh the decisions of international conferences and to give publicity to them.

tree grows, spreading its branches and leaves so far and wide that the work for which it is set up gets almost hidden by it. So it is a complex matter. Let me tell you that this is true not only of India but the whole world. In a sense, bureaucratic procedure has become so complex that mere slogans and principles do not help. Expert knowledge is essential. I am an individual whose entire life has been spent in the Congress. There is no question about it. If we appoint a famous political leader, he may be very good but it is possible that for that particular task he may be unsuitable. The problem is not solved by his being a political leader. We have to select experts. After all, expertise is an extremely important thing and, at the same time, extremely dangerous too. We cannot do without it and yet it is extremely difficult to keep it on a straight path, even when there are four or five people of this kind, there are problems. You can imagine that when a place is teeming with such people, in secretariats and offices, it becomes more like a jungle or a maze from which it is difficult to find a way out. These are the problems and I have not been able to find the right way to solve them. Some of them are getting sorted out automatically but we want that the work should get done faster. This is where you come in because you come into contact with various sectors. You have wider experience whereas my contacts with the various ministries and departments are limited though there is no doubt that there are excellent people in them. My problem is not dearth of good, hard-working people, but the procedure which is followed. The whole thing is so complicated that a great deal of time is wasted in discussions and files and notings and the work does not get done. I feel perturbed by all this and sometimes get involved in things which are really none of my business and often people feel that it is not proper for me to do them.

This is your first meeting after the fifteenth of August when India was reborn. With freedom came disaster and tremendous problems and we must be thankful that we somehow overcame them. Yet, the fact remains that whatever measures we took were of a temporary nature. Take the situation in Delhi, for instance, our capital city. It is painful. It is obvious that every one of you has the right to blame the Government for the delay in improving the situation. There is no doubt that the responsibility rests with the Government, whether it is able to discharge it fully or not. The condition of Delhi is painful just now in every way. The camps are bad and there are rows of stalls in Chandni Chowk which look terrible. Why is it that we are not able to solve it? You talk about nationalisation and private enterprise which are big things when we have not been able to solve these problems which are quite small in comparison. It is worth considering.

When there is a real crisis as in times of war, a country sweeps everything else into the background and its only goal is to win the war. Every individual is conscripted into the war effort whether it is to fight with guns

and swords or with something else. Then there is no choice left to men and women. I am slowly coming to the conclusion that there is need for conscription in this country—I am not thinking of military conscription but of forced labour. There seems to be no other way. There are millions of refugees in the country who are in camps. It is strange that many of them do not like to work at the tasks that are offered to them. That is a big problem. So I think we should have conscription for social work. People must live where there is accommodation and do the work that is available. There is no question of dignity about this. The problem is those who belong to the various professions want to do only that work which is not always possible. But when people are conscripted into the army, everyone is treated as an ordinary soldier, to whichever class of society he may belong. So we must also ensure that each individual performs his duties in some capacity or the other. The present atmosphere of a few people working and the rest leading lives of leisure imposes a burden on society. Some people have no houses and others live in palaces. These things are painful. It cannot be tolerated in the world of today that one individual lives in a house with 20 rooms while others do not have even a roof over their heads. It cannot go on for ever. All these things have to be decided. You say that if there is a useless strike, you will combat it. That is all right, for strikes are harmful even to those who go on strike and production falls. After all, if they want more wages, the money will not come from other countries. It is only by increasing production that the wealth of a country can increase. Even if you take away the wealth of a few rich people, there will not be enough to go round. We have to produce wealth. All this is true but, as a matter of fact, we have to change the atmosphere and the mental attitude so that people may realise that each one of them has to bear his share of the burden in running the country. No individual is alone. This question arises in connection with the refugee problem. After all the difficulties they have gone through, when they get the feeling that people have forgotten them or that nobody bothers about them, they feel frustrated and angry. You must look at these problems from this point of view and help in solving them, for India cannot move on two wheels. She needs many wheels and it is obvious that she cannot move unless all of you help in every possible way. You must help fully by looking at the problems not from your own point of view, but by understanding the changing world of today and giving suggestions accordingly. There is no other way to help fully.

I talked about the last five months when troubles descended upon us and the country became unstable. Until the problems with Pakistan are gradually settled, nothing else can be taken up. A new problem has cropped up recently of duty and customs at the borders between Pakistan and India which is causing great trouble. Talks are going to be held, but I do not know what the result will be. But I am firmly convinced that soon an era

ought to be ushered in when there will be no such barriers between us. They are harmful to both. It is absurd to think that either side can make money at the expense of the other or that it will cause harm at the national level. People crossing from one side to the other are stopped for hours on end and subjected to a thorough search. It has become an extremely painful thing. The sooner it is removed and normal relations established and trade ties resumed, the better it will be for everyone. You have mentioned that there should be no restrictions on movement of goods within the country. I agree with you entirely. There should be free movement between the various provinces and States. There should be no restrictions.

We have just witnessed the dangerous consequences of communalism which resulted in dividing the country into two. It did not stop at that for the emotions that it churned up led ultimately to the murder of Mahatma Gandhi. We must realise what a poisonous thing communalism is. We are making efforts to suppress it and I hope that they will continue till it is completely rooted out of India. I think provincialism is almost equally dangerous. Every province has its own laws and regards the other provinces as its enemies and tries to impose restrictions on people's movements, trade and employment, etc. If this kind of thing goes on, instead of forming a united India, we will be divided into hundreds of fragments, each fighting with the other. I am rather perturbed by what I see. By a coincidence the factor responsible for uniting India is the connection between all the provincial Governments and the Congress. If this connection had not been there, nobody knows what our provincial administration would have come to. So we must combat this fresh danger by educating the people. Nothing can be done by force. We must try to promote industries. So leave aside the question of nationalisation and private enterprise, etc. They are always there. Unless we have some kind of planning, there can be no steady progress. If there is competition in the provinces in the same fields like trade and industry, it will mean an unnecessary waste of money and energy and tension. Therefore planning—central planning—is essential in consultation with the provinces. Everybody has to work together but ultimately the planning has to be done at the centre as we want to ensure a balanced development, spread out all over the country. Therefore the spread of provincialism is an extremely dangerous development.⁹

There are just one or two things. One is, I think, I have long thought, as a Congressman, that cottage industries should be encouraged. I have never considered them as something opposed to the development of large-scale industry. Now, in the present context of things in India, I am quite convinced that quite apart from the long-term programme of industrial

9. Up to this point the original speech was in Hindi, Nehru then spoke in English.

development, one of the important ways of meeting the present crisis is the immediate development of cottage industry. I have come to that conclusion quite independently of my Congress background and after considering the problem in its present context. You mentioned, Sir, talking of the difficulty of getting capital goods from abroad,¹⁰ where are we to get them, if America does not send them, or some other country cannot supply them? Well, obviously, we shall try to get them where we can, but we must begin to think of using our existing resources to the utmost. To give you a minor example, there is tremendous housing difficulty in Delhi for refugees. Now our Government departments think in terms of steel and cement and because there is not enough steel and cement therefore nothing is done. I do not think that approach is good enough. If there is no steel and cement, there is quite enough good earth here. Let houses grow up, and houses grow up, for people to live in, including high officials of Government, not only others. Not only this. Something must be done in the same way in regard to industrial development. Our waiting for big machinery to come in for big schemes to develop is not a satisfactory approach. For even if machinery comes, big schemes take some years to develop. The only thing that can be done fairly rapidly is something on the cottage scale, on a widespread cottage scale. You may use electric power, if you like, you may use small machines if you like. I am not thinking in terms of machinery as an evil or anything like that. Use it where you can and where you like. But, nevertheless, try to develop production in a large way on cottage scale. I am quite sure that if we try to do that in a way it will make a tremendous difference in India at present, quite apart from giving employment to a fairly considerable number of persons and I think that is also one of the methods we should use in order to solve this problem of refugees and relief.

Now in regard to nationalisation, I should like to add one thing, that is, even when the industry is nationalised, I think it should be run by some kind of a statutory corporation, more or less on the lines, if you like, even of private business, that is to say, not on a departmental level. I do not like departmental running of industry at all.¹¹ So that it will approximate to the same ways of carrying on business as any efficient private industry might.

10. Master had said that import of capital goods had been handicapped by limited foreign exchange and the necessity of utilising it for foodgrains. The Marshall Plan by which the United States had decided to help European countries in reconstruction would curtail imports of capital goods from that country. This would be further threatened if America switched over to a semi-wartime economy. Industrialists wanted to know what alternative avenues would be made available.

11. Master had said that an official department would not function with the same efficiency as private enterprise.

Now, lastly you said something, Sir, about South East Asia, about Burma etc.¹² Well, surely, it is not necessary for you to ask me or my Government to take an interest in the Indians in Burma, or Indians overseas anywhere. It is our duty and we are intensely interested in their welfare, and we are trying to do our utmost for them. But there are two difficulties, one is that we are dealing with independent countries, and where Indians have finally to decide whether they are nationals of that country or aliens of that country. That is one essential difficulty. We are apt to think too much of the old state of affairs,—they are all considered to be legally British subjects and we appeal to some superior authority, either the India Office or the Colonial Office, to protect the interests of Indians there. Well, but that does not happen now. You have no superior authority, we are dealing equally with each other, and we try to do our utmost, and Indians in these places have to choose whether they will be nationals of the country they are residing in or not. Now the second difficulty is—if it is a difficulty—that if the Burmese Government has any discriminatory legislation towards Indians, of course, we are in a fairly strong position to protest and to object to it but where it has some legislation which is equally applicable to all the people there, it becomes a little more difficult for us to protest, although in effect it may injure us more than the others. Now, that is the effect of it, but it applies to all, even so, of course, we point out the effect and do all that, but there is this difficulty. Suppose they are changing their social structure, how are we to come in the way of their changing their social structure, simply because in that process something happens to us also? It is a difficult problem, but anyhow it is up to us to do our utmost to protect the interests of Indians there. Now, in regard to all this in South East Asia, if for a moment you forget our present difficulties, and alarms, war and the rest, there can be little doubt that the South East Asia region is going to develop in close cooperation with India, because everything points to that, both economic and defence reasons and geography etc. In the whole Indian Ocean region, India, whatever her other virtues or failings may be, is very peculiarly situated from this point of view, and anything that happens in the whole Indian Ocean region, affects and is affected by India. It simply cannot help it. Of course, if India goes to pieces then that is a different matter; then India does not count. But if India is a big running concern then that big running concern affects the whole of South and South East Asia. There is no doubt about it. Now I am not thinking in flamboyant and bombastic terms of India being a leader of South East Asia or South Asia. That is just

12. The President had said that India should represent her views as a country of strategic importance in South East Asia. In Burma, the Indian Government should secure the same treatment for Indians in regard to land and property as had been secured by the British Government for the property of British citizens in Burma.

silly. People with imperialistic outlook talk like that although they may consider themselves Socialists or Communists or anything. But we must not think in terms of India dominating this region but rather as cooperating with the other countries in building up a common sphere of action, economic, defence and the rest. Nepal is our closest friend and neighbour, that is a different matter. Burma will inevitably come into it. Ceylon, Malaya and Indonesia would also come in, not suddenly and immediately, but we may grow. Indo-China, I mean Siam, I will leave out for the present.

On the other side there is Pakistan. I do not know how far its association or cooperation with other countries will extend. I am not clear about that in my mind—the Middle East countries I mean, but certainly Pakistan obviously comes into that picture, both from the defence point of view and economic point of view. So that, in all the South and South East Asia region, some kind of economic grouping is likely to take place. I believe that many people, many statesmen of countries bordering India, are thinking on these lines even now, and once we have our hands free, and if these talks of war etc., were not ever present, something else on peaceful lines may develop. Now, any such development of closer cooperation in South East Asia is not meant to be and would not be, I am sure, a kind of grouping against any other group. As some people seem to imagine, some other groups or great powers with guilty conscience cannot imagine any other countries cooperating except in terms of some evil designs against them. But this is not so, it is quite inevitable that there should be this geographical and economic grouping for mutual advantage, not against anybody but just to preserve our own freedom, political and economic, and to help each other as far as we can. And I have little doubt that ultimately in the South East Asia group Australia and New Zealand would also find a place because geographically they happen to be there. It is a geographical idea, it is not a racial idea, it is not a religious idea, it is not any other idea, but essentially one based on geography, which ultimately has a powerful influence on future policy.

You said, Sir, something about the business and commercial community being on trial.¹³ Well, we are all on trial, and I am afraid the most on trial is the Government. And I am not quite clear that from that process of trial, we have emerged quite as successfully as we should have liked to emerge. We have not and I hope, whatever other virtues or failings we may have, we should always remember at least, not to be foolish enough to slur over our mistakes and errors. I hope and I invite you indeed to point out those mistakes and errors wherever you see them. We want those mistakes to be

13. The President had said that the business community was on trial at the bar of public opinion. Such actions as profiteering by some industries had exposed the whole community to criticism and so nationalisation was unduly extolled.

pointed out naturally. We want them to be pointed out in a friendly way, but if you feel otherwise, you can point them out in some other way. I don't mind. We have to face enormous difficulties, and we want your goodwill and cooperation, and we are prepared to give our help and cooperation indeed. It is not the question of being prepared but it is our bounden duty to all groups and sections of the community which are working for the common good. *Jai Hind*.

22. Strike of the Central Government Employees¹

May I answer this question, Sir, on behalf of my colleague?

Government have heard with regret that active preparations are being made to start a strike of the employees of the Central Government in the Calcutta offices.² From the reports that have reached Government the proposed strike is not a normal strike, but has certain special and very undesirable features. It has been stated that the strike will take the form of staying in the offices, coupled with a hunger-strike. Further, incitements to violence have been made and the organisers evidently think in terms of achieving their objective by violent methods. It is clear that those who are organising the strike are moved by other than purely economic motives of bettering the condition of the employees. There is a strong political objective which has nothing to do with the economic aspect, although many of those who may be induced to cooperate with the organisers of the strike may be moved by economic considerations. The proposed strike is thus a challenge to Government on the political plane and it raises a variety of issues of considerable importance.

Though the proposed strike is for the present confined to Calcutta, it is evidently a part of a larger movement, essentially political and violent,

1. Reply on 30 March 1948 to a question enquiring what action the Government proposed to take if the Central Government employees launched a strike on 2 April 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report, Vol. IV, 1948, pp. 2745-2749.*
2. Employees of about one-third of nearly sixty Central Government offices in Calcutta participated in the strike which began on 2 April 1948, and it was called off on 14 April after prolonged discussions between employees led by Mrinal Kanti Bose, President, Federation of Central Government Employees Unions, and S.P. Mookerjee, Minister of Industry and Supply.

which is taking shape in some parts of India. It is in this context that I should like the House to consider this matter, as this affects the democratic structure of our Government and our public life. There can be no democratic functioning if violent means are adopted to attack Government and to enforce the will of a small minority on the great majority. Because of the importance of this matter in its various aspects, I am venturing to make a somewhat lengthy statement in reply to the short notice question.

Government are naturally anxious to do everything in their power to help their employees. Government have also a duty to the people generally of this country. With the best will in the world they cannot change the face of India overnight and produce suitable employment for every man and woman in the country. That indeed is the objective which any government must aim at. But in order to reach it for all the people living in this vast country, vast schemes have to be undertaken. There is no other way of doing it.

The proposed strike in Calcutta, which has been fixed for the 2nd April, was to have commenced on the 17th March, but it was postponed. The strike is being called by an organisation, which is described as the Federation of Central Government Employees Unions. I should like to make it clear that this is a Calcutta organisation and has nothing to do with another organisation, which has a similar name and whose members held a conference recently in Delhi.³ I understand from certain office-bearers of this Delhi organisation, who met me a few days ago, that they dissociate themselves from, and disapprove of, the activities of the Calcutta organisation.

A few weeks ago a representation was received from the Calcutta organisation by the Finance Minister. This contained a plea for substantial increases in the pay-scales of Central Government employees. As the House is aware, the whole subject of pay-scales and service conditions was considered very recently by the Central Pay Commission, an independent non-official body, which examined a large number of witnesses, obtained evidence from recognised as well as unrecognised associations, and consulted experts who could speak with authority about labour conditions. The Commission recommended substantial increases in the pay-scales of almost all classes of employees. Government have accepted and are implementing these recommendations which in the aggregate are estimated to cost over thirty crores of rupees per annum. They were therefore not prepared to reopen a subject recently decided after very careful consideration and make changes involving radical departure from the general structure of pay-scales envisaged in the Commission's report.

3. A conference of All India Central Government Employees, convened by Shibbanlal Saxena and presided over by K.T. Shah, was held in New Delhi on 21-22 March 1948. It adopted resolutions demanding non-retrenchment of temporary employees, recognition of their unions and various facilities.

When this position was made clear to the Federation, it found another reason for launching a strike. About this time it had become necessary to carry out certain discharges of surplus personnel in the Military Accounts Department as well as in the Disposals Organisation of the Ministry of Industry and Supply. The Federation has seized upon these discharges as the occasion for resorting to direct action involving all government employees in Calcutta and not merely those of offices affected by retrenchment.

The main demands of the Federation, as now put forward, relate to retrenchment and are couched in the following terms : (1) There should be no retrenchment without provision for suitable alternative jobs and continuity and security of service should be assured ; (2) Those who have completed one year's service should be confirmed with effect from the date on which they completed one year's service. Government have carefully considered these demands and come to the conclusion that they cannot possibly be accepted. The Second World War led to a very great increase in the army and in many establishments connected with the work of the army. As is well known, our army had a war-time peak of $2\frac{1}{2}$ million persons. This vast army led to the rapid growth of a large number of temporary offices connected with the army. Thus the Military Accounts Department expanded during war time from a peace-time strength of about 8,600 to over 20,000. At the conclusion of the war demobilisation began and during the last two years nearly two million soldiers have been demobilised. That was inevitable and as a consequence retrenchment had to take place in various other departments which had grown with the army and were now no longer required or could not be kept up at war-time strength.

Similar considerations apply to other temporary employees recruited for special purposes connected with the war, and also to a certain extent for the administration of controls, which have ceased to be necessary. It is obvious that posts which have ceased to be necessary in the public interest cannot continue to be filled merely in order to provide employment for temporary government servants. If it is the business of Government to keep these posts filled, whether they are wanted or not, then the Government should not demobilise the war time army, and indeed should provide governmental employment to all the unemployed in the country.

Nor is it possible to guarantee that a sufficient number of posts, particularly permanent posts, shall always be available under Government for providing alternative employment to the large numbers of temporary employees recruited for these special purposes. Again, appointment on a permanent basis cannot be made without reference to the basic minimum qualifications required. Many of the employees who were recruited urgently for temporary purposes do not possess such qualifications.

Government, however, fully realise the hardship involved in retrenchment, and further consider it their duty to do everything in their power to

mitigate such hardships and to find alternative employment, wherever available. They have proceeded very slowly with retrenchment and have in fact kept on many employees, although they were surplus, in order to lessen these hardships. Discharged temporary employees have been made eligible for gratuity. The position of those who did not get any benefit in the form of gratuity will be further considered. Temporary service is recognised in many cases as a war service. The names of such employees are registered at the employment exchange, thereby enabling their cases to be brought to the notice of intending employers, whether government or private, for consideration. Facilities have also been provided by relaxation of age-limits to temporary employees to sit for examinations and qualify themselves for permanent absorption in government employment, wherever this is possible. These terms compare favourably with those on which considerable numbers of surplus personnel have already been discharged.

Government are, however, anxious to bring about conditions in which everyone who is willing to work is enabled to find some employment, private or public, suited to his or her capacity and qualifications. The various development schemes, which are undertaken by the Central and Provincial Governments, will, as they develop, gradually bring about such conditions. This necessarily takes time.

Government are also exploring temporary methods of employment. A committee is now checking up the categories of stores in various depots with a view to collecting together enough general purpose tools to start the manufacture of some of the common users stores. Government would aid and encourage the formation of cooperatives of artisans and the like among those who are to be retrenched for this purpose. Another possible avenue of temporary employment may be the preparation of electoral rolls on the basis of adult franchise for the general elections under the new Constitution. This will be a big undertaking, involving a vast population of adults who will be entitled to vote. The responsibility for the preparation of these electoral rolls will be largely that of the Provincial Governments, and Government propose to recommend to the Provincial Governments to utilise, as far as possible, government employees who have been retrenched. I am mentioning two possible methods of temporary employment. Other methods will no doubt suggest themselves to the honourable members and we shall welcome their suggestions.

I need hardly remind the House of the events which have shaken this country during the last seven months and more. These tragic events have led to the complete impoverishment of millions of our countrymen, in addition to great physical suffering and mental anguish. These people have not only lost their employment or profession, but have lost almost every single thing that they possessed. It is the duty of Government and the country as a whole to succour them and rehabilitate them. This is a colossal problem

for any government. Those who undoubtedly suffer because of retrenchment should remember the fate of these vast numbers of our countrymen whom a cruel destiny has hit so hard. The resources of the Government are being utilised to the utmost to give relief to these people, but these resources have certain obvious limits, and if too great and unbearable a burden is cast upon them, then the whole structure of our economy might be shattered, resulting in little or no relief and far greater unemployment.

In these circumstances, while Government will continue to do their best to assist their temporary employees, they cannot accept the position that retrenchment should be postponed indefinitely until employment can be guaranteed to everybody, nor can we agree to confirm all those who may have completed one year's service.

The House is aware not only of the vast problems and difficulties which this country has to face in its internal economy, but also of the grave international situation which faces the world. Again, we stand on the edge of a precipice and no man knows what the future may hold. It would almost appear that the organised efforts, that are being made to shatter the country's economy, are deliberately meant to be related to these larger issues. For any Indian today to attempt to break down the productive and administrative apparatus of the country is the height of irresponsibility and unpatriotic behaviour. Government have repeatedly made appeals to the people to cooperate together to add to the wealth of the country and to avoid strikes and conflicts at this time of trial for all of us. They are glad to note that such appeals have not been in vain and that the great majority of the people of this country, and more specially the working classes on whom lies so much the responsibility for production, have responded to them. But there are certain groups who think and act differently and who, for reasons of their own, appear to be bent on creating trouble. That trouble will do harm to the country as a whole, but it will injure most the interests of labour.

If every Indian has a duty in these critical times, much more so is that duty incumbent on employees of Government, who by virtue of their position must be true servants of the public and must always keep the public good before threats of direct action, which may be directed against Government, but which must inevitably do injury to the public. That is a gross dereliction of duty and Government must take a very serious view of any course of action calculated to challenge the foundations of democratic Government, dislocate public work and cause a breakdown of discipline among the public services. I must therefore make it clear that any public servant, who, in the circumstances which I have described to this House, joins any strike or other forms of direct action, will be considered as guilty of dereliction of duty and serious misconduct entailing dismissal from service. Instructions to this effect are being issued to all heads of offices in Calcutta. I



AT AN EXHIBITION OF INDIAN STAMPS, NEW DELHI, 3 MARCH 1948



ADDRESSING THE ANNUAL SESSION OF THE FEDERATION OF INDIAN
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY,
NEW DELHI, 28 MARCH 1948

trust that government employees of all ranks will realise their obligations and will set an example of discipline and conduct and devotion to duty, and desist from participation in any shape or form in the threatened strike. Rights and obligations go together. It is from an obligation duly discharged that rights flow. Where there is no obligation there can be no right.

23. Progress of Development Projects¹

The Hon'ble Prime Minister asked Mr. Khosla² to prepare a development chart for India for the next ten years including all projects, a six monthly probable progress chart against which actual achievement could be checked and also a statement of technical personnel required. He wanted progress reports to be submitted every six months and in certain cases he might insist on progress reports being submitted as often as once a week. He said it would be desirable to have a "Central Pool of Technical Officers" recruited in advance of requirement so that there would be no time wasted between the sanction of a work and the recruitment of staff. The Hon'ble Prime Minister next suggested that likewise there should be a "Central Stores and Equipment Pool" for general purposes as requirements for all projects were likely to be more or less similar and the stores and plants could thus be utilised to the best advantage. He desired that a "Technical Committee" should be set up to go into the question of stores and machinery available in the various disposal depots. He mentioned that all the stores and equipment on the disposal lists had been frozen and could not pass into private hands. The Hon'ble Prime Minister stressed the necessity of overcoming all bottlenecks and of going ahead with all possible speed with the implementation of projects.

1. Minutes of a meeting attended by members of different standing committees, officials and Dr. J.L. Savage, an American Consulting Engineer who specialised in building dams, 31 March 1948. File No. DW-21(11)/51/DW/IV, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power.
2. A.N. Khosla.

24. To Albert Mayer¹

New Delhi
2 April 1948

Dear Mayer,

Your letter of the 24th March. I think a telegram has been sent to you already.

I agree with you that it might be worthwhile for your team to be associated with the Damodar Valley Project.² I shall discuss this matter with people here. I am not quite sure what other arrangements they have made and I do not want to upset them. In any event, this is a matter we can discuss and decide a little later or even when you come here. Both the Central Government and the Provincial Governments are working in harmony with each other and there should be no difficulty in arriving at a mutually satisfactory decision. I am sending a copy of your letter to the Premier of the United Provinces to know what his reactions are. I am also consulting the Damodar Valley people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Damodar Valley Project was intended for the development of irrigation, flood control and power generation facilities in West Bengal and Bihar. The project was administered by the Damodar Valley Corporation, set up by the Centre on 18 February 1948.

25. To N.V. Gadgil¹

New Delhi
2 April 1948

My dear Gadgil,

The other day you mentioned to me that the Provincial Governments concerned had made certain recommendations for the Damodar Valley Corporation which were unsatisfactory. I have since then heard of some other matters connected with this Corporation which have filled me with apprehension. This is our first venture on a big scale for river valley schemes. It is of the utmost importance that this should not only succeed but succeed rapidly and brilliantly. Therefore it becomes essential that the persons appointed to the Corporation or Board, or whatever it is called, should be first-rate

1. J.N. Collection. Gadgil was Minister for Works, Mines and Power.

men for this particular job. They should be experts in planning, engineering, etc. They should not be politicians or normal servicemen of the I.C.S. variety who have no conception of this kind of thing and who work in ruts. So far as I am concerned I would much rather hang up this scheme or postpone it indefinitely than hand over charge to persons whom I consider unsuitable. The whole future of our river valley schemes depends upon the success we achieve in Damodar Valley. You will thus observe how intensely interested I am in this matter and I trust that no step will be taken in regard to appointments without the fullest consideration.

I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from Albert Mayer who is bringing out a team of experts on behalf of the U.P. Government. As he mentions Damodar Valley Scheme in this I thought I might send this letter to you. I might mention that Albert Mayer and his team are first-rate. I am not keen on their going to Damodar Valley because I have plenty of work for them. But if they can be of any real use there, we can consider the matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

26. To Leonard Elmhirst¹

New Delhi
6 April 1948

My dear Elmhirst,
Thank you for your letter of March 16.

I am afraid that I have rather ignored the development of the Damodar Valley Scheme in spite of my very great interest in it. "Ignored" is perhaps not the right word, but it is true that I have not been able to give my personal attention, except that I was continually reminding the Minister in charge to push it through. Legislation has now been passed. Perhaps there are some undesirable features in it. But I do not think this is very important. I entirely agree with you that politics as well as departmental supervision must be avoided and that we should have men of competence, integrity and vision in the board of control. I am looking into this matter now and shall try to remedy such defects as I can at this stage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(45)/48-PMS.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION**III. Educational, Social and Cultural**

1. Discipline for Nation Building¹

The educationists in India have urgent tasks before them and some of these are the creation of a sense of discipline among the youth, channelizing their energies in healthy directions and devising ways and means of finding the right talent for various plans of reconstruction.

Whenever conferences are called to frame a plan for education in India, the tendency, as a rule, is to maintain the existing system with slight modifications. This must not now happen. Great changes have taken place in the country and the educational system must also reflect them.

The entire basis of education must be revolutionized. The present educational system might have suited the past, but continuing with it under the present circumstances would do nothing but harm to the country. The present system of education is incapable of producing healthy and modern minds.

India has lost five precious months in unproductive activities. Big plans were prepared for the cultural, social and economic reconstruction of the country but unforeseen and unfortunate circumstances have diverted our attention from them.

In the plans for the rebuilding of the nation, education has an important place, because that is the basis for all other activities. India's misfortunes are not completely over but still those cannot be allowed to put the question of education in the background. Practical steps must be taken immediately to implement our plans for improving education in the country.

The rehabilitation of the refugees is engaging the attention of the Government of India, but here also the question of education is not absent. The Advisory Board has to suggest arrangements for the education of a large number of young boys and girls, whose education has been rudely terminated by the disturbances. The Government must ensure that their education is not discontinued.

The younger generation is our future hope. On them depends the progress of the country. The way their faculties are developed and minds moulded will make or mar India's destiny. Hence the need to give top priority to the educational needs of the growing generation.

These displaced young men cause great concern because they affect the future plans materially. The younger generation, in general, has not been educated on lines suited to the changed times. It nurses wrong sentiments.

1. Speech at the fourteenth session of the Central Advisory Board of Education, New Delhi, 13 January 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 14 January 1948.

It is lacking in discipline. The Board must, therefore, advise the Government how to create a sense of restraint and discipline among young men. In moulding their minds, I do not advocate use of any kind of force or compulsion, but I feel that certain amount of guidance and direction is essential.

Another task before the Board is to advise the Government on the implementation of reports like the one submitted by the Scientific Man-Power Committee.² So many reports have been submitted by various committees on different subjects, and work is being done on them, but it is a pity that action is being taken so slowly. I urge you to accelerate the work of this nature. For all proper planning, it is necessary for the Government to know what talent it has at its disposal, and how it must train its men for essential jobs. India is not lacking in talent, scientific or otherwise, but it is not properly employed. There are so many tasks lying undone because we feel we do not have the men for them and yet there are men in the country with necessary qualifications who are not employed.

Our system of education must not be developed in isolation from our social and economic life. Different aspects of our life and activities must be correlated. The primary aim of any system is to create balanced minds which cannot be misled. We have just seen the phenomenon of millions of our people being misled. We must become mentally strong before we can think of building a nation.

2. See *post*, sub-section IV, item 1.

2. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
16th February 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 15th February.²

This question of forming linguistic provinces bristles with difficulties. I am quite sure that once we start in any one place there will be uproar in some other areas making the same demand. In fact, it is not possible to tackle it in one place only. While we have accepted this principle and must

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. Pointing to the strength of feeling on the matter of linguistic provinces, Rajendra Prasad urged the Government to come to a decision on the issue as the work of the Constituent Assembly was approaching its final stage.

therefore give effect to it, it does seem to me that the present moment is most inopportune for this purpose. I discussed this matter with General Nye, Governor of Madras, who is a very sensible person, and he warned me of the disastrous consequences of any precipitate action.

It seems to me that the only action we can take is to appoint a committee on behalf of the Constituent Assembly to investigate this problem and to report.³ We must have full data before any decision can be made. It is not merely a question of principle but also, as you say, of many other vitally important matters, including boundaries.

It appears to me that if we give precedence to Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra, and more especially Karnataka, will raise a tremendous outcry. They are quite willing that the matter might be postponed for a little while provided no one province is favoured in this respect. Andhra is very anxious to get itself mentioned in the new Constitution as a separate province.⁴ Perhaps some way might be found, without going into details of mentioning in the new Constitution, this linguistic redistribution subject to reports of commissions or committees.

The real difficulty comes in because of conflict over boundaries. Where there is such a conflict the most careful investigation will have to take place. I do not think the Government as such should take up this matter now. It is for the Constituent Assembly to appoint its own commission.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 16 June 1948, Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly, announced the appointment of a commission to consider the creation of the new provinces of Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra and Maharashtra.
4. The Constitution did not mention an Andhra province. The state of Andhra Pradesh was formed on 1 October 1953.

3. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
17th February 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Your letter about the linguistic provinces dated 16th February.² I appreciate all that you say. I feel, however, that the best course would be for the matter

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. Rajendra Prasad wanted the Government to take a decision on the creation of linguistic provinces or ask the Constituent Assembly to take the necessary steps.

to be raised in the Constituent Assembly itself officially by any of us and for a committee to be appointed to begin with to consider the various aspects apart from boundaries and to report about the feasibility of the new provinces. To some extent this committee would have to consider boundaries generally. It should be their function to get as large a measure of agreement as possible. If this is done the next step will be the appointment of one or more specific boundary commissions actually to demarcate the boundaries.

For the Government to take this step now would probably involve us in greater difficulties. The statement I made some time ago³ was some indication of Government's policy and matters might be allowed to rest there. I then said that the Constituent Assembly would deal with the question. I think this would be the best course. Any attempt for Government to move in the matter officially would precipitate a minor crisis.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 530-532.

4. To Harekrushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
25 February 1948

My dear Mahtab,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th February. I was glad indeed to learn that the Jagannath Puri temple had been opened to Harijans.²

I am sorry about your correspondence with Dr. Rajendra Prasad. One of the most unfortunate developments of recent times is the growth of provincialism. This conflict between Bihar and Orissa over the amalgamation of certain States has been peculiarly unfortunate. I should have thought that the solution was easy enough—leave it to the people of the areas concerned.

You have, therefore, not only to win over the people but also to proceed in a friendly way with the Bihar Government. Do not enter into controversy

1. J.N. Collection.

2. After two days of satyagraha, five hundred Harijans entered the Jagannath temple at Puri on 14 February, 1948. On 20 February, Orissa Government published the Temple Entry Authorization Bill which was passed by the Legislative Assembly on 5 March. The new law provided that whosoever prevented a Harijan from entering the temple was punishable with imprisonment or fine or both.

with them. I must confess that I have not liked the way the Bihar Government has behaved in this matter and some of the Patna newspapers have been peculiarly bad.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To K. de B. Codrington¹

28 February 1948

Dear Codrington,²

Thank you for your letter of the 24th February. I have been following from a distance the fortunes of the Indian exhibition in London³ and I am very glad to learn that it has attracted so much favourable attention. I am only sorry that I have been unable to see it myself. I do not know what is going to happen to it now. There was some talk of it being sent to America. Anyway, it would be a pity if it was all dispersed after return to India.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Kenneth de Burgh Codrington; Keeper, Indian Section, Victoria and Albert Museum, London, 1935-48; Professor of Indian Archeology in the University of London, 1948-66.
3. An Indian Art Exhibition was held in London from November 1947 to February 1948.

6. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
1 March 1948

My dear Maulana,

I feel that the Government of India should do something to help in the development of athletics in this country. We should also encourage the Olympic Association² which is in charge of athletics and some other sports.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Indian Olympic Association had been founded in 1927.

Merely encouraging athletics in schools and colleges, etc., is not good enough and no high standards can be obtained. It is necessary therefore to have facilities for training top-ranking athletes. Every four years or so there is an international Olympic meet. I believe it is taking place this summer in London and an Indian team will be going. It seems desirable that the Government should give financial help for this team.

We are very poor in equipment for developing sports and athletics in India. There are very few proper tracks for running. I believe that the only good track is in Patiala State.

For the present I would suggest that we might contribute one lakh of rupees or some such sum towards the expenses of the Olympic team this year. Further that we should give a recurring grant of Rs. 25,000/- to the Central Olympic Association of India. They can distribute it among the various athletic associations which are affiliated to them.

The Maharaja of Patiala is the Chairman of the Olympic Association. He has spoken to me about this matter and I am asking him to send a formal request to you.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Finance Ministry.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Postage Stamps¹

The importance of the designs of a country's postage stamps cannot be over-emphasised. The stamps should not only be artistic in design but must also represent the history and character of the people. They should be beautiful symbols of a nation's emotions and aspirations.

My interest in postage stamps is not new. I agreed to come to the function because of my former hobby of stamp-collecting. Years ago I used to be an ardent stamp-collector and had succeeded in having a substantial and valuable collection of them.

The designing of India's stamps had not hitherto received very great attention. Stress was laid only on the presence on them of the image of the emperor. The "New India" postage stamps, however, must be prepared with

1. Speech at the inauguration of a stamp exhibition, New Delhi, 3 March 1948. *National Herald*, 5 March 1948.

care, and should be attractive to look at and distinctive in character.²

I hope that the officials of the department will get the help of eminent artists in designing the set of India's new stamps.

2. Designs selected by a committee on 24 February for the 'New India' postage stamps were Buddha, Mahatma Gandhi, the Ship of State, the Lotus and the Mohenjodaro Bull.

8. The Asian Youth Festival¹

I do not know much about the Asian Youth Festival that has been organised by the All India Youth Congress in Bombay.² The idea of such a festival of Asian youth, however, appeals to me. The more opportunities there are for the youth of Asia to meet and confer together the better it is for India and Asia. We talk of cooperation between the countries of Asia for common ends. But any real cooperation must rest on knowledge and understanding of each other. The Youth Festival as proposed should help in bringing some measure of knowledge and understanding. I hope that it will increase the bonds between different countries of Asia and more specially the youth of these countries.

1. Message, New Delhi, 7 March 1948. J.N. Collection.
2. The festival was held from 19 March to 14 April 1948.

9. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
7 March 1948

My dear Maulana,

I believe your attention has been drawn to the paintings of Amrita Sher-Gil,²

1. File No. 40(7)48-PMS.
2. (1913-1941); after training in Paris, painted a large number of Indian motifs; some of her best known paintings are : "Bride's Toilet", "Brahmacharis" and "South Indian Villagers Going to Market". She had been a personal friend of Nehru; for her letter to him of 6 November 1937; see *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 1958), pp. 192-193; a reference to her can be found in Nehru's letter to Indira Gandhi dated 20 November 1943 in *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 13, pp. 295-296.

the young woman who died unfortunately rather suddenly about seven years ago. She is considered to be one of the most notable and talented painters in India of this generation and I have little doubt that her paintings, valuable now, will increase in value later. Some of them have been sent to the Indian Art Exhibition in London. Even when she was studying in Paris, some of her paintings were exhibited in the Paris Salon.

I think it is desirable for Government to acquire these paintings as a whole.³ Just to take a few chosen ones would not be good enough. An attempt should be made to get, as far as possible, the full collection.

I understand that most of her paintings can be divided in two groups: the bigger group belongs to her husband,⁴ and is at present stored by Dewan Chamanlal, and the other group is with her parents⁵ in Simla. There are a few others privately owned. But we might leave them out.

I am afraid it is not possible to get all these pictures free from their present owners. It may be possible to get the paintings from Amrita Sher-Gil's parents without any payment provided we make it clear that we are getting the others also from the husband and will have more or less a complete collection. As for the husband, he is not very well off and will not part with the paintings free. I think he can easily sell them separately and he may as well do so if we delay. I would therefore suggest that Government should decide to acquire these paintings and as a first step to find out privately what these would cost.

Unfortunately, these paintings are not being looked after properly and are deteriorating. It would be a tragedy if they were damaged too much. I would suggest that you might find out from Chamanlal what the position is.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Many of Amrita Sher-Gil's paintings are now in the National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi.
4. Victor Egan, a medical practitioner.
5. Umrao Singh Majithia, and Marie Antoinette, Hungarian pianist and singer.

10. To Kailas Nath Katju¹

New Delhi
9 March 1948

My dear Kailas Nath,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th March. We are all very glad to learn that the Puri Jagannath Temple was thrown open to the Harijans and that

1. J.N. Collection. Katju was the Governor of Orissa at this time.

the Provincial Government will be introducing legislation soon empowering Harijans to enter every public temple. But as you say, what is required is a strong effort among the Harijans themselves for the removal of all disabilities between Harijans *inter se*.

I am glad you have been touring in the Orissa States. I was surprised and pleased to read your letter that in every State you found a fairly good hospital and well-managed institutions for boys' education. You must now certainly push ahead with productive activities and the constructive programme and I hope that the Praja Mandals will help in this.

About the subvention to Orissa, I cannot say anything now. The Provincial Government should send a proper request for it supported by facts. We want to help every province and specially the weaker provinces but, after all, our resources are limited and we cannot be vicariously generous.

About the control of opium, could you send me your ideas on the subject?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. Santiniketan—a Tribute to a Tradition¹

Santiniketan is something unique in India in many fields of activities, more particularly the activities which add to the beauty and grace of life. I have come here because of my admiration for all that Santiniketan has stood for under Gurudev and subsequently.

I felt somewhat embarrassed for having been called to speak on art. It may be that because of my position people call me to perform such ceremonies. It is a bad habit to call people, who are politically prominent and occupy high offices in the Government, to open such functions and then press their claims for financial assistance.

I do not think it is a fair approach. It is embarrassing for persons like me for being asked to give large contributions from the state's treasury.

I am aware of my numerous failings. I know little about art. It is something which has been lacking for a long time from our national institu-

1. Speech at the inauguration of an exhibition of paintings and woodworks of Rabindranath Tagore, New Delhi, 10 March 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 11 March 1948.

tions, certainly from our political institutions which are singularly graceless. Our politicians, among whom I include myself, function in a field which has little to do with the beauty of life. In this barren field came Rabindranath Tagore and left his powerful impress on Indian life and diverted it to a great extent into right channels.

Whenever any foreign visitor saw Gandhiji, the latter always mentioned Santiniketan among three or four places which he advised him to visit. So anything coming from Santiniketan has very great value for me. Santiniketan fostered a kind of renaissance in India, especially in the field of art and other similar activities. That tradition which Gurudev laid down is being carried on by others and more notably by Rathin Babu.² It is a great pleasure for me to pay homage to that tradition in declaring this exhibition open.

2. Rathindranath Tagore.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

IV. Scientific

1. Roster of Scientific Talent¹

The Government of India have at present under consideration the report of the Scientific Manpower Committee appointed in April, 1947,² to advise on the best method of utilising and augmenting the scientific manpower resources of the country. A basic recommendation of the Committee, which the Government have accepted, is that immediate steps should be taken to prepare a roster of scientific talent that is now available. The necessity of such a roster is obvious.

The National Institute of Sciences had previously made an attempt to prepare such a roster but they were not able to make much headway. The Government of India have entrusted the work to the same agency working under the auspices of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research.³

I appeal to all persons in India possessing degrees or diplomas in science to send complete information about themselves such as age, permanent and present addresses, their scientific qualifications, research and industrial experience, their present occupation, the nature of the research work, if any, they are engaged upon, etc. This information should be sent to the Secretary to the National Institute of Sciences, India, University Building, Delhi. I hope this information will be supplied soon and a complete roster prepared urgently.

1. Statement to the press, 6 January 1948. *The Hindustan Times*, 7 January 1948.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 1, p. 395.
3. The C.S.I.R. published, in three volumes, *National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel*.

2. Age-Limit for Retirement of Scientists¹

The age-limit for retirement from our service is not suitable for scientists who function differently from ordinary civil servants and the like. In fact, many scientists do their best work in later years. We have a great lack of eminent scientists and we can ill spare them. Normally, therefore, it is desirable to

1. Note, 28 January 1948. File No. 35(9)/56-66-PMS.

keep them on for as long as they are capable of good work. Dr. Bhatnagar² and some other prominent scientists in India are doing important work and are capable of continuing to do so for a number of years. Therefore, the application of the old-age limits would be harmful to our interest. The extension by a year does not appear to me to be quite sufficient. This leaves a sense of insecurity in the minds of those affected as well as the Government, and big schemes, with which they are concerned, may suffer somewhat.

2. Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar.

3. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi

29 February 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I have just had a talk with Dr. Homi Bhabha. He has given me a long report about atomic energy research. I am very much interested in this and I am sure that we should seriously start taking steps in this direction. I think this is important from many points of view. It will not, of course, bring immediate results. But the future belongs to those who produce atomic energy. That is going to be the chief, noted power of the future. Of course, Defence is intimately concerned with this. Even the political consequences are worthwhile. I propose, after I have studied Homi Bhabha's report, to put up some proposals before the Cabinet. Homi Bhabha made some suggestions to me about the question of our having a scientific adviser for the Defence Ministry. I understand he will be seeing you tomorrow and will explain these proposals in detail. I think they are sound and might well be given effect to. It is not much good our getting a second-rate man from England or elsewhere. It is far better for a real first-rate man to come here from time to time to advise us together with two good men from India. Homi Bhabha himself could be one of them. He is first-rate and is highly thought of in the foreign scientific world. His contacts in other countries are also very good. Any advice that he may give is therefore worthy of consideration. If you agree with his proposals you might send instructions accordingly to H.M. Patel.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Atomic Energy¹

Sir, I move: That the Bill to provide for the development and control of atomic energy and for purposes connected therewith, be taken into consideration.

Unfortunately, the first use that atomic energy has been put to has somewhat clouded the other manifold uses that it is likely to be put to in the future. Most people probably think of atomic energy in the sense of something producing atomic bombs for the destruction of human beings. But, probably, even the great destruction of that atomic bomb will be forgotten, while the use of atomic energy may in future powerfully influence the whole structure of the world. No one can say when that use will be perfected or brought into the common life of man. But the tempo of change and progress is so great nowadays that it is quite possible that within our life-time we may see the whole world change because of the use of this enormous power being released for human purposes. Therefore, it is not from the point of view of war that I am placing this Bill before this House but rather from the point of view of the future progress of India and the Indian people and the world at large. If we do not set about it now, taking advantage of the processes that go towards the making of atomic energy, and join the band of scholars and researchers who are trying to develop it, we will be left behind and we shall possibly only just have the chance to follow in the trail of others. That is not good enough for any country, least of all for a country with the vast potential and strength that India possesses. Fortunately for India we have most of the material that is needed—the minerals that are essential and the human material, which is perhaps even more essential. All that is necessary is that we should put them together and the state should give every facility for this development.

Now, because of this association of atomic energy with war, inevitably the matter has become a highly secret matter and most of the countries advanced in research are jealous that the results of their research should not be known to others, unless, of course, there is some kind of mutual exchange. We have, therefore, ourselves proceeded somewhat cautiously, that is to say, in a sense that our research work cannot be as public as normal scientific research or scientific work ought to be. Firstly, because if we did that, the advantage of our research would go to others before we reaped it, and, secondly, it would become impossible for us to cooperate with any

1. Speech while moving the Atomic Energy Bill in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 6 April 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. V, 1948, pp. 3315-3334. Extracts.

other country which is prepared to cooperate with us in this matter, because it will not be prepared for the results of their research to become public. Therefore, this Bill lays down that this work should be done in privacy and in secrecy.² There is no other way of doing it. It is not that we desire secrecy and privacy. We should rather wish that all scientific work and scientific research were public and that the world could take advantage of it. I am entirely opposed to any secrecy in science, just as I am entirely opposed to the pernicious system of patent medicines that has spread, whether they are the western type of patent medicines or Unani or Ayurvedic or any other. I think secrecy in science or in the art of cure is a dangerous thing. So it is not our desire to keep these processes secret but we are compelled by circumstances to proceed along these lines ; otherwise there can be no progress at all.

So this Bill gives certain powers to the Atomic Energy Board that we have already got, subject, of course, always to the supervisory and superintending power of the Government, to carry on these researches in a non-public and secret way and to concentrate more or less all the researches in it and bring them more or less together into its own domain.

There is a tendency, and that tendency might perhaps increase, for individual researchers to do work separately. They are welcome to do so. Nobody wants to come in the way of any individual doing any research work. But atomic energy research, if it is to be effective and successful, must be on a big scale. Individual can do research work in a petty way on the theoretical aspect of it; nobody comes in the way. Fortunately, we have some very eminent scientists who are acknowledged to be very eminent in regard to theoretical physics and even in the study of cosmic rays and atomic energy. But when you come to the practical side it is just impossible for any individual to do it without pooling all the resources that we have had and without the aid of the state. This Bill provides for that being done the pooling of their resources and the aid of the state³ for which we shall have to provide later on.

A number of amendments have been moved. I should like the movers of those amendments to bear two or three facts in mind. One is that this work must be of a secret character. It cannot be done publicly. Therefore to have advisory committees and the like will defeat the purpose of this work. There is an Atomic Board—I forget what the exact name of it is—a Board for the study of this problem and the execution of any projects that we may have. It consists of very eminent scientists. That is the advisory board for Government and the Board will presumably carry out the schemes.

2. Clauses 11, 14 and 15 laid down restrictions on information, offences and penalties.
3. The Act declared that it was expedient in the public interest that the Central Government control the development of any industry connected with atomic energy and any mineral used in the production, or research of atomic energy.

That the Board may be added to is a different matter. But if we have other boards and advisory committees it would be impossible for that Atomic Energy Board to function with any privacy or secrecy.

Secondly, there is a certain amount of urgency about this matter, not that we are going to produce any great results immediately but we have to preserve our mineral deposits, those that might be used for this purpose and already there is a hungering for them and there might be misuse so that we cannot delay this matter. And if we are to enter into any cooperative terms with other countries engaged in the production of atomic energy we have to guarantee them secrecy on this thing. We cannot talk to them till we have some such Act on our statute book and some Board appointed under the Act. There is a proposal that there should be an advisory committee and, secondly, that this Bill should be circulated for public opinion and be brought again at the next session. I submit that this delay would not be good and we might lose valuable time.

As for the other amendments, and there are many, some are rather verbal and some of them I propose to accept but those which infringe these fundamental provisions I would rather not accept, because I do not want to weaken this measure. It is not a measure, of course, applying to the people in general; it applies to a very limited number of persons who might be interested in or who might be working for the production of atomic energy and if in this particular case, for the safety of the state we apply rather stringent rules to them I do not think any person has a right to complain. Ultimately, of course, it will be for the Government and beyond that for Parliament here to determine what we should do or what we should not do. The ultimate authority will inevitably remain with this House. Apart from that we should give them sufficient authority to carry on their work in secrecy and effectively without what might be called governmental or other interference. Sir, I beg to move.⁴

Sir, every member who has spoken has welcomed this Bill⁵ in a more or less degree; many of them have grown rather poetic envisaging the future that might develop through the use and exploitation of atomic energy to the human race. But the last speaker who spoke, Mr. Krishnamurthy Rao,⁶ while finally welcoming it, practically criticised every feature of the Bill and in fact thoroughly disapproved of it lock, stock and barrel. I was amazed to hear that he was really supporting the Bill or was welcoming

4. The Bill is not printed here.

5. While the Bill was welcomed by Seth Govinddas, K. Santhanam, H.V. Kamath and Pattabhi Sitaramayya, it was criticised by S.V. Krishnamurthy Rao for placing controls on atomic research for peaceful purposes.

6. S.V. Krishnamurthy Rao (1902-1968); took part in the freedom struggle; member, Mysore Representative Assembly, 1946-49, and Constituent Assembly of India, 1947-50; Deputy Chairman, Rajya Sabha, 1952-62; Deputy Speaker, Lok Sabha, April 1962-66.

it. He attacked the provisions regarding secrecy. He said there was nothing constructive about it. He asked me to tell him what equipment we have proposed to have, how many cyclotrons and how many other things we have got in India, that there were advisory committees elsewhere and so on and so forth. I am sorry I cannot provide a list here of various technical equipment that we have or might get. I have not got it. But the fundamental fact is that in regard to time, for instance, I should like this House to appreciate that time is an important element; I will go further and say that it is a vital element. And anyone who raised the question of time, specially today, is singularly ignorant of what is happening all around us. It may be that a short while later it may become impossible for us even to deal in such matters with other countries. It may be that in view of each country trying to get the best bargain in regard to materials and other things, if we do not take advantage of an opportunity when it comes our way, we may not have that opportunity for some time. It is not enough for us merely to say that our materials should not go out of India; we may want to send them out in exchange for something valuable. It is not quite enough to hold on to them as misers without profiting by them ourselves and not knowing how to profit by them, but just to hold them on merely for the pleasure of having some kind of wealth. These minerals have been here under the Indian earth for a few million years; the time and opportunity for exploiting them has come only now. We did not profit by them during all these years as the rest of the world did not profit by them. Now when the time comes, to sit back and think ourselves fortunate in possessing them seems to me an extraordinarily limited and narrow view of looking at things, especially in this vast changing world of today.

As for the secrecy part, I should have thought that what has been said in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and further from what has been said by other honourable members after me, it is obvious that it is difficult to go ahead in this matter internally or externally without these provisions for secrecy. I believe there are these provisions of secrecy, maybe in varying measures but more or less on these lines, in every country. Now it is possible and conceivable that these provisions might come in the way of some scientific research. On the other hand, in scientific research of this kind what is more likely to come in the way is frittering away our energies and not concentrating them. As I mentioned earlier, it is impossible to do any experimental research of any major scale—theoretical research of course is open to everybody—except on a large scale, i.e., except on a scale which is helped by the state. I can conceive of no private scientists or individuals being in a position to do so; even if the state helps them separately they cannot do so unless they coordinate their efforts. When the question of coordination comes, you arrive immediately at some central organisation or body where these scientists who are associated with it will do it with the

help of the state. So I do not understand many of the criticisms that Mr. Krishnamurthy Rao has put forward. He asked us what equipment we have got—cyclotrons and other things. I do not quite follow this line of argument—that if we have not got the equipment we should not set about it and if we have got it we have got it. The fact of the matter is that we have very little equipment but we have some. My own interest in this business is not a very new interest. I think the first time the question came up before me was before the last war, and I was instrumental in helping one of the universities in India⁷ to get the first cyclotron machine into India. Unfortunately, the war came and it was not easy to set it up fully because some parts had not come; but anyhow it had come. Since then I have been following this matter up. We have not got much in the way of equipment, we have some little things for theoretical work and for petty experiments. But the point is this : are we going to carry on in that petty, local, limited way or are we going to set up what is called a pile? A pile need not be a big pile, it may be a small pile. Nevertheless, a pile is a big thing involving much expenditure, much preparation, concentration and effort and so on, and a great deal of secrecy. I do not know of a single instance anywhere in any country where this has been done without this erection of a pile and without all the concomitants of secrecy, concentration of work, etc. I may also point out that it is not true to say that there are only three countries indulging in this atomic research today. Mr. Krishnamurthy Rao mentioned the U.K., the U.S.A. and Canada. Undoubtedly, these three countries are going ahead with this; but there are several other countries and several of them are pretty far advanced—perhaps more advanced—who are also doing it. I am not for the moment referring to the U.S.S.R. about which we do not know much, except that I have no doubt that they are doing something to develop atomic energy. But many countries of Europe and even many small countries like Belgium and, of course, France are technically highly advanced. I do not wish to discuss individual countries, but in spite of their small resources they are quite advanced and sometimes more than countries with higher resources, scientifically advanced and otherwise. They are setting up piles in small countries in spite of their relatively limited resources. So that at the present moment there is everything ripe for us and we can go ahead. What I mean is this that the main things that are necessary are the men or human beings trained to do it and materials. We have got them but we naturally want equipment, we want other facilities, we want many of them, but unless the pile comes we cannot set about doing it. The more you delay the Bill the more we simply cannot begin functioning in this new way; we cannot start doing it. Of course, the passing of the Bill will not work wonders and nothing much will happen. You cannot produce atomic energy merely by setting up the

7. Calcutta University.

machinery and men; but in course of time—not too long I hope—we shall be able to set up all the kind of plant that is required for this purpose. Therefore, I will beg the House not to delay this matter but to give these powers to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. Krishnamurthy Rao also spoke about the advisory committee and he mentioned some names. I am sorry I cannot say much about England, but when he was reading out the names I was rather surprised to notice that the names were of the very eminent scientists who formed the Atomic Energy Commission there, which he called the advisory committee, so far as I can make out. There are half a dozen or ten or more eminent scientists chosen for atomic energy research in England. We are just forming that atomic energy commission here too. The point is whether you are going to have an advisory commission to sit over the heads of these scientists, to advise them, to cross-examine them or to find out what they are doing. That I think would be undesirable. Therefore, I think that in regard to this measure the changes suggested—either postponement or removal or secrecy of advisory committees, etc.,—would be highly undesirable.

One criticism is that there is nothing constructive about it, presumably referring to the giving of grants, etc. All that hardly comes within the scope of this Bill. Of course, Government, if it is interested, as it is bound to be, must develop scientific research in every way, in the universities etc. The giving of grants to the Atomic Energy Commission will, of course, be one concentrated effort to work out this business and for universities to carry on theoretical research work. That is an important function of the Government or the Education Ministry, and I have no doubt that they will look after it.

S.V. Krishnamurthy Rao : May I know if secrecy is insisted upon even for research for peaceful purposes?

Jawaharlal Nehru : Not theoretical research. Secrecy comes in when you think in terms of the production or use of atomic energy. That is the central effort to produce atomic energy.

Krishnamurthy Rao : In the Bill passed in the United Kingdom secrecy is restricted only for defence purposes.

JN : I do not know how you are to distinguish between the two.

There is just one aspect to which I should like again to draw the attention of the House. Somehow we cannot help associating atomic energy with war. This is the present context of our lives. Nevertheless, the important thing today is that atomic energy is a vast source of power that is coming to the world and it is something even more important than the coming in

of wars and the like. The wars may be forgotten. Even great world wars may come and go and bring enormous destruction in their wake. But we are on the verge, I think, of a tremendous development in some direction of the human race. Consider the past few hundred years of history; the world developed a new source of power, that is steam—the steam engine and the like—and the industrial age came in. India, with all her many virtues, did not develop that source of power. It became a backward country in that sense; it became a slave country because of that. The steam age and the industrial age were followed by the age of electricity which gradually crept in, and most of us were hardly aware of the change. But enormous new power came in. Now we are facing the atomic age; we are on the verge of it. And this is obviously something infinitely more powerful than either steam or electricity. While we are on the verge of the atomic age people talk of another source of power which is even bigger and vaster, that is, cosmic rays. It may be that this atomic age may merge into the cosmic age or the cosmic ray age, whatever it may be called. The point I should like the House to consider is this that if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation which keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war—indeed, I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. It is in that hope that we should develop this. Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way. But I do hope that our outlook in regard to this atomic energy is going to be a peaceful one for the development of human life and happiness and not one of war and hatred.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

V. Armed Services

1. In the Service of the Country¹

I have always been anxious to meet you, but have not been able to do so because of the heavy pressure of work. Although I have very little time at my disposal today and have to leave for Delhi within a couple of hours. I have come here solely to meet you. I may come again so as to be able to spend more time with you and to know you intimately. I feel it is essential that there should be the most intimate relations between the army and other sections of the people.

The defence of the country is of paramount importance. Until now, with India's defences secure, the Government could look to the other problems which are numerous. There are the questions of the removal of unemployment and illiteracy from our country, and development of industries, provision of irrigation facilities and production of electric power. The Government's task is to create wealth. I have no doubt that the conditions in the country will undergo a tremendous change soon. We are taking measures in that direction and I am certain that the advance of the country will be rapid. You have to do much to make the country prosperous and great. That end can be achieved with all sections of the people working in perfect cohesion.

The first responsibility of the army is to defend the country from foreign invasion. In your service of the people you should not be partial to any particular community or to people belonging to a particular creed. You are all citizens of a big country and it is the duty of the army to serve all the people alike. An army which cannot be depended upon to be impartial is a danger to the country to which it belongs.

We are now a free people and our country is independent. We had to fight hard for our independence and when it was achieved we were faced with disturbances. We have overcome the difficult situation. But the thing to be remembered now is that we have big issues to solve and should not allow ourselves to be side tracked by trifles. We cannot overlook the fact that our individual progress is inseparably tied up with the progress of the country. If the country progresses, our own progress is assured. But if the country falls to pieces, we cannot escape our own doom. We should, therefore, all work to make the country progressive and strong. We should not also allow anybody to look at it with an evil eye. I hope the New Year will bring you happiness and prosperity.

1. Speech at a rally of the members of the defence services, Lucknow, 2 January 1948. From *National Herald*, 3 January 1948.

2. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
16 January 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I have been worried for a little time past at a certain development which can do no good for our army. This is the tendency of some of our senior officers to dabble in politics. Some of them attended meetings of the Panthic Conference.² Others also seem to be discussing military matters and plans with all manner of people.

I suppose in an independent country a certain latitude inevitably takes place to begin with. But there are obvious dangers in this kind of thing. Also there appears to be too much of hunting for promotions and posts among the senior officers. I do not like this. Inevitably, in existing circumstances we have to consult our senior officers. But this consultation should not become widespread. Or else mutual jealousies and rivalries will become accentuated.

I do not quite know what should be done about this matter. But as Defence Minister you will no doubt have chances to impress this aspect on our officers in an informal way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A meeting of the Panthic *Durbar* was held at Patiala under the chairmanship of the Maharaja of Patiala in the first week of January 1948.

3. To J.R. Bhonsle¹

New Delhi
12 February 1948

My dear General Bhonsle,

Your letter of the 10th February.

I note that a meeting of the Advisory Committee is going to be held on the 27th February.

As you know we have tried our utmost to get the I.N.A. personnel absorbed in various services, including the auxiliary defence forces and armed police that are being raised. The question of their being taken into the regular

1. J.N. Collection.

army presents great difficulties and I fear nothing can be done about it at present. As a matter of fact, no regular recruitment to the army proper has taken place. Apart from this, the various unhappy occurrences since August last have created new problems. A large number of the I.N.A. people live in Pakistan. Many of them are in some kind of private army which we are discouraging and which we may even ban.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Future of ex-I.N.A. Personnel¹

I agree with the proposal made to the effect that the ex-I.N.A. personnel should be treated as discharged as from 1st March 1942 or should be permitted to resign from the service from that date. This would mean that they would have no claims for pay, etc., after 1st March 1942. The expenditure involved is supposed to be about Rs. 25 lakhs plus 0.5 lakh recurring on account of pension.

I agree also that there should be no question of reinstatement *en bloc* of these officers and men. Their services will have to be terminated on the date mentioned. Any question of large-scale re-employment of these people will raise difficulties of all kinds and at the present rather delicate moment these difficulties should be avoided.

I feel, however, that a distinction should be made between this large-scale reinstatement and the possible re-employment of any individual I.N.A. officer or O.R.,² provided, of course, that he is found otherwise fit and suitable. This should raise no difficulties as in the case of reinstatement. It would be a new employment and probably it would apply to very few cases which are considered particularly suitable. This re-employment would be entirely in the discretion of the Defence Ministry.

This follows logically from the fact that we discharge them or allow them to resign. In that event they are not barred from seeking fresh employment in the Defence Services. In other words while we do not reinstate them, we remove the bar against any possible fresh employment in the Defence Services, leaving such re-employment to be decided on grounds of individual merit.

1. Note, 25 February 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. Other ranks.

This would do away also with any difficulty in their employment in the Frontier Constabulary or such other forces. I entirely agree with the Defence Minister that these people should be encouraged to join the Home Guards, Police, etc., more specially officers and V.C.O.s should be used as instructors for training these Home Guards, Raksha Dals, etc.

There is one other matter which might be considered. This is the question of giving pensions to widows and dependants of those killed or disabled. I realise that this raises some difficulties. Perhaps we might say that individual cases of this kind will be considered for some gratuity. I do not think it is desirable to carry on any recurring liability of this kind. I am not myself clear in my mind about this and I am noting it down for consideration.

I entirely agree with the Defence Minister that this problem should be finally solved and that this must be made perfectly clear.

5. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
26 February 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

The discussion in the Cabinet about the I.N.A. question has led me to think that our approach should be slightly different. I think there is some truth in the criticism made that if we fix a date like the 1st March 1942, we shall thereby signify our particular disapproval of the I.N.A. activities after that date. This will be liable to be misunderstood. We should therefore mention no date, but merely state that we are putting aside a sum of money to compensate the I.N.A. people. This sum could then be distributed by us according to any rule, we think. Without the mention of any date, in distributing it we can take into consideration widows and dependants or displaced persons. This approach would be a simple one and would not lead to any argument.

In addition to this we would clearly state that we should treat the I.N.A. personnel as having been discharged from service or having resigned from it, and that there is no kind of bar against them. But we should make it perfectly clear that for certain reasons stated it is not possible to consider any reinstatement of the I.N.A. personnel in the regular army. It will be open to them, however, to join the Home Guards, Frontier Constabulary, Police and all civil services. Government will encourage in every way their employment in all these services.

To repeat, we shall say something as follows :—

Government have given earnest consideration to the cases of the ex-I.N.A. personnel, both officers and other ranks. These cases were considered by the previous Government over two years ago and certain decisions were arrived at, dividing the personnel in three classes, "white," "grey" and "black". Certain steps were also taken in accordance with this division of which the public are well aware. In August last some officers and men of the I.N.A. who had been convicted and sentenced were released from prison.

The new Government brought a fresh viewpoint to bear on all these cases and they have come to the conclusion that the orders of dismissal should be set aside and should be replaced by a discharge from the army. The fact that any member of the I.N.A. was previously placed in "grey" or "black" category should not be allowed to come in the way of service of the state. That service should be judged on individual merits and suitability.

The question of reinstatement in the army of the ex-I.N.A. personnel is full of difficulty. In the normal course many of the ex-I.N.A. officers and men would have been demobilised by this time. All of them have been out of the Indian Army for many years and an attempt to reinstate them would lead to complications. At a moment when the army has been re-organised after the partition, the unity of the army, which is so essential, might be affected. Government, therefore, have come to the decision that there should be no reinstatement of ex-I.N.A. officers and men in the regular army.

But it will be open to them to join the Home Guards, the Frontier Constabulary, the Police and like services as well as the civil services, subject always to merit and suitability. Government are anxious to give such opportunities of service to them.

Government have also decided to set aside a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs (or 30) in order to compensate the officers and other ranks of the I.N.A. for loss in pay, allowances, pensions, etc. Widows and disabled persons and dependents of those who died will also be entitled to help from this sum.

This is a very bad draft and it should be written up more properly with additional reasons given. If you agree, you might consult Indian officers and others in the Defence Ministry. We can then have a talk and try to finalise this matter.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. See *post*, item 12.

6. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
27 February 1948

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

Your letter of the 27th about the I.N.A. After our discussion in the Cabinet yesterday we propose to vary somewhat the proposals. So far as giving pecuniary compensation is concerned, I do not think it can be said with reason that we have been anything but generous.

It is being clearly stated that the I.N.A. personnel should be employed in the Home Guards, boundary forces, constabulary, etc. Further it has already been made clear that there is absolutely no ban.

No question of a relief fund arises when we are actually giving relief to all of them as well as making every effort to provide employment. The only real difficulty is the actual reinstatement in the army which is very strongly objected to by our army officers.

The revised proposals will be put up before the Cabinet before they are finalised.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

7. To Anil Chandra Chatterji¹

29 February 1948

My dear Chatterji,²

Your letter of the 26th February reached me only tonight. I have read it carefully. I can well appreciate your feelings in the matter. I am surprised, however, that you should imagine that I have any animus against the I.N.A. or that any of us have entered into any kind of a pact with the Britishers. At this morning's meeting I tried to explain our position to you and our

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Anil Chandra Chatterji (b. 1891); joined Indian Medical Service 1917; in South-East Asia on active service, 1942; joined Indian National Army, September 1942; Finance and Foreign Minister in Azad Hind Government and Governor Designate of liberated territories, 1943-44; Inspector-General of Prisons, West Bengal, 1947; Director of Health Services, West Bengal, August 1947-48; Secretary, Medical and Public Health, West Bengal, May 1948.

desire to do everything in our power to help. You will appreciate that we have to consider all the aspects of the problem. I hope that we shall arrive at a decision soon and that this will go a long way to relieve the distress of members of the I.N.A.

I am returning the High Court summons to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
1 March 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I am told that the East Punjab Government have issued orders that in future, in the recruitment of services personnel, the Sikhs should get 40 per cent and all other communities 60 per cent. Further that these communal proportions are to apply to promotions also and that any officers of a particular community should not be promoted if these proportions are thereby disturbed.

I do not know how far this is correct but if it is so then it is a dangerous precedent which would give rise to all manner of undesirable consequences. I shall be grateful to you if you would kindly let me know how matters stand.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

9. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
11 March 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I enclose a redraft for the I.N.A. matter.² We will consider this on my return to Delhi.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. For a statement of policy of the Government of India on the ex-I.N.A. personnel see *post*, item 12.

Meanwhile, I should like you to consider what Rafi was saying. I think that this would go a long way to give a certain psychological satisfaction to the I.N.A. and to the public generally. Rafi wanted that a few of the men (not officers) might be taken in order to show that having been in the I.N.A. was not a barrier to any kind of service or activity including the military. I myself do not see any danger in this and politically speaking it will be a good step to take.

This, of course, could be done without changing the note I am sending to you in any way. When we say that there is no bar to their employment in any capacity, it necessarily means that there is no bar to the individual to his joining even the army. Having stated so we have then stated that we are unable to reinstate them in the army. The statement we make does not conflict with this in any way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To C.J. Stracey¹

New Delhi
11 March 1948

My dear Stracey,

I have seen copy of your letter dated 8th March addressed to the Defence Minister.

I do not quite understand how I.N.A. people can be selected for training in the Indian Military Academy as all of them would be above prescribed age.

We want to encourage the employment of I.N.A. officers in the State Forces. Sardar Patel mentioned this to me also. As soon as he is well enough I should like you to see him.

You would better prepare a list of suitable I.N.A. officers who might be employed in the state regular forces or in the Home Guards. Some V.C.O.s might also be employed as instructors in these formations.

I have been asked by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad to supply him with some I.N.A. officers for Kashmir Home Guards. Also some V.C.O.s as instructors for the Home Guards. Please collect names and information on this subject and meet me on my return to Delhi. I am going away tomorrow for four days.²

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nehru went on a tour of Wardha, Waltair and Vishakhapatnam from 12 to 15 March 1948.

If you prepare such a list you might send a copy to Sardar Patel and another copy to Sardar Baldev Singh. You might mention that you are doing it at my instance.

I want you to prepare also a list of the Tokyo cadets with full particulars about their age, training and present employment. Some of them might be suitable for military training. A copy of this list should be sent by you to Sardar Baldev Singh.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. On the Role of the Army¹

I am certain that there will be no war in the near future. We stand for peace and shall do our utmost to preserve it; we have no designs on any other country but we are determined to defend ourselves and maintain our independence. India's army, air force and navy have to play the role of the ambassadors of a free nation.

In the past, the army fought valiantly on many battlefields and had won a name for itself. But now, in a sense, it is a new army. Freedom has been won by sacrifices and can be retained only by a vigilant guard on the part of the people. But the greater responsibility rested on the Indian armed forces. India's defence forces are for the entire country and not for the protection or service of any particular community or province.

To lead a nation of 350 million people on the path of progress is not an easy task and requires everyone to make sacrifices and put in selfless work. We have still a long way to go and the soldiers of India shall be failing in their duty if they do not make service of the people their ideal.

The country has to be protected against all dangers—external as well as internal. The members of armed forces should not hesitate to lay down their lives in the cause of their country's security. India's army embodies the country's character. If her character is strong, the country will prosper, but if it is weak, the country too will go down.

The Indian Army is necessarily a people's army because it has sprung from among them and aims at safeguarding our rights and freedom. This position calls for a greater contact and fellowship between the people and the armed forces.

1. Speech at a ceremonial parade by the army, New Delhi, 22 March 1948. From *National Herald*, 23 March 1948.

12. The Ex-I.N.A. Personnel¹

Sir, I crave leave of the House to make a statement of Government's policy in regard to the ex-Indian National Army personnel. I regret the delay that has taken place in this matter because both this House and the country are interested in this question. Indeed, that interest has been evinced on many occasions in this House. Many of us in our personal and individual capacities have, in the course of the last two years and more, been associated with an attempt to give some relief and occupation to some of this personnel. But the House will remember what has happened during these last one and a half years. It was originally viewed from a particular point of view before this Government came into existence. Then there was a kind of mixed Government and there were other difficulties. We might have viewed it and we should have viewed it, after the 15 August, from an entirely different viewpoint and come to such decisions as we thought fit and proper. But from the 15th August or thereabouts and onwards all manner of upheavals have taken place in the country which delayed the consideration of the most vital problems. Hence this delay. Among the other things that have happened since the 15th August, is the fact that the Indian National Army itself—the ex-Indian National Army personnel—has been split up into those that might be considered to belong to India and those that might be considered to belong to Pakistan. Now, obviously, any statement of Government policy that I might make applies only to those who belong to India and not to those who now belong to Pakistan.

I shall now read the statement of policy.

"Government have given earnest consideration to the cases of ex-I.N.A. personnel, both officers and other ranks. These cases were considered by the previous Government over two years ago. It was then decided that I.N.A. personnel should be divided into three categories : White, Grey and Black, and that certain steps should be taken in regard to the three categories. "Whites" were permitted to remain in service; "Greys" were discharged, and the "Blacks" dismissed or convicted.

The new Government brought a fresh viewpoint to bear on the whole question so that no stigma should attach to anyone by virtue of the fact that he was a member of the I.N.A. Immediately on the Government assuming office in August last, officers and men who had been convicted and imprisoned were released. Government have now considered other aspects of the matter. They have come to the conclusion that orders of dismissal

1. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 29 March 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. IV, 1948, pp. 2673-2674.

passed on I.N.A. personnel should be set aside and replaced by orders of discharge from the army, so that no stigma should attach to the members of the I.N.A. The result will be that the previous classification will not hold good any longer and will not be a bar for service of the state in any capacity. Whether any person should be employed *de novo* would be judged on individual merit and suitability.

The question of reinstatement in the army of the I.N.A. personnel is full of difficulty. In the normal course, a large number of these members of the I.N.A. would have been out of the army for many years and there has been a long break in service. They have thus got out of touch with the army and any attempt to reinstate them would lead to many complications, both practical and psychological. At a time when the army has been exposed to considerable stress and strain, consequent on its reorganisation after partition, the unity of the army, which is so essential, might be affected. Government have therefore come to the conclusion that ex-I.N.A. officers and men should not be reinstated in the army.

Government are, however, anxious to afford ex-I.N.A. personnel opportunities of service. It will be open to them to join the Home Guards, the State Forces, the Armed Constabulary, the Police and like services as well as the civil services, subject always to merit and suitability. The Central Government and the provincial governments will give every help to them to find such employment.

The financial loss which the ex-I.N.A. personnel have suffered is not easy of assessment. While serving overseas our armed forces were a charge on the Government of the United Kingdom. Family allowances continued to be paid in India. A large measure of support was also obtained from public funds.

Government, however, realise the hardships which the I.N.A. personnel have suffered. They have decided to arrange for payment of pensions wherever due. They have further decided to set aside a sum of rupees thirty lakhs for distribution among the ex-I.N.A. personnel on an equitable basis. Widows and dependants of those who died and disabled persons will also be entitled to help from this sum."

May I just point out one or two matters contained in this statement? First of all, I wish to repeat that this statement applies to the I.N.A. personnel in India and obviously not to Pakistan. Secondly, it removes from the political point of view, so far as we are concerned, any question of a stigma or bar attaching to them and it is open to them to serve the state in any capacity. "In any capacity" includes military capacity also, so far as that is concerned. But so far as reinstatement of this personnel in the army is concerned, numerous other factors arise. In the army many of these people were engaged temporarily—by way of Emergency Commissions and the like. Normally speaking, they would have gone out of the army

long ago. A number of permanent commissions would have remained. The main fact, as stated in the statement, is that there has been such a big gap, and meanwhile all manner of changes have taken place in the army—promotions, etc., that it will be exceedingly difficult, not only practically but psychologically to fit them in. But that has nothing to do with any political reasons because they belong to the I.N.A. but entirely to other reasons. Then again, we want them to serve the state because we think there is very valuable material among them. We want them to serve the state in many other capacities, including not only the Home Guards, etc., but the military forces of the state and the civil services, and may be, if they are suited for it, for such very highly important services like consular or foreign services, so that no avenue is closed to them.

Then so far as compensation for non-payment of various allowances, etc., is due, first of all we have decided to give them pensions wherever due. Secondly, it involves a difficult calculation of how to give them compensation. For the present we have decided to set aside a sum of Rs. 30 lakhs, that is apart from the pensions—that is a separate item to be given to them. How exactly it will be given to them will be worked out according to some form which will be fair and equitable.

13. The Indian Army¹

India's army is an army of the people, pledged to the disciplined service of India and her people. We are lovers of peace and wish to encourage the arts of peace so as to raise the standards of our people and make our motherland strong and prosperous. But peace and independence can only be preserved if we are strong enough to do so and gain the respect of others.

Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Therefore we must have a model army capable of comparison with any other in its discipline, efficiency and devotion to duty. It must think of India as a whole and not of sectarian or provincial differences. It must not pay heed to any aspect of communalism which has done so much injury to our motherland. Every soldier of India must remember that he has the honour of India in his keeping. The army has set a high standard and by that standard he will be judged.

Greetings to the soldiers of free India. *Jai Hind.*

1. Message on the occasion of the exhibition and tattoo organised by the armed forces, New Delhi, 30 March 1948. From *National Herald*, 1 April 1948.

14. Uphold the Country's Honour¹

Soldiers and fellow citizens,

I am here to inaugurate an exhibition of military equipment of our armed forces and its three wings, that is the army, the air force and the navy. I believe there have been other exhibitions of this kind but perhaps never on such a large scale. It is a good thing to have such an exhibition because in today's independent India we have to understand well how our armed forces are constituted and how they function. We have to break down the old barriers between the armed forces and the common people and to adopt new ways. What is the duty of a soldier? It is service to the country. It is the duty of all of us to serve the nation, whatever our profession, whether we are soldiers or officers. And I think that to be a soldier in independent India is a matter of great honour. No other honour can be greater than this, in whatever manner he serves India, because to be a soldier of a large, first-rate country is and should be an honour. But the honour of a country can be maintained only when her citizens are constantly vigilant as to do nothing by which that honour is sullied or her good name is besmirched. This becomes specially necessary for a man in uniform because he becomes a symbol of India, wherever he may be, in India or abroad. He becomes an ambassador of India. They have to constantly bear in mind that they have to uphold the honour of the country.

So, it is a good thing that we, the citizens of Delhi, and the men of the different units of our armed forces should come together, meet and know one another. We have to perform big tasks in the future and they will remain incomplete until all of us learn to work together.

We have to do away with the things that separate us or place obstacles in our path. We have to remember that every citizen of India is a contributor to and a shareholder in the building of independent India. So he is a sharer in her independence and the advantages that accrue from it. Independent India does not belong to a few people. It belongs to thirty five crores of Indians and every one of them is entitled to an equal share in it. It is true that there are thousands of problems and so many ups and downs to be faced these days. It is also true that some people live in luxury and the majority suffer great privations. It is very difficult to control this at once. We have to work very hard to create the new fabric of independent India. But we must keep before us the goal of treating every Indian as our kith and kin whatever his caste,

1. Speech inaugurating the armed forces exhibition, New Delhi, 31 March 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi.)

religion, status or occupation may be. We should make no distinction on the basis of caste, religion or status. There are many forces at work in India which separate us. We must put an end to them. Some people think only of their own provinces and forget their country. But if you consider the matter, you will see that if the whole country does not progress, how can any one state or an institution or a party or people belonging to a particular religion do so? If the whole nation forges ahead, all the people will and if the nation falls, so will the people with it. If India lives, we too live. If India does not live, how long will we last? So we have to think about our unity and understand it. The greatest man of this country and the world gave up his life trying to teach this lesson. We must always remember this and never do anything on our part which makes us forget this basic tenet and thereby become weak. So we must remember this lesson, especially our armed forces on whom there is a great responsibility to protect the country, to increase her prestige, and to face hostile incursions. We do not maintain an army to enslave others or to attack them. Our country wants to live by peaceful means. We want to have friendly relations with other countries of the world. We do not want to fight with anyone. There have been enough wars in the world and even now there is often talk of war but our way, as far as possible, is of peace. Yet, if we are attacked, we will face it to defend our honour and the independence of our country. Therefore, our armed forces have to be smart, clever and alert. If a country maintains an army, it is useless to have a second-rate one. If India maintains an army, as it has to, in the world of today, it has to be first-rate and the best possible army, courageous, well-trained in modern warfare and well prepared to meet any danger that may threaten her security.

So the armed forces have to understand this and the common people have to understand what an army is all about. Some of us may be in the armed forces and others in different occupations. But the tasks are the same for everyone to serve India and her people, to solve their problems and to add to the prestige of India.

I shall now inaugurate the exhibition and I hope that all of you will see it properly and try to understand many of the things over which there used to be a curtain of secrecy before, away from the common man's eyes, and remember that they belong to all of us, and not to a handful of officers or specialists. *Jai Hind.*

15. The Armed Forces Tattoo¹

The tattoo will give the people an idea of how the army is being trained to be a proper instrument of national service. The work of the army is not merely to defend the country but to serve the people at all times.

The Purana Qila² reminds us of India's long history with her many ups and downs. We may come and go, but India stands for all the time. India is immortal. We have each a small part to play in fulfilling her destiny. The tattoo will not only provide entertainment but also give an idea of how the army is prepared to be a proper instrument of national service.

1. Speech inaugurating the tattoo in New Delhi, 1 April 1948. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times* and *National Herald*, 2 April 1948.
2. A fort built in the mid-16th century by Emperor Humayun and Sher Shah Suri on the site of the ancient Indraprastha.

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
28 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have your letter of 27 January about the Income-Tax Investigation Commission.² This matter was considered at some length in the Cabinet and a full discussion took place. Varadachari, Chairman of the Commission, was also present. Both he and Shanmukham Chetty stated that without the additional powers the Commission would be completely helpless. Indeed, it would do more harm than good. The choice was either not to have the Commission or to give it these additional powers. It is hardly possible or desirable to do away with the Commission at this stage. That would create a very bad public impression. It was pointed out that the powers given to this Commission were less than those given to Congressional commissions in the United States set up for this purpose. We have appointed a very high-power board in whose judgment we can trust. The only power to which objection has been taken is the power to investigate accounts books etc., and the delegation of this authority to some officers. In a sense this is done even now by income-tax officers, though not with that sanction. Apart from income-tax, any magistrate can issue a search warrant. So in effect nothing unusual has been done.

This morning I discussed this matter again with Shanmukham Chetty and he told me that after full consideration he felt that the additional powers should be given to the Commission. Otherwise the Commission might as well be wound up. There appeared to be no half-way house.

If you still think that the matter should be put up before the Cabinet again I shall certainly ask for this to be done.³ But I rather doubt if after this full consideration and decision any change is likely to be made.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 278-279.

2. Patel wrote that the new powers of the commission would drastically upset those in business, hinder production and create a lack of confidence. Therefore he suggested that the Cabinet again consider reduction of the severities of the law.

3. Patel agreed that no useful purpose would be served by discussing the matter again in the Cabinet though he still felt that the cumulative effect would be some lack of confidence among businessmen.

2. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
11 February 1948

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

In my letter dated the 7th February, I informed you that I was consulting the Home Minister about your suggestion for the institution of a system of honours and awards in India. Sardar Patel agrees with me that the best thing would be to appoint a committee to go into the question; he also agrees to the personnel suggested by you. I am accordingly taking steps to constitute the committee.

2. In submitting their report, the committee will be bound by the decision taken by the Constituent Assembly that no title shall be conferred by the state. This of course does not conflict with the proposals you have made.

3. The committee ought to have some terms of reference. I think the best thing would be to place before them a copy of your letter No. F. 44-H/48 dated the 2nd February and this I am doing.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(46)/48-PMS.

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
16 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You will remember that at the party meeting questions were asked about having some kind of a Raksha Dal in Delhi province after the pattern of such Dals in the U.P.² and some other provinces. I do hope that some such action will be taken. Apart from doing good to the young people taken in, it has a good psychological result. The Raksha Dal would be honorary, except when some actual service is taken from it. They would have no arms, though some kind of training may be given in arms where feasible.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. G.B. Pant had organised a month earlier in the United Provinces the Prantiya Raksha Dal—a regional and local self-defence corps—to combat communal crime and work for the poor. Eleven persons from each village were proposed to be trained in the handling of fire-arms.

4. To R. K. Shanmukham Chetty¹

New Delhi
19 February 1948

My dear Shanmukham,

The other day your Ministry gave their consent to the appointment of a Consul-General² in New York. This recommendation had been sent a considerable time ago from External Affairs. It has been rather an urgent matter and it was delayed because the Finance Ministry took a long time over it.

It seems to me that some method should be devised to avoid these delays. I am told that a very large number of files from the Education Ministry have been in the Finance Ministry for many months and some for over a year. Indeed, some proposals have simply lapsed because of this delay. You will agree with me that any system which leads to proposals being hung up for a long time is not satisfactory. Could you kindly consider this matter so that we might devise a quicker way of dealing with proposals emanating from various ministries which go to the Finance Ministry for approval? In particular I shall be grateful if pending matters from the Education Ministry are examined and expedited.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 37(13)/ps/48-PMS.
2. Ramji Ram Saxena.

5. Accommodation in Dalhousie¹

One of the finest hill stations in India is Dalhousie² from the point of view of beauty, climate and agreeable surroundings. It is not a flashy hill station like some others and there are few amusements there. During the past few years, this has gradually deteriorated as people, whose idea of a hill station is a place of parties and dances etc., have preferred to go to other places. For my part I would rather go to Dalhousie than almost any other hill station in India, Kashmir apart.

1. Note, 19 February 1948. File No. 2(358)/49-PMS. Extracts.
2. A hill station, at an altitude of 6,678 feet, in Himachal Pradesh. The Nehru family had spent there the summer of 1925.

2. Dalhousie has been progressively depopulated. At the present moment out of about 485 bungalows and houses, about 400 are lying empty. They are good houses, some of them big ones with some kind of garden. There is a good road to Dalhousie and there are the usual conveniences like electric light, water supply, etc. It seems extraordinary that such an attractive place should lie empty when there is a tremendous demand for housing all over the country. I think it is eminently desirable that steps should be taken to utilise Dalhousie for public purposes, as well as private if necessary. In this matter the Central Government and the East Punjab Government should give the lead.

3. Apart from Dalhousie itself, there are extensive military barracks which, I understand, are lying empty. These are on the way to Dalhousie. There are the Gurkha lines at Baklow and there are the barracks meant for British troops at Balun. The latter specially are very attractive with messes, clubs, hospitals and the like. In both these barracks there is electricity and water supply and good roads. They are lying empty...the ideal places for townships to grow up or for the establishment of any big institute.

4. I suggest the question of utilising Dalhousie as well as the military barracks at Baklow and Balun be immediately investigated. So far as the barracks are concerned, if Defence are not going to use them, they should be put to some other use. They should not lie empty.

5. Among the various uses that Dalhousie and these barracks can be put to are :

- (i) The University of East Punjab. I doubt if there is any place in East Punjab which is more suited for a university from every point of view. I understand that there is some talk that the University might be at Solan or round about. I very much doubt if Solan is a suitable place. In Dalhousie immediate accommodation is available in the best surroundings. Some people do not like the idea of being rather near the Pakistan frontier. I think this fear is completely unfounded, more specially for a place nestling in the mountains;
- (ii) A sanatorium run by the Central Government. The Health Ministry should be interested in this ;
- (iii) A scientific institute, specially a high-altitude one which could have its base at Dalhousie and its advance observation centre high up ;
- (iv) Any government offices, either Central or Provincial ; and
- (v) A township or a colony for refugees.

6. There are any number of other possibilities. It seems an absurd waste to allow this fine place with its large number of houses to run to waste when we are in urgent need of housing. We have got something ready-made

in the best of all localities. Why a person should want to live in overcrowded cities with a none too good climate when there is this ideal situation, I do not know.

7. I suggest that this question be urgently considered by the various interested parties. Among them are :

- (1) The East Punjab Government;
- (2) The Defence Ministry;
- (3) The Health Ministry of the Central Government;
- (4) The Works, Mines and Power Ministry; and
- (5) The Department of Scientific Research.

I am sending this note to all of these. I shall be grateful if they inform me of their reactions to the suggestions I have made above.

6. To N. V. Gadgil¹

New Delhi
24 February 1948

My dear Gadgil,

I wrote to you some time back about the desirability of utilising the princes' houses in Delhi for ambassadorial or other purposes. I believe you have done something in this matter already. I think quick action is needed as many of the princes may be thinking of selling their houses because of the rapid collapse of the States structure in India as we have known it for all these years.

You will remember that we decided to have a national park with a commemorative pillar in the middle at the side of Gandhiji's cremation. I think a formal decision by Cabinet should be arrived at and the public should then be informed about it. I suggest therefore that a paper might be prepared by your Ministry on the subject for the consideration of the Cabinet. After the Cabinet has approved of it, the question of what the pillar should be will have to be carefully considered. This pillar may well become a model for other pillars in India and therefore great care has to be taken that it is suitable, artistic, simple and dignified. Probably it will be desirable to ask for suggestions from artists including schools of art in India. You might also ask some famous foreign sculptors and artists to give us their ideas on the subject.

1. File No. 2 (76) 48-PMS.

I am given to understand that there are some difficulties in the way of having a large enough park on the site of the cremation, chiefly due to the fact that the level is low and liable to flooding. Two methods to avoid flooding are either to have an embankment or to raise the level. Both appear to be unsatisfactory and very expensive. If this is so, it might perhaps be desirable to think in terms of a small park there with a monument. This small area could perhaps be raised a little. It does seem necessary that that exact spot must have some kind of a memorial. From some points of view it might be even desirable to have simple kind of a memorial there, that is, no elaborate park. That would perhaps be in the fitness of things. A large park might be made somewhere else in Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
6 March 1948

My dear Gopichandji,
Thank you for your letter of the 1st.

I am quite clear in my own mind that we must adopt a very firm attitude in regard to the communal demands of the Akalis for weightage, parity, etc. It is quite impossible for us to accept this principle in one place and not in another. Our attitude is, of course, quite friendly to the Sikhs, for they form an essential and important part of the nation. We want them to have full opportunities in national activities and I have no doubt that they will have them. I am convinced that it is harmful in their interests to seek to isolate themselves by claiming special privileges.²

Regarding the I.N.A., I am glad you are doing everything possible to help them. Of course, you have to be careful about individuals.

We are greatly worried because of the delay in the announcement of the capital for East Punjab. This is holding up so many things and adding

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A number of Sikh organisations in Punjab had sent telegrams to the All India Congress Committee and the Government reminding them of their assurance to give special weightage to Sikhs in the future constitution of the country. Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, and members of the Constituent Assembly came to Delhi in mid-February to represent their case to the Congress leaders.

to our difficulties. You told me in Jullundur that you would send us all the papers finally but so far as I know, they have not yet been received.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. The National Flag and the National Anthem¹

Objection has been taken to the use of our National Flag by all manner of persons on all manner of occasions. I think the objection is justified and certain rules should be framed in regard to it. I believe there are such rules in other countries. We have been lenient in this respect because we wanted to popularise the flag. But the time has come to consider the framing of rules governing the display and use of the National Flag. I shall be grateful to have your views on this subject.

We are frequently asked about our National Anthem.² There is no official or formal National Anthem yet. But it is clear that we must decide about it soon. Probably the final decision will have to be taken by the Constituent Assembly. But before that a committee may have to be constituted to consider this matter.

For many years past *Vande Mataram* has been used unofficially as a National Anthem. It will no doubt continue to be liked and respected because of its history and past association. But it is rather doubtful if it is wholly suited as a National Anthem, both because of its language, which is difficult and not understood by most people, and the tune. The music of a National Anthem must be a judicious mixture of life and dignity. We do not want anything which is undignified or lifeless. It must also be remembered that a National Anthem is not only played in the home country but in all foreign countries and therefore it must have some kind of an appeal in foreign countries also.

1. Circular to all Governors, 7 March 1948. File No. 2(61)'47-PMS.

2. On 25 August 1948 Nehru announced in Parliament the decision of the Cabinet that *Jana Gana Mana* should be the provisional National Anthem until the Constituent Assembly took a final decision. On 24 January 1950 Rajendra Prasad made a statement in the Constituent Assembly that *Jana Gana Mana* should be used for official purposes as the National Anthem of India.

Last October our Delegation to the United Nations gave a party in New York and the orchestra there played a musical rendering of Tagore's *Jana Gana Mana*. This was appreciated greatly in New York and in fact many foreign representatives there asked for the score. We obtained a copy of this score here and we sent it to the A.I.R. as well as to a number of military bands. It has since been frequently played by these bands and by the A.I.R.³

What we have aimed at is that before any final choice is made, people should get acquainted with the music and the tune. I suggest that this musical rendering of *Jana Gana Mana* might be practised in the provinces also.

Most of our cinema houses finish up each performance by giving what they consider the National Anthem. This varies and often is very long. Personally I think that this practice should be discouraged. It is not usual practice in other countries. What normally happens is that a mournful dirge is played for several minutes much to the discomfiture of the audience, many of whom are moving out at the time. This undignified procedure does no credit to anyone. I think that cinema houses should be told not to play any kind of National Anthem at the end of their performance. All they need do is to show the National Flag on the screen for an instant. We are arranging to supply a good picture of the National Flag on the Red Fort in Delhi.

I am not writing to your Premier separately on the subject of this letter. I suggest that you might consult him also and then let me have your joint or separate opinion.

3. The orchestral version of *Jana Gana Mana* was played by the A.I.R. after broadcasts by Nehru and Patel in February.

9. To Archibald Nye¹

New Delhi
7 March 1948

Dear Sir Archibald Nye,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th March.

We are full of work and worry. But I can assure you that we shall do our utmost to avoid famine and starvation in Madras. The Food Minister has gone into this question thoroughly and has made certain proposals which we are now considering. I understand that recent rains have slightly improved the situation in Madras.

1. J.N. Collection.

I agree with you that the demand for the formation of a separate Kerala province has no sufficient justification even for consideration at present. There can be no separate province for Malabar itself and we do not propose to break up Travancore and Mysore.

Hyderabad is a running sore and a nuisance. We are yet far from any kind of a settlement though continuous efforts are being made to that end.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To C. M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
9 March 1948

My dear Trivedi,

Thank you for your fortnightly letter of the 5th March. It is a very good letter, if I may say so, and gives us much general information about the province.

You mention General Mohan Singh's Desh Sewak Sena. I have no doubt that all such private organisations should not be allowed to carry on; at the same time we have to proceed with some caution in order to avoid adding to our difficulties. Dr. Gopichand has written to me that he has come to some kind of understanding with Mohan Singh and proposes to incorporate this organisation in the National Volunteer Force.

The Sikh private armies are definitely not to be encouraged; apparently they hardly exist now. As for the 300 volunteers from Qadian perhaps the best course would be to watch them carefully, as you suggest.

As you must have learnt Delhi has had some serious crimes. A gang has been functioning here. Our information is that this gang came from Rohtak. I hope your intelligence and police will keep track of these criminal tendencies and specially the gangs that may be at work. They should keep in touch with the Delhi police and intelligence.

I am glad that the Director of Industries has at last been appointed in East Punjab.

I am really worried over the delay in the choice of a capital. I had hoped that a final decision will be arrived at very soon. So much of our work is affected by this and our Rehabilitation and Development Board is anxiously waiting for your decision.

Your request for a subvention will of course be considered here. But there is a general feeling here that the East Punjab administration is extravagant even in regard to the relatively petty things like pays, allowances, etc. Sometimes rates seem to be higher than those prevalent in Delhi. I heard that all officials who have been staying in Jullundur charge daily allowance. I have written to Dr. Gopichand about this matter. Travelling allowances also appear to be excessive.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To W. C. Mehra¹

New Delhi
9 March 1948

Dear Mehra,²

I have not thus far interfered in any way with the security arrangements you have made. But I think the time has come for you to make a change. Life is becoming progressively unbearable for me in these conditions. I realise that security arrangements must be made. But I really think there should be a limit to them somewhere. This is not only personally extremely distasteful to me but is also a great waste of public funds.

I have had a letter from Rajkumari Amrit Kaur protesting against the extraordinary police arrangements made for her protection. I sympathise with her protest. I think that you should reduce some of these very extra precautions progressively. I am not asking you not to take precautions, but the present extent of them is both undesirable and unnecessary.

Some members of the Cabinet probably require somewhat more protection than the others for a little while. There is a certain public feeling that this protection should be given and I do not wish to go against this feeling. As far as I can see the members of the Cabinet who should be given some special protection are Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mr. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee and myself. But even this special protection should be much less than at present. It certainly should not be necessary for a special car to pursue us wherever we may go or for

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (b. 1907); joined Indian Police Service in 1930 and served in the Punjab; Deputy Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, 1947-55; Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer, 1955; Inspector General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir, 1956-65.

such large numbers of policemen, army men and plainclothes men to surround us all the time.

As regards the other members of Cabinet a lesser measure of protection should be enough.

I am going away from Delhi on the 12th and returning on the 15th afternoon. I hope that by the time I return the new arrangements will be functioning. I feel that a continuation of the present arrangements is bad for all of us and the country and in fact is more of an irritant than anything else.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. Return of Government Servants from Pakistan¹

At the party meeting today reference was made to the announcement made in the press to the effect that about 8,000 Muslim Government employees who had provisionally opted for Pakistan had now finally opted for India and were coming back here. Members of the party, almost unanimously, expressed their alarm at the return of these persons. I was asked how and why the Government of India was under any obligation to take them back and if there was any such obligation, did it preclude a close scrutiny of the reasons why a person has changed his previous option? While the legal and moral obligation of the Government of India was challenged, the practical difficulties of taking them back were also pointed out with considerable warmth. Their return would upset the services here and may give rise to trouble. The instance of some railway workers who had returned to Lucknow was pointed out. The U.P. Government had specially asked the Railway Ministry not to send them back to the workshop because this might lead to a breach of law and order. These persons, numbering some hundreds in Lucknow, were thus being treated as if they were on leave which was due to them.

2. The question of seniority would arise and retrenchment.

3. The real reason behind the members' mind was that of security. They were apprehensive that security might be endangered by the return to essential services of all these persons.

1. Note to Minister of Home Affairs, 16 March 1948. J.N. Collection.

4. There was also the question of non-Muslims who had previously opted for Pakistan, but who had been driven out by circumstances. What was their position? Many who had opted for India were still awaiting appointments.

5. For all these and other reasons the party was of opinion that this matter should be very closely scrutinised and no encouragement whatever should be given to these people to return to service in India.

6. I understand that the Home Ministry is dealing with this matter and has asked our High Commissioner in Pakistan not to take any action till further directions are received. I trust that the Home Ministry is collecting full facts and figures from the Railway and Communications Ministries. It should also be made clear what the nature of the decision was in regard to options and how far this has been given effect to on both sides. Much has happened since the pre-partition days and this has to be taken into consideration. Was the second option exercised within the period stated and, if so, what was the reason for this change? The question of the possibility of absorption of these new personnel also has to be considered. I suggest that a telegram be sent to the High Commissioner advising him of all these difficulties in our way and telling him in explicit language not to encourage the return in any way of these persons, till further instructions are received.

13. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
16 March 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I have now received the papers about the East Punjab capital. I think the sooner we meet the better so that we can finally decide this question. I expect to be in Delhi for the rest of this month and, although I shall have a very busy time, I shall try to fit in with any day that is convenient to you and your colleagues who may come here for this discussion. I suppose that the Governor and Sardar Swaran Singh will be accompanying you as well as anyone else you choose to bring with you.

You told us that as soon as the choice is made your Government will issue an ordinance to prevent the rise in land values. The other day in our

1. J.N. Collection.

Cabinet meeting a proposal of wider significance was made by our Finance Minister and was generally approved by our Cabinet. This was with a view to prevent speculation in land all over East Punjab. In view of the tremendous upheavals and migrations that East Punjab has suffered from, there might well be violent fluctuations in land values all over the province. It was therefore suggested that some ordinance or other legislation might be passed immediately fixing the maximum price for sale of land all over the province at the average price on a particular date. I am putting this rather crudely, but you will get my point.

This would be in addition to any special ordinance for the land intended for the new capital.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

14. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
17 March 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

Your Government has been good enough, at our request, to allot a plot of land in Ranchi measuring 25 acres to His Highness Maharaja Sir Padma Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana, the Prime Minister of Nepal. The Maharaja Saheb came to see me today and expressed his gratitude for this. But he was worried about one matter and that is that he and his heirs will not have the right to transfer, assign, sublet, or part with the possession of the land and premises or any part thereof. Normally speaking this proviso seems to me very reasonable. But in this special case we should like to show every consideration to the Maharaja's wishes and he is very anxious that the restrictions should be removed. I would suggest to you that the condition attached might be altered so that a transfer can only be made with the previous sanction of the Government. You may further add, if you like, that in case of a proposed transfer the Government will have the first right to purchase the land and buildings thereon.

I hope it will be possible for your Government to agree to some such variations. We are particularly desirous of showing every consideration to the Maharaja. Could you kindly let me know what your decision is?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
22 March 1948

My dear Pantji,

I understand that elections to the Gram Panchayats in the U.P. are likely to take place in May. Many of the rural workers in the U.P. who came to Wardha for the conference² there expressed grave concern at the U.P. situation. That is to say, they fear that communalists and reactionary elements might succeed in large numbers. I do not know what can be done about this matter except to draw your attention to it.

I am not quite clear in my own mind whether it would be desirable to run official Congress candidates for the Gram Panchayats.

Would it be possible to have some provision or some arrangement to check misuse of Gram Panchayat powers in regard to minorities? The success of Gram Panchayats depends very largely on competent secretaries. I understand that in Bombay there are special training schemes for such secretaries. The Talimi Sangh suggested in Wardha that they would consider the proposal of training office bearers for Gram Panchayats if the Government wished them to do so.

I am writing to you because I am anxious that this Gram Panchayat scheme should succeed. It would be a great pity if it became a hotbed of intrigues and nepotism.

Yours affly,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The conference of constructive workers, convened by the Gandhi Seva Sangh, met at Sevagram, Wardha, from 13 to 15 March 1948, to formulate a future programme. The conference, attended by about 600 delegates and presided over by Rajendra Prasad, had passed a resolution on the communal problem.

16. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
22 March 1948

My dear Amrit,

Thank you for your letter of the 21st March. I am sorry you have been unwell.

1. J.N. Collection.

What the proper designation of the Indian state is going to be and what its relations will be to the British Commonwealth are vital matters which will, no doubt, be discussed at length in the Constituent Assembly. There are deep feelings involved and I do not know what the ultimate decision will be.

We are prepared to help delegates to go to international conferences held by non-governmental organisations. But we can hardly lay down rules that we shall do so in every case.

I was unable to meet the women's delegation to which you refer but I got a thing from them which rather irritated me. It is obvious that they were wholly Communist. Recently there was an Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta where much mischief was done by some Communist delegates.

I think that it would be a good thing if you could take charge of the Delhi Health Administration, or possibly your Ministry might associate itself formally with it and in that way control it to a large extent. I do not know what you mean by saying that this can only be done if the whole municipal administration is taken over by Government. It is a 100 per cent Central Government administration run by Home Ministry.

It would be a good thing to have an all-India conference of local self-government as you suggest.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

17. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
25 March 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

My attention has just been drawn to a circular letter dated 15th January 1948 issued by the Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Bihar, to various firms and individuals in regard to the employment of Biharis by the holders of mining concerns in the district of Singhbhum.² This presumably applies more specially to the coal-mining industry. The circular says that "no mining lease will in future be granted to any person/firm unless the firm or firms concerned is willing to make all non-manual appointments on the recommendations of a board to be constituted by Government".

1. File No. 35(2)/48-PMS.

2. *Harijan* of 27 June 1948 published the text of the circular letter of 15 January 1948 said to have been addressed to forty eight mining concerns.

I can well understand the desire of the Bihar Government to encourage the employment of Biharis, but I must confess that I have been distressed on reading the circular letter referred to. I have on other occasions drawn your attention to the undesirability of viewing matters of general and all-India concern from the purely provincial viewpoint. If other provinces did this, then there could be no all-India planning or all-India development. I have no doubt that with the growth of industry the field of employment will also grow, but industry will not grow if we impose all manner of restrictions and limitations on its growth. This is more specially so in the matter of employment of technical personnel. In mines the safety of large numbers of persons is involved and any reduction of the standard of competence and efficiency may not only affect our production but might endanger the lives of our people. The imposition of personnel from outside in industry will make the management of that industry irresponsible and they will always be able to cast the blame on other people for any error or deficiency on their own part.

One of the important matters before us is the question of nationalisation. It is the considered view of Government that when there is nationalisation of a major industry, this should be run by a statutory corporation which should have a large measure of autonomy. The state will lay down the general policy and will otherwise not interfere with the working of the industry. We do not want a departmental control of industry or a day-to-day interference by even the state apparatus. Dual control will lead to loss of efficiency and irresponsibility on the part of those controlling the industry.

If this is our policy even in regard to state concerns, much more so must we refrain from interference, except in regard to general policy, in appointments and day-to-day working of private industry. Otherwise private industry will not be able to function properly and it will blame Government or some other outside authority for all the ills that it suffers from.

These are some of the considerations that have to be borne in mind and I could point out many more. We have to concentrate on efficiency and production, as well as, of course, on equitable distribution. All this will be affected if we think too much in terms of controlling appointments on a provincial basis.³ It seems to me that provincialism may also become as dangerous for our future well-being as communalism has been. Both tend to depress standards and reduce efficiency. So far as technical personnel is concerned this is particularly undesirable and full of danger. I would therefore beg of you and your Government to reconsider this matter as it strikes

3. K.B. Sahay, Minister of Revenue for Bihar, wrote to Nehru on 18 July 1948 that the Bihar Cabinet had decided that while they would try to respect his opinion, they would also submit figures of appointments held by Biharis in various firms and industries in Bihar. All the lessees in Singhbhum, he added, had accepted the suggestion.

at the very root of any idea of central planning or of efficiency in production.

The provision about Bihari appointments is supposed to be a part of the provincial Government's new mineral policy. Is this the only part of it or is there something else about the policy? It will be rather odd if appointments are considered the sole or the most important elements of a mineral policy.

I wrote to you a few days ago about the Mor scheme which involves the erection of the Messenjore Dam. I shall be grateful for an answer.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
25 March 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I have been following news from Simla with mixed feelings. I am glad of course that the Akali Party has joined the Congress. But it is not quite clear how far they have joined the Congress or how far the Congress has joined them.

Meanwhile, there appears to be trouble in the Congress ranks in the Punjab. I deeply regret the methods adopted by some of the Congressmen there. But for the moment I am not concerned with individual errors, but rather with the situation that is taking shape today. I am myself not fully conversant with it and therefore cannot form an opinion. During the last two months or more all the information I have had about the Punjab politics has been almost entirely from the newspapers. I do not wish to rely upon them. Nevertheless, newspaper accounts do give one powerful impression that things are not well in the Punjab. So far as the Congress is concerned, the burden of dealing with this situation just rests on you. I do not like, and I am sure you will not like, a situation arising in which the Congress is split up in two and you have to rely chiefly on the support of people who were outside the fold of the Congress till very recently. I put these difficulties to you as perhaps you might be able to help me to understand the position.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

19. Accommodation for Ministers¹

According to rules in force Ministers of the Central Government are entitled to free house accommodation in Simla during the summer season. Why they should have this unnecessary privilege, more specially when house accommodation is limited, I do not know. However, there it is. I rather doubt if many Ministers will take advantage of it. It is not possible for any Minister to carry on his work effectively from Simla and owing to the urgency of many problems Ministers must of necessity remain in Delhi throughout the summer. They might go out for a few days respite in Simla. It seems to me totally unnecessary to keep many houses vacant in Simla on the odd chance of a Minister requiring them.

I understand that there are six government houses in Simla specially reserved for Ministers. There is also a house reserved for the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly. Some of these houses are already occupied by judges of the East Punjab High Court and they are being asked to move out.

I suggest that each Minister and the Speaker should be asked if they want a house reserved for them, and if so, for what period. This will give correct information which can be acted upon. Even if some Ministers go to Simla they are likely to do so for a few days only and it will hardly be worthwhile for them to run a house during this brief period.

For my part I do not require a house in Simla and I take it most of the Ministers will also not require it. Anyhow, this question can be finally cleared up as a result of enquiries from the Ministers and the Speaker. Perhaps two houses might be kept in reserve for emergencies and the others used for other purposes. There is no point in driving out the judges of the East Punjab High Court from any of these houses on the odd chance of their being required.

1. Note to Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, 25 March 1948. File No.45(2)/48-PMS.

20. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
30 March 1948

My dear Rajaji,
You know that Lord Mountbatten is leaving his office about the 22nd June.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

We have to find a successor for him, and inevitably our eyes turn to you. Before making any final proposal, I thought I ought to write to you. I hope you will agree. Your presence in Delhi will be a great help to all of us, and specially to me.²

Mountbatten has been repeatedly asking me as to who his successor will be, because he wants to fix up many things about the staff etc. I threw out a hint about you, and he expressed his pleasure at it.

We have to make up our minds as to what we should do with Government House. On the whole, I think that the Governor-General should continue to stay there, though he need not spread out all over the building. He can occupy a wing. It is our present intention to take a wing for the Foreign Office.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 2 April, Rajagopalachari replied, "I should like to have a few days to think over ... who will take my place here ? I have come to love Bengal and its people ..." He also enquired about the successor to Archibald Nye in Madras state, where "things are going from bad to worse" and where his presence as "a private citizen" and "as an elder" might help.

21. Appointment of Parliamentary Secretaries¹

At the last Cabinet meeting I mentioned that it seemed to me necessary to appoint Parliamentary Secretaries soon. There had already been considerable delay in this matter largely because of me. From many points of view it has become essential to proceed with this matter before the present session of the Assembly ended and members retired to their homes.

Members of the Cabinet generally agreed with this and thereupon I suggested that each Minister might let me have the suggestions privately. It was not considered wholly necessary to have a Parliamentary Secretary for each Ministry immediately though ultimately that would have to be done. Perhaps it might be preferable to appoint some Parliamentary Secretaries now and some a month or two later. That would really depend on the recommendation of each Minister, so far as his own Ministry is concerned.

1. Note to the Cabinet Secretariat, 31 March 1948. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

I suggested that each Minister might be good enough to indicate to me whether he would like to have a Parliamentary Secretary immediately or a month or two later; secondly, that he might indicate one or more names for this post; thirdly, he might also mention some additional names not for his own Ministry but possibly for others. If I could have these personal opinions and recommendations, it would help us in proceeding with this matter.

I need not add that the choice has to be made from among the members of the Assembly, I should be grateful for a very early reply.

1. The Powers of the Prime Minister¹

The recent correspondence between Sardar Patel and me has raised important issues of vital consequence; and yet the origin of that correspondence related to a relatively minor matter.²

2. It is true that there are not only temperamental differences between Sardar and me but also a difference in approach in regard to economic and communal matters. These differences have persisted for a large number of years, ever since we worked together in the Congress. Nevertheless, in spite of these differences, there was obviously a very great deal in common in addition to mutual respect and affection and, broadly speaking, the same national political aim of freedom. Because of this we functioned together during all these years and did our utmost to adapt ourselves to each other. If the Congress came to a decision, we accepted it, though there might have been a difference in implementing it.

3. Our political aim having been more or less achieved the other questions, on which we have differed to some extent, come more and more to the forefront. At the same time crises face the country which makes it incumbent on all of us not to stress the differences but rather to emphasise the points of agreement and to cooperate in the face of these crises. So far as the economic and communal matters are concerned, we are bound down by Congress policy and decisions, and both of us, as well as other Congressmen, must necessarily work in accordance with them. On the communal issue, the Congress standpoint has been clarified recently. On the economic issue, the broad lines of policy have been laid down and, no doubt, further details will soon follow. The Cabinet will have to consider these matters soon. We have delayed too long already in laying down an economic policy and this has led to differing interpretations and statements by Ministers.

4. We may therefore, for the moment, leave out of consideration these important matters and come down to the immediate issue. This issue essentially relates to the functions of the Prime Minister. It is something much more than a personal issue and it should be considered, therefore, as a question of principle, whoever the Prime Minister might be.

5. As I conceive it, the Prime Minister's role is, and should be, an important role. He is not only a figurehead but a person who should be more responsible than anyone else for the general trend of policy and for the coordination of the work of various Government departments. The final

1. Note to Mahatma Gandhi, 6 January 1948. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 17-21.

2. The correspondence related to H.V.R. Iengar's visit to Ajmer on 20 December 1947. See also *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 538-539.

authority necessarily is the Cabinet itself. But in the type of democratic set-up we have adopted, the Prime Minister is supposed to play an outstanding role. This, I think, is important (again quite apart from personal factors), as otherwise there will be no cohesion in the Cabinet and the Government and disruptive tendencies will be at work.

6. Speaking for myself, I have at present two functions to perform in Government. As Minister of External Affairs, I function like any other Minister and my Ministry is like any other Ministry. As Prime Minister, however, I have a special function to perform which covers all the Ministries and departments and indeed every aspect of governmental authority. This function cannot be easily defined and the proper discharge of it depends a great deal on the spirit of cooperation animating all the parties concerned. Inevitably, in discharging this function of Prime Minister I have to deal with every Ministry not as head of one particular Ministry, but as a coordinator and a kind of supervisor. Naturally, this can only be done effectively with tact and goodwill and without in any way diminishing the prestige of other Ministers. Other Ministers must not normally be interfered with and should have freedom to carry out their work without unnecessary interference.³

7. If this position is recognized, then no present difficulty arises, and if at any time a difficulty does arise, it can be resolved by personal contact and discussion between the parties concerned. Because of this I have endeavoured in almost every matter of importance to confer with Sardar Patel.

8. The immediate issue arose out of my sending Iengar to Ajmer.⁴ I think that my sending him was not only completely within my competence but also it was an eminently desirable thing to do in the circumstances and that undoubtedly it did some good. This opinion of mine has been strengthened by my visit to Ajmer. Iengar had nothing to do with holding any kind of an inquiry or sitting in judgment in any way on the officials in Ajmer.⁵ He was sent as the eyes and ears of the Prime Minister and to convey the Prime Minister's regret for his having had to cancel his visit to Ajmer pre-

3. In his note of 12 January 1948, Patel questioned Nehru's interpretation of the Prime Minister's role as inconsistent with a democratic system of government, for it would raise him "to the position of a virtual dictator". The Prime Minister was no doubt "first among equals," but he had no overriding powers over his colleagues "as responsibility for implementing policy decisions rested with the Ministry concerned and on the Minister in charge."
4. Patel said that the immediate issue was not H.V.R. Iengar's visit to Ajmer but Gopalaswami Ayyangar's direct correspondence with the East Punjab Government.
5. Patel reiterated that "Iengar went to Ajmer, inspected various places, received deputations... the public mind is bound to associate it with an inquisition. The Chief Commissioner took it in that light and stated that the public also felt it as such."

viously. In Ajmer and elsewhere, we have to deal with psychological problems and mental states. The approach to the people direct is always important when dealing with such problems. The importance of Ajmer had induced me to pay a visit there even at inconvenience. I could not go then because of a death in the family. My not going was variously interpreted in Ajmer and gave rise to all manner of suspicions and rumours. Iengar's going helped to lessen these suspicions somewhat among the people by making them realise that the Government was greatly interested in their peace and welfare. My subsequent visit, of course, did much more good. It did not, as it was not meant to, affect the position of the Chief Commissioner, whom indeed I praised publicly for his ability and impartiality. But apart from these facts the question remains : Is the Prime Minister entitled to take such a step and who is to be the judge of this? If the Prime Minister cannot even take this step and is not himself to be the judge of what is proper and what is not in such matters, then he cannot function properly or fulfil his functions.⁶ Indeed, he does not function at all as the Prime Minister should. The mere fact that he is Prime Minister presumably leads to the conclusion that he is capable of judging aright and carrying out the policy laid down. If he is not capable of this, then he should cease to be Prime Minister. Indeed, this means abdication of his functions and he cannot in future function with any effectiveness. There will be no proper coordination of governmental authority and, in such circumstances, the administrative machinery weakens and there are rival pulls.

9. If this view is correct, then the Prime Minister should have full freedom to act when and how he chooses, though of course such action must not be an undue interference with local authorities who are immediately responsible. The Prime Minister obviously is as much interested as anyone else in having the loyalty and cooperation of the services.

10. In the event of the Prime Minister not functioning in this way, then he can hardly carry on as a mere figurehead and much harm may be done to the services as well as to the public at large by the enunciation of contradictory policies by Ministers.

11. This is the background. But whatever the theory may be, practical difficulties continually arise. Normally speaking, the best way out of these difficulties would be for some rearrangement in the Cabinet to be made which would cast the responsibility on one person more than anyone else. In the present set-up this means that either I should go out or that Sardar Patel should go out. For my part, I would greatly prefer my going

6. Patel felt "the question is not whether the Prime Minister was entitled to take this step or not or whether he is not to be the judge of the propriety of the action, but whether I, as a Minister, was wrong in pointing out to him the inadvisability of the course he had taken and the probable consequences it entailed."

out.⁷ Of course, this going out of either of us need not and should not mean any kind of subsequent opposition. Whether we are in or out of Government we remain, I hope, not only loyal Congressmen but loyal colleagues, and we will still try to pull together in our respective spheres of activity.

12. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that if either of us goes out at the present juncture it would create a sensation both nationally and internationally, and the consequences may not be good. At any time this position would have to be faced; but at the present juncture, with the Kashmir issue and the great problem of rehabilitation facing us, not to mention the States and the growth of communal organisations in India, any such parting of ways may well have very serious consequences affecting the good of India. None of us wants to do anything which may be at all injurious to the national good, even though our views of the national good may differ somewhat. After having given very serious thought to this matter during the last fortnight I have come to the conclusion that as far as possible we must avoid, at this particular juncture, any parting of ways in Government. We are too much in the transitional stage and a serious shake-up of Government may well lead to an upsetting of the applecart. I think that we should carry on for some months more till the Kashmir issue is more clarified and other problems have also been tackled to some extent. The way to do this must be the fullest consultation about every important matter. At the same time I do feel that the Prime Minister's function, as defined above, must be appreciated.

13. If, however, this is not considered possible, then the only alternative left is for either me or Sardar Patel to leave the Cabinet. As I have said above, I consider this an undesirable alternative in the present context, and I have come to this conclusion as objectively as possible. If someone has to leave, I repeat, I would prefer to leave.

14. Latterly there has been a growing tendency towards a lack of cohesion in the various Ministries and Departments of Governments. This has resulted in members of the services also being affected. This is unfortunate and, in any event, has to be countered, for if the Cabinet and Government do not work jointly, all work must necessarily suffer and a psychology produced in the country which comes in the way of cooperative working.

7. Patel replied "... if anybody has to go, it should be myself. I have long passed the age of active service. The Prime Minister is the acknowledged leader of the country and is comparatively young; he has established an international position of pre-eminence for himself."

15. Probably before very long we shall have to consider a refashioning of the governmental set-up in the sense of introducing Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and the like. It may be desirable to put certain Departments in charge of Deputy Ministers, each group of such Deputy Ministers being under the supervision of a Minister. This would make the real Cabinet a somewhat smaller body. However, this can be seen to later. At the present moment the allocation of portfolios is not a very logical one and some are very heavy indeed.

16. The States Ministry is a new Ministry which has to deal with vital questions. If I may say so, it has dealt with these questions thus far with remarkable success and surmounted the many difficulties that are continually arising. I feel, however, that many decisions have been taken involving matters of principle without any reference to the Cabinet.⁸ For my part I agree with those decisions; but it seems to me a wrong procedure for these decisions to be taken without reference to the Cabinet or to the Prime Minister. Being a new Ministry, it functions naturally outside normal procedure. To some extent this is inevitable and quick decisions have to be taken. But an attempt should be made to bring this functioning within the terms of our ordinary procedure.

17. Before the Constituent Assembly meets or sometime during its next session, we have to come to some decision regarding our general economic policy. The problem of rehabilitation may well be tied up with this policy.

8. Patel denied this. "The only instance in which I anticipated a Cabinet decision was that of the merger of Orissa and Chhattisgarh States; subsequent confirmation of my action ... upholds my judgement in anticipating it."

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

11 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You must have received my letter with a note² some days ago. I suggested that we might meet at Gandhiji's place for a further talk on this subject. If you could suggest some time convenient to you I shall fix it up with Bapu. I understand that you will be going away for some days to Bombay and Ahmedabad. I think it would be desirable for this meeting to take place before your departure.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, p. 17.

2. See the preceding item.

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
13 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 12 January² which I received today together with the note which was enclosed with it.³ I can quite understand how terribly busy you must have been since your return from Jammu.

2. I hardly think it is worthwhile my attempting to write another note on the subject. Having indicated our respective viewpoints to some extent, the only thing that remains is for us to discuss this matter with Bapu.

3. I should like to say, however, that I still find a considerable difference in your appreciation of the Prime Minister's position and mine. There is no question, of course, of the Prime Minister or anyone else being a dictator. So far as I know, the position in practice in the United Kingdom is in consonance with what I have suggested.

4. I fear it is not possible to fix up a meeting and discussion with Bapu before you leave for Bhavnagar. In any event, it would be improper to put an additional burden on him just now when he is fasting. I mentioned this matter to him and he said that we might postpone the discussion for a little while till certain immediate and urgent issues had been dealt with. Meanwhile, of course, Bapu's fast overshadows other matters and we shall have to wait for developments. As soon as the opportunity arises I hope we shall be able to fix up a meeting with Bapu.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 24-25.

2. Patel had written that Nehru could arrange a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi at any time that suited him.

3. For Patel's note, see *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 21-24.

4. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
14th January 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

In accordance with the desire of the non-Muslim members of the West Punjab Assembly and your advice in the matter, we have issued an ordinance

1. J.N. Collection.

enabling them to become members of the East Punjab Assembly. This will mean a substantial addition to your membership. The Muslim members of your Assembly will continue to remain so, though their electorate has probably departed. We cannot touch them, nor do we wish to do so, but there is one point to be considered in this connection. If they have really gone away for good and do not and cannot attend your Assembly meetings, then it is rather absurd for them to continue as members of the East Punjab Assembly.

I do not know what rules of payment to members you have. If you pay them for attendance then it does not much matter but if you pay some kind of monthly allowance then you may have to continue paying this even though they may have left for good. Probably it will be advisable to make a rule that people who do not attend will not be paid any allowance.

It would not be desirable to take any steps which might affect Muslim members of your Assembly as such. In the present state of tension and suspicion every little step has to be carefully considered. Perhaps what you might do to begin with is to ask each one of them whether he wishes to continue to function as a member of the East Punjab Assembly, that is to say, you will ask those persons who have actually gone away to West Punjab and more or less settled there. If they say they wish to retain their membership, then the matter should rest there. If, however, they say that they have finally shifted to West Punjab, then they can be requested to resign.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Lord Mountbatten's Record of Interview with Nehru¹

Nehru asked me with his very engaging and rather shy smile whether he may raise a rather delicate personal matter. "How long have you decided to stay with us?" In the course of discussion the Prime Minister hinted that he hoped I would be able to stay as long as possible and indicated distress when I said I was leaving on April 15. I finally said that I would leave the decision open until I could have a further discussion with him, but would not assess the exact date to a week or even a month. The Prime Minister said that the Constituent Assembly would be meeting for the final constitution-making

1. New Delhi, 14 January, 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.

process in April and he thought they should finish their work within two months, and he therefore said that they would not like me to leave before the middle of June at the earliest.²

2. Mountbatten agreed to stay till 20 June 1948.

6. Minutes of the Governors Conference¹

The Prime Minister said that, in his view, it was desirable that there should eventually be a certain measure of uniformity in the procedure in the various provinces, but this should not be rigid. The Constitution was a developing one. He did not consider that it would be advantageous to change the varying procedure at the present time in view of the unanimous reports of cordial relations which had been submitted.² He had also received information from the Premiers concerned that they considered that their relations with their Governors were cordial. If, as for example in the case of Bihar, there was any difficulty, comparison could be made with the rules of business in force in other provinces.³ He considered that the Premier should be a normal channel of communication between Governors and their Ministers and that Governors should not normally deal with other Ministries direct except on particular subjects with the prior knowledge and approval of the Premiers. Another important consideration was that Governors should be given important information in good time for them to act on it and give advice if necessary.

The Governor-General and the Deputy Prime Minister said that the existing rules could continue.

The Prime Minister explained that the original conflict in the Constituent Assembly had been between the adoption of a constitution based on the British or on the American form of government. At present, the British

1. New Delhi, 2 February 1948. The Conference was attended by the Governor General, the Ministers of the Government of India and the Governors of the Provinces. File No. 9-99/47, pp. 44-67, President's Secretariat. Extracts.
2. Jairamdas Doulatram, the Minister for Food, who had previously been the Governor of Bihar, had suggested that the relationship between the Governor and the Ministry be regularised by an instrument of instructions.
3. Doulatram had said that the rules of business had not yet been drawn up in Bihar because a draft, based on the rules in force in Orissa, had been rejected by the Bihar Government.

form had been chosen in the main, but some points from the American form had been inserted. A rather confusing mixture had emerged. In his view, it was a question of choosing more clearly between the British and American constitutions—a mixture was not likely to work well. He pointed out that the discussions on this subject had taken place at rather an abnormal time, when there was a general feeling that a strong man at the head of affairs was necessary. Subsequently, Sir B.N. Rau had visited the United States, Canada and Ireland, and had returned with a number of suggestions for changing decisions which had been taken by the Constituent Assembly, including this question of the election of Governors.⁴ The matter was probably going to be reconsidered in the Constituent Assembly.⁵ He added that he personally agreed with the opinions given by the Governors, that Governors should be nominated rather than elected.

4. All the Governors were in favour of appointment by nomination, except the Governor of Orissa who held that if Governors were given powers they should be elected on adult suffrage; but he was prepared to modify his opinion. John Matthai said that the system of nomination might pose a problem if governments at the Centre and in the provinces were represented by different parties. N.V. Gadgil felt that criticism of the Prime Minister's nominations could be avoided by the system of election.
5. The Provincial Constitution Committee appointed by the Constituent Assembly recommended that the Governor be elected by the people. The Drafting Committee said that this would lead to friction between Governor and Chief Minister and suggested appointment by the President of the Union from a panel of four selected by the legislature. The Constituent Assembly finally decided on nomination of Governors by the President on the advice of the Union Cabinet.

7. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
3 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

When Bapu was alive we had hoped to meet him together and discuss various matters that had troubled us somewhat. You will remember our correspondence.² In my last letter I had expressed the hope that, in spite of certain differences of opinion and temperament, we should continue to pull together as we had done for so long. This was, I was glad to find, Bapu's final opinion also.

Now, with Bapu's death, everything is changed and we have to face a different and more difficult world. The old controversies have ceased to

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 29-30.

2. See *ante*, items 1 to 3.

have much significance and it seems to me that the urgent need of the hour is for all of us to function as closely and cooperatively as possible. Indeed, there is no other way.

I have been greatly distressed by the persistence of whispers and rumours about you and me, magnifying out of all proportion any differences we may have. This has spread to foreign ambassadors and foreign correspondents; mischief-makers take advantage of this and add to it. Even the services are affected and this is bad. We must put an end to this mischief.

It is over a quarter of a century since we have been closely associated with one another and we have faced many storms and perils together. I can say with full honesty that during this period my affection and regard for you have grown, and I do not think anything can happen to lessen this. Even our differences have brought out the far greater points of agreement between us and the respect we bear to each other. We have even learnt to differ and yet carry on together.

Anyway, in the crisis that we have to face now after Bapu's death I think it is my duty and, if I may venture to say, yours also for us to face it together as friends and colleagues. Not merely superficially, but in full loyalty to one another and with confidence in each other. I can assure you that you will have that from me. If I have any doubt or difficulty I shall put it frankly to you, and I hope you will do the same to me.

I had hoped to have a long talk with you, but we are so terribly pressed for time that we can hardly see each other in private for long. Some time or other, soon I hope, we shall have this talk and remove any misunderstandings or misapprehensions that may have arisen. Such talks are necessary from time to time. But meanwhile I do not want to wait for this talk and hence this letter, which carries with it my affection and friendship for you.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Patel replied on 5 February that he had been deeply touched by Nehru's letter. Mahatma Gandhi's death had made him realise the need for further joint effort. He agreed on the need for greater mutual consultation and for a talk to settle differences and clear the atmosphere.

8. Lord Mountbatten's Record of Interview with Nehru¹

The last three quarters of an hour I spent alone with the Prime Minister.

1. New Delhi, 5 February 1948. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.

I gave him a pretty full account of my interview with Sardar Patel the previous day, and congratulated him on the statement which had appeared in the press today (5th) that he and Sardar Patel intended to stand together side by side.

I told him of my statement to Mahatma Gandhi that, quite apart from differences of outlook, ideology and temperament, needless friction was being caused between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister on account of faulty procedure. I first pointed out where I thought Sardar Patel had been wrong in trying to introduce his own selected nominees into the embassies and High Commission offices abroad without proper reference to the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. I also mentioned the fact that he was getting too tight a control of the civil services to the detriment of the Prime Minister's position.

I then went on to tell the Prime Minister what I had told Gandhi and Sardar Patel about his own shortcomings. I told him that in my opinion not even Mr. Churchill, in the heyday of his power, would have dared to ride roughshod over his ministers in the way that Pandit Nehru appeared to be doing; I quoted the case of his orders on a financial matter for Kashmir without reference to the Ministry of States and, as far as I knew, without prior reference to the Ministry of Finance.

Pandit Nehru hotly denied the latter charge, but admitted he had been wrong in not bringing the Ministry of States into the picture.

I then pointed out how much Sardar Patel had been riled at his sending his Principal Private Secretary, Mr. Iengar, to Ajmer without consulting Sardar Patel in his capacity as Home Minister since in this case he was responsible for Ajmer as a Chief Commissioner's Province. Pandit Nehru explained that this had come about through his being unable to fulfil a promise to visit Ajmer as arranged with Sardar Patel, on account of his nephew's death. He had therefore sent Mr. Iengar down to explain to the people of Ajmer how it was that he could not keep his promise.

I told the Prime Minister that other Ministers, such as Dr. Mookerjee and Mr. Bhabha, were hurt at the way he had set up committees of development and planning without consulting them though their Ministries were obviously interested. Pandit Nehru expressed complete surprise at this and was not quite clear about the case. I advised him to obtain particulars from Sardar Patel.

The Prime Minister defended himself by saying that the last thing he wished to do was to act in an unconstitutional manner. On the contrary, he always dealt through the Ministers, and his secretaries dealt through the Ministries. So far from short-circuiting them, they themselves were holding up vital matters. He quoted in particular an instance where the Home Ministry had held up arrangements which the Cabinet had approved for a committee to examine candidates for temporary service in the police force

for more than three months, and still nothing had been done.

I pointed out to the Prime Minister that the correct way of dealing with this sort of thing was by the method I had adopted in the Emergency Committee, namely, to call for reports on any urgent matter on which the Cabinet had given a ruling. I suggested that each time the Cabinet went into Committee to consider reports, those reports should specially include progress on items of this nature.

Pandit Nehru stated that he still could hardly believe that Ministers were dissatisfied with the way he was handling affairs. I told him that was due to their great devotion to him and their anxiety not to add to the burdens of his worries. I said that even such a loyal, devoted friend as Rajkumari Amrit Kaur had told me that but for her great devotion to him she could never have accepted the degree of high-handedness and interference over questions of health measures for the refugees to which she had to submit.

I warned him that I thought the feeling in the Cabinet was stronger than he knew of, and I urged him to go and have a heart-to-heart talk with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel at the first opportunity, and to quote my conversation and really get to the bottom of all the trouble and put matters right. This he willingly promised to do.

9. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

7 February 1948

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 5th February about the Governors' Conference.² I agree with you that the meeting was a valuable one.

I have been sending fortnightly letters to the Premiers. I am afraid that these letters have been rather scrappy as I have had to dictate them in a hurry. Still I felt that something should be sent regularly and these letters would help me to keep in touch with the provinces. The Premiers have also sent letters to me, though rather irregularly. I am arranging to send you copies of my letters to the Premiers.

1. File No. 95-GG/47, President's Secretariat.

2. Mountbatten wrote that the Governors' fortnightly letters to the Viceroy, though of immense value, had been discontinued after 15 August 1947. He suggested in view of the changed constitutional position a new series of Governors' letters to the Governor-General, with copies sent to the Prime Minister and the Provincial Premiers concerned. This would "help keep both of us informed of what is happening, but I have of course no wish to assume any executive position or to usurp any of your authority."

11. On Expansion of the Cabinet and Reconstitution of the Planning Department¹

Jawaharlal Nehru : Sir, it is not quite clear to me what the matters mentioned by the two Honourable Members who spoke last—something about the States and something about the centrally administered areas—have got to do with the motions under discussion. Are they supposed to be some separate motions or are they parts of these? If we are to provide a Minister for each of such areas, we should have a thousand.²

I am in an unfortunate position, unfortunate in the way that I find it very difficult to resist the arguments advanced today on both these motions. Dr. Keskar's motion is to the effect that there should be more Ministers and that the Departments should be better controlled. I do not quite know what he means by Departments being better controlled, nor do I quite understand what Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, in his very interesting remarks,³ said. If Dr. Keskar thinks that by appointing a number of Ministers the Departments would be better controlled, I think he is wrong—in fact entirely wrong. It is much more likely that the Ministers who are appointed so will be for a long time controlled by others. Instead of their controlling they will be controlled or they will fail to understand the machine and the permanent machine will control them. This is not a matter so much of policy or of circumstances in India. It is the development of an intricate and complicated system of administration in every country. If Dr. Pattabhi had had to walk a mile here in some secretariat building, he probably would have to walk about seventy miles in a War Office building in Washington—just one War Office building—I am not talking of the whole secretariat. The secretariat establishments now of great countries are so enormous, so complicated, that nobody understands them; no government understands them; they run themselves as a spontaneous growth.

So that this is a problem which is not solved by appointing more Ministers but it is a separate problem and a very difficult problem. In fact, one of

1. Reply to a cut motion, 8 March 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative Debates, Official Report, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 1772-1786*. Nehru's remarks are given in full while the rest of the relevant proceedings are summarised.
2. K. Hanumanthaiya had protested that the people in the States, who formed one-third of the Indian population and occupied nearly half the area of the country, were not represented in the Cabinet; and Deshbandhu Gupta suggested that there should be a separate minister for centrally governed areas.
3. Supporting B. V. Keskar's motion, Pattabhi Sitaramayya drew attention to the haphazard growth and antiquated rules of Departments.

the major problems of the age is how to control this intricate system of administration democratically because democracy cannot deal with such problems. Only high-class experts in an organization can really understand it. The democratic system arose in a fairly simple way where high principles were laid down and they were carried out by certain civil servants; but when the civil servants' job became not only frightfully intricate but also rather technical—because it is becoming more and more technical—then a democratically elected House finds it difficult to consider it in all its details. So the civil servants or the technical establishment became progressively more and more independent because nobody could understand or control them. They just laid down principles or high policies. It is a very difficult matter to consider and in fact the whole democratic structure of government is rather imperilled by this development. I do not think therefore that the appointment of additional Ministers will by itself bring about any radical change in the control of Departments. I do agree that—whether you may call them Ministers or Deputy Ministers—it is desirable to have a large number of heads looking after these various activities. On the other hand, if you increase the number of Ministers the Cabinet becomes uncontrollable.

A member mentioned that in England there were 21 members in the Cabinet.

JN : That is why it is not a very good one. It is a grave difficulty. There is a tendency then for the Cabinet Ministers to function separately. It ceases to be a practical thing. The whole idea of Cabinet Government is that it should be practically a jointly responsible thing.

Ananthasayanam Ayyangar suggested that additions could be with or without cabinet rank.

JN : I am going to deal with that point. So I think it is definitely undesirable for the Cabinet to be too big. It cannot function together. In fact, if I may confess it, even our present Cabinet is slightly difficult to function together. In fact, to give you a very simple test, it becomes sometimes difficult to sit even round a table together, and if people have to sit in two or three rows, it ceases to be an informal meeting to consider a matter. It becomes more like a public meeting; so that the only way out is not to increase the Cabinet Ministers but to have somebody in the nature of Deputy Minister or whatever he might be called. You may perhaps have some kind of Deputy Minister in charge of each major Department and a person who can be called a Cabinet Minister in charge of three or four of them, in supervisory charge. That is a possibility. It is true that the work of many of the Ministers—in fact of all of them—is very heavy. Anyhow it would have been heavy

because we had to catch up, not to carry on a machine but create precedents and do many such things. Quite apart from this, the events of the last six months have put such a tremendous pressure upon Government and prevented it doing many things which it otherwise might have done, that it has become really difficult to know how to deal with all the problems that we have. It is not, of course, a question of lack of policy or people not being eager enough to do this or that job. It is far more an intricate question of doing something which is an organic growth and which is not upsetting. Now, for instance, we had the case of appointing additional Ministers in this Government, first Mr. Neogy who came as Minister for Rehabilitation and Relief; then Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. After their appointment, for some weeks almost, they were homeless. They did not have a place to sit in or an office. They did not have a secretary, clerk or stenographer or anybody because naturally the establishment here thinks in terms of a Minister having a certain coterie of secretaries, assistants, helpers, menials, etc., and if all of that is not there, he simply cannot function.

This is the trouble and perhaps might be important. Nevertheless, it is true that you do want some place and some organization to function. If you are to function efficiently, you must have a certain equipment and certain place to sit in and certain methods of work, so that it is an odd thing, you will notice, that this House protests—and rightly protests—against the increase of bureaucracy and at the same time it suggests things which inevitably involve increase of bureaucracy. The Minister is just there—somewhere—one person, but with him he brings in thirty or forty or fifty officers sitting to the right and to the left of him.

It is a difficult problem. The House will not expect me to give a precise answer to these questions, but I do realise that it is necessary to make further arrangements for, if I may say so, the individual supervision of various Departments more than it can be done now. I do not think Ministers can be added to—certainly you could have one or two more, but I rather doubt whether the increase will be conducive to better working. May I say that long before I requested Mr. Neogy to come in as Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, even then we were thinking in terms of a Minister for Social Welfare and Economic Welfare, some such Minister, because we attach considerable importance to that? But then other events came in, the Punjab events and others, which put that rather away from our minds.

I should like in this connection, if I may, to say something about certain remarks that have been made, and that have been repeated, I believe outside, in criticism of certain of my colleagues. In fact, they have named four of my colleagues—and the criticism made is that for various reasons they should not be in the Cabinet, that they should resign. Now, obviously I am the person primarily responsible for their appointment to the Cabinet and if any criticism is to be made it should be made about my appointment or

about me—not about them. As matter of fact, I have no doubt that each one of them would willingly and gladly divest himself of this tremendous responsibility at the slightest suggestion ; nobody is sticking on or holding on to office. Office is not a pleasure nowadays, as the House might well realise, it is not easy now to induce people even to accept office because it is so difficult and the burden is so heavy. In fact, I might mention that two of my colleagues—I shall not name them now—have actually repeatedly asked me to relieve them, but it is at my request only that they have continued, and one of them has only continued at my request for a limited period of time and not for long. So I would say this that it is rather unfair to my colleagues and to me for these criticisms to be made. I can understand that it is the right of any member of the public to demand on public grounds or other grounds that the Cabinet may be changed or the Government may be changed. Or if he likes occasionally he may criticise any individual member of Government. But this persistent criticism of some members of Government and a demand for their withdrawal from the scene of their activities is improper unless it is coupled, as it should be coupled, by a change of Government completely and primarily by the removal of the Prime Minister who is responsible for them.

I may say that naturally the Cabinet as it exists today is what you might call a “mixed” Cabinet, you may call it a Cabinet of various talents, or varying talents, whichever you like. It was deliberately made that way, whether that was rightly done or wrongly done is another matter, but it was deliberately made from the point of view of having various elements in the Cabinet who could devote themselves with ability to the particular tasks in hand. It was not meant at that time to be just a purely party Cabinet, although undoubtedly the viewpoint of the party was the dominating viewpoint and had to be because that viewpoint was represented by the great majority in this House, and we were responsible to this House, and the majority in the Cabinet also represented that viewpoint. Nevertheless, it was not conceived to be a purely party Cabinet. It was felt by me and by those colleagues of mine whom I consulted at the time that in the peculiar context of events after this changeover we should proceed on a wider basis. No doubt gradually, as soon as the immediate problems are over, we thought things would take some other shape—may be there may be purely party ministries or all-party ministries whatever that might be—but immediately in the early days of August when I had to think about it I thought this was the right thing to do and those colleagues whom I consulted also thought that that was right. We cannot, in the changing context of today, make plans for any lengthy period of time; I can only look a few months ahead, I do not know what may happen after that. So it was in that context that we made this Cabinet, deliberately including people who were not definitely

of the Congress persuasion but whom we expected naturally to fall in line with the general viewpoint of this House.

I wish to say this, that in spite of differences of opinion on many topics we have pulled on with extreme friendliness and cooperation; we have differed, we have argued, but we have in a very large measure shown very great loyalty to each other. So it distresses me to see any colleagues of mine criticised in the way some of them have been criticised in the press.

May I say a few words about planning? I do not entirely understand or agree with Mr. Krishnamachari's suggestion that planning as such should be postponed for two years and preparations for planning should be made till then by the appointment of various other liaison agencies on the secretarial level. I agree that those liaison agencies should be appointed on the secretarial level. I thought it might be a good thing to revive the Cabinet Coordination Committee which existed last year; it did do some good work, I think it might be revived. I do not know that the Development Board as such, as it existed, would do much good now. We have now, you will remember, something of this kind; we have now the Rehabilitation and Development Board and although it is thinking in terms of refugees only, nevertheless it is thinking in terms of development also. I hope that either as an extension of this or independently of this something more in the nature of planning will be arranged.

Now, the various liaison bodies can come into existence almost at the same time or may be that the planning authority itself may create them—quite possibly. This business of doing a lot of spadework in preparation of the planning authority hardly seems to me to be necessary partly because we have got tired of spadework—we have been doing it year after year without any structure emerging out of it.

Another thing that I am anxious that we should do is to improve the complete set-up of our statistical organisation. At the present moment many of our Ministries have some statistical departments. That is not good enough; we are very bad in regard to statistics, although as a matter of fact Indian statistics have a very high reputation in the world today; that is, not governmental statistics but some Indian experts have a very high reputation. I hope that before very long we shall organise a set-up connecting governmental activities with the non-official statistical organisations so that this work may go ahead. That will also be the foundation for the planning activities in the future.

There are many things that might be said about planning; it is a vast subject. But all I can say to Mr. Krishnamachari is that I am intensely interested in it and I am very sorry that events have somehow compelled us not to pay much more attention to it. I do hope that before this session is over we might be able to produce some more concrete proposals.

Biswanath Das asked whether the Prime Minister was going to allot a day to the House to discuss industrial planning and the formation of a Planning Commission.

JN : Yes, certainly. Sometime in this session.

11

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. General

1. To N.V. Gadgil¹

New Delhi
23rd January, 1948

My dear Gadgil,

We are getting into a bad fix in regard to ambassadors' houses. The Russian Ambassador² is very angry with us. He has been here a month and he has not got a house yet. We were told before he came that a house had been allotted to him. But I find to my horror that the house is still not available. Something has to be done very rapidly unless we allow our international relations to deteriorate. Nations are very touchy about these matters, more especially Russia, and I am very anxious that this matter must be handled immediately.

Then there is the Consul-General for Afghanistan.³ He has been on the verge of tears for a long time. He says that his house is much too small. He cannot bring his wife or do any work there. Now that we want a house in Kabul for our Ambassador we are simply told that you have not provided a house for the Afghan Consul-General.

The Chinese Ambassador⁴ is equally unhappy. His house is a good one but not big enough for his Chancery and himself.

I wish you would kindly look into this matter very urgently and let me know what can be done.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Kiril Vasilevitch Novikov.
3. Ghulam Mohammad Khan.
4. Lo Chia-lun.

2. To Asaf Ali¹

New Delhi
16 February 1948

My dear Asaf,

This is just a brief letter. I sent you a telegram a few days ago saying that you should certainly stay on till April.

Aruna tells me that you have some idea of going to England and settling down there because you seem to imagine that there would be not much doing

1. J.N. Collection.

for you in India. You are very wrong there and I think that you should return to India. I am quite sure that the idea of settling down in England is wrong. If you like you can spend a few weeks there on your way back. But you should return to India. There is plenty to be done here.

Mountbatten has sent me a copy of your letter to him dated 22nd January. In this you refer to a treaty of commerce and navigation with the U.S.A. Nothing has been done in regard to this. All that has happened is that Grady mentioned the possibility of such a treaty to our Commerce Ministry.

I am overburdened with work and worry. So you will forgive me if I do not write at greater length, although there is a great deal to write about.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To N.V. Gadgil¹

New Delhi
3 March 1948

My dear Gadgil,

I understand that your Ministry has held up the sale of Bikaner House to the American Embassy. I think you are quite right in objecting to some of our principal buildings in New Delhi being acquired by foreign embassies. We must keep a watch over these transactions, though we may not be able to stop them completely as we must necessarily provide suitable accommodation for foreign embassies and legations. Normally, embassies do not like living in rented buildings. They cannot add to them or even furnish them so as to reproduce the atmosphere of their own country as they always like to do. Our own desire is to own the buildings occupied by our embassies abroad and we are gradually giving effect to it.

Regarding Bikaner House it appears that the sale had almost been completed when it was stopped by your Ministry. The States Ministry as well as the External Affairs Ministry had given their permission. Now the American Embassy is in a huff and complain bitterly to us. The Maharaja of Bikaner is also very much put out as he had made certain arrangements.² Owing to the rapid change in the States the rulers are in a bit of a fix.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Ultimately, the sale of the Bikaner House did not take place.

I would suggest therefore that in regard to Bikaner House you might give permission for its purchase by the American Embassy. We do not want at this present juncture more specially to have any kind of conflict with them. We should also like, in so far as it is possible, to do a good turn to the Maharaja of Bikaner who has on the whole behaved well with us. So I recommend that this sale might be permitted.

At the same time, I think, you should make a formal rule that no sale of houses in New Delhi to foreign embassies will be allowed without the Government's special permission. We can consider each case on the merits.

In view of some rather special circumstances, I should like a very early decision about Bikaner House. If there is delay the transaction will fall through and we shall be responsible for that. I would therefore like you to inform me today, March 3, by telephone or otherwise about your final decision so that I might communicate it to the parties concerned who are anxiously waiting for our reply.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. India's Foreign Policy¹

Sir, may I intervene to say that there is no question of any formal or informal or any other kind of treaty talks of any kind going on, I do not know where the honourable member got his information from.²

Sir, I have taken interest in the various suggestions and criticisms made. I think possibly if I had been speaking not from my place here but from somewhere else I might have produced a longer list of criticisms. So I am grateful for the gentle way in which honourable members have treated the External Affairs Department.

In criticising the foreign policy of the Government of India during the last year or six months I should like this House for an instant to turn its

1. Nehru's intervention in the debate on the budgetary demands of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, 8 March 1948. *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, Vol. III, 1948, pp. 1747-1772. N.G. Ranga, Govinddas, Hussain Imam, H.V. Kamath, H.N. Kunzru, K. Santhanam, Naziruddin Ahmad and B. Shiva Rao participated in the debate.

2. N.G. Ranga alleged that "some treaty talks" had been going on between India and Britain. He wanted the Government to remove the uncertainty over India's association with the British Commonwealth.

mind to any country today and think of its foreign policy—whether it is the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, China or France. These are supposed to be Great Powers. Just think of their foreign policy and see if you would say that the foreign policy of any one of these countries has succeeded, obviously succeeded from any point of view, from the point of view of moving towards world peace or preventing world war, succeeded from even the more opportunist and individual point of view of that country. I think if you look at this question from this point of view, you will find that there has been a miserable failure of foreign policy of every Great Power and country. It is in that context that we shall have to see these things. It is not really the failure of the foreign policy of any particular power, though perhaps two or three major powers do influence foreign policy greatly. It is a gradual or rapid deterioration of the international situation. Now, surely the responsibility for deterioration might lie on some powers. In India our responsibility is very little. We may have functioned well or badly on the international stage but we are not, frankly speaking, influential enough to affect international events very much. Therefore, if that great deterioration has taken place in the international sphere it is not due to our policy. We suffer from it just as every other nation suffers from it and I think it is this vague feeling that somehow we have suffered or something that has happened that induces members to search for reasons why we have suffered. I think that is a very right approach, because we must find out the reasons, where we might have erred, how we might have bettered our lot and so on and so forth. Nevertheless, I think the real reason is that the causes lie entirely outside any policy that we have pursued. There are bigger and deeper causes affecting the world and we, like the strongest of nations, are pulled hither and thither by these forces. That is one fact that I should like the House to bear in mind.

Another factor and that is more applicable to us is this: that owing to the unfortunate events that have happened in India since the 15th August 1947 anything we did outside the world has suddenly lost weight for a time. We counted for something not very greatly of course, more in our potentiality than in actuality, because potentially we counted for a great deal, though actually we need not have counted for much. But the events that occurred after 15th August in India, Pakistan, etc., all over here—Pakistan I might say naturally did not count for much because it had no background; it was a newcomer; it was we who counted—those events suddenly brought down our credit in the international domain tremendously. It affected the United Nations when they were meeting last October, considering the South Africa issue.³ Undoubtedly, the fact of the events in India affected the decision of

3. Rebutting the charge of apartheid, the South African representative at the United Nations wondered whether countries like India, which cited the U.N. Charter while criticising South Africa, did not stand self-condemned by what happened in their own countries.

the United Nations General Assembly in regard to the South Africa issue; so also in regard to other matters. All these facts have nothing to do with foreign policy. The point I wish to place before the House is this, that it may be desirable for us to adopt a certain foreign policy or a certain other one, one of what is called neutrality, or, as Pandit Kunzru said, a more positive one. But all this has no relationship, it has nothing to do with what has happened. Other factors govern it. If you like, it was a fault, but we have been rather passive about all these matters, and where we have been somewhat active are the very things in which some of the honourable members desire us to be more active than we have been. We are asked to collect the smaller nations round about us—in India or elsewhere. I think Mr. Kamath wanted us to go into darkest Africa and have alliances with tribes there....⁴

May be somebody else. Well, I am all for our going to Africa or to any other place. But the point is the very activity—call it idealistic, I do not think it is purely idealistic; I think it is, if you like, opportunistic in the long run—this policy that we have so far pursued before we became a Government, and to some extent after we became a Government, that is, standing up somewhat, in so far as we can, for the weak and the oppressed in various continents, is not a policy which is to the liking of the Great Powers who directly or indirectly share in that exploitation. It is that, that puts us in the wrong with them.

There has been a lot said about other matters. It is a clear issue before this House. There is Indonesia. We have done precious little in the way of actual active help; we are not in a position to do that. But we have got sympathy towards them and we have expressed it as publicly as possible. Because we give our sympathy and some faint degree of help to Indonesia and because this offends and irritates some of the major powers of the world, are we to withdraw that?

Are we to remain quite tame and say : "No, this might irritate this power or that" because it does irritate this or that power and there is no doubt about it? Naturally, we cannot, as a Government, go as far as we might have done as a non-official organisation where we can express our opinions as frankly and as aggressively as possible. Speaking as a Government we have to moderate our language. We have sometimes to stop doing things which we might otherwise do. Nevertheless, the fundamental thing is, do we sympathise and openly sympathise with a country like Indonesia in her struggle for freedom, or do we not? That applies not to Indonesia only but to several other countries. In each case we have to face the passive hostility of various interests, not only the direct interests but also the indirect interests involved, because the direct and indirect interests hang together

4. H.V. Kamath denied making this remark. In fact, Govinddas had said that there were many countries still where India had not sent any representatives.

in such matters. It has been an astonishing thing how in the last so many months the Good Offices Committee⁵ functioned in Indonesia—all good people, and as it happens the Secretary of the Committee was an Indian.⁶ The way it has functioned and the results it produced are not at all satisfactory. If this House is dissatisfied with what the Security Council has done this year or considered in regard to Kashmir,⁷ they would be still more dissatisfied, I think, if they consider the Indonesian Good Offices Committee's work, because unfortunately their approach to these problems is a certain approach with which this House cannot fit in on account of our past traditions, on account of our ideals, etc.

Now I am not talking in terms of this bloc or that bloc; I am talking independently of these blocs as have appeared on the world stage. We have either to pursue that policy generally within limitations because we cannot pursue it wholeheartedly, nevertheless, pursue it openly—or give it up. I do not think that anything could be more injurious to us from any point of view—certainly from an idealistic and high moral point of view, but equally so from the point of view of opportunism and national interest in the narrowest sense of the word—than for us to give up these policies that we have pursued, namely of standing up for certain ideals in regard to oppressed nations, and trying to align ourselves with this Great Power or that and becoming its camp-follower in the hope that some crumbs might fall from their table. I think that would be undoubtedly from the narrowest point of view of national interest a bad and harmful policy. I can understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of the smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater powers and become practically satellites of those powers, because they just cannot help it. The power opposed to them is so great that they have nowhere to go to. But I do not think that consideration applies to India. We are not citizens of any weak or mean country and I think it is foolish for us to get frightened, even from a military point of view or any point of view, of the greatest of the powers today. Not that I delude myself about what can happen to us if a great power in a military sense goes against us; I have no doubt it can injure us. But after all we have in the past opposed, as a national movement, one of the greatest of world powers. We opposed her in a particular way and in a large measure we succeeded by that way, and I have no doubt that if the worst comes to the worst, and in a military

5. To deal with the crisis in Indonesia created by the Dutch armed action in July 1947, the U.N. set up in September a Good Offices Committee comprising Australia, Belgium and the U.S.A. The Committee, however, was ineffective in face of Dutch intransigence.

6. T.G. Narayanan.

7. See *ante*, section 5, item 49.

sense we cannot meet these Great Powers, it is far better for us to fight in those ways than submit ourselves and lose all the ideals which we have. Therefore let us not be frightened too much of the military might of this or that group. I am not frightened and I want to tell it to the world on behalf of this country that we are not frightened of the military might of this power or that. Our policy is not a passive policy or a negative policy. In fact, these words are used rather vaguely. Two or three instances that were given perhaps gave an indication of the thing that was working in the minds of some of the honourable members which they have not had the time or the desire to say clearly. I shall give one instance. It was stated, I think by Pandit Kunzru, that we supported the veto in the United Nations presumably because we did not wish to offend the Soviet group.⁸

It is immaterial. Now I want to place the facts before the House as far as I remember them. The veto was put there, as the House will remember, by the common consent of all the Great Powers—all the Great Powers in every group. It was put there because they felt—and may I say that the Soviet felt that way, the United States also felt that way, because these huge and Great Powers did not like the idea of half a dozen little countries just telling them to do this or that. Both felt that way and neither of those were prepared to submit just to a kind of majority voting and of little nations put together, so that it was put there in the Charter right at the beginning. Whether the veto was used or misused, I am not going into the question, but now this question arose that the veto should be removed. This was not liked by several Great Powers. It was not a question of supporting this bloc or that bloc. Both the blocs did not like the removal of that veto. Now the problem before us was that if that veto was somehow removed by a veto or decision of the United Nations, there was little doubt that the United Nations, as they are, ceased to be at that instant. That was the choice. It was not a question of liking the veto. On behalf of India, as on behalf of many countries, it was stated openly that we disliked this veto and that it should go. It was pointed out, however, that this could only come about by some kind of general agreement. Now we agree with what Mr. Santhanam said that the United Nations, in spite of its failings and weaknesses, is something that is good.⁹ It should be encouraged and supported in every way, and should be allowed to develop into some kind of world government or world order. Therefore we instructed our delegates not to press this

8. It was, in fact, N.G. Ranga who had said that the Soviet Union wished to keep the veto but Britain and the U.S. wished to have it removed.

9. K. Santhanam had said that, despite her experience with the U.N., India should strive to vest the U.N. with legal and material powers to maintain peace, and therefore should oppose the right to veto which undermined the effective functioning of the organisation.

question of the veto to the breaking point and to say that although we did not like it, it should remain there so long as it could not be removed by some kind of agreement of the major groups involved. In that way various questions come up and each question has to be considered on the merits.

I do not know if any honourable member has analysed our voting at these international conferences. It would help them perhaps to appreciate the scene better if they took up any of the major issues during the last year in the United Nations or its various committees and councils and found out what India had done. It is certainly true that our instructions to our delegates have always been obviously and firstly to consider each question in terms of India's interest, secondly on the merits. I mean to say if it did not affect India, naturally on the merits, and not merely to do something or give a vote just to please this power or that power, though of course it is perfectly natural that in our desire to have friendship with other powers, we avoid doing anything which might irritate. As a matter of fact we go as far as possible to try and win over. It is not our purpose to enter into other people's quarrels. Our general policy has been to avoid entering into anybody's quarrels. If I may say so, I have more and more come to the conclusion that the less we interfere in international conflicts, the better, unless our own interest is involved, for this reason that it is not in consonance with our dignity just to interfere without any effect being produced. Either we should be strong enough to produce some effect or we should not interfere at all. I am not anxious to put my finger in every international pie. Unfortunately, sometimes one cannot help it. One is dragged into it. For instance, there is the Korea Committee. Well, not only are we in that committee, but ultimately our representative became the chairman of that committee.¹⁰

Now that leads to another matter to which reference has been made by some honourable members. That is this. It is an odd contrast today that while in the official councils of the United Nations we may not perhaps pull the weight we ought to, nevertheless in the unofficial councils outside our weight has considerably increased. Why is that so? Because progressively people see that within the United Nations things are done far from idealistically or morally or in terms of the underdog or in terms of the smaller nations or in terms of the Asian nations, and so more and more of these people try to search for someone else and in their search for someone else, who might perhaps give a lead in these matters, almost automatically their eyes turn towards India.

10. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was set up on 14 November 1947 to facilitate the establishment of an elected government in Korea and provide for an early withdrawal of the occupying forces. The Commission consisted of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria. K.P.S. Menon was elected Chairman of the Commission.

Now I do not wish to enter into any comparisons with other countries, and certainly we have done nothing in India to merit any assumption of leadership of anybody. It is for us to lead ourselves and then only can we lead others properly and I do not wish to place the case of India at any higher level. We have to look after ourselves. That is why I am, if I may say so, in spite of being Minister in charge of External Affairs, not interested in external affairs so much as in internal affairs at the present moment because external affairs will follow internal affairs, but there is no basis for external affairs if internal affairs go wrong.

Therefore also I am not anxious to widen our scope of representation all over the world. It is fairly wide now. That too we have been almost compelled by circumstances to do because we simply cannot be an independent nation without having that representation, but I am not anxious to extend it any further unless some very special reason arises. That being so, nevertheless, the fact remains that we stand for certain things. Now, when we come into contact with the external world, do we stand for them or do we not? We have to choose. I have no doubt at all, as I said right at the beginning of my remarks, that in the long run it is to the great advantage of India for it to attract to itself the sympathy and the hope of millions of people in the world without offending others. It is not our purpose to offend others or to come into conflict with others. Nevertheless, the world is in a pretty bad way and it is easy enough for people to tell me, 'Oh, you talk idealistically, you should be practical.' May I remind the House that we have seen for these many years the results of persons and things being very practical? I have had enough of this practicalness, which leads to incessant conflict and which leads to all the misery and suffering that we have seen. If that is the meaning of being practical, the sooner we are not practical the better. But that is not being practical. That is being grossly impractical in their march without looking to the left or to the right, and each group just contracting in a close circle, full of danger for the other group, trying to win over other small or big nations by some immediate advantage or something given. I do not say that is good enough for this country and we really are not even compelled by circumstances to do it. We might have been compelled by circumstances but we are not compelled by circumstances to give up, because it does amount to giving up, our independence in order to gain the goodwill of this country or that country. I think, not only in the long run but in the short run, that independence of opinion and independence of action will count. That again does not mean that we should not associate ourselves closely in certain activities with particular countries we do.

Pandit Kunzru referred to the necessity of our developing economically, militarily and otherwise.¹¹ Surely this House realises that nothing is more

11. Kunzru had emphasised the importance of building up India's defence and economy and to achieve this he suggested that India should not hesitate to accept foreign aid.

important in the opinion of this Government than to make India economically strong and militarily strong, not in the Big Power sense, because that is beyond our capacity, but as strong as we can to defend ourselves if anybody attacks. We want to do that. We want the help of other countries; we are going to have it and we are going to get it in a measure—I am not aware of this having been denied to us to any large extent. Even in taking that help, economic or other, or even in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all your eggs in one basket, if I may say so, that one should get help and more especially at the cost of one's self-respect. Because then you are not respected by any party; you may get some petty benefits but ultimately even those may be denied, and then you may have no basket to sit in or go to. Therefore, purely from the point of view of opportunism, if you like, a straightforward honest policy, an independent policy, is the best. What that policy should be at a particular moment, it is very difficult for me or for this House to say because things change rapidly from day to day. It may be that we have to choose what might be a lesser evil in a certain set of circumstances—we have always to choose the lesser evil. We stand in this country for democracy, we stand for an independent, sovereign India. Now, obviously anything that is opposed to the democratic concept—the real, essentially democratic concept, which includes not only political but economic democracy—we ought to be opposed to. We will resist the imposition of any other concept here or any other practice. That I can understand. But there was a curious confusion in the speeches of some honourable members when on the one hand they talked about our standing for the weak and the oppressed against imperialism and all that and on the other hand they asked us more or less to side with possibly a power here or there which may stand for imperialism. It may be that sometimes we have to side with this power or that power. I can quite conceive of our siding even with an imperialist power—I do not mind saying that; in a certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the two evils. But, nevertheless, as a general policy it is not a worthy policy or a worthwhile policy.

May I state another fundamental difficulty before us? Because of our past record in India, that is the anti-imperialist record, we have not been *persona grata* with many groups and peoples outside. We have not got rid of that yet. With the best will in the world, those people do not like us. Those people govern opinion elsewhere, they govern the press. It is amazing how a certain section of the press, say in the United Kingdom, deliberately and offensively misrepresents us. Now, as I was sitting here, a telegram came to me, a telegram from a foreign correspondent in this country sending a long message to his paper in London, which is the most offensively false thing that I have seen. It amazes me that any person who has been here for some months should have the temerity to send such false messages, and it is about time that the Government of India dealt with this matter more firmly.

We have been extraordinarily lenient towards the press, Indian or foreign. We have gone out of our way to tell them that we will not do anything even if they send messages which are extremely disagreeable to us. But there is a limit to falsehood and that limit has been passed, I think, in regard to some messages.

Well, it is in this context that I should like honourable members to see the picture. Mr. Kamath said in a kind of peroration that we must join this bloc or that. He said, "I do not know which, but join this bloc or that." I remember later he inclined towards one bloc, but that was his first statement—evidently in the course of his speech he changed his mind.¹²

What does joining a bloc mean? After all, it can only mean one thing—give up your view about a certain question, adopt the other party's view on that particular question in order to please it and gain its favour. It means nothing else so far as I can see because if our view is the view of that party then there is no giving up and we do go with that bloc or country or whatever it is. The question only arises when we are opposed to it on that point; therefore we give up our viewpoint and adopt the other one in order to gain a favour.

Now, I am prepared to agree that on many occasions, not only in international conferences but in this House, one gives up one's point to gain a compromise, and I am not prepared to rule out the possibility of our subordinating our viewpoint in international conferences in order to gain something worthwhile. That is perfectly feasible, that is often done. But this general approach is the worst possible approach to get anything from that country. I should like this House to realise that even if we wanted to adopt that policy, this approach is the worst approach to get that thing done. Because you have got to leave your viewpoint about it, you simply give it up to get a few crumbs, and the next day you do not know where to go. You do not know what it comes to.

The fact of the matter is that in spite of, in a military sense, our weakness—because obviously we are not a great military power, we are not an industrially advanced power—nevertheless, India even today counts in world affairs, and the trouble that you see in the United Nations or the Security Council is because she counts, not because she does not count. That is a fact you should remember. If we had been some odd little nation somewhere in Asia or Europe, it would not have mattered anything. But because we count, and because we are going to count more and more in the future, everything we do becomes a matter for comment, and because many people do not like our counting so much. It is not a question of our viewpoint or of attaching ourselves to this or that bloc; it is merely the fact that we are potentially a great nation and big power, and it is not liked possibly by

12. Later, Kamath had advocated an alliance with the Soviet Union and China.

some people for anything to happen which strengthens us.

So there are these various things to be considered. It is not such a simple matter for us, as just by a resolution, to affiliate ourselves to this organisation or that organisation and get all the privileges of membership of that organisation. That kind of thing is not going to happen. And, therefore, Sir, I do submit to this House that while undoubtedly much has happened in the past, so many months or year which is very undesirable, so far as the External Affairs Department is concerned it has not functioned at all well, if I may admit frankly to this House.

Also as far as our Information Services are concerned they have not functioned at all well. That is all perfectly true. But so far as our fundamental approach to this problem is concerned, I just do not see how we can fundamentally vary it. As occasion arises we adapt it to circumstances that I can understand—but the fundamental approach I do think has to remain the same, because the more you think about it the more you analyse it, there is no other way. It is not a question of your adopting a certain policy because idealistically you think it a good one, but I do submit that if you give it up there is no other policy for this country to adopt with the slightest advantage.

Now, I just mentioned about our Information Services and the rest. Mr. Shiva Rao made one or two suggestions,¹³ which I welcome. One was in regard to the various delegations, deputations etc. that go abroad. Each ministry chooses its delegation, gives it a brief and that delegation goes to a particular conference. Often enough, the briefs of two delegations do not fit in with each other and there is a slight conflict, so much so the two delegations speak with two different voices. Frequently also, the choice made of people who are sent abroad is not too good. So there is this conflict and lack of coordination. That is why we are trying to set up, in accordance with Mr. Shiva Rao's suggestion, some kind of an agency in External Affairs. In fact, it is there in an embryonic stage. It is called the Conference Section. Every delegation will be fundamentally chosen by the ministry concerned—the External Affairs Ministry will not choose every delegation—but the proposal will in essence be vetted by the Conference Section of the External Affairs Ministry in order to prevent overlapping and possible conflict.

Then in regard to publicity, there is at the present moment, may I whisper to the House, a small discussion going on between the External Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. So far external publicity has been handled by the Information and Broadcasting Ministry. No external

13. B. Shiva Rao had suggested the creation of a policy planning department within the External Affairs Ministry and the formation of an interdepartmental committee of secretaries of the various ministries to brief in a uniform manner the different delegations going abroad.

publicity as such should obviously be organised and looked after by the External Affairs Ministry. That is, in fact, so in every country. In England, external publicity is under the Foreign Office, not under the Home Publicity Service. The two are different, because external publicity has continually to keep in touch with external affairs. Of course, we will come to an agreement and make proper arrangements about that. But there has been unfortunately a great lack in our approach to foreign publicity in the last few months. At the same time, I do not want this House to imagine that by improving our publicity, some wonderful change will come about, because the reasons for people thinking as they do in other countries and in government departments are far deeper than just lack of publicity. Mr. Shiva Rao pointed out that our publicity work in America, however efficient, is carried on, after all, by a small organisation.¹⁴ That is all that we can afford.

At the present moment, Pakistan's publicity has been undertaken at their request by the British Information Service in New York which is a tremendous organisation. Now, it is not for me to judge or appreciate the propriety of this. It is for the United Kingdom to do so. Today publicity in America is organised on such a big scale that it is just absurd for us to think of competing with them. I understand the British Information Service have got probably 600 men working in New York. We are certainly not going to send 600 men. We shall try and probably we can send 6 men, i.e., hundred times less. And all this publicity organisation has, unfortunately, during the past few years, been built up on an anti-Indian basis. The British publicity organisation in America, the House will remember, was functioning some years back with one of its main objectives as anti-Indian propaganda. The same people function there today, so that whatever propaganda they do, they have an anti-Indian bias, whether they want it or not. We cannot get out of that rut. In fact, I regret to say that some Indians who used to do anti-Indian propaganda are still employed by the British Information Service in America.

Now, may I apologise to the House for not dealing with so many matters that have been mentioned, especially by my honourable friend, Seth Govinddas, about Indians overseas?¹⁵ I should like the House to consider the question again in this background. It is not a question of the External Affairs Department or this House turning a switch this way or that way to make

14. He had said that India's publicity arrangements in the U.S. compared unfavourably with those of Pakistan, which had made arrangements with the British Information Service to supervise their publicity work in that country.
15. Govinddas had urged the Government to take steps to safeguard the rights of the Indians settled in the British colonies particularly if India left the Commonwealth. He had also criticised the discriminatory nature of the immigration laws in the East African colonies and the move to introduce separate electorates for the Muslims in Kenya.

everything all right. It is far more complicated than that, and when the time comes, if necessary, we are prepared to switch over to this or that policy, provided we are dead convinced that it is for the good of the country.

As for the Indians overseas, I will just say one or two words. Many of these difficulties continue and they are likely to continue. I am sorry to say that we do not get much help from the British Colonial Office. Not only we do not get much help, but it astonished me, used as I am to the delays of the Government of India—and they are pretty remarkable—but the delays of the British Colonial Office are indeed a revelation. I remember that we sent some urgent letters and also reminders by cable. It took us exactly ten months to get a reply. The matter was about sending a deputation to some of the British colonies just to have a look at the Indians there. It was a very simple matter, no great principle was involved, still it took them ten months to reply, and during that period other events happened and it could not be done. So that what I mean is, we come up against this bureaucratic red tape in all these offices, here as well as there.

But the real difficulty is this question of citizenship. Now, these Indians abroad, what are they? Are they Indian citizens? Are they going to be citizens of India or not? If they are not, then our interest in them becomes cultural and humanitarian, not political. That interest of course remains. For instance, take the Indians in Fiji or Mauritius. Are they going to retain their nationality or will they become Fiji nationals or Mauritians? The same question arises in regard to Burma and Ceylon. It is a difficult question. This House gets mixed up. It wants to treat them as Indians and in the same breath it wants complete franchise for them in the countries where they are living. Of course, the two things do not go together. Either they get franchise as nationals of the other country, or treat them as Indians minus the franchise and ask for them the most favoured treatment given to aliens. These difficulties come up in regard to citizenship and the rest.

Finally, Prof. Ranga right in the beginning asked a question about India being in the British Commonwealth. Apparently, he has been misled by some newspaper reports that have been appearing recently about a delegation that has gone from here to London to discuss this matter. It surprises me how people can give the reins to their imagination. I suppose this delegation referred to is a Defence Ministry delegation led by Mr. H.M. Patel.¹⁶ It had nothing to do with this matter; it had to do entirely with defence matters and certain materials that we wanted to purchase in England and elsewhere. No such question has been discussed. As to our general position, however, that was defined in this Constituent Assembly in the early stages and it will finally be decided by the Constituent Assembly itself.

16. An official delegation led by H.M. Patel went to Britain in February 1948 to arrange for the procurement of military stores.

There is no question of any committee or any individual discussing it or coming to even preliminary conclusions about it. Whatever the final decision may be, it is quite certain, I believe, that India will be a completely independent and sovereign republic or commonwealth or state or whatever you may like to call it.

Now, that does not do away with the consideration of the other problem of what our relations should be with, whether it is England or the British Commonwealth or any group. That is not merely a theoretical question, but a very practical question again in regard to citizenship. Leave out other matters; it affects the citizenship of all Indians abroad. In the various British colonies exactly what type of relationship we should have which might affect that citizenship; they may not become aliens; all these must be considered, but apart from that politically, and otherwise, India must be a completely independent country.

5. An Age of Crises¹

We live in an age of crises. One crisis follows another and even when there is some kind of peace, it is a troubled peace, with fear of war and preparations for war. Tortured humanity hungers for real peace, but some evil fate pursues it, and pushes it further and further away from what it desires most. Almost it seems that some terrible destiny drives humanity to ever-recurring disaster. We are all entangled in the mesh of past history and cannot escape the consequences of past evil. In the multitude of crises, political and economic, that face us, perhaps the greatest crisis of all is that of the human spirit. Till this crisis of the spirit is resolved, it will be difficult to find a solution for the other crises that affect us.

We talk of world government and one world, and millions yearn for this. Earnest efforts continue to be made to realise this ideal of the human race which has become so imperative today, and yet those efforts have thus far proved ineffective, even though it becomes ever clearer that if there is going to be no world order, then there might be no order at all left in the world. Wars are fought and won or lost and the victors suffer almost as much as the vanquished. Surely, there must be something wrong about our approach to this vital problem of the age, something essentially lacking.

1. Recorded on 19 March 1948 for broadcast to the United States on 4 April 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

In India, during the last quarter of a century and more, Mahatma Gandhi made an outstanding contribution not only to the freedom of India but to that of world peace. He taught us the doctrine of nonviolence, not as a passive submission to evil, but as an active and positive instrument for the peaceful solution of international differences. He showed us that the human spirit is more powerful than the mightiest of armaments. He applied moral values to political action and pointed out that ends and means can never be separated, for the means ultimately govern the ends. If the means are evil, then the end itself becomes distorted and, at least, partially evil. Any society based on injustice must necessarily have the seeds of conflict and decay within it, so long as it does not get rid of that evil.

All this may seem fantastic and impractical in the modern world, used as it is to thinking in set grooves, and yet we have seen repeatedly the failure of other methods and nothing can be less practical than to pursue a method that has failed again and again. We may not, perhaps, ignore the present limitations of human nature or the immediate perils which face the statesmen. We may not, in the world as it is constituted today, even rule out war absolutely. But I have become more and more convinced that so long as we do not recognise the supremacy of the moral law in our national and international relations, we shall have no enduring peace. So long as we do not adhere to right means, the end will not be right and fresh evil will flow from it. That was the essence of Gandhi's message, and mankind will have to appreciate it in order to think and act clearly. When eyes are bloodshot, vision is dimmed and limited, I have no doubt in my mind that world government must and will come, for there is no other remedy for the world sickness. The machinery for it is not difficult to devise. It can be an extension of the federal principle, a growth of the idea underlying the United Nations, giving each national unit freedom to fashion its destiny according to its genius, but subject always to the basic covenant of the world government.

We talk of rights of individuals and nations, but it must be remembered that every right carries an obligation with it. There has been far too much emphasis on rights and far too little on obligations. If obligations were undertaken, rights would naturally flow from them. This means an approach to life different from the competitive and acquisitive approach of today. Today fear consumes us all, fear of the future, fear of war, fear of the people or nation whom we dislike and who dislike us. That fear may be justified to some extent, but fear is an ignoble emotion and leads to blind strife. Let us try to get rid of this fear, and base our thoughts and actions on what is essentially right and moral, and then gradually the crisis of the spirit will be resolved. The dark clouds that surround us may lift, and the way to the evolution of world order based on freedom will be clear.

6. Cable to G.S. Bajpai¹

Your letter dated 22nd March.² I am delighted to hear that the very hard work you have put in in this office has not impaired your health.

2. I agree with you that we should, from now on, take preparatory soundings as to the support that we will get if we decided to stand for the Security Council. I would like you to sound U.S.A. about this. I am telegraphing to our Ambassadors in Moscow and China³ and the High Commissioner in the U.K. to make similar approaches. Would you like us to telegraph to Pillai⁴ or do you consider it enough for you to tackle Parodi?⁵

1. New Delhi, 30 March 1948. File No. 1(41)-UN II/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Urging India's candidature for the seat in the Security Council which was to fall vacant, Bajpai advised Nehru to take preparatory soundings on the support India was likely to get.
3. K.P.S. Menon was the Ambassador in China.
4. P.P. Pillai was India's permanent representative to the U.N.
5. Alexandre Parodi (b. 1901); permanent representative of France to U.N., 1946-49.

7. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

I have been considering whether we should try for one of the seats in the Security Council which will fall vacant at the end of this year.² I have been officially informed that Iran is proposing to stand for election and I would not be at all surprised if Pakistan were also to enter the field, supported by the Arab states who feel grateful to her for Zafrullah's advocacy of the Arab cause during the debates on Palestine. I have come to the conclusion that we should press our own claim. Our position in Asia makes our claim a very strong one and there seems no reason why a seat should go year after

1. Also sent to V.K. Krishna Menon and K.P.S. Menon, New Delhi, 30 March 1948. File No. 42(3)/48-PMS.
2. In fact, India did not contest for election to the Security Council in 1949 and was elected for two years from 1 January 1950.

year to a Muslim country. It is necessary, however, that preliminary soundings should be taken before we finally make up our mind. I would like you, therefore, to sound the Governments of the U.S.S.R., China, and the U.K. Let me know what their reaction is.

8. Cable to Pearl S. Buck¹

Thank you for your telegram. We are all greatly disturbed at growing international tension. I have given careful thought to suggestions made by you and your eminent colleagues. I would gladly take every step in my power in order to relieve this tension. But I feel that step you suggest would be unreal and ineffective at present. As Prime Minister of Indian Union any step taken by me must necessarily be official. I see no present prospect of achieving any results by approaching various Governments. Whenever an opportunity arises, I shall gladly take some action either officially or in my private capacity. Greetings to you and Albert Einstein and Clarence Pickett.²

1. New Delhi, 5 April 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. Clarence E. Pickett (1884-1965); leading American Quaker; Executive Secretary, American Friends Service Committee, 1929-50.

9. To Pearl S. Buck¹

New Delhi
April 5, 1948

My dear Pearl Buck,

The telegram you, Albert Einstein and Clarence Pickett sent me has made me think hard. I have sent you a reply by cable. I feel like you that the world situation is rapidly growing worse and yet my mind is not clear as to what can be done. I feel it would be presumptuous of me to rush in unless there is something definite and positive to be done. If I go abroad, as I greatly

1. J.N. Collection.

like to do and might do, I would no doubt meet many friends and perhaps help a little in a minor way. But I can only function effectively if India functions in that way. And therefore I have felt that my duty lay in India. I do not consider the Indian problem in isolation as if it was cut off from the rest of the world. A world disaster will be disaster for India. And so if in any capacity I can help in averting that disaster, I must do so to the best of my ability. But unless I know exactly what I should do, my action will be in the air and totally ineffective.

Thank you for your letter of March 13th about Dr. Dustoor.² I am very glad to learn of his success in America. I shall be glad indeed if he can go there again. I do not know exactly what I can do about it. I shall get in touch with him.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Phiroze E. Dustoor; taught English literature at Calcutta and Allahabad Universities, 1922-48; Professor of English, University of Delhi.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

II. External Publicity

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

January 22, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

The question of foreign publicity has been coming before us in a variety of ways. I received the other day a note from A.S. Iyengar,² the P.I.O., about his talks with Shiva Rao regarding publicity in America. I have had copies of notes sent to the Ministry of Information from Moscow. From all this it appears that some radical changes will have to be made about our publicity set-up in regard to foreign countries. We cannot, of course, compete with the British because of our lack of human material and resources. But whatever we might do and on however small a scale, it should be made to yield some results.

In the U.S.A., the Pakistan people have asked the British Information Services to do their work for them. They have thus got the biggest information service in the U.S.A. putting across their point of view and thus influencing public opinion in England. Today I saw a note from the Ministry of Information appointing Bhatia³ to Moscow as a Public Relations Officer. I do not know Bhatia and I suppose he is a good journalist and may prove suitable to this job. But, I think, it should be appreciated that foreign publicity is something entirely different from just journalism and from home publicity. It is intimately allied to foreign policy and knowledge of foreign affairs. It is also to be considered in close connection with the environments of the country concerned. Thus a person who is suited for America may be totally unsuited for Russia and *vice versa*. Of the men we have sent on the staff of the embassy to Russia, two have been found to be unsuitable although they are quite good in their own way. We are thus calling them back and sending others in their place.

In the present context of world politics publicity has to walk on a tight rope. If it is not very carefully managed and coordinated with our foreign policy, it may do us harm. Because of this foreign information services are directly run by foreign offices of various countries because they are supposed to be quite different from home services. In any event, it is obviously necessary for the closest coordination between foreign policy and foreign publicity.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Principal Information Officer, Government of India, 1946-48.

3. Prem Narain Bhatia (b. 1922); special correspondent of *The Statesman* at Lucknow and Delhi, 1946-58, with a gap of six months in 1948 when he was Public Relations Adviser to the Indian Ambassador in Moscow; on staff of *The Times of India*, 1960-63; Editor, *The Indian Express*, 1963-65; High Commissioner to Kenya, 1965-69, and to Singapore, 1969-73; Editor, *The Tribune*, 1977-86.

I suggest that this question might be considered in all its bearings. At present the money we spend is not yielding any result and there is a loud cry for proper publicity organisation.

In Russia, as would appear in the note sent from our embassy there, ordinary information about India is not required and there are large numbers of Russians who learn Hindi and other Indian languages and keep abreast of facts here. The average journalist in India would probably not be able to keep up with them. What is required there is information about our constructive activities and not so much the purely political side. They are interested in our big projects for river valley development, hydroelectric works, land reform, educational reform, health reform, etc.

I think that the proper procedure would be for foreign publicity to be directed by the External Affairs Ministry or by a joint committee of External Affairs and the Ministry of Information, appointments to be made in the same way.

The Public Relations Officer should, of course, function under the Ambassador and take his directions from him as to how to work. Normally speaking such appointments should be made after consultation with the Ambassador. Otherwise they would be misfits and waste of efforts.

There is one other matter which I should like to mention to you although it has no particular bearing on publicity. In New York which, of course, is the centre of activity far more than Washington, we have a number of officers, each one of them separately is very expensive and they are lodged in different parts of the city. I think it would be far better and cheaper in the end if we had one central building to house all the various activities on behalf of the Government of India. This would mean an initial expenditure but the recurring expenditure will be less and the work will be more efficient and speedier. The effect of having a big India House in New York would also be considerable so far as the public are concerned.

You will be interested to learn that the communications between our embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Government are now in Hindi. The Soviet Foreign Office informed our Ambassador that he did not see why English should be used. If Russian could not be used, he would prefer Hindi. So now when Vijayalakshmi goes to meet the people in the Foreign Office in Moscow she speaks in Hindi and this is translated into Russian. A Russian interpreter translates also from Russian to Hindi. This use of Hindi in future in Russia in place of English has also to be borne in mind in appointing our representatives there, including the Public Relations Officers.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

30 January 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am sorry for the delay in acknowledging your letter of the 28th January. As you know I have been away at Amritsar and have just returned.

I entirely agree with you that Dr. Anup Singh has not been a success as P.R.O. in Washington. The copies of telegrams from him that you have sent me indicate his limited outlook. Reports from other people coming from America also justify this conclusion. I believe Anup Singh is a good and straight man in his own way but he is not suited to function as Public Relations Officer. I think therefore that he should be given such notice as you think necessary.

I am given to understand that Shastri, who has been Anup Singh's assistant, is also not much good. In fact, he does not understand the nature of the work at all. I am not sure that he wants to stay on either. I remember my sister saying that Shastri came to New York to tell her that he wanted to resign, why it is not quite known. In any event, he appears to be ignorant not only of the American conditions but of publicity work.

While some kind of publicity man should be given to our Embassy in Washington, it seems clear to me that the real centre of our publicity should be New York. I am told that British and foreign publicity agencies are situated in New York which is the proper place for news dissemination. We shall have to establish a proper Indian Information Service in New York.

In a previous letter I suggested to you that it would be desirable for us to have an India House in New York to house our various activities there. At present we are wasting large sums of money in America without any obvious result. We have a Trade Commissioner in New York. We have our representative in the United Nations and we have a branch of the India Supply Mission there, all with separate offices far removed from each other, and all paying high rents. These might well be brought together under one roof and an Indian Information Service established there also. We shall soon have to appoint a Consul-General in New York who could also be in the same building, which should have a hall for conferences, receptions, etc. Possibly also a permanent exhibition of Indian products as most embassies have.

I understand there is a Trade Mission on our behalf in Washington also. This is a very costly undertaking and seems to be rather unnecessary. One Trade Mission in New York ought to be quite enough, though possibly

1. J.N. Collection.

some official may remain in Washington also. Our Trade Mission in Washington also has a separate building, though it could easily be accommodated in our own buildings there.

I am told that the *Information Service* that is sent to Washington (as well as other places) by air mail and is printed there has no effect whatever and American newspapers do not use it in the least.

Shiva Rao has recently come back from America and when you have the time I suggest you might discuss American publicity with him. He knows about publicity as well as about American conditions and he has recently had first-hand experience.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
22 February 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Thank you for your letter of the 14th February about foreign publicity.

I have read through Azim Husain's² and N.C. Mehta's notes. While I agree with a great deal that has been said in them, I confess I remain entirely unconvinced as to some of the conclusions.

I am all for spreading knowledge of Indian art, culture and civilization abroad and the more extensively we do this, the better. But obviously our resources are limited, not only in money but even more so in trained and suitable personnel. I think that much can be done even with limited resources provided they are properly directed. We cannot compete with the U.K. and the U.S.A. in this respect. Personally I think that while we should take full advantage of their technique, our general approach should be more in keeping with our simpler habits and political outlook. Indeed, there is no alternative course open to us because of our lack of resources at the moment. This does not mean that we should not spend more money on publicity but that we should get full value for our money.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1945-48.

These are questions on which there is general agreement. The immediate issue before us is the machinery for conducting external publicity. This external publicity will certainly include dissemination of Indian art, culture, etc. But the first point in foreign publicity is the furtherance of our foreign policy. Foreign policy in every country is regarded as a distinct and highly specialised branch of governmental activity. This policy is expounded from day to day abroad under the guidance of the country's diplomatic representative, who, in turn, receives his instructions from his foreign office at home. It seems to me essential that foreign publicity should be intimately allied to this foreign policy. The fact that the Indian people are not world conscious and have to be educated in international relations does not make any difference to this basic approach.

Both in our foreign relations and in our foreign publicity we are in the early stages and have no well established conventions. Nevertheless, under the stress of events we have to take decisions and decide on general trends of foreign publicity in accordance with those decisions and outlook. Our foreign publicity practically began to take shape during the last war. It was intended to publicise the British Government's viewpoints and not the Indian viewpoint. It was in fact anti-Indian publicity. In cooperation with the British Foreign Office and the British Information Services in the U.S.A. specially, a tremendous deal of anti-Indian propaganda took place. The issue was a simple one partly because of the war and partly because it did not require much intelligence to run down Indian nationalism and boost up British imperialism. Men like Joyce³ and Puckle⁴ and their likes did this work with some thoroughness. The kind of publicity was to exaggerate communal differences and riots and generally to run down Indians. It was a Joyce-Puckle Report in July 1943, for reasons then existing from the point of view of the British publicity of India, which recommended the transfer of external publicity to I. & B. Department. I do not think that those reasons hold any longer or that Messrs. Joyce's & Puckle's views are of great moment to us.

We have to consider the present situation as it is developing when, whether we like it or not, our foreign affairs are intimately affecting us and we cannot escape from them. As a matter of fact, I am anxious not to spread out in the foreign field as far as possible because of our limited resources, chiefly in personnel. But almost against my will we have been spreading

3. Alec Houghton Joyce (1894-1982); Information Officer, India Office, 1935-40; Adviser on Publicity, India Office, 1941-47; Head of Information Department, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1948-54.
4. Fredrick Hale Puckle (1889-1966); joined I.C.S. 1913; served in the Punjab, 1919-37; Director-General of Information, Government of India, 1939-43; Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington, 1944-48.

out slowly. An independent nation just cannot function otherwise. With this spreading out certain consequences follow and certain additional responsibilities are thrown upon us. One of these is foreign publicity, intimately coordinated with our foreign policy. The more I think of this the more I am convinced that this intimate coordination can only be properly brought about by external publicity being placed definitely under External Affairs. That is the general rule in other countries and no doubt this rule has been adopted there because of their larger experience. Indeed, I am inclined to think, and in this I agree with what you have yourself said, that any joint administration of external publicity is not likely to be successful. This would involve both the control of foreign publicity in regard to policy and appointments being placed under External Affairs. Coordination would then inevitably follow between the two.

It would be desirable, however, for the external publicity branch of External Affairs to keep in close touch with internal publicity under I. & B. For this purpose there should be a joint committee.

I have suggested in my previous letter that appointments of P.R.O.s should be made in consultation with our diplomatic representatives. This does not mean, of course, that the Ambassador or Minister will make the appointment. It simply means that any person appointed should fit in and be capable of cooperating fully with the diplomatic representative under whom he will necessarily have to serve. In making any appointments in foreign embassies we follow this rule. This avoids possible future complications and is a courtesy due to our chief representative in a particular country. We found no difficulty in acting in this way. It is seldom that an Ambassador has any serious objection. If he has any such objection and there are reasons for it, then it is better that the particular appointment is not made, regardless of the merits of the individual concerned. What is required, even more abroad than in India, is team work among the officers of our Government. Unless there is this team work and discipline and a central authority, work as well as our reputation abroad are likely to suffer.

You have rightly referred in your letter to the special treatment that has to be accorded, in regard to publicity, to different countries. That treatment can only be judged and decided upon by External Affairs in consultation with our diplomatic representatives abroad, who are supposed to inform us of the conditions and trends prevailing in each particular country. We will no doubt make mistakes, because of our inexperience and the inexperience of the people we send abroad in various capacities. Gradually we shall build up a fund of experience which will help us to avoid errors. What we have to do now is to lay down a suitable machinery which will facilitate our coordinated work and avoid a double and sometimes conflicting approach to the same problem in foreign countries.

The suggestion made in the I. & B. notes for coordination by having

some kind of a joint committee will not help us much by themselves. Such coordination will be of no use at all unless it is at least at Secretaries level. From such experience as I have I can imagine that this interdepartmental Secretaries' meetings will take place rarely. It is hardly to be expected that each Secretary will explain fully to the other on every occasion the implication of foreign policy and of publicity. Daily decisions are being made in regard to foreign policy and practical adjustment takes place of this policy to particular events. Publicity is immediately affected by it. All this cannot be done by an interdepartmental committee.

So far as personnel is concerned, it is the instrument of policy and must be suited to the special needs of that policy. A person may have a flair for public relations and knowledge of foreign affairs and yet might not be a professional journalist or even possess the technical experience of publicity.

I would therefore earnestly suggest to you to consider this matter again. I would recommend therefore that foreign publicity including appointments of P.R.O.s in foreign countries should be placed directly under External Affairs. In addition to this an interdepartmental committee might be formed to consider the technical aspects of publicity as well as the links between foreign and home publicity. The matter is important and might well be placed before the Cabinet if you think this necessary.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. External Publicity¹

Sir, with your permission, before I deal with the subject matter of the debate, I should like to make a reference to the tragedy that occurred in Europe a few days ago. I refer to the death of Mons. Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovakian Republic. Not only is this in itself a very tragic event (so far as I am personally concerned I was acquainted with him and it was a personal loss to me also), but in the circumstances in which it has occurred it may have grievous consequences. I took the liberty to send to the Ambassador of the Republic of Czechoslovakia² here the sympathy and condolence of the Government and the people of this country and I am

1. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 15 March 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. III, 1948, pp. 2188-2192.

2. M. Jaroslav Sejnoha, Czech Ambassador in India, 1948-49.

sure the members of this House will also like to add their own sympathy to that message.

Now, Sir, on the occasion of a cut motion in regard to the policy of the External Affairs Ministry, rather incidentally and casually, I made a reference to the British Information Services in America—in fact, my colleague Mr. Shiva Rao had mentioned it and I also referred to the fact that he had mentioned it—and I stated that they had been carrying on publicity at the request of the Pakistan Government. Further, I mentioned that they had employed some Indians. Now the British Information Services in America have contradicted that statement and have clearly stated that they are not carrying on any propaganda, or rather publicity, on behalf of the Pakistan Government and that they have not employed any Indian on their staff.³ I must accept that now and I express my regret for having made a statement which was not factually true. I do not wish to enter into this argument. But apart from being factually true or not, it is possible to point out many things which occur, and which occur simply because they have been occurring for a long time past, and it is difficult to get out of the old rut. A little while ago an article by an eminent British journalist dealing with Kashmir was circulated by the British Information Services not only in America but in various foreign countries. Now this article contained certain statements which were completely untrue. For instance, to mention one, it stated that it was after the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union that the tribal people, irritated by that accession, invaded Kashmir, which was just a reversal of what took place. This is a minor matter. I merely mention this because people who have been connected in the past with a certain type of work naturally tend to look at a problem from that point of view; it is difficult to get out of that rut. However, I am sorry I made a statement on the last occasion which was not correct. I regret it.

Now, in regard to external publicity I have very little to say except to welcome many of the suggestions that Mr. Shiva Rao made.⁴ External publicity it is called, and perhaps honourable members may think that we should try to flood foreign countries with facts and figures in the nature of propaganda. I do not think that it is desirable for us to do that or that we can, in fact, do it. I do not think our approach should be the pure publicity or the advertisement approach. We cannot do it because the way to do it would be to spend far vaster sums than we can ever afford, to engage far bigger personnel and so on and so forth. But my main reason for not desiring to do so is that I do not like that approach at all. That approach tends inevi-

3. A denial was issued by the British Information Services in the United States immediately after Nehru's speech in the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948.
4. B. Shiva Rao suggested, among other things, the training of young educated persons for publicity work abroad.

tably to become a tendentious approach, and while it may perhaps create an impression now and then the value of it progressively lessens when people realise that it is too much propaganda of a particular type. I would much rather place the facts before the public here in India or outside. Naturally, I shall place them inevitably from our point of view, try to give the background of the facts—but facts and nothing more than facts as far as possible and allow other people to judge. Of course, it makes all the difference in the world how facts are placed before the public. Statistics may be made to tell almost any tale. That is so. Anyhow, this business of publicity, whether factual publicity or any other kind of publicity, is an extraordinarily tricky business anywhere, and more especially in foreign countries. It is easy to criticise it, and I think many of the criticisms advanced are justified. It is also easy perhaps to draw up schemes which appear good on paper but which may not succeed so well in practice. As I told the House on the last occasion we have been discussing this problem, the problem of this external publicity, because external publicity is so intimately aligned to external policy that normally every country has its external publicity organised by its foreign office and not by its internal publicity machine. Here, owing to various developments, war-time developments—because this was only thought of in war time—external publicity became a part of our Information Department here. The more I have given thought to it the more I have realised that this is not a very satisfactory arrangement. Obviously there must be the closest cooperation between the internal publicity machine and external publicity. But it is far better, I think, that the External Affairs Ministry should have a greater part in the organisation of external publicity than it has had thus far.

I agree with Mr. Shiva Rao when he refers to Public Relations Officers rather than publicity agents abroad. That conveys far more the idea of the work they ought to do. At the present moment the various hand-outs, etc., that are issued no doubt do serve some useful purpose, but I do not think they are worth the money we spend upon them. My own impression, not now I mean but previously, and my own, because I have myself tried to do—not as a member of the Government but as a private individual or a member of the Congress organisation some kind of external publicity, is that all these hand-outs and pamphlets and leaflets find their way to the wastepaper basket. They influence very few persons except a few persons who have been previously converted and who use them and keep them for their own benefit. The whole thing has to be looked upon entirely from a different point of view, from a psychological point of view, from the point of view of the requirements of each country concerned. For instance, the approach in the United States of America is likely to be different—I think completely different—from the approach in France and even more different from the approach in the Soviet Republic. The kind of paper that one may produce

in America ought to have some bearing on the kind of information that America requires. In France it will not be the same. I can say that with assurance. They have a different outlook and attach different values. The kind of information that we send to the Soviet Republic will be entirely different or almost entirely different. The kind of information that the Soviet Republic asks us, our Ambassador tells us, is almost entirely economic information like what is being done in our various projects, various schemes, dams, reservoirs, river valley schemes and the rest, irrigation, education. They ask us for these; they are interested in them. No particular enquiry about politics as such has come from them. Now, it may be that they deliberately put forward those kinds of enquiries because they are mostly put forward by governmental agencies there. But my point is that the approach has to be different in every country that we tackle. It can only be fully appreciated by competent public relations officers as well as our embassies and legations there as to what is required and how it can be done properly. And then it has to be coordinated with our publicity arrangements here. So I do think that all this matter has to be considered fully, and, in fact, the External Affairs Ministry and the Home Ministry are considering this matter. We hope to evolve some more feasible and better method. Inevitably, we shall have to approach this question by the method of trial and error. There is no way to find the perfect method of doing things, except by experience. Then again the other countries that indulge in this kind of publicity have done so for many years and have got a great deal of experience. They spend vast sums of money, employ very large numbers of persons, and have already developed very intimate contacts with the publicity organisations in the countries they function in. It is easy for them. We may send the brightest of our young men from here. It takes time for him to develop those contacts, and not only physical contacts, but psychological and other contacts, so that if results are not brilliant, the House should realise that it is not a mechanical matter of sending shoalfuls of pamphlets, leaflets or lectures and others, but developing something which is much more intricate and difficult. Undoubtedly the present arrangements are not very happy and they have to be changed, I think, more or less on the lines of some of the suggestions made in this House.

Now coming to information and broadcasting, may I say that both in regard to information and broadcasting, and publicity, etc., the Ministry has very kindly given me full notes containing a large number of particulars? I do not propose to read them to the House because that will take too long a time and the House might get lost in a large number of figures; but the House should know those particulars of course and I shall suggest to the Ministry to place them before the House or before the public in the proper form so that they may know exactly what is being done. Now, my own view of the set-up for broadcasting is that we should approximate as far as possible

to the British method, the B.B.C., that is to say, it would be better if we had a semi-autonomous corporation under, of course, Government, with the policy controlled by Government but otherwise being not conducted as a Government department but as a semi-autonomous corporation. Now I do not think that is immediately feasible. I have merely mentioned this to the House. I think we should aim at that even though we may have many difficulties. In fact, in most matters we should aim these semi-autonomous corporations, the policy and otherwise being distantly controlled by Government, but Government or Government departments not interfering in their day-to-day activities. But that is not an immediate issue. Obviously, these debates about the policy to be pursued, about our various services—news services, the language question and the rest have given an indication of the mind of the House. That helps. But if they are to bear real fruit, there should be far more discussions more or less on the —shall I say—not academic level but certainly on the scholarly level carefully by committees, etc. It is impossible really to consider these matters in vague speeches connected with cut motions. I am sorry to learn from an honourable member⁵ that these advisory committees have not been functioning in some of the provinces.⁶ I should have thought that in regard to broadcasting etc. it was necessary for such committees to function very frequently, for advice to be taken, for them to be told what was happening, and generally for there to be coordination between the non-official element and the official element. I should have liked the Standing Committee attached to this Department also to consider all the matters that are raised in this House and discuss them with the officials in the Department. That is the proper way of dealing with them. It is not very satisfactory for honourable members to make speeches here and for me or someone else to make a reply, and there the matter ends for the year. I hope therefore that this kind of intimate contact and intimate discussions over these matters will take place much more so in future than in the past.

Now take any question, like the language question. It is obviously a matter for high scholastic consideration, not a matter which can be disposed of properly in the heat of a political debate. More especially a broadcasting organisation should consider it from that point of view, should have indeed high-class advisers who know something about languages and the rest and who can advise them. In England there is no such language issue, of course, as to what language should be employed, but the best literary

5. Durgabai Deshmukh (1909-1981); imprisoned several times in the freedom struggle; member, Constituent Assembly of India, 1946-50; member, Planning Commission, 1950-54; Chairman, Central Social Welfare Board, 1952-62.

6. Durgabai had said that the non-official committee for the Madras radio had rarely met, and that the one for Calcutta had not met since 1946.

figures in England are employed to advise the B.B.C.—men like Bernard Shaw and others. They have them on the permanent Advisory Committee as to the use of language. I am not quite sure if the biggest literary figures were asked to advise us, the results would be very happy because their advice would probably apply to other literary figures and persons like me will not understand at all what has happened. That is a conceivable possibility. Nevertheless, my point is that persons capable of understanding this problem, in its educational as well as public aspects, should dispassionately consider this, should be attached to these broadcasting ministries, and should advise them, and should make lists of words, vocabularies, etc., to be used. That is done in every country even though there is no such type of controversy that exists here. That applies to the kind of news that is to be given also.

Now, there can be no two opinions in this House as to the importance of the development of broadcasting in the rural areas. I did not quite understand what I think Shrimati Kamala Chaudhri⁷ said, something about much more time being given to the rural areas. It is not a question of time at all, I think. Suppose you give instead of an hour a day, five hours a day. They can only listen at certain times and there is such a thing as overdoing it. Nor do I think it would be at all right for us to proceed in our broadcasting programmes with the fixed desire to benefit the other person concerned. I do not know how honourable members react to attempts being made to improve them, but I react strongly against it. If anybody is going to sermonise me, well, I am not going to listen to that sermon. I think that is the general public psychological reaction : too much sermonising, too much attempt to benefit, too much being told to be good, does not result in good results. One must approach differently. If you want to educate, you must do it in an amusing way, entertaining way, in a light way, sometimes in a heavy way too if you like, just as you cannot train a child by simply dozing him with heavy stuff all the time. You just ruin his life if you do that. So you must treat him better. I suggest these are matters for experts to consider. So I think it would be desirable for members of separate committees to consider them and coordinate their activities and advise the Ministry, and thus gradually we might improve.

I am sorry, I have not dealt with many of the matters raised, but I have suggested the way that should be followed in order to deal with them.

7. (b.1908); Congress worker from Uttar Pradesh; imprisoned several times in the freedom movement; member, Constituent Assembly and Provisional Parliament, 1947-52, and Lok Sabha, 1962-67; writer of short stories in Hindi.

INDONESIA

1. To A. Soekarno¹

New Delhi
6th January, 1948

My dear President,

Thank you for your letter of October 25th which reached me only a few days ago. I am grateful for what you have written. We have been able to do little in the practical sense for Indonesia thus far but you will appreciate that this has not been due to any lack of goodwill but rather to circumstances beyond our control. There is a fund of goodwill for the Indonesian Republic in India. This no doubt is due to many common interests in the present, but it is also due, as you suggest, to subconscious urges derived from past ages.

We have had and are having a difficult time in India but at no time have we forgotten the struggle for freedom in Indonesia. The birth of freedom in any country must, I suppose, be accompanied by travail. I have no doubt, however, that India and Indonesia will make good and will come ever nearer to each other in the working out of common tasks.

We are following closely developments in Indonesia. These developments are not very satisfactory and all kinds of manoeuvres appear to be going on on the part of your opponents to weaken the Republic. In the long run all these manoeuvres are bound to fail.

I am glad that our representatives Raghavan and Mohammad Yunus Khan² are working in full cooperation with you. That was the purpose of our sending them because we are anxious to develop our contacts. Sometime in the not distant future we may have to consider more precisely about the future of South East Asia. Thakin Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, discussed this matter with me some little time ago. He was anxious that the countries of South East Asia should come nearer to each other.

With all good wishes.

Thank you for your photograph which I value. *Merdeka*.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mohammad Yunus was India's representative in Indonesia from October 1947 to December 1948.

3. Freedom.

2. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram No. 30 dated 13 January.² We agree that Republic should be given assurance that truce will remain binding until situation requiring truce ceases to exist and not merely for fourteen-day period. We think, however, that Republic should, while expressing acceptance of Dutch proposals to Good Offices Committee,³ ask Committee to obtain such assurance.⁴ If, nevertheless, the Dutch refuse to give guarantee, they will be putting themselves in the wrong with enlightened opinion throughout the world, and Republic will have stronger case to approach Security Council.

2. As regards point 3 of last six points enumerated in your telegram No. 28 dated 12th January,⁵ *it is obviously unreasonable that one party should have to approach the Security Council through the other party.* If the Republic so wish, they can also ask the Good Offices Committee to have this condition modified so as to permit them (Republic) to appeal to Security Council through Good Offices Committee. You can, however, give the Republic assurance that, if a situation should arise when Republic wish to appeal to Security Council, we shall be willing to do so on their behalf.

3. Suggestion in paragraph 2 presupposes continuance of Good Offices Committee of Security Council until political agreement has been

1. New Delhi, 14 January 1948. File No. 114-F.E.A./47 (Vol.II), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Indonesia had expressed fears of a resumption of the Dutch offensive against the Republic even after they had joined the Interim Government. It sought an assurance that the truce would be observed not for just 14 days, but "until situation requiring truce ceases to exist", and wished this to be referred to the Security Council.
3. On 2 January 1948, the Netherlands delegation proposed that a ceasefire be effected between the parties within forty-eight hours of signing the agreement and the withdrawal of the Republican forces operating behind forward Dutch positions; the establishment of demilitarised zones to be administered by the civil police of the two sides; economic activity be permitted between the areas; and the truce agreement be binding for fourteen days and thereafter for a further period of fourteen days unless it was terminated because of non-observance by either party.
4. The truce was the outcome of mediation for twelve weeks by the United Nations Good Offices Committee. It was signed on 17 January 1948 between the Netherlands East Indies Government and the Indonesian Republic providing for a "standstill agreement and ceasefire order."
5. Point 3 stated that "prior to the dissolution of the Good Offices Committee" either party through the Netherlands could request its continuance for settling the "differences... and other party shall not object."

implemented. Sub-paragraph I of Para. 10 of your telegram No. 28 of 12th January suggests that it is intended to maintain Committee only until agreement for settlement of political dispute in Java, Sumatra and Madura has been signed. We do not think that this is enough and would advise that Republic should ask for continuance of Good Offices Committee, until terms of political agreement have been carried out.

4. We shall inform Pillai of latest developments but feel that course mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, namely prior approach to Good Offices Committee, is preferable to our going direct to Security Council on behalf of Republic.

3. To Mohammad Yunus¹

New Delhi
7th February 1948

My dear Yunus,

Thank you for your letter of the 10th January. I am very happy to learn that you are getting on well with our friends in Indonesia and like the place and the people. This is as it should be. I am only sorry that we cannot help them more than we have done. We are facing trouble in so many directions that our hands are more than full. You will, of course, explain all this to President Soekarno and give him my greetings.

Gandhiji's assassination has been a terrible blow but we cannot simply weep for it; we have to work hard as ever. His life was a magnificent example which will inspire us throughout the rest of our days.

I do not think there will be any question of your going to Kabul ever in the near future. I think it is better for a person to do one job well as you are functioning very satisfactorily in Jogjakarta. You should continue to remain there till further developments take place.

My love to Laj² and Adil Shahryar.³

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Wife of Mohammad Yunus.

3. His son.

4. To Mohammad Yunus¹

New Delhi
2nd March 1948

My dear Yunus,

I have your letter of the 3rd February. Bapu's death has indeed been a terrible blow. The manner of it made the shock even greater. India seems rather an empty place without his rich and elevating personality and yet his death was in keeping with his life and perhaps in the long run it is as well that he died in this way. Both in life and in death he has become an imperishable part of India's history.

The shame is upon us who fell so far below his standard and who could not even protect him.

Will you please convey my deep gratitude for the numerous messages of sympathy and condolence that you received from friends in Java? It is impossible for me to reply to them separately. I have received about 15,000 telegrams not to mention innumerable letters.

I have received Dr. Abu Hanifa's² book which you sent to me. It is attractive but I fear I cannot read it. Please thank him for it.

Badshah Khan has gone to Karachi and is at present attending the Pakistan Constituent Assembly meeting. We have been completely out of touch with him.

I received your letter of the 23rd December some time back. We have realised quite well the difficulties of the position in Indonesia. I wish India could help but you know how we stand in the world and in our own country and apart from our full sympathy we can do little. Of course, if we have a chance of doing something in the United Nations we shall take it. Please convey my greetings and good wishes to the President and to Dr. Shahrir.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Abu Hanifa was the leader of the Indonesian delegation to the First Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947.

SRI LANKA

1. To D.S. Senanayake¹

New Delhi

20th January 1948

My dear Mr. Senanayake,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th January.² I can assure you that I have had to give up the idea of personally attending your Independence celebrations with regret but I do hope to visit your beautiful country and it will be a great honour for me to bring the sapling of the sacred Bo-tree from Bodh Gaya to Ceylon. It is a little difficult for me to fix a definite date. I should like it to be sometime ahead, say, about the middle of April or even later. If you have any preference for any particular date round about then, could you kindly let me know.

As I have informed you already my colleague Dr. Rajendra Prasad will represent our Government at your Independence celebrations.³ He will not only represent Government, but as President of the National Congress and President of the Constituent Assembly, he will in effect represent the people of India better than anyone else can do. Our High Commissioner, Mr. Giri, will be associated with him.

With regards and good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 30(33)/47-PMS.
2. Expressing disappointment at Nehru's inability to attend the independence celebrations in Colombo, Senanayake requested him to fix a date on which he could come to Sri Lanka bringing with him a sapling of the sacred Bo-tree.
3. Rajendra Prasad also could not go and P. Subbarayan, Home Minister of Madras, and V.V. Giri, Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, represented India.

2. India and Sri Lanka¹

A change is coming over the face of Asia, the mother of continents. Through

1. Message given at New Delhi, 23 January 1948. File No. 30 (33)/47-PMS. Not printed in newspapers in India.

heavy sorrow and travail she is lifting herself from subjection to freedom and independence. The process has seemed slow to us, but looking at it in the perspective of history, it is fast enough.

In Indonesia, freedom, often assailed and surrounded by danger, is now firmly planted and must grow and spread. In India, the 15th August saw a great and historic change. Burma, three weeks ago, declared her independence and we rejoiced with her on that great occasion.

And now comes the turn of Ceylon, or Lanka of ancient fame.² No country can rejoice more at this change than India which has been and is like an elder brother to Lanka. Geography, tradition, culture, religion and economic interest all combine to bring Lanka and India close to one another. Those bonds have existed in the past and in the new freedom they will undoubtedly grow.

India and Ceylon stand in the centre of southern Asia. The wide-flung Indian Ocean washes their shores. Great trade routes pass by them or across them. *Inevitably there is going to be a closer union of these countries of southern Asia, more specially of South East Asia.* So we look forward not only to a closer union of India and Ceylon but also of the other countries in southern Asia, and to common ideals and common objectives furthering peace and freedom in the world.

On this occasion, I send my greetings to the people of Ceylon and salute the freedom that they have achieved.

2. Sri Lanka became independent on 4 February 1948.

3. On Sri Lanka's Independence¹

On behalf of Government and people of India I send you fraternal greetings on the attainment by Ceylon of independence. *Simhala Dweep* is once again sovereign and free India looks forward to even closer cooperation than in the past with her kin and neighbour in tasks of mutual interest and in common endeavour, with other friendly nations, for emancipation of people still struggling for their liberties and for establishment of enduring world peace.

1. Cable to D.S. Senanayake, 5 February 1948. File No. 30(33)/47-PMS.

4. Greetings to Sri Lanka¹

We have been through abnormal days in India and many of us have suffered not only a national loss, but a personal loss. There has been a flood of emotion all over the land and it will take us some time to get back to some kind of normality.

Nevertheless, I am happy to be present here on this occasion to commemorate a great event. I come here not only as one who has felt very much attracted towards Lanka but more officially, representing the Government of India, to request you to convey our greetings and good wishes to your Government and people on this occasion. We would have rejoiced at the attainment of freedom by any country, more especially an Asian country, but Ceylon, though a separate country, is hardly away from us or apart from us. Not only history but what I saw myself with my own eyes in Ceylon reminded me that we were of the same blood, that we were kith and kin, that our minds had the same texture, in fact, that we came out of the same material. I can never think of Ceylon or Lanka as anything apart from India and, even when I listened to many of the ancient ceremonials, I was reminded of India.

You referred, Sir, in your address² to Vijaya and Mahinda,³ you forgot to refer to that gracious lady, Sanga Mitta,⁴ who took a branch of the Bodhi tree⁵ from this country 2,300 years ago. That Bodhi tree has flourished in Ceylon ever since and has been a symbol of that great gift which India gave to Lanka and to the world so long ago. That Bodhi tree is a symbol of India and Lanka being together for our mutual advantage and for the freedom and advantage of the world.

1. New Delhi, 14 February 1948. Speech on the occasion of the flag-hoisting ceremony to commemorate Sri Lanka's independence. From *The Hindu*, 15 February 1948.
2. Sri Lanka's special representative, M.W.H. de Silva, in his welcome address, referred to the visits of Princes Vijaya and Mahinda to Sri Lanka.
3. Mahinda, son of the Mauryan Emperor Asoka, led one of the earliest Buddhist missions from India to Sri Lanka. He is said to have converted King Tissa to Buddhism.
4. According to tradition, the nephew of Tissa was sent to Pataliputra to fetch Sanga Mitta, daughter of Asoka, so that Queen Anula of Sri Lanka and the ladies of the court could be ordained.
5. A branch of the Bodhi tree at Gaya under which the Buddha attained enlightenment was according to legend taken by Sanga Mitta and planted in the city of Anuradhapura.

OTHER COUNTRIES

1. Greetings to Burma¹

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

On this auspicious day I should like to convey, on behalf of the Government and people of India, their greetings to the Republic of the Union of Burma. This is a great and solemn day, not only for Burma, but for India and for the whole of Asia. We in India are particularly affected by it because we have been bound in so many ways to Burma for immemorial ages. Long ago in our ancient past, our books referred to Burma as *Swarnabhumi*, the land of gold. Long ago also, but in a somewhat later age, we sent a message to Burma, the message of the greatest of the sons of India—Gautama Buddha—and that message has tied us together during these 2,000 years and more. Apart from any other things, that message was of peace and righteousness, and perhaps today that message of peace and righteousness is more needed than anything else.

We have had these bonds. There have been in the past political ties and bonds, but the real bond that has existed between India and Burma has been a silken bond of the spirit, often of mutual interest, often of common ideals, something that even political changes cannot break. And so today we welcome the advent of the Republic of Burma. In the past we have travelled together through many a valley of shadows. We have been partakers of joy and sorrow alike, and now, on the eve of freedom, we have had to face many other travails for freedom, as any birth apparently must be preceded by travail. Still, out of travail come freedom and good. I hope that after the travail that Burma has passed, her future is going to be one of construction and creation for the common good of the people of Burma. As in the past, so in the future, the people of India will stand shoulder to shoulder with the people of Burma, and whether we have to share good fortune or ill fortune, we shall share it together.

1. Speech on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by U Win, Burma's Ambassador to India, New Delhi, 4 January 1948. From *National Herald*, 5 January 1948.

2. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

11 January 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th about your meeting a representative of the Vietnam Government.² You know that we fully sympathise with the struggle for freedom in Indo-China and we have expressed our public sympathy with Vietnam. It is not clear however how we can help them. We cannot raise this question in the U.N.O. as we are not members of the Security Council. We have, however, done our utmost to bring pressure on the French Government on this issue during the past few months and I believe that the French Government has been influenced by this pressure to some extent. But France is in a very difficult position internally and seems to be verging on civil war.³ There may be a dictatorship there or something else.

In the United Nations, France has sided with us on important issues.⁴ In regard to French possessions in India also their attitude, though somewhat dilatory, is not unfriendly and we hope to arrive at some settlement before very long.

As for stopping the passage of French planes, we do not allow any military planes to go.⁵ If any military personnel is carried, this must be done secretly and without our knowledge. We cannot stop civil planes without a breach of international law and our agreements.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

2. The representative of Vietnam appealed for Indian support in their struggle for freedom and urged the stopping of overflights and refuelling facilities in India to French aircraft.

3. Sharp differences had risen between the French Government and the Communist Party.

4. De la Tournelle, the French delegate in the Security Council, suggested on 25 January 1948 that the conditions of a free and fair plebiscite included the withdrawal of tribal forces and the Indian army and the return, to Kashmir, of citizens of all communities who had been forced to emigrate.

5. The Indian Government had taken steps to limit the number of French aircraft flying across India.

3. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Krishna,

There is much to write to you about, but for the moment I am writing about a relatively small matter. I saw in the papers that you specially went to the Pakistan High Commissioner's house² as a gesture of goodwill. There is nothing much in that. But I feel that it would be better if we did not indulge in too many gestures which are not reciprocated. They produce a bad effect here where, as you know, there is great tension.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. On 19 January 1948 Krishna Menon called on the Pakistan High Commissioner in London.

4. To P.C. Bhandari¹

New Delhi
22 January 1948

My dear Bhandari,

Thank you for your telegram about Gandhiji's fast. Also for your previous telegram of good wishes for the New Year.

Raghunandan Saran showed me your letter to him with its enclosures about Krishna Menon. Obviously I cannot form any personal opinion about what is happening in London. I can only judge from the reports I receive from London and from the intimate contacts we have here with the High Commissioner's office in London. According to the information available to us through these contacts, there has been a tremendous improvement in the work of the High Commissioner's office. For the first time our foreign relations have been handled satisfactorily and some kind of order is evolving in the India House. Many people have written to us in commendation of this change. Visitors from India have also spoken well of Krishna Menon's work. So also Ambassadors and British Cabinet Ministers. With this large consensus of opinion it seems it will be a little difficult for

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

me to accept the criticisms of petty matters which have been brought before me.

I know very well Krishna Menon's good qualities and failings. He was appointed as High Commissioner not at my instance but because others suggested it and I agreed. I must say that I have been agreeably surprised at the success he has made of this job. It is one of our difficult and responsible offices. He may have made some mistakes. But these are outweighed considerably by his successes. Thus far I have had no reason to complain about his work in regard to any major matter. I have to judge a person entirely impersonally and as objectively as possible. I am not concerned with the individual but with his work. You will not expect me therefore to give up my opinion of his work because of personal prejudices or complaints of some people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
23 January 1948

Nan dear,

I have not written to you since you left. I have received, however, two or three letters from you during the last few days. Two of these I have before me at present, one dated January 1st, and the other January 12th. I have also received some letters from Chand. I have enjoyed reading all these letters with their full descriptions of Moscow during winter. Indeed, I wish I were with you. I fear, however, that I am more of a prisoner than I have ever been.

2. Problems and difficulties seem to increase day by day. The only compensation is that one's sensitiveness to them decreases and, therefore, one's capacity to face them indirectly increases. Perhaps this results from a certain dullness of the mind after receiving shock after shock.

3. Looking into the future I do not see any relief for at least a year, or may be, two years. I think there is little chance of semi-normal life before 1950. By that time, of course, we shall have got so used to abnormality that normality itself will appear to be abnormal. This does not mean, of course, that I am going to be tied down to New Delhi till 1950. I am becoming

more and more anxious to get out of India even for a few days. If this Kashmir business and one or two other matters had not been there, I would have gone out for a while. The moment I get a real chance, I shall take it though my visit abroad will necessarily be brief. Just at present even a day or two counts and I simply dare not go away. In spite of all these, however, I have decided to go to Allahabad for a day or two for *amavas* on the 8th and 9th February. The *Kumbha Mela* is on there. The Mountbattens want to see the *Mela* too, but they cannot go on the 9th. They might go on the 15th, the *Vasant* Day, and perhaps I might accompany them also.²

4. I talk of peace in India or some kind of normality by 1950. And then I wonder if this is not just wishful thinking. How can there be normality so soon with millions of people displaced and uprooted? And even if we recover somewhat, the world goes more and more awry and we drift towards war on a major scale. Recent developments have practically ended, for the time being at least, all chances of cooperation between the U.S.A. group and the U.S.S.R. group. This kind of thing cannot remain where it is. It must change for better or worse, and there appears to be no fair chance of a change for the better.

5. We, that is India, are placed in a difficult situation because we refuse to line up with any group. There is no possibility of our adopting any other policy and I am quite sure that we are right in this. But being right does not remove the difficulty. By our reference to the Security Council various tendencies have been accelerated and, at every step, we have to make some choice, some inclination towards this group or that. So we get more and more entangled in this mess of a world. It might not have been so bad if India had been peaceful and generally progressing. People all over the world have a sufficient appreciation of our potential strength. But actuality is so bad in their opinion that potentiality loses its value. I do not myself feel frightened about this actuality, though it depresses me occasionally.

6. I knew all the dangers attendant on our going to the Security Council and yet there was no other course left open to us and there we are mixed up with the various pulls and intrigues. Zafrullah has talked viciously as usual and I felt very angry. Generally speaking, the U.S.A. and the U.K. talk patronisingly of being neutral. But, according to us, they incline towards Pakistan. The Belgian Chairman, much to our surprise and annoyance, has also not been very impartial. We had indeed suggested that Belgium should represent us on the new Commission appointed. But on Gopalaswami Ayyangar's representation we have suggested Sweden. Czechoslovakia was considered and she would have been a good choice except for one important factor. It would have meant our lining up in the eyes of the world

2. Nehru and the Mountbattens attended the *Kumbha Mela* on 9 February.

with the Soviet bloc. That would have affected our Kashmir position as well as others. Hence we have chosen Sweden. But we have given some discretion to our delegation.

7. The Kashmir situation is not very satisfactory and petty raids continue near Jammu which frighten everybody there and add to the host of refugees in Jammu. From a military point of view this does not mean much. But psychologically it is important.

8. You will, no doubt, have opportunities of meeting Molotov, Vyshinsky³ and other important functionaries in the Soviet Foreign Office. You should speak frankly to them and tell them that it is quite absurd for anyone to think that we are tied to the apron strings of England or that we attach ourselves to the U.S.A. The last traces of British political influence in India are rapidly vanishing. Even the economic influence grows less and less. We have no desire whatever to be caught up in America's foreign or economic policy. But, situated as we are, we do not wish to quarrel because such quarrelling would do us a lot of harm. We want, above all, some time and some peace to build. We have not had a day since the change-over in August. Instead, a host of formidable problems have pursued us. We want to be specially friendly with Russia because we are convinced not only that we can learn much from her but also because she represents, in our view, in many ways the future pattern.

9. The Communist Party of India has recently changed its policy⁴ again and is now openly against our Government which is dubbed as just a camp-follower of the Anglo-Americans. Otherwise also it has given and is giving some trouble. I do not care very much about this except for the fact that many people in Russia may form their opinions from reports of the C.P. in India. That is bad and would mislead a lot.

10. The Socialist Party is on the verge of breaking with the Congress. I think this will be bad for them as well as for the country. And yet I just don't see how it can be prevented now. Things have gone too far. I am quite convinced that Jayaprakash and his colleagues are acting wrongly and will, to some extent, prejudice thereby the cause of socialism in India.

3. A.Y. Vyshinsky (1883-1954); Professor of Law, Moscow University, 1925-28; Deputy Public Prosecutor, 1931-38; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1940-49; Foreign Minister, 1949-53; Soviet permanent delegate at the United Nations, 1953-54.
4. The Communist Party of India declared in its new resolution that India had become a "reactionary force opposed to anti-imperialist nationalist front."

11. After reading your report about the U.N. Assembly, I sent for Shavax Lal⁵ and told him that I did not like his behaviour. He made various excuses; but, anyway, he promised to be careful in future. He is not going to be sent again in such a delegation. I am sorry a mistake was made last year; but you will remember the conditions prevailing in Delhi and India then.

12. I think it will be worthwhile to expedite our diplomatic contacts with Sweden. We shall do something at this end and you can also push ahead at your end. You can pay a visit to Stockholm for a few days every month.

13. Asaf Ali will be coming back from Washington sometime in March, I think. We have not yet decided as to who to send in his place. Meanwhile, Ratan⁶ is going in a few days to act as Counsellor in Washington. You will remember that I suggested to you that you might go to Washington after a year in Moscow. But now that you are taking such a lot of trouble with Russian, would it not be wasted if you left Russia just when you were getting on? However, this is a question which does not arise now.

14. Probably the next session of the U.N. Assembly will be held at Geneva. If so, I might think of attending it. But that again is too long a way off, and it is foolish to plan so far ahead.

15. Bapu is recovering rapidly from his fast. He has been a tower of strength to all of us, and it is a little difficult to imagine what we could have done if he had not been there.

16. Pakistan gives us a continuous headache. From all accounts, however, the state of Pakistan is much worse than a headache. They have got a chronic disease which is hardly curable. The recent disturbances in Sind have made it almost impossible for Hindus or Sikhs to stay there, and so we must be prepared for another million refugees. Where all these will go, heaven only knows.

17. This is a scrappy letter, but it is better than nothing. I am going to Aligarh tomorrow for a day to address the Muslim University convocation.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

5. Shavax Ardeshir Lal (b. 1899); Assistant Secretary to Government of Bombay, Legal Department, 1932-36; Secretary to Council of State, 1936-46; Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Law, 1947-48; Secretary to the Governor-General of India, 1948-50; Secretary to the President of India, 1950-55.

6. Ratan Kumar Nehru.

6. To B. Rama Rau¹

New Delhi

The 7th February 1948

My dear Rama Rau,²

Thank you for your letter of January 16th, which I have read with great interest.

The position in China is most distressing³ and yet it seems that nothing can be done about it except to watch the tragedy proceed to its final denouement. The suggestion that I should visit Nanking as a kind of mediator struck me at the time it was made as not feasible. Now, of course, it is still less so. Apart from my complete inability to leave India in the present state of affairs, I do not think I could do anything by visiting China. My job remains in India and it is a difficult enough job. If we make good here, as I am sure we will ultimately, then we can play some role elsewhere.

The other day Brailsford made the fantastic suggestion that I should bring the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. together by taking advantage of the universal feeling caused by Gandhiji's death. It amazes me how some intelligent people are led by frustration to make fantastic suggestions. Here I am having to deal with groups and people in my own country who are pulling in all manner of directions and giving us an enormous amount of trouble. If we cannot put our own country in right shape, how are we to address others.

Our recent experience of the Security Council in regard to Kashmir has been thoroughly disappointing. Indeed, it has created a powerful impression in the country and is likely to have far-reaching consequences regarding our foreign relations.

About a federation of South East Asia I am sure that some such development will ultimately take place. I imagine, however, that the beginnings will be with India, Burma, Ceylon and possibly Indonesia, a little later.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. B. Rama Rau was Political Representative of India in Tokyo.

3. The People's Liberation Army launched the final phase of its offensive in the beginning of 1948 after Mao Zedong's declaration in December 1947 that "the Chinese People's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point."

7. The Way to Peace¹

Under the shadow of the tragedy which has so recently befallen the Indian nation, it is only natural that I should speak to you of Gandhiji's life-message. The world today sorely needs peace, peace that can come only through surrender, by nations of the world, of mutual distrust and by sincere cooperation among them in the common task of promoting, by every means, physical and moral well-being of people of all races in all climes. The great democracy of the United States is fitted, by its ideals and resources, to play a leading part in accomplishment of this purpose. India, which has achieved her own freedom through the practice of truth and nonviolence, and hopes to build her strength and prosperity on these twin foundations, will devote her entire energy to such international efforts in unison with all nations which share her aims and ideals.

1. Message sent on the occasion of the first National Convention of Americans for Democratic Action in Washington on 19 February 1948. File No. 9(37)/48-PMS.

8. India and the Vatican¹

The Apostolic Delegate² called on me this evening and gave me a letter conveying a message from His Holiness the Pope.³ An appropriate reply might be drafted and sent to me.

2. He mentioned that the Holy See was wholly agreeable to revision of the Concordat according to which the Portuguese Government exercises control over a number of dioceses in western India, i.e., even apart from Goa.⁴ I mentioned this matter to him last year and he had promised to

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 3 March 1948. File No. 19(83)-Eur.I/49, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.J. Extracts.
2. Leo Peter Kierkels (1882-1957); Apostolic Delegate to the East Indies, 1931-48; Papal Internuncio in New Delhi, 1948-52.
3. Pope Pius XII (1876-1958); Pope from 1939 till his death.
4. By a Concordat with the Holy See, Portugal exercised ecclesiastical authority over Goa as well as certain bishoprics in India. It was proposed that if Rome could draw up a new Concordat with India, Portugal would be relieved of its religious jurisdiction in India and the Goan Catholics could resist their colonial rulers without opposing the Church.

consult the Vatican. He said that while the Vatican was willing to revise the Concordat and bring it in line with the present position in India, it would be desirable for the Government of India to refer to the Portuguese Government also on this subject. I agreed with this as obviously no change can be made without the concurrence of one of the parties affected by it.

3. I pointed out to the Apostolic Delegate that the whole question of the political future of the Portuguese possessions in India had also to be considered and although the Concordat could be separated from the political issue, there was an indirect connection between the two. The Apostolic Delegate said he appreciated what I had said, but he thought that the Concordat issue could be taken up separately and immediately. So far as the Vatican was concerned it was primarily interested in this revision of the Concordat.

4. It is for us to consider whether we should take up the Concordat issue separately or make it part of a general approach to Portuguese possessions and privileges in India. If we take the whole question together there is likely to be greater delay. My own reaction is that without wholly separating the two issues, we should, nevertheless, take up the Concordat issue first. In the course of our discussions on that issue, no doubt the other issue will also arise.

5. What steps should we take next? Should we wait for an exchange of diplomatic representatives? I think it would probably be better for us to raise this question with the Portuguese Government through our High Commissioner in London and suggest to them that discussions will be facilitated if we had diplomatic representation. We might make a reference to the political issues also briefly and without going into details. We might just say that this also is a matter which we wish to discuss.

6. At the same time we should get into touch with the Vatican through the Apostolic Delegate.

7. Before we do this we should be clear in our minds as to what our own proposals are in regard to the Concordat. Mr. Rashid Baig, our then Consul at Goa, studied this question and made certain proposals. This matter might be gone into and if necessary Mr. Baig might be consulted. It might be desirable also to consult some of the Christian and more specially Roman Catholic members of the Constituent Assembly or other leaders.

8. He talked about an exchange of diplomatic representation with the Vatican. I agreed that this was desirable but we were short of personnel and for some time it might be difficult to arrange it. He then said that it might be possible for our Ambassador in some other place, for instance Paris, to be accredited to the Vatican also. I did not pursue this matter any further.

9. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Recent events in Czechoslovakia culminating in Masaryk's death have greatly distressed us. Situation in Europe as well as in world rapidly deteriorating and full of explosive possibilities. We would like you to observe trends and developments carefully and report to us. We have to take step carefully to avoid entanglements. At same time undoubtedly public opinion in India very critical of Russian attitude in Czechoslovakia. We expect rapid developments in European scene.

2. I am going to Sewagram and from there to Vizagapatnam to launch ship, returning to Delhi on 15th afternoon.

1. New Delhi, 12 March 1948. J.N. Collection.

10. To Padma Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana¹

New Delhi
17 March 1948

My dear Rana Saheb,

It has been a great pleasure to meet Your Highness and to discuss various matters of common interest with you. It has been specially gratifying to me to find how much there is in common between your viewpoint and mine. I am sorry that Your Highness is thinking of leaving your high office in Nepal.² I trust, however, that your wishes in regard to Nepal will be fulfilled. I need not assure you that all of us in India have feelings of the greatest friendship with Nepal and her people. Indeed, we can hardly think of the Nepalese people except in terms of kinship. Nepal is no foreign country to us. We are sharers in a common culture and inheritance and I have little doubt that our future lies in the closest cooperation.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Padma Shumsher Jung gave up the office of Prime Minister and Supreme Commander of Nepal for reasons of health and was succeeded by General Mohan Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana.

The magnificent gifts that you have presented to me have embarrassed me a little, for we have become used through many years to living simple lives. But the feeling that inspired you in presenting these gifts to me has touched me greatly and I am deeply beholden to Your Highness. Everything that you have given me is a lively work of art which it is a pleasure to see.

I am sending you a photograph of mine as a souvenir of our meeting. I am also venturing to send a copy of my last book—*The Discovery of India*.

I trust that Your Highness will recover your health soon and serve the cause of Nepal and her people which you have so much at heart. While you live in India you will be an honoured friend and guest and I hope that you will treat this ancient country as your own.

With all good wishes.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. Message to Australia¹

I send my greetings to the people of Australia. We live in a mad world which instead of solving any of its problems continually makes new ones. However mad it may be, we have to try our best to retain our sanity. For unless this is done, catastrophe will overwhelm us again and again as it had done in the past.

India seeks peace and friendship with all countries. But, inevitably, India's relations with the countries of South Asia and the Pacific will grow closer, for geography, defence and economics demand this closer collaboration. Australia and New Zealand, though far from India, come within this larger sphere of friendly cooperation. We shall welcome that and shall strive for it. We stand, as I believe Australia does, for democratic freedom, for human rights and for the ending of the political domination or economic exploitation of one nation or group of another. We should cooperate, therefore, for the extension of freedom, equality and social justice.

1. Recorded on 19 March 1948 for broadcast to Australia. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

12. Relations with Saudi Arabia¹

Maulana Azad came to see me today and told me that he had received information from various sources to the effect that some persons from Pakistan had been carrying on virulent propaganda against the Indian Union at Mecca. Mecca being an international centre where people congregate from many parts of the world, this propaganda has a bad effect. The question is how we can counteract it.

2. I should like to know what our present set-up is in the Hedjaz. I understand that there used to be a British Consul at Jeddah and an Indian assistant was attached to him to look after our pilgrims. The British Consul lived in Jeddah because no non-Muslim is allowed to live in Mecca. The *Haj* pilgrimage is not so important from our point of view now as it used to be as the great majority of these pilgrims will come from Pakistan, though no doubt there will still be many from India proper and we shall have to make some arrangements for them.

3. Maulana Azad informed me also that he had received a letter from Mr. St. John Philby,² the Adviser of King Ibn Saud,³ suggesting that we should have a representative in the Hedjaz and that the King was also desirous of having closer contacts. I think it would be advisable for us to have some such representative in Mecca rather than in Jeddah. Presumably, he would be a Consul. This matter should be looked into.

4. Have we anything to do now with the British representative in Jeddah? The sooner we dissociate our work from him the better.

5. In the event of any appointment having to be made at Mecca, Maulana Azad should be consulted. The person to be appointed must necessarily be a Muslim and must know Arabic as also English.

7. The *Haj* pilgrim traffic is at present dealt with by Commonwealth Relations. This whole business of the *Haj* will have to be reconsidered and reorganised in view of the partition. The question of our relation with the Hedjaz is something more than looking after the pilgrims.

1. Note to Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Wing, 23 March 1948. File No. 18-2/48/Haj, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Harry St. John B. Philby (1885-1960); joined I.C.S. 1907; served in the Punjab up to 1915; employed on political duties in Mesopotamia, 1915-17; Chief British Representative in Transjordan, 1921-24; converted to Islam in 1930 and settled down in Arabia; author of several books.
3. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (1880-1953); founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and was its ruler from 1932 till his death.

13. Trouble in Palestine¹

I presume you are asking Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai to represent us at the special meeting of the General Assembly to consider the Palestine issue. Some kind of instructions might be sent to him though some discretion should be given to him in the matter. India need not play any important rôle in this business. Nevertheless, India cannot be passive.

2. Sir B.N. Rau has sent me a note on Palestine² which he prepared when he was in New York during the last Assembly session. He had then shown this note to Weizmann,³ the Jewish leader, who had been rather attracted to it. Essentially the note is a half-way house between partition and some kind of federation. It is not an attractive solution, but in the present impasse any possible solution might be borne in mind. A copy of the note might be sent by air to Bajpai for his information.

3. It seems to me that the only correct approach is more or less in accordance with the line we took up at the last meeting of the General Assembly, that is, a federation with full autonomous units. If this general principle is accepted then it should not be difficult to work out the details. Perhaps any attempted solution of this kind should be limited to a certain number of years, say, ten, and then the matter can be reviewed afresh.

4. B.N. Rau's proposal, while accepting this general principle, inclines somewhat towards partition. Probably the Arabs would like the inclination the other way.

5. If the United Nations are to become trustees of Palestine for a fixed period, some arrangement of a federal autonomous character might be suggested to function under that trusteeship. All this is vague, but the general idea is that partition should be avoided and at the same time the largest measure of autonomy given to the Jewish and Arab parts. The city of Jerusalem would probably have to be treated in a special manner.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 4 April 1948. File No. 2(5)-UN/48, M.E.A., N.A.I.

2. The outline of plan for Palestine was finalised on 24 November 1947.

3. Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952); scientist and Zionist leader; Provisional President of Israel, 1948-49, and first President, 1949-52.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IV. French Possessions in India

1. To Rashid Ali Baig¹

New Delhi
12 January 1948

My dear Rashid,

You will hear formally from our Ministry. I am writing to you in addition. You know that certain negotiations are going on about the French possessions in India. The French Ambassador here has gone to Paris to discuss this matter. It is undesirable for any direct action of the like to take place in these possessions, namely, Pondicherry, Karaikal and Chandernagore while these negotiations are in progress. I understand that some trouble is brewing in Karaikal.

It is not right for us to intervene publicly or obtrusively in such matters. Nor would it be right for you to take any step in this direction, but it should be possible for you entirely informally and privately to give this advice to the people concerned. This should be done in a way to avoid any public mention of it in the press or otherwise. You can pay a visit to Karaikal as that is in your sphere of action and find out how matters are and convey a hint to some responsible people there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 15(4)-X/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I. Baig was Indian Consul-General in Pondicherry.

2. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
12 January 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

In a letter sent to you today I mentioned the fact that we were having conversations with the French Government about the future of French possessions in India. Monsieur Levi, the French Ambassador, has gone to Paris with certain proposals and I hope that the outcome will be satisfactory. It seems to me important that while these proposals are being discussed there should be no direct action movement in any of the French possessions in India. These possessions are Chandernagore, Pondicherry and Karaikal (not far from Pondicherry on the East Coast). There is some talk of direct action in Karaikal.

It is not possible for us to approach the people in these places directly.

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

I would be grateful if you could as Congress President help us in this business and suggest, privately of course, to the people of these French possessions that they should refrain from any direct or aggressive action pending our negotiations.² They can, of course, make any constitutional demands they like. Perhaps you would get in touch with the Provincial Congress Committees which might have some contacts in these possessions.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Rajendra Prasad took action as suggested. Nehru also wrote on similar lines to the Premiers of Madras and West Bengal.

3. Note to G.S. Bajpai¹

I am afraid the delay of five years is completely unreal.² In this rapidly changing India no Government has the power or authority to accept this. Any attempt to do so will be rejected not only by popular opinion but also by the people of the French establishments, who would take the law into their own hands.

1. 2 March 1948. File No. 15(4)-X/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. In his note of 1 March Bajpai had said that Daniel Levi, the French Ambassador, had stressed that it would be impossible for the French Government to hold consultations with the Government of India about the referendum in French India for another five years due to the uncertain political situation in France.

4. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
26 March 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have received the papers from the Administrative Council of Chandernagore which you have sent. I do not think your note, which you sent to the people of Chandernagore, need have emphasised our disapproval of their action, except insofar as it was rather inhuman to prevent the administrator from

1. File No. 15(10)-X/48. M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

going out.² The matter is full of difficulty and the French Government is behaving in a very sticky manner. The only attitude we can adopt in regard to Chandernagore is not to interfere either way unless there is some trouble on our borders or there is some actual inhumanity within Chandernagore.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. B.C Roy had in a note on 21 March 1948 expressed the Government of India's disapproval of the "aggressive steps" taken by the local population to secure Chandannagore's accession to the Indian Union.

5. Resistance in Chandannagore¹

I have consulted the Home Minister and he and I are in agreement about the undesirability of our taking any action of the kind indicated in Chandernagore.² What the treaty of 1814 is I do not know—it should be unearthed and examined—but, in any event, this ancient treaty cannot govern our actions now. Our general policy has been, and, in existing circumstances, must continue to be, to avoid acting as the policemen of the French administration in Chandernagore &c. This does not preclude our taking preventive action on the borders or even, on an emergency, entering Chandernagore to prevent inhumanity. But to go into search for arms and to arrest people would certainly go beyond this. It may be that Communists are taking the lead in Chandernagore but the fact remains that the movement might be considered a liberation movement and it would be improper for us to aid in suppressing it.

I have spoken to Dr. B.C. Roy on the telephone and made clear to him that his Government should take no action in Chandernagore. He should only have the borders guarded.

1. Note to his Principal Private Secretary, 27 March 1948. File No.15(10)-X/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. The French Consul-General in Calcutta asked the Government of India to take action against those alleged to have collected a large store of arms and ammunition in Chandannagore as he feared that they would "forcibly take over the administration". He wished the West Bengal police to enter Chandannagore in search of unlicensed arms and for arrest of the offenders. He thought this would be in accord with the treaty of peace agreed after the Napoleonic war in 1814 as well as past practice.

12

MISCELLANEOUS

I. General

1. To John Haynes Holmes¹

Lucknow

1 January 1948

My dear Dr. Holmes,

Thank you for your letter of December 28th. I am disappointed at not being able to meet you again. I had been looking forward for at least one more meeting before you left India.² Our first meeting in Delhi left me with a desire to see you again. However I quite appreciate that it was difficult for you to return to Delhi.

It is very good of you to write, as you have done, about me.³ Need I say that I feel greatly encouraged and heartened by what you have written? We have had difficult times and no doubt we shall continue to have an abundance of problems and difficulties. But a certain faith in the future carries us on.

I have read with great pleasure reports of the speeches you have delivered in India.⁴

With all good wishes to you for the New Year.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Holmes left India on 30 December 1947.
3. Holmes had been impressed by the confidence, admiration and loyalty which the people of India had bestowed on Nehru, and praised his leadership.
4. Holmes, who had been in India from early October 1947 as a Rabindranath Tagore Memorial Visiting Professor, had advocated in his lectures world unity based on a just economic system.

2. To Harold Laski¹

New Delhi

10 January 1948

My dear Laski,

I received a few days ago your letter of 17th December addressed to Krishna Menon. You mentioned in this that something should be done in recognition of the gallant services to the cause of Indian freedom by Reginald Sorenson. I quite agree with you but I am not clear as to what we can do at this end.

1. J.N. Collection.

Of course, I will gladly pay a tribute to Sorenson on a suitable occasion. If you can suggest any other method I shall be grateful.

Ever yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To the Maharaja of Patiala¹

New Delhi
27 January 1948

Dear Maharaja Saheb,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th January. The recording is of Tagore's famous song *Jana Gana Mana*. I enclose a Hindi script of the first paragraph.

We have received a musical score for an orchestra from New York. If I could get a copy I shall have it sent to you.

What we have to evolve is something short and yet giving the essential features of the song and tune. There is too much repetition about the whole thing and it is too long.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

4. To Zakir Husain¹

New Delhi
16 February 1948

My dear Zakir Husain,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th February.

Need I tell you that the Jamia² is near to my heart and that I attach great value to the work it has done? I have no doubt whatever that this work

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Jamia Millia Islamia was set up in 1920 at Aligarh as a response to Mahatma Gandhi's call for the boycott of educational institutions run by the Government. It was later shifted to Delhi and developed into a nationalist university under the guidance of Zakir Husain. It adopted the "project method" in learning community approach to living.

has meaning and significance and must be carried on in the spirit in which it was originally undertaken. Few institutions succeed in retaining for long the impress of the ideal that gave them birth. They tend to become humdrum affairs, perhaps a little more efficient, but without the enthusiasm that gives life. The Jamia, more I think than any other institution that I can think of, retained some of the old inspiration and enthusiasm. That was of course due to you and to the noble band of workers that surrounded you.

Now that Gandhiji has gone a very special responsibility attaches to us to carry on the work he was interested in and the Jamia was an important part of this work. Whatever I can do for Jamia, I shall endeavour to do. The world seems very dark, dismal and dreary place, full of people with wrong urges or no urge at all, living their lives trivially and without any significance. All the more therefore we seek the few sanctuaries and causes and try to derive sustenance from them. I feel overwhelmed, not so much by the great problems facing us, but rather, by the affection and comradeship of friends who expect so much from me. A sense of utter humility seizes me in the face of this faith and trust.

I have received Rs. 500/- which you have sent me on behalf of Hafiz Fayaz Ahmed of Panipat.³ Will you kindly thank him on my behalf? I am sending this to Dr. Rajendra Prasad for the Gandhi National Memorial Fund.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Hafiz Fayaz Ahmed, a senior colleague of Zakir Husain, contributed the amount to the Gandhi National Memorial Fund.

5. Milk for Children First¹

I propose to commend to the Food Minister² to make a law which would enable provision of milk to children first and, if any left over, then to others.

The cow in India is venerated a great deal but little attention is paid to her upkeep, unlike in Europe. I feel that it will be good for this country if people venerated the cow a little less and paid more attention to her upkeep.

1. Remarks at the Seventh All India Cattle Show, New Delhi, 25 February 1948. From *National Herald*, 27 February 1948.
2. Jairamdas Doulatram.

This is probably the first cattle show I am attending in India although I had attended such shows in Europe.

6. Protection of Lions¹

I have long been interested in the preservation of lions in India. They exist only in Kathiawar now in the Gir Forest and it would be a great pity if they were allowed to be shot or otherwise to suffer extinction. I trust that the Regional Commissioner of Kathiawar and the Administrator of Junagadh will be specially asked to issue such directions as may be considered necessary for the protection of lions and that no shooting of them should be permitted.²

1. Note to Commonwealth Relations Department, 25 February 1948. File No.2(395)/49-PMS.
2. Earlier, on 13 January 1948, in a letter to the High Commissioner of India in London, the Duke of Devonshire, President, Society for Preservation of Fauna of the Empire, had appealed for a sanctuary of lions in the Gir Forest, supply of deer as food, and a ban on shooting from motor cars. He had wanted this matter to be brought to the Prime Minister's notice.

7. To Henry Charles Usborne¹

New Delhi
6 April 1948

Dear Mr. Usborne,²

Thank you for your letter of the 24th March.

I have thought over your proposal for a crusade for world government. I have no doubt at all that only a world authority can put an end to the national and other conflicts which continually threaten us and often lead us to repeated disasters. If that is so, then obviously some kind of a crusade for it is necessary. Indeed, the tempo of events is so fast now that even the period mentioned by you and your pamphlet appears to be too far off.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. (b. 1909); Labour Member of Parliament, 1945-59.

I would gladly associate myself with any effective steps that might be taken to this end. I am not quite clear, however, how far the steps envisaged will lead to that end. And yet something has got to be done and to remain passive is to court disaster.

I have, however, to face a difficulty. As one holding a responsible office in the Government of India it is a little difficult for me to associate myself with non-official organisations of this character. Possibly at a later stage the Government of India itself might be able to associate itself. I cannot, of course, 'speak for Pakistan. Thus it may be possible that, as you suggest, India may be able to join officially the constituent assembly in 1950. It may even be possible to have some kind of national ballot in 1950 for this purpose. But 1950 seems a long way off at present and all manner of things are likely to happen before it.

I have little doubt that the great majority of our people would welcome the idea of international cooperation or some kind of a world government. But it is important that they must not think of this as a reversion to European or any other domination. You will appreciate that there is a strong feeling on this point. Even the United Nations, as at present organised and functioning, represents far more European and American interests than the rest of the world.

Our new Constitution is likely to be finally passed by August next. After that it will take many months and possibly a year before general elections on an adult franchise basis can be held.

* We would welcome your visit to Delhi at any time. But I doubt if this would lead to anything very definite in the near future.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. To Asaf Ali¹

New Delhi

10 January 1948

My dear Asaf,

I have not written to you for a very long time and I have not had any letter from you either for some time past. Life has become one continuous tussle with crises. We have become rather tough because of this and perhaps a little callous to human sufferings. Just when we think that we have turned a corner and come to grips with one problem, half a dozen new ones take its place.

At present we have a little war going on in Kashmir and tremendous tension all over India because of possible developments. We have the reference to the Security Council on this issue. We have the little problem of rehabilitating a few million refugees. Delhi has nearly half a million of them and it passes the wit of man to fix them up quickly. So in Delhi we live in a state of extreme mental discomfort not to mention other difficulties. In Karachi there has been a big blowup and this is still continuing. A large number of persons have been killed and a vast number of houses looted. Over and above all this is, of course, the economic problem which essentially is more important than anything else.

This is the kind of life we have to lead and still we are hardened and problems carry on rather shamelessly.

I shall not write to you much about these conditions because that is too long a story and I have not the heart to write, or indeed the time.

I wanted to write to you specially about your tenure of the embassy in Washington. When you went there we told you that you would be expected to remain there for about a year. In fact practically all our appointments have been for a year because we did not want to tie ourselves down to any longer period in these changing times. Your year will be up in another six weeks or so and I have been giving a great deal of thought to this matter. I have come to the conclusion that we would better stick to the period fixed.

That would mean your coming back to India after this term of one year is over. Roughly that means sometime in March. The exact date, of course, can be made to suit your convenience.²

As you know Ratan is going to the Washington Embassy as Counsellor. He has been delayed here for various reasons but will soon be leaving. He will not go straight to the U.S.A. as we are entrusting him with some work *en route* in connection with the development of our air services. He will

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Asaf Ali returned in February.

spend some little time in Cairo, London and perhaps some other places and enter into agreements specially for the coming air services which we hope to inaugurate between India and Europe.

I should like Ratan to reach Washington sometime before you leave.

I do not know what Aruna's programme is or indeed where she is at the present moment. We have had no news from her.

Sarup was here for about three weeks and then went to Moscow where she is enjoying —30° of frost.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
28 January 1948

My dear Deshmukh,

I have been somewhat distressed to learn that you are thinking of retiring from the Reserve Bank and in fact of leaving the country. I am told that you have come to this decision chiefly because of personal and domestic reasons. It is difficult for me to say much when such reasons influence a decision. But nevertheless it is a bit of a shock to feel that you might be leaving. I need not tell you how much all of us, more specially I, have valued your work in the Reserve Bank. Even if you leave the Reserve Bank, which I of course do not want you to do, you are too valuable a person for the country to lose. You know well how difficult it is for us to find first-rate men for any important work. Your departure would make a difference. If I could possibly induce you to stay on, I would feel happy. There is no reason why you should not take leave for a few months and go away and return again.

Many of us are very tired and have our own personal and domestic difficulties. But there is no escape for us and we have to carry on.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

3. To Dhirajlal Desai¹

New Delhi

10 February 1948

My dear Dhiru,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th February which I appreciate very much. We have a hard task before us, but we shall have to face it like men. Wherever we may be and whatever type of work we may have to do, the ultimate aim will be the same, i.e., to serve India to the best of our ability.

My love to Madhuri.²

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Wife of Dhirajlal Desai.

4. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi

21 February 1948

Nan dear,

I have just received your two letters dated 11th and 12th February—one personal and the other more or less formal. I found both of them very interesting reading. I hope you will continue to send fortnightly letters about various trends in the U.S.S.R.²

About your personal letter, I agree with you in much that you say. I am convinced, however, that you should do a full-sized job wherever you may be and not think in terms of looking after me.³ It seems to me that a good part of the population of India are eager to look after me. I would love to have you here. But the kind of work you have to do abroad cannot easily be entrusted to someone else.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. After going through the fortnightly letters of Nehru to Premiers of Provinces, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, in her letter of 12 February, informed Nehru of her decision to give information every fortnight about the political trends in Russia which did not always find their way into the press.

3. She had expressed a desire to live nearer Nehru and to look after his personal needs.

I have already informed Asaf Ali that he should come back after his year was over. On his suggestion that he might stay a month or so more I agreed to his returning in April next. We have not yet thought of his successor and I confess that I cannot find any suitable person. We must make up our minds before very long. It does not much matter if there is a small gap of two or three weeks. Ratan is there as Counsellor and he can function as *Charge d'Affaires*. But our new Ambassador must reach there in May.

Asaf, as you know, had an idea that he should go to London and that Krishna Menon should go to Moscow and you to Washington. But I do not think Asaf would fit in in London or Moscow, and I do not want to remove Krishna Menon either from his present post. What Asaf will do is another problem, an almost insoluble one. He is very depressed and talks about settling down in England which is absurd. I have told him to come back here after a little holiday in England if he likes.

About you I have no doubt that you should stay on in Moscow for some time. I cannot fix any date as events happen rapidly nowadays. I am sure that you would do excellent work in the U.S.A. But if you left Moscow, I would not know who to send there. Probably Moscow is our most difficult assignment. We shall, therefore, wait and see, at any rate, till August or September next. You know that the U.N. Assembly is meeting in Paris this time.

I am beginning to think that before this year is out, rather big developments are likely to take place in the international sphere. The pace of events is rapid and the prospect of war grows nearer.

Owing to various happenings, I have not seen much of the Russian Ambassador here. I invited him and his wife to dinner once. He appears to be a typical Russian diplomat, pleasant enough but rather keeping to himself. The Russian Embassy's attitude is more or less what you find in Moscow. They are non-committal and throw out hints of our making up our minds and not remaining neutral. In spite of these reactions in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., I am quite clear in my mind that we should not line up closely with either. I am sure this policy will pay us in the long run and will get us the respect of others.

With love from

Jawahar

5. To Fenner Brockway¹

New Delhi

27 February 1948

Dear Fenner,

Thank you for your letter of the 29th January.

I am afraid it is difficult for me, situated as I am, to associate myself with various conferences and the like. Naturally, I am greatly interested in every attempt to bring together socialistic and advanced elements. I am convinced also that the passing of political imperialism should be followed now by the ending of economic imperialism. I feel particularly anxious about the people of Africa who have a hard task ahead. It is quite possible that Asia having gained a large measure of political independence imperialist powers may find scope in Africa now.

I feel, however, that these conferences somehow do not make much difference to the course of events which move on like some Greek tragedy to its inevitable denouement. I have got tremendously difficult problems to face here and I feel it would be presumptuous of me to meddle in others' affairs till I see some light in India.

Yours,

Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

6. To H.S. Suhrawardy¹

New Delhi

3 March 1948

My dear Suhrawardy,

I have just received your letter of the 28th February.

I am afraid it is difficult for me to advise you. I do not presume to think that I am competent to advise others; it is difficult enough for me to chalk out any plans for myself.

Besides, the point you raise is by no means an easy one. As a citizen of the Indian Union, you can hardly take part in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and yet, as you yourself say, you might be able to do good work

1. J.N. Collection.

there. In the balance, perhaps, it is desirable for you to go to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly for the time being but it is for you to decide.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
25 March 1948

Nan dear,

I have long been thinking of writing to you, but inevitably I postponed it and waited for some leisure moment which never comes. Now that Tara is leaving tomorrow I am at last sitting down to this letter.

I do not know quite where to begin or how to carry on. For a multitude of events have taken place and there are so many problems that I grow callous about them.

But first of all I must tell you that I am sending a letter to Aleksandra Kollontai² as suggested by you. Please forward it on to her.

Ever since Bapu's death the Delhi police have made up their minds to treat me as some kind of a prisoner. The security measures for my safety that they have been taking are fantastic in the extreme. To some extent this applies to all ministers, but more specially to me and to Sardar Patel. I shall not tell you all about this because the story would be too long. Perhaps Tara might enlighten you. I put up with this kind of thing for a few weeks. But then I protested vigorously and succeeded in some measure. Even so, my house resembles a kind of armed camp. If I go out for dinner somewhere my poor host's house is previously visited by some police officer and presumably they look under the chairs and tables and inside the cupboards in case some dangerous person is lurking there.

Imagine me living in this way. Fortunately, I have been spending my whole day in my office or the Assembly. And so this business of being guarded has not come in my way so much as it might otherwise have done. When

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Aleksandra Mikhailovna Kollontai (1872-1952); Russian revolutionary, diplomat and novelist; active in revolutionary circles and forced to flee abroad in 1908; visited U.S. and edited, with Bukharin, the Communist daily, *Novy Mir* (New World), in New York City, 1916; returned to Russia in 1917; people's commissar for social welfare, 1920; minister to Norway, 1923, and to Sweden, 1930-35; wrote extensively on social questions.

I visited Allahabad for a day last month, Anand Bhawan also became an armed camp and nobody could enter the compound without a permit. Sometimes, as during my recent visit to Vizag,³ I cursed the police and ran into the crowd.

The odd thing is that probably I am more widely popular now than I have ever been, previously, and what is more surprising, people generally accept this business of security with goodwill. Indeed, they are frightfully anxious that I should take no risks. Anyhow, life in these conditions is becoming an intolerable nuisance. There is one slight consolation and that is, that I have a little more peace in my house than I used to. Ever since August, that is, soon after you left and the big troubles started in the Punjab, crowds of people infested this house from morn till evening. Now that does not happen or rather, if the crowds come, they are intercepted at the gate where there are reception tents and other people deal with them, usually inadequately.

Everybody seems to be anxious to look after me as if I was some kind of a cripple. Indu secretly conspires with Tara and Betty so that when she is away others should be here. Betty was here for some time and will be coming back again within a few days. Indu is in Allahabad. She has not been well at all and has been getting a daily rise in temperature. Her lungs, etc., were found to be in a fairly good condition. But she continues to be very anaemic in spite of all manner of tonics. She has been under some kind of treatment under Vatsala⁴ in Allahabad. From there she will go to Lucknow and gradually drift to Delhi next month. I think she ought to go to the hills for the sake of her own health. But she is under the impression that duty demands her presence by my side. And so she has made no arrangements at all to go to the hills. Personally, of course, I am no believer in the hills except for special cases. At Indira's suggestion we are installing an air-conditioner in the house. By the way we have got a new room in the house now, an additional one which is quite good. It is on the first floor.

Tara is going off tomorrow with Madame Friedman⁵ and the two servants. Rajeshwar Dayal⁶ and his wife went yesterday, though they will reach Moscow after Tara. Rita's passage has been booked also. When

3. Nehru visited Vishakhapatnam on 14 March 1948.

4. Vatsala Samant, Medical Superintendent of the Kamala Nehru Memorial Hospital.

5. Wife of Maurice Friedman, a Polish engineer who became a Hindu and was known as Swami Bharatananda.

6. (b.1909); joined I.C.S. 1933; Home Secretary, U.P., 1946-48; Counsellor and *Charge d'Affaires*, Embassy of India, Moscow, 1948-49; Permanent Representative to the U.N., 1952-54; Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1954-58; High Commissioner to Pakistan, 1958-62; Special Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, 1962-65; Commonwealth Secretary, February-May 1965; Ambassador to France, 1965-67; Foreign Secretary, August 1967-68.

she arrived here a few days ago the first question she put to me was whether she should go to Moscow or not. I had seen your letter to Mathai. I told her that it was for her to decide. She said that while she liked to go, she was not quite sure that it would be desirable for her to go now. It appeared to me that she was a little hesitant and I did not press her. In fact I suggested that if she felt that way, she had better not go just now. But I made it a condition that she should stay in Delhi and not in Lucknow, a condition which she accepted with alacrity. I do not quite know why you put her in Government House; Lucknow. It is a good place for a while but not for too long. I realise, of course, that 17 York Road is very far from being an ideal place for any human being, much less a young girl.

Tara has been here for some months and I fear that she has had a thin time so far as I am concerned. It has been a bad time, of course, for Delhi with all these terrible happenings in the Punjab and roundabout. I have been overwhelmed with work and worry and I can hardly think of anything else. And so I have been the poorest of companions for Tara. I wish I had had a little more leisure to talk to her and to get to know her better. I like her very much and I think she has something solid about her, though she is apt to function rather casually. She has had a heavy and difficult time here partly because of the troubles we have had and partly because of my own preoccupations. The change from America to this troubled India, with millions of people uprooted, was too great and I fear she could not adjust herself, as indeed very few persons can, to these extraordinary and tragic happenings. She resented somewhat that the world should go wrong just at this time when she had come home. She disliked naturally the public marketplace atmosphere of 17 York Road, where there was little privacy and where the unhappy and the miserable came in such large numbers. One has to react to this kind of thing either favourably or most unfavourably. There is no middle course. Tara, I fear, was more repelled by much that she saw. In any event, she felt that she did not fit in with this kind of life. Above all, what she wanted was a quiet, settled existence and she could have neither here. Having been away for several years in America, she does not realise perhaps that there has been no peace or quiet or settled existence in our lives for the last thirty years at least, except when we have been in prison. What she missed therefore was something which we all have had to do without and not only we but vast numbers of others in India. Of course, during the last few months the upheavals that have occurred have uprooted millions of people and to talk of security and settled existence has become a mockery.

I am sorry, as I have said, that I have had little opportunity to have long talks with Tara. The fault has been mine. I have been out the whole day and working till late at night and I have had little time to talk to anyone in the quiet, unhurried way which is necessary for a proper talk. My mind has been functioning too intensely and it became closed to other matters.

I am glad Tara is going to Moscow for that will give her an opportunity to develop herself in some other ways. I cannot say whether the atmosphere of Moscow will fit in with her temperament or not.

I suppose you know that we have sent the brass doors from the Birla House as well as the *shamadans* to you by the Russian freighter. I do not know when you will get them, if at all. Talking of the Birla House there has been great feeling and great resentment in Delhi. It was presumed immediately after Babu's death that the Birla House, where he had died, would be gifted to the nation. Indeed, *The Hindustan Times* announced this fact.⁷ But Ghanshyam Das stoutly resists any such suggestion and I have had the greatest difficulty in stopping questions and resolutions in the Assembly over this matter.

Sardar Patel suddenly had a heart attack about three weeks ago. It was not a severe attack. But at his age it was dangerous enough. He has recovered well. But he is still confined to his bed and must rest for another six weeks or two months. This adds to my difficulties.

You must have followed the strange transformation that is happening in India in regard to the Indian States. It is really extraordinary how the map of India has changed during the past six months. Out of the 600 and odd States there are at present only about 30 units left and probably this number will be further reduced. I wonder how Ranjit would have felt about it, for some of his friends have been swept away. Not that any ruler had been done badly out of the transaction, for he gets a good pension, sometimes much, too much. I had a letter the other day from Saranga.⁸ All this has taken place chiefly because of popular upheavals or the possibility of upheavals. The removal of the British power suddenly made the rulers helpless. We were not going to help them against the people. Indeed, our sympathies were with the people. And so with amazing rapidity they all fell into line. Some of them gave trouble. Bhopal is likely to give us trouble in future. Patiala, though outwardly friendly, is also a difficult problem.

In effect, the States problem is marching towards solution with the exception of the two major States, Hyderabad and Kashmir. Hyderabad, of course, cannot possibly run away from India or from the Indian Union. But the people who have power there are a lot of bigoted fools and I fear they will do much mischief.

As for Kashmir the proceedings in the Security Council drag on. As before the British representative works against us, even though Attlee and Cripps gave us definitely to understand that he would not do so. There has been some change for the better in the attitude of some other countries including the U.S. But I myself do not see any favourable outcome in the Security

7. On 8 February 1948.

8. Sarangarh, a princely State in central India. Its ruler then was Jawahir Singh (b. 1888) who ascended to the throne in August 1890.

Council. The United Nations seems to be fading away. The recent action of the U.S. Government in going back on partition in Palestine seems to me to have effectively sabotaged the United Nations.⁹ I rather doubt if they will survive this blow. It is astonishing how naive the Americans are in their foreign policy. It is only their money and their power that carries them through, not their intelligence or any other quality.

I have had an intimation from President Truman that he would like to invite me. Attlee has been inviting me repeatedly. To both of them I have said that I would gladly come, and this is perfectly true, but just when I cannot say. It is not wholly unlikely that I might pay a brief visit to America and England, though I do not myself see how I can do it for some time to come. If I go there I should like to pay you a short visit in Moscow.

The Mountbattens will be going to Naini Tal. Having heard of Kalin, Edwina wants to pay a visit to it. I do not think they will have the time for it.

H.V.R. Iengar must have written to you about the activities of the Soviet Delegates to the Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta. Those activities were not good. I think we shall have to be careful in future about the issue of visas. Personally I am all in favour of the generous policy and of even taking risks. But some care has to be exercised.

I have dictated for a considerable time and yet I have hardly said anything worthwhile about any important matter. Perhaps it is as well I shall not go on any longer with this letter for it is late now. It was my intention to write to Chand and to thank her for her letters which I have loved receiving. For the present she can share this letter with you.

With love from

Jawahar

9. Until early March 1948, the United States had supported the proposal of partition. But, on 19 March, the U.S. delegate to the Security Council, without previous warning to the British, proposed that the partition plan should be temporarily dropped and and that, instead, the United Nations should exercise a temporary trusteeship over Palestine.

8. To Aleksandra Mikhailovna Kollontai¹

New Delhi

25 March 1948

Dear Madam Kollontai,

It was good of you to send a message of condolence on the death of Mahatma Gandhi and I appreciated it very much.

1. J.N. Collection.

My sister, Madame Pandit, has written to me about you on several occasions and told me of your courtesy and friendliness to her. I am grateful to you for this. I have appreciated having news of you through her, as I have long been a distant admirer of yours. I remember reading about you more than a quarter of a century ago and ever since I have welcomed any news of you that has come my way. I hope that I may have the pleasure of meeting you. Perhaps I may be able to visit Moscow and then I hope to have that privilege.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
1 April 1948

Nan dear,

I have just received your letter of the 18th March. Your account of conditions in Moscow as between the Soviet authorities and the foreign missions is interesting but also distressing.

Why are people so full of hatred for each other? We have had a vivid example of this in India, that is, between Pakistan and India. It is the same or worse between Russia and America now. Hatred and cruelty, I think, ultimately come from fear. Fear is the most dangerous of companions for it leads to all manner of evil consequences. I suppose that both the Americans and the Russians are suffering from some kind of a fear complex in spite of their words and their strength. The man or the nation that rises above fear can ultimately, I think, master any situation. So was Gandhi.

I do not know where all this is leading to. I go on saying, and I believe in it largely, that there will be no war in the near future. And yet if there is so much bitterness and hatred, it will come up in war and end in destruction. All we can do is to keep our minds and hearts as clear as possible. I suppose in dealing with Russia one should never forget the whole background of the last thirty years. They have an accumulation of suspicion and hatred against some countries. Their whole psychology seems to differ from that of western Europe and America. Perhaps we Indians can understand it a little better than Americans and yet most of us have been conditioned in the western European atmosphere.

Why should I blame the Russians or the Americans when we have to face similar problems on a lower level in India? I am worried about develop-

ments in East Bengal and Hyderabad. Recently there was a big communal riot in Godhra² in the Panch Mahal district of Gujarat. It was started by the Sind refugees and, though the casualties were not many, the small town has been destroyed by fire, thus adding to our many difficulties. I live in apprehension of something big happening in East Bengal or Hyderabad. When will we be out of the woods I wonder !

I enjoyed your previous letter very much and more especially the letter of the Austrian to the Hungarian Ambassador. That was a masterpiece.

I do not know where Tara is now. I was told she was likely to be held up in Paris owing to strike by the Swedish airlines. Krishna Menon suggested her going to London and I told him I have no objection.

Regarding our request for Indian military officers to go to Moscow for some kind of language training, I rather doubt if this is a suitable time for this venture.

Rita and Betty came here from Bombay yesterday. Indira is still in Lucknow. Sarojini is again more ill than usual and there is no one to look after her and she refuses to have any person. Padmaja is in Hyderabad.

Delhi grows warm and fans are sometimes necessary.

Love to you and Chand.

Your loving brother,
Jawahar

2. On 25 March 1948 communal disturbances broke out in Godhra in Bombay province owing to the stabbing of a Hindu refugee in a Muslim locality.

10. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
6 April 1948

My dear Krishna,

I have received your letter in which you talk about your salary² and about the mental conflict that you appear to be having. I can quite understand that and I suppose most of us in some measure have to put up with that conflict. I know no way of escape from it. The times are out of joint and Gandhiji's death has shaken us all. I hope that you will remember that we rely upon you and trust you completely. If I disagree with you or do not like anything that you might do, I shall let you know. So do not worry about this matter. But remember that many things are done inevitably without

¹ V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

² Krishna Menon had informed Nehru on 29 March 1948 that he did not wish his salary to exceed £650 a year although about £3,000 a year was customary.

my knowledge or without my ability to stop or change them. The burden of work is very heavy and it is impossible to deal with every matter.

I shall probably write to you at greater length sometime later. At present this is just a brief letter of acknowledgment and a little more.

I think I informed you that Richard Walsh is bringing out a book which he calls *Nehru on Gandhi* or by some such name.³ This consists of extracts from my writings and speeches about Gandhiji. I have told him that the royalties will go to the Gandhi Memorial Fund. He asked me if you would care to have such a book published in England, also about translations I referred him to you.

I received many enquiries about translations of my books, specially in French. I wonder if you are getting on with them. Could you not utilise Louise Morain for the French translation? I think she would do it rather well and she would certainly put her heart into it.

From all accounts A.C.N. Nambiar is having a very difficult time and continues to be unwell. Even more than physical ill health is his mental sickness. I do not know what to do about him. Perhaps our Legation at Berne might be able to arrange some work for him. Meanwhile, I suggest that you might send him some money from my personal account. I do not know what sum to suggest. But for the present this might be £50/.

About your salary, I do not know how our rules can be twisted to meet your requirements. I have personally no objection to what you say. I shall enquire.

Indira has been unwell for some time. She is still in Lucknow.

I had a personal letter from Attlee⁴ a few days ago in which he discussed the question of India remaining in the Commonwealth. I shall send him a reply soon and send you a copy of both letters. My reply will on the whole be non-committal. Indeed, I am not in a position to commit myself or anybody else on this subject. There are various advantages in remaining in the Commonwealth and there are equally obvious disadvantages. General public opinion will certainly favour our going out of the Commonwealth. In the balance I am myself inclined to think that this would be best. But I do not wish to make up my mind till the time comes for it. Mountbatten, of course, is anxious and eager about this matter.

In the army here we have practically removed all Britishers from command posts. We are however continuing Bucher as Commander in-Chief for some months longer. There is a lot of jealousy among our senior Indian officers, many of whom have been rapidly promoted.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Published in 1948 by J. Day & Co., New York.

4. On 11 March 1948 Attlee suggested that India remain in the Commonwealth and accept common allegiance to the Crown.

11. To Dhirajlal Desai¹

New Delhi
6 April 1948

My dear Dhiru,

I had your letter from Rome and I have also had news about you since then from a variety of sources. I hope you have settled down now. We should like you to send us appraisements of the general European situation as viewed from Switzerland. The situation appears to be rapidly deteriorating and we want to keep in touch with it.

Among those who have written to me about meeting you have been Madame Louise Morain and A.C.N. Nambiar. Both of them can be of considerable help to you and I hope you will utilise their services insofar as you can. I am particularly anxious about Nambiar who is a very decent person and who has suffered a lot during the last few years. I should like you to think how you can utilise him in the Legation and then to write to us on the subject. As I have not met him for ten years now it is a little difficult for me to make any constructive suggestion.

You will remember that I spoke to you about Dr. Ghosh who told us that he had a fine mansion somewhere near Montreux, which he called Hind Azad House. Could you find out something about him and about this house of his? It is rather an odd story and I should like to know more about it.

Yours affly.,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

12. To A.C.N. Nambiar¹

New Delhi
6 April 1948

My dear Nanu,

I have your letter of the 6th March. I have also received two or three letters from you during the past many months. I handed them over to Indu or Feroze and expected them to acknowledge them. I am sorry that apparently all of us failed to do so. But you will realise the kind of life I have been leading here and the extreme difficulty of writing letters.

1. A.C.N. Nambiar Papers, N.M.M.I.

Indu has not been well. She is at present at Lucknow. So is Feroze. I am not in touch with the *National Herald*, though I am, of course, interested in it still, so when your letter came about the *Herald* I had it forwarded to the Editor hoping that he would deal with it.

I am glad that you have met Desai. I asked him specially to meet you. If it is possible for you to work with him it will give me considerable pleasure.

I am sorry that your health continues to give you trouble. I wish I could do something in the matter. As you know I have long been of opinion that you should at least pay a visit to India, though it is true that India is a country full of difficulties at present. You have been away for so long that it must be very difficult for you to have a picture of India as she is. It is for you to judge. Perhaps it is as well that you stay on in Switzerland for the present. With the opening of our Legation there you should be able to keep in greater touch with India.

You need not address me formally. The only change that has come in me, or the principal one, is that I am older and sadder. But that, I suppose, is a change that is common to all of us.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. To Marie Romain Rolland¹

New Delhi
6 April 1948

Dear Madame,

Thank you for your letter of the 13th March.

Many of us were in prison when the news of the death of your illustrious husband² reached us. His passing away grieved us greatly and I wanted to communicate with you, but this was not possible under the jail rules.

I am very glad to learn that you, your sister-in-law³ and other friends have started an "Association des Amis de Romain Rolland".⁴ And there must be a very large number of friends and admirers of Romain Rolland who will welcome this, and who will value a collection of his letters and other writings.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Romain Rolland died in 1944.
3. Madeleine Rolland.
4. Association of Romain Rolland's Friends.

I would gladly send you any letters of his in my possession. But it is not easy for me to find them. I did not have many letters from him and during the past few years none at all. The few letters that I might have are old ones. Unfortunately, because of my repeated visits to prison, my papers have partly got lost and are partly in such a condition that it is very difficult to find anything. I shall, however, remember your suggestion and as soon as I can find any of his letters, I shall send them to you.

I am grateful to you for the telegram you sent me on the death of Mahatma Gandhi. Accept, dear Madame, my regards and believe me,

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

Note to Dorothy Norman¹

Below is an English translation of a letter which Gandhiji sent me. The original is in Hindi. It was written on the day he broke his fast which had already lasted a number of days and which was undertaken to indicate his unhappiness at the communal tension in Delhi.

I was rather upset at events in Delhi as well as Gandhiji's fast and for a day or two I did not take any food. This was not a regular fast but rather personal reaction to events which hardly anyone knew. Somehow, Gandhiji got to know of it and hence his advice to me to put an end to it.

The reference to a "jewel of India" is a pun on my name Jawahar which means jewel.²

This was the last letter [Gandhiji] wrote to me. Twelve days later, on January 30th 1948, he died at the hands of an assassin.

"My dear Jawaharlal,

Give up your fast. . . .³ May you live long and continue to be the jewel of India!

Blessings from
Bapu"

1. Undated. Nehru wrote this note to Dorothy Norman, an American journalist and friend of the Nehru family, when she was collecting material for her book, *Nehru, The First Sixty Years*, published in New York in 1965. This note is printed on pp. 363-364 of the second volume of this book.
2. Mahatma Gandhi described Nehru as a jewel on many occasions. On his birthday in 1944, in a cable to Krishna Menon, he called him "a jewel among men". On 22 June 1946, at a prayer meeting he said, "You must be all curious to have news of India's jewel. . . ."
3. Omission in the source. For the full text see *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. XC, p. 449.

GLOSSARY

Amavas	the last day of the fortnight when the moon is waning
Andhra desh	Andhra province
Asthi	ashes after cremation
Bania rule	rule of the business class
Bhangi	scavenger
Dhobi	washerman
Durgah	tomb of a Muslim saint
Gurdwara	Sikh temple
Haj	pilgrimage to Mecca
Imambara	religious place of Shia Muslims
Inquilab Zindabad	long live revolution
Jai Hind	victory to India
Jihad	holy war waged by Muslims
Mela	fair
Mohalla	locality
Mullick	village headman
Murdabad	'death to'
Pawindas	nomads of Afghanistan
Rabi	spring harvest
Sanchalak	organiser
Senapati	commander-in-chief
Shamadan	lampstand
Shariat	injunctions of Quran
Thana	police station
Triveni	the confluence of the three rivers, the Ganga, the Yamuna and the Saraswati, at Allahabad
Vasant day (Vasant Panchami)	fifth day of the eleventh month of the Hindu calendar when the moon is waxing

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